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The JOURNAL of the UNITED SERVICE Institution of INDIA

CONTENTS

Secretary's Notes. Editorial.

1. The historical background of the "Collectivization" of agriculture in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by "LEDSAM"
2. The Defence of Ports, Part II, by "MADEIRA."
3. The Armies of Malaysia and Indo-China, by Major T. A. Lowe, D.S.O., M.C.
4. Frontier Cantonment Life in the days of Lake and Wellesley, by Colonel E. B. Maunsell.
5. Drill—A Plea for a revival of the Drill Spirit, by an Indian Infantry Company Commander.
6. My Manx Camel Corps, by Lt.-Colonel C.G. Lloyd, C.I.E., M.C.
7. The £. s. d. of a Fox Hunting Holiday, by P. C. Pratt.
8. Close Support of Infantry—An Infantry Officer's Point of View, by Captain D. McK. Kennelly.
9. Some Thoughts on Burma, by Captain A. G. Fuller.
10. More Musings about Administration versus Training, by Major C. W. Sanders.

Letters to the Editor. Military Notes. Reviews.



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UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Rules of Membership.

ALL Officers of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Colonial Forces, and of the Auxiliary Force, India, and Gazetted Government Officers shall be entitled to become members without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and annual subscription.

The Council shall have the power of admitting as honorary members, the members of the Diplomatic Corps, foreign naval and military officers, foreigners of distinction, other eminent individuals, and benefactors to the Institution, not otherwise eligible to become members.

Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on the following terms:—

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Members receive the Journal of the Institution, *post free* anywhere.

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Honorary Members shall be entitled to attend the lectures and debates, and to use the premises and Library of the Institution without payment; but should they desire to be supplied with the Journal, an annual payment of Rs. 10, *in advance*, will be required.

Divisional, Brigade and Officers' Libraries, Regimental Messes, Clubs, and other subscribers for the Journal, shall pay Rs. 10 per annum.

Sergeants' Messes and Regimental Libraries, Reading and Recreation Rooms shall be permitted to obtain the Journal on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 10.

If a member fails to pay his subscription for any financial year (ending 31st December) before the 1st June in the following year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following his name shall be posted in the Reading Room for six months and then struck off the roll of members.

Members joining the Institution, on or after the 1st October, will not be charged subscription until the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.

Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address, and not returned by the post.

All communications shall be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

*Rs. 7 in the case of British Service Officers.

The United Service Institution of India.

1. The United Service Institution of India is situated at Simla.
2. Officers wishing to become members of the United Service Institution of India should apply to the Secretary.
3. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of Service interest that are published.
4. There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free. Members not resident in Simla may have books from the Library sent to them *post free* (See Secretary's Notes).
5. The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.
6. Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution for which payment is made. Information for the guidance of contributors will be found in Secretary's Notes.
7. In order to assist members studying for Military Promotion or Staff College Entrance Examinations, the Institution has obtained a number of Tactical Schemes with Solutions, and a series of Precises of important Lectures. These Schemes and Precises are issued to members on payment of a small charge. Lists of Schemes and Precises with their prices are given in Secretary's Notes.

FEEDING THE WORLD'S BIGGEST FAMILY.

Every day in the year Dr. Barnardo's Homes have to think about Food.

Their family numbers 8,200 boys and girls and babies and all of these require three meals a day. Some of them need the extra diet of the invalid child or the young baby. There are about 4,000 boys and girls of school age with the healthy appetite of youth.

In order to supply the meals of this large family, which equals a town in size, the Homes are appealing for 400,000 Half-crowns as Birthday Gifts in memory of the late Dr. Barnardo, and to celebrate Founder's Day, June 27th, over which the President of the Homes, H. R. H. The Duke of York, will preside.

The Barnardo family needs at least 24,000 meals a day: 168,000 meals a week: 8,736,000 meals a year.

Bread is a large item. 1,600 loaves are baked daily by the lads in the Barnardo Bakehouse. But this supplies only about three-eighths of the family. Milk is another large item in the daily menu. Over 1,000 gallons per day are required.

Economy is the guiding principle of the Homes in all their work. But every house-mother knows that you cannot economise on the food of children, without detriment to their health.

Last year 488,546 Half-crowns were sent in by 82,698 generous friends all over the world, and the Homes are renewing their appeal this year in the hope that all lovers of little children will send as many or even more Half-crowns, for the children must have bread, and some butter!

The Charter of the Homes is "No Destitute Child Ever Refused Admission." On an average 5 children are admitted daily. Under this Charter over 110,000 children have been admitted, cared for, educated and trained and placed out in the world as A1 Citizens instead of C3's. Over 30,000 have been sent to the British Dominions, thus helping to people the British Empire Overseas with British born. If all the children rescued by Dr. Barnardo's Homes were to hold hands they would stretch over 80 miles.

Cheques and Orders may be made payable to "Dr. Barnardo's Homes Food Fund," and crossed "Barclays Bank Ltd. a/c Dr. Barnardo's Homes," and addressed to "Dr. Barnardo's Homes Food Fund," 18-26, Stepney Cruseway, London, E. 1. England.

MILITARY WIDOWS' FUND, BRITISH SERVICE

THIS FUND enables a British Service (Army) officer, by subscribing from Rs. 6 to Rs. 10 per quarter, to assure, in the event of his death while on the Indian Establishment, immediate payment :—

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The Secretary,
MILITARY WIDOWS' FUND,
Army Headquarters, Simla.

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Elected Members.

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by LT.-GEN.

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United Service Institution of India.

OCTOBER 1931.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Editorial	394
1. The Historical Background of the "Collectivization" of Agriculture in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	402
2. The Defence of Ports, Part II	409
3. The Armies of Malaysia and Indo-China	423
4. Frontier Cantonment Life in the days of Lake and Wellesley	440
5. Drill—A Plea for a revival of the Drill Spirit	451
6. My Manx Camel Corps	457
7. The £. s. d. of a Fox Hunting Holiday	464
8. Close Support of Infantry—An Infantry Officer's Point of View	475
9. Some Thoughts on Burma	482
10. More Musings about Administration <i>versus</i> Training. Letters to the Editor	490
Military Notes	495
	503
REVIEWS	
1. U-Boat Stories	509
2. League of Nations Armament Year Book 1930-31	510
3. Mesopotamia 1917-1920—A Clash of Loyalties	512
4. Saddle Room Sayings	513

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August 1931 :—

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Lieut. P. R. Macnamara.

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F. Tymms, Esq., M.C.
F. V. Wylie, Esq., C.I.E.
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Wing Commander A. R. C. Cooper.
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Lt.-Colonel G. D. Rice, D.S.O.
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Captain C. F. Raper.
Captain J. E. Walker.
Captain H. D. Whittick.
Lieut. W. D. H. Beyts.
Lieut. G. K. Cassels.
Lieut. H. Grattan.
Lieut. G. H. Hunt
Lieut. A. K. Mumford.
Lieut. G. T. Wheeler.
Lieut. G. T. Widdicombe.
Lieut. G. H. R. Woodman.
2/Lieut. J. D. Butler.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from three thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 30 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet black*. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used,

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset.

The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential" may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1). The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2). No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3). The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4). A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5). Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential" may not be removed.

(6). No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7). Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8). If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9). Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10). The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11). A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12). Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13). The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
1. Exmoor and Other Days-Hunting and Shooting Memories. (Presented by Messrs. Constable and Co., Ltd., London).	1930 ..	Arthur O Fisher.
2. The Battle of Dora (Presented by Messrs. William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., London).	.. 1931 ..	H. E. Graham.
3. Shikar-Notes for Novices (Presented by the Pioneer Press, Allahabad).	.. 1931 ..	J. W. West.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
4. Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (Presented by Messrs. John Murray, London).	.. 1931 ..	L. S. S. O'Malley.
5. India in 1929-30 (Presented by the Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).	.. 1931 ..	R. S. Bajpai.
6. Historical Records of the 3rd Bat- talion (Sikhs) 12 F. F. Regi- ment. (Presented by the Officers of the Regiment).	1931
7. U-Boat Stories (Presented by the Oxford University Press, Bombay).	.. 1931 ..	Neureuther & Bergen.
8. Armaments Year-Book 1930-31	.. 1931 ..	The League of Na- tions Secretariat.
9. History of the 22nd (The Residency) Field Battery, R. A. (Presented by the 22nd Field Battery R. A.)	1931 ..	Captain P. A. Brooke.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

1. The Indian Mutiny in Perspective	Sir George MacMunn.
2. The War in the Air, Vol. II ..	H. A. Jones.
3. The Uneasy Triangle ..	"Apex."
4. The Biography of Marshal Lyautey	Andre Maurois.
5. Surtees to Sassoon-An Apprecia- tion of Hunting Literature.	Harvey Darton.
6. Allenby of Armageddon ..	R. Savage.
7. The Unknown War, the fourth volume of the World Crisis.	Hon'ble Winston S. Churchill.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
1. Burma	.. 1925	.. Sir J. G. Scott.
2. How to Shoot—Sport	.. 1930	.. Robert Churchill.
3. Some Economic Consequences of the Great War.	1930	.. Arthur L. Bowley.
4. The History of Persia (2 Vols.) 3rd edition.	1930	.. Sir Percy Sykes.
5. The Advance from Mons, 1914	.. 1930	.. Walter Bloem.
6. The Secret Battle	.. 1930	.. A. P. Herbert.
7. More Yarns	.. 1931	.. “Stalky” (Maj-Genl. L. C. Dunsterville).
8. Scientific Disarmament	.. 1931	.. Victor Lefebure.
9. The Statesman's Year-Book	.. 1931
10. The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French.	1931	.. Major Gerald French.
11. India-Speeches, 1919-1931	.. 1931	.. Hon. Winston S. Churchill.
12. The Story of the N.-W. Frontier Province. J. M. Ewart and E. B. Howell.
13. Conflict—Angora to Afghanistan	.. 1931	.. Rosita Forbes.
14. The History of Mysore, Vol. I	.. 1931	.. Wilks.
15. A Short History of the Imperial Service Troops during the Great War, 1914-18.	1930	.. Sir Harry Watson.
16. The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World--Warsaw 1920.	1931	.. Viscount D'Abernon.
17. Mesopotamia, 1917-1920—A Clash of Loyalties.	1931	.. Sir Arnold Wilson.
18. Cawnpore Riots Commission Report.	1931	.. Official.
19. England Arise !	.. 1931	.. Godfrey Elton.
20. The Rise of General Bonaparte	.. 1930	.. Spenser Wilkinson.

VI.—Army Examinations.

(a) *Promotion*.—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from March 1932, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (b) (iii) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (d) (iii):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	March 1932	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702—09.
2	October 1932	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.
3	March 1933 ..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War-Military Operations-Egypt and Palestine Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..
4	October 1933	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War-Military Operations-Egypt and Palestine Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).
5	March 1934	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War-Military Operations-Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.

(b) *Staff College*.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

*The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted).

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

* Applicable to 1932 and subsequent examinations.

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to IV.

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

Naval and Military Despatches A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.

Reports of the Dardanelles
Commission.

Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I
(C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) . . . The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—The Mesopotamia Campaign.

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV,
(F. J. Moberly).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April
1917. (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

Mesopotamia 1917-20 A, Clash of Loyalties (Sir. A. Wilson).

6.—Waterloo Campaign.

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W.
O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also
Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

- History of the British Army Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).
 Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).
 The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).
 John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).
 Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).
 A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).
 The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).
 Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—1709 (A. Kearsey).

8. *The American Civil War.*

- Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).
 History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).
 History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).
 A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861—1862 (A. Kearsey).
 The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).
 History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).
 Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).
 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).
 Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).
 Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

- Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).
 Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).
 My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

- Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).
 Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).
 Official Account : The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military),
 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.
 Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).
 A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).
An Account of the Battle of Liao- Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11. *Napoleon's Italian Campaign, 1796-97.*

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).
Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12. *Organization of the Army*

A.—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SINCE 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir. W. H. Anderson.

B.—FORCES OF THE EMPIRE.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

C.—FOREIGN ARMIES.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13. *Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(Contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whittaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J.A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (Sir. C. P. Lucas, 1917).

- The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
 The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
 The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of **Their** System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
 The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
 England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).
 B.—BOOKS ON SPECIAL PORTIONS OF THE EMPIRE OR WORLD.
 The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir. A. O. Lyall, 1894).
 General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
 India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).
 India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).
 Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
 Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
 The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
 Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
 The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
 History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
 The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
 International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
 What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
 Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

- Navaland Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
 Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
 Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
 Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).

TACTICS.

15. *Tactical Problems.*

- Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).
 Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1931 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issues, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(A) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (Reprinted May, 1928).

To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2.

(B) *Tactical Schemes* (Reprinted May, 1928), Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.

(i) Mountain WarfareRs. 2-8

(ii) Defence and Attack orders. .. „ 2-8

Captain to Major.

(i) Outposts „ 2-8

Defensive position.

Withdrawal.

(ii) Tactical exercise without troops .. „ 2-8

Reconnaissance.

Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(C) *Tactical Schemes (Reprinted May, 1928).* With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

- (i) Approach MarchRs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.
- (ii) Outposts, 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.
- (iii) Move by M. T., 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(D) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes—1928.*—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps

and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps.)

- (i) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.
- (ii) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.
- (iii) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (i).)

1929.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps

and solutions ..Rs.3 each (Re. 1 without maps.)

- (i) Withdrawal—Appreciation.
- (ii) Advanced-Guard—Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (i).)
- (iii) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1930.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and

solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

- (i) Defence.
- (ii) Attack.
- (iii) Advanced Guard. (Map as for (i).)

1931.—Strategy and Tactics papers, complete with maps and solutions .. Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

- (i) Training for War (Protection).
- (ii) Advanced-Guard and Attack.
- (iii) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

(E) *Mountain Warfare.*

A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted
May 1928) Rs. 2-8

(F) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram. (Reprinted May, 1928).*

To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2

(G) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.—*

(i) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions)

(1930) Re. 1 each.

(ii) The History and Organization of the Empire

(with suggested answers), (1931) .. Re. 1 each.

(iii) Organization, Administration and Transport-

ation (Peace), (1931) .. Re. 1 each.

(iv) Withdrawal, (without map), (1931) .. Re. 1 each.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of precis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These precis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The date of the precis is given in each case.

- (i) Night Operations (1931)Rs. 2/- each.
- (ii) The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) 1/8 ..
- (iii) The Third Afghan War (1931) 1/8 ..
- (iv) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930) 1/8 ..
- (iva) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) 1/8 ..
- (v) Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796 (1930) 1/- ..
- (vi) American Civil War, (1930) 1/- ..
- (vii) Military Evolution, and the Influence of
modern inventions on Warfare, (1931) 1/- ..
- (viii) Transportation, War (1930) 1/- ..
- (ix) Supply of a Division in War (1930) 1/- ..
- (x) History and Organization of the Empire (1931) .. 1/- ..
- (xi) Hints on working for examinations (1930) .. As.-/8/- ..
- (xii) Notes on Military Writing (1931) " " ..
- (xiii) The Employment of Artillery (1930) " " ..
- (xiv) Artillery (1931) 1st lecture " " ..

(xiva) Artillery (1931), 2nd lecture	As. /8/ each.
(xv) Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	„ „ „
(xvi) Wireless Communications in the R.A.F. (1931)	„ „ „
(xvii) Air Co-operation (1931)	„ „ „
(xviii) The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	„ „ „
(xix) Anti-Gas Defence (1931)	„ „ „
(xx) Tanks (1930)	„ „ „
(xxi) Armoured Cars (1930)	„ „ „
(xxii) Military Engineering (1930)	„ „ „
(xxiii) Signals in the Division (1930)	„ „ „
(xxiv) Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	„ „ „
(xxv) The Organization of the British Army (1930)	„ „ „
(xxvi) Mobilization (1930)	„ „ „
(xxvii) Reinforcements (1930)	„ „ „
(xxix) Military Law, I (1930)	„ „ „
(xxixa) Military Law, II (1930)	„ „ „
(xxixb) Military Law, III (1930)	„ „ „
(xxx) The "Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	„ „ „
(xxxi) Inter-communication within a Division (1929)	„ „ „
(xxxii) The Auxiliary and Indian Territorial Forces (1929)	„ „ „
(xxxiii) Training (1930)	„ -/4/- „
Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on "Transportation in War"			
	„ -/12/- „

X.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—concl'd.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal†.

(i) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(ii) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award).

1889..BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1891.. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
- 1892.. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893.. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZALDAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894.. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895.. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896.. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897.. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 16th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898.. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899.. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900.. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901.. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902.. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903.. MANIFOLD, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904.. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905.. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906.. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1907.. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908.. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909.. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910.. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911.. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912.. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallahabad Light Infantry
(specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913.. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914.. BAILEY, Capt F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915.. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Ratray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916.. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917.. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918.. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919.. KEELING, Lieut.-Col. E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N. E. Frontier Corps.
- 1920.. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921.. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(*concl'd.*)

- 1922..ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt. O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923..BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924..RAHMAT SHAH, HAVILDAR, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAB HUSSAIN, NAIK, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925..SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926..HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927..LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928..BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929..ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps. (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930..GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
- 1931..O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.*)

- 1872..ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879..ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880..BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry
- 1882..MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883..COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884..BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887..YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*contd.*).

1888..MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.

YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).

1889..DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.

1890..MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.

1891..CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.

1893..BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.

1894..CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.

1895..NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.

1896..BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.

1897..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

1898..MULLALLY, Maj. H., R. E.

CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).

1899..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.

1900..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.

LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1901..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.

1902..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.

1903..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.

BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1904..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.

1905..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

1907..WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.

1908..JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.

1909..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.

ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1911..Mr.D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.

1912..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.

1913..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).

1914..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).

NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).

1916..CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.

1917..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concl'd*).

- 1918..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927..HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
1928..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931..FORD, Lt. Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
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Vol. LXI. OCTOBER, 1931. No. 265.

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of nationality " has been conceded by His Majesty's Government the question of " an extensive military occupation " must be ruled out as impracticable, or at least for the time being impractical, politics. In the meantime the study of contemporary politics gives much food for thought.

The outstanding political event of the last three months has been the Government's successful endeavours to persuade Congress to observe the main purpose of the Delhi Agreement. It has not been an easy task. Before the ink was dry on that controversial document the myrmidons of Congress were busy in all provinces carrying on subversive propaganda, preaching a gospel of hate, organising their shattered forces and making no concealment of their intention to use the intervening period for active preparation for " the next and final war."

With extraordinary patience Government watched these activities, checking them here and there when they ran counter too blatantly to the law of the land, but in most cases holding its hand in the hope that, in spite of the deliberate provocation offered, its immediate and important aim of getting Mr. Gandhi to the Round Table Conference might be realised. This policy of " wait and see " has been partially justified. Mr. Gandhi is now in London face to face for the first time for eleven years with realities, and no matter what the outcome of Congress representation on the Conference may be the British and Indian Governments have demonstrated to the world their desire that the Round Table should be a wholly representative body of all the creeds and factions that make up the sub-continent of India.

The immediate situation, however, has not improved. It may be safely presumed that Government recognised the risks involved in allowing the peasantry of the United Provinces and Bombay to be exploited by unscrupulous half-baked communists, in permitting the most loyal recruiting area in the North West Frontier Province to be seduced, and the rank and file of the police and other services to be discouraged ; these risks were obvious. But we may be sure that they were taken only after the most anxious consideration and weighing of all possibilities. Let us hope that the end will justify the means, and that the Conference will succeed in producing a Federation, Confederation or Commonwealth which will bring peace to a distracted country.

To many this will seem a mere platitudinous aspiration, more pious than probable. The conflicting elements which compose the

Conference are likely to have many bitter arguments and battles before their respective views are merged into a satisfactory compromise. Mr. Shaukat Ali, Dr. Moonje, Sir Mohamed Iqbal, Mr. Ujjal Singh, Mr. Benthams and Mr. Gandhi do not strike one as being congenial bed-fellows. But it will be remembered that similar doubts were expressed before the first Conference, where, except for the Communal problem, British and Indian statesmen succeeded in outlining a new constitution with the unanimous approval of all the various discordant interests.

In the meantime in India we are more concerned with the attitude of Mr. Gandhi's disgruntled followers. They made every effort to prevent him from going to London and when these tactics failed they were left high and dry on a barren shore. It would be too much to expect that men, whose life-work has been agitation, would be content to sit with folded arms during the absence of their leader. We may anticipate, therefore, that they will continue their "Social Uplift" work and their preparations for a further struggle in the not improbable eventuality of Mr. Gandhi withdrawing his co-operation in London.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Gandhi accepts the stern realities of the most complicated problem in the world and comes to a common agreement with his brother delegates his subsequent task will not be enviable. He will have to persuade his heterogeneous followers, including the gunmen of Bengal and the comic opera "red" army on the frontier, that constitution-making is more than shouting "Long Live Revolution" or annoying people who want to buy clothes. It is likely—indeed, almost certain when one considers the amount of seditious poison which the youth of India has imbibed during the last two years,—that his appeal will fall on deaf ears. Then, Indian politicians will have to hold the baby of their own begetting.

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It is only natural to expect that the present world-wide economic depression should have its effect on the services in **Retrenchment.** India. The various Retrenchment Committees, whose work is wrapped in necessary mystery, are working feverishly to cut down expenditure in all departments of the Government, and, needless to remark, Army expenditure is not escaping the prevailing necessity for drastic pruning. While it is impossible to prophesy what the actual savings will be or in which directions they will be effected, the study of the May Committee's Economy Report at Home

may give an inkling to possible proposals for economy. Briefly, some of these recommendations were as follows :—

<i>Pay and Pensions.</i>	<i>Saving.</i>
Introduction of 1925 rates of pay for all personnel of the fighting services (Navy, Army and R.A.F.) ..	£2,199,000
Introduction of revised cost of living deduction for officers of the fighting services	£400,000
Introduction of revised cost of living deduction from pensions of officers of the fighting services ..	£190,000
Reduction by roughly ten per cent. of expenditure on technical research, education, inspection costs, and clothing allowances	£859,000
Discontinuance of subsidies for mechanical transport and the light horse breeding scheme	£50,000

This represents a saving of almost £3,700,000 and does not include the more general recommendations for limiting expenditure in all branches of the services, which brings the cuts to the substantial total of nine million sterling.

The proposed cut in pay leaps immediately to the eye. If pay is reduced at Home it is too much to hope that a similar measure of economy will not be examined in India. The Home cut is based on the general fall in prices in all commodities in Europe, but it can hardly be argued that a corresponding fall has occurred in India. On the contrary, it is clear that the recent increase in import duties, the continuing high level of servant's pay, rents and educational fees, together with the enhanced income tax, have actually raised the Indian cost of living for all British officials.

Further means for reducing the 1931-32 Military Budget of fifty two crores are being energetically explored. In this connection the ultimate fate of the "Military Reserve Fund" which, under the original arrangements for the stabilisation of the Military Budget for a period of four years, had been earmarked to carry out a programme of mechanisation and modernisation of equipment, may now, perhaps, be safely left to the cynic's imagination. The disbandment of two Indian infantry battalions has been reported in the press. It would be unwise to speculate on other methods of economy, but the amalgamation of British and Indian Hospitals, the Anglo-Indianisation of nursing staffs, the overhauling of Ordnance establishments with a

view to their competing in the open market, and the reduction of redundant staff appointments are obvious lines for inquiry. The taking over of all engineer services on the N. W. F. P. by the Public Works Department has been recommended by the recent Haig Commission ; this would effect a military economy certainly, but in case of war such a saving at the cost of army efficiency might have incalculable consequences. The whole question of Retrenchment bristles with problems the solution of which is bound to cause heart-burning, but the delicate financial position of India must, as in England, demand sacrifices from all.

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The general Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations is **The Disarmament Conference.** to meet at Geneva on 2nd February 1932 under the Presidency of the Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Arthur Henderson, if his new duties permit. India as an independent member of the League is to send a delegation.

It is no exaggeration to say that this conference represents the most important international event since the deliberations which preceded the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. That Treaty, framed whilst its creators were still swayed by the antagonisms and hatreds of the war, has left Europe in an unbalanced and dangerous condition. On the one hand are the victorious allied nations still, with the exception of the British Empire and United States of America, maintaining large conscript armies and numerous Air Forces. On the other hand are the defeated central European peoples with armies rigidly limited and no defensive Air Forces at all. France, with the memory of two invasions in half a century, asserts that her safety depends upon her right to maintain absolute and complete military ascendancy. Germany, still at heart militaristic, with a large and intensely patriotic population, is becoming more and more exasperated at this situation. She accuses the allies of a one-sided application of Article 8 of the covenant, which recognised " that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of Armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." In addition further east there is the menacing figure of Soviet Russia with ever increasing armies permeated by a doctrine undisguisedly hostile to European civilization.

The solution of these problems is the task of the Conference, and upon its success or failure may well depend the future of Europe.

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The report of a gallant frontier episode has just come to light
A Frontier Incident. which reflects very creditably on the staunchness and discipline of the Zhob Militia. On the 29th June the Commandant, Zhob Militia, received a message from the small post at Ashewat, (about 50 miles north of Killa Saifulla), that a large *lashkar* was in the vicinity. This intelligence could not be verified until the 3rd July when definite information was received that the post was being besieged.

During this period of uncertainty the Indian Officer commanding the post (garrisoned by two Indian officers and seventy-six men) had been taking all necessary precautions to strengthen his defences and had sent out reconnaissance parties, who, however, discovered nothing. In addition he had made outside arrangements to communicate with the nearest post if an attack materialised. On the afternoon of July 3rd the attack by several hundred tribesmen occurred, and the information reached Fort Sandeman the same night.

The Post Commander, uncertain that the news had got through to the authorities, decided to supplement it by sending two sowars to the nearest post. The gates were thrown open and out galloped the messengers in the teeth of a dust storm and the enemy's fire. They got through safely. Firing was kept up during the night but the use of Verey lights prevented the tribesmen from getting to close quarters, and at dawn the arrival of aeroplanes from Quetta made the *lashkar* melt into invisibility. In the meantime a small party of militia under another Indian officer, which had been sent from Shaighalu post, thirty-five miles away, had been marching through the night and arrived at 11 a.m. A good march, including the crossing of the Torghar Hill (8,600 feet).

This small incident again draws attention to the crying need of a bridge over the Gomal to complete the link between the Zhob and Waziristan. This would necessitate the construction of a post at Gul Kach, which would then facilitate control of this wayward area and prevent the recurrence of such attacks in the future.

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Members who propose spending a portion of their leave in or retiring to the Irish Free State will be interested in **Sport on Leave.** the Irish Sporting Estates Agency. This agency has recently been established with the object of providing information on life and sport and inspecting or providing properties in the Irish Free State. The Agency, controlled by retired British officers, is also prepared to put officers of the services and others, who wish to spend their leave or part of the hunting season in the State, in touch with suitable hosts who would be willing to accommodate them as paying guests.

Further particulars are obtainable from The Irish Sporting Estates Agency, Coolmore, Thomastown, Co. Kilkenny.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1932.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1932:—

“Disarmament, and its effect on the Foreign Policy of the British Empire.”

The following are the conditions of the competition:—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and Auxiliary forces.
- (2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1932.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1932.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE "COLLECTIVIZATION" OF AGRICULTURE IN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

BY "LEDSAM."

1. The institution in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of "collective" farms has aroused widespread interest, some misunderstanding and considerable speculation as to its ultimate outcome. A short sketch of the evolution of the agrarian problem in Russia from the days of serfdom, may help to place this latest development in its true perspective.

2. *Serfdom.*

After the death in 1584 of Ivan the Terrible, Russia passed through a period of chaos known as the Time of Troubles. This lasted until 1613, when Michael Romanov, the first of his dynasty, was crowned Tsar in Moscow.

Serfdom was the result of the efforts of the new dynasty to restore order out of social disruption. Its aim was a centralized state, and it was forced to rely upon the great number of "gentry" who in return for land and privileges put their services either civil or military at the disposal of the State. The Time of Troubles had however impoverished these gentry, whose real wealth consisted in the number of peasants available to till their land. Large numbers of these peasants had deserted and fled: some towards the Lower Volga: others into Siberia, leaving the gentry and the land without labour, and the State face to face with famine.

The gentry therefore made urgent demands that fugitive peasants should be restored to them: and that their migration from their particular area should be forbidden. These requests were granted in the form of many decrees extending over a long period, each decree increasing the powers of the gentry and limiting the rights of the peasants.

By 1646, serfdom as we understand it, was complete. From that date the gentry were required to enter in government registers the names of all their peasants. These and their descendants then became

legally attached to the estate. Serfdom became hereditary. In 1649 the Tsar Alexis definitely established serfdom as a state institution. But it must be remembered that the object of all this was to establish order and ensure that the land was tilled to the best advantage. To the government of the day it must have appeared the most logical method.

3. *Peter III and serfdom.*

Serfdom thus continued under a *regime* in which the governing class was entirely aloof from the mass of the people which it appears to have regarded as existing for their special benefit. The powers of the squires grew; and the rights of the peasants dwindled.

Eventually, in 1762, even the fiction that the privileges of the gentry existed in return for services rendered was abolished: for in that year the half-witted Peter III released the Russian gentry from their state obligations. He thus changed them from being servants of the state, and remunerating themselves for their services by the labour of the peasants on their lands, into private landowners owning the freehold of their land and regarding their peasants as their slaves. The peasants, as was natural, bitterly resented this change and, in places, broke into revolt. They had always regarded the land as their own; land which they, under the direction of their squires tilled as part of their general obligation to the State. They were sufficiently shrewd to realize the full implications of this latest decree. Their own obligations to the squires continued, while that of the squires to the State was abolished. In other words they became the property of the squires, and the ensuing period was far the worst in the history of serfdom. But they clung to their time-honoured belief that the land was theirs even though their rights as citizens were practically non-existent. An episode from the reminiscences of the Decembrist Yakushkin illustrates this point of view.

Yakushkin on return from abroad decided to put an end to a state of affairs in which he was practically a slave owner. He went to his estate called together his peasants and put the question to them. The land was his: they were his. He would free them. He would even allow them to rent some of his land on easy terms. What did they think? But the peasants, to his surprise evinced no great joy. They merely asked "And what is to become of the land?" Yakushkin explained: and received the reply—"No: let things remain as they were. We are yours and the land is ours." This was the view of the

mass of the Russian peasantry : a view be it said in contradiction to that of the State and the governing classes, who regarded it as ridiculous.

4. *The Emancipation.*

The Emancipation of the Serfs, carried out by Alexander II in 1861 in the face of much opposition, did not grant them that complete freedom which the words suggest. It is true they were freed from the squires who from now became country gentleman living on their estates, surrounded by peasantry working on their own land, but they continued in a way to live under the conditions of serfdom. The land, not granted to the gentry, was the property of the village commune and was distributed among the peasants according to the number of souls in each household. This distribution was subject to periodical readjustment dependent upon the increase or decrease in the sizes of families. Their collective responsibility for the payment of taxes made them dependent upon the village community, which they could not leave without its permission. The peasants were, however, allowed to lease land and in many small ways their lot was improved.

We find therefore at this period, two systems of land tenure. On the one hand the gentry, private landowners with power to dispose of their property. On the other hand the peasants bound to the commune, and still performing the State function laid upon them, that of cultivating the land for the ultimate benefit of the State. Two such conflicting *regimes* could not exist side by side. As the population increased, the peasants, confined within the limits of the land allotted to the commune, began to experience an ever-increasing land shortage and to look at the land owned by the local squire with covetous eyes. To their minds the squire's property was land that had been illegally taken from the peasants ("We are yours and the land is ours") and there arose an all-pervading desire to own it.

Peasant discontent was marked by serious though abortive risings culminating in the general disorders which followed the unsuccessful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. The peasants had become definitely hostile and it became evident that reform was essential if revolution and economic distress were to be averted.

5. *Stolypin's reforms.*

The task facing the Russian Government was immense, and in 1907 with great energy, under the leadership of the Prime Minister

Stolypin, it set about its task of converting the peasants into private-landed proprietors, and of making them free citizens with full rights. Stolypin freed the peasants from their dependence on the village commune and gave them the right, should they wish to exercise it, of claiming their allotment of land as permanent property and to have it in one compact settlement, instead of being divided into strips all over the village holding.

At first the peasants were slow to realize the benefits conferred upon them by this new legislation, but gradually in increasing volume overcame their prejudices and took advantage of the opportunities offered them. For the first time in Russian agrarian development economic forces were allowed full play. The harder-working and shrewder peasants bought up the land of their lazier or less gifted neighbours, who in most cases drifted into the towns. Thus by the outbreak of the Great War there were the beginnings of a strong nucleus of energetic and enterprising peasant proprietors. The war however put a stop to this development, and the revolution of 1917 gave a set back to the whole movement.

6. *The Revolution of 1917.*

The course of events in Petrograd and in the army during the revolutionary period of 1917 are sufficiently well known. What meanwhile, was happening in the country? Of this we have only slender evidence, though the broad outline of the movement can be traced. The distinction between Stolypin's peasant proprietors and those who had not availed themselves of his reforms, ceased to be: and the peasants *en masse* reverted to type and set about dividing up the land and property of the squires. This, however, was followed by a further development of the movement, and that was a demand by the poorer peasants for a wholesale equalisation of all land whatsoever. Thus arose a conflict between the peasant proprietors who by thrift and hard work had become people of comparative substance, and those who had little or nothing. For a period the country-side was immersed in its own quarrels: agricultural production declined: and the towns-people began to starve.

7. *The food requisitions.*

In the communist Party however the remedy was simple. The peasants were to hand over to the State all that they did not require for their own purposes. Grain was acquired by force; in many cases

by actual punitive expeditions and this resulted not only in a number of peasant risings throughout Russia, but in the peasants themselves producing no more than their requirements for personal consumption and for seed-grain for the following year.

Meanwhile the towns continued to starve : discontent reigned through the length and breadth of the country and culminated in a mutiny at Kronstadt which nearly broke the Soviet Government.

8. *The New Economic Policy.*

The situation became so critical that Lenin, who alone had sufficient authority, introduced, in March 1921, the New Economic Policy. This was in effect a return to capitalism. The peasants were allowed to dispose of their goods to the best advantage (after having paid a heavy tax in kind) and to hire labour. Conditions started to improve. Grain and food again began to reach the towns and it looked as if Russian agriculture was at last coming into its own. There was, in fact, in the villages a veiled but intensive return to the days of Stolypin : but with this great difference that under Stolypin the innovation had come from the Government : now however it was the peasants themselves who in an elemental stream returned, as it were, to the land and started to work it under conditions of which they had dreamed for centuries.

9. *Beginnings of Collectivization.*

For a while the Government maintained a benevolent neutrality ; but not for long. It soon became apparent that the New Economic Policy was resulting in the establishment of a class of well-to-do farmers : of men who by superior energy and enterprise began to acquire more land, cattle and wealth than their neighbours, who had considerable local influence : and who in fact were potential "capitalists." Here was a problem for the Soviet Government. The country was settling down, but "capitalism" was beginning to return : "Capitalism" of a type which, if allowed to grow, would stifle communism in the most vital part of the political and economic system of the country. What was to be done ?

The reply of the Government was the institution of the collective farm and the introduction of an equalising partition of land among the peasants. By privileges and other advantages the Government set itself to attract the peasants to the kolkhozy but without much success. Many Kulaks themselves entered the collective farms, which develop-

ed into small estates managed by a kulak, and actually known in some cases by the name of the manager. Other collectives simply became refuges for loafers who hoped to live without effort on what the Government provided. In other words in various disguises, and in spite of Government opposition, "Kulakism" continued, the countryside managed to live in comparative prosperity: and the threat to the existence of communist government grew stronger.

The Soviet Government's repressive measures thereupon increased in severity. By means of forced loans, high taxation, and a manipulation of the prices of town and country products, they ruthlessly, systematically and with considerable success set themselves to despoil the peasants. Their grain was bought from them at the lowest prices and town products sold at three and four times their value. The peasants found themselves unable to resist. There remained only one line of action for them and that was to go out of the market. Once more the area sown rapidly diminished: food again became scarce in the markets, and the peasants withdrew into themselves, sowing enough for their own requirements and no more.

The Government retaliated by the seizure of grain. Punitive missions again were sent into the country; and in the face of considerable active opposition, amounting in places almost to civil war, forcibly took the grain from the peasants. But this was no more than an expedient. The harvested crop could be seized: but the peasants could not be compelled to sow more than their own requirements for the following harvest: and in spite of the harshest of treatment, resolutely refused to do so.

10. *General Collectivization.*

What was the Government to do? There appeared to be the alternatives of either reverting to the New Economic Policy, or of instituting State Agriculture on an immense scale. The former indeed meant a return to "capitalism" in the villages: but the latter implied another revolution which would abolish peasant ownership of the land, by far the most important result of the Revolution of 1917, and turn the peasants once more into serfs working on communal land, with their joint obligation to the State. It meant in fact snatching from their grasp the land for which they had dreamed since the original introduction of serfdom and which after some four hundred years they had only just obtained.

The alternatives before the Government were no less than either the enunciation of an undoubtedly important principle, but one which after all had recently been renounced : or the initiation of a system which would probably meet with such widespread opposition as to endanger the whole Bolshevik *regime*.

Small wonder that all outside observers confidently predicted the reintroduction of the New Economic Policy.

The Government however went boldly forward and by possibly the most important decision since they came into power, resolved on the institution of state agriculture : and with the utmost energy and enthusiasm set about hustling the peasants into the new collective farms. Bands of Communists and Young Communists were let loose over the countryside to preach, cajole and threaten : and the peasants, crushed by taxation, bewildered, and thoroughly disheartened, gave way. After selling their property for almost nothing, and killing and consuming their cattle, they streamed towards the collective farms.

But the pace had been too fast, the collective farm organizations were incapable of dealing with this great influx of labour. This, and the fact that peasant discontent began to be reflected in the army caused Stalin to issue his decree " Dizzy with Success " in which the various Communist organizations were ordered to go slow. Compulsory collectivization was stopped in the spring of 1930 ; but the principle remained the same. All peasants were intended eventually to enter the collective farms.

There for the time being we must leave them : these peasants who having just realized the fulfilment of their age-long dream of possessing all the land, now find themselves serfs working under the domination of a system more ruthless and exacting than ever were the old gentry. What are their feelings ? What their intentions ? Will they always continue in this state ? Can they after centuries suddenly renounce all their desire to own and till their own land ? The future will provide the answer ; and the existence of the present *regime* will be vitally affected thereby.

THE DEFENCE OF PORTS—PART II.

BY "MADEIRA."

VI. THE ROLES OF THE SERVICES IN PORT DEFENCE.

16. *Changes in role suggested by modern conditions.*

For the last four hundred years, that is since artillery came into general use, the primary element in harbour defence has been the heavy gun mounted on shore. This, combined with the fact that the greatest threat to a well defended port has come usually, not against its sea-face, but from the landward side, has almost invariably made the army the predominant service in its local defence. Within the last thirty years, however, new weapons have been forthcoming which have challenged, not only the supremacy of the shore gun as a means of defence, but the advisability of considering the army as the service best suited to provide that defence.

The defensive armour and offensive power of the warship have increased. The submarine may claim to provide a more efficient defence than the gun. Lastly the Air Force with the newest of weapons, whose potentialities are as yet unrealized, possibly even by those who wield them, appears on the scene.

In assessing the relative importance of the Services in port defence, it is first necessary to examine whether the army with its shore batteries cannot be efficiently and economically replaced in its old leading role by the other services with their newer weapons.

17. *Shore Defence versus Ships.*

Does the gun on shore still retain its superiority over the gun afloat? The increased range, power and accuracy with air observation of the naval weapon are counterbalanced by similar improvements in coastal artillery, while the fundamental disadvantages of the ship as a gun platform remain. Briefly, it is unstable, so that uncontrolled movement of the gun takes place at the moment of firing; restricted, so that its range finding instruments can have only a limited base; conspicuous, so that it is a comparatively easy target; and vulnerable, because, in spite of its armour, there are large areas in which a hit with a heavy shell can do serious damage. A well sited coast defence gun,

on the other hand, fires from an immovable platform, has little restriction as to the location of its range-finding instruments, is almost, if not quite, invisible from the sea and inconspicuous from the air ; and presents such a small target that direct hits on it will be practically unknown. In addition its ammunition supply is not so limited. The experience of the last war again demonstrated the weakness of purely naval attack on shore defences. British monitors, with every available device to help them, engaged the German batteries on the Belgian Coast on no less than forty occasions, firing large numbers of heavy shell, but never once succeeding in putting a gun even temporarily out of action. The efforts of the fleet to force the Dardanelles broke down mainly because the mine fields could not be cleared until the shore guns covering them were silenced, and this the ships guns proved unable to accomplish. It may be taken, therefore, that the shore gun retains its efficiency as a defence against attack by surface ships, and it is not, reasonable for this reason that it should be supplanted by other weapons.

The question then arises that while retaining coast defence guns, would it not be better to let the navy man them ? Defended ports are part of the scheme for using the naval forces and should perhaps, therefore, logically be in naval hands. In practice, however, the working of coastal artillery resembles much more that of heavy artillery on land, than afloat. The army, also, will have to provide artillery for land defences and against air attack, so that organization is simplified if all artillery on shore belongs to one service.

The submarine, first intended largely as a coast defence weapon, soon took on a wider scope, but it retains and has increased its potentialities for its original role. It can engage the hostile ships at a distance, constitutes a very serious threat to any bombarding ships, and must act as a deterrent to their employment. But means of defence against submarines have progressed to such an extent, that they alone could not hope successfully to repulse serious naval attack, nor could they to any considerable extent replace shore guns.

18. *The Air Force as the Primary Service in Port Defence.*

The advent of a new partner in combined operations has not only given a third dimension to the attack, but it has provided the defence with most potent weapons. So much is this so that it is doubtful whether capital ships would attempt a bombardment without a reasonable assurance of air superiority during the operations. Apart

from the risk of damage or even total loss from air attack, the need to be constantly under way and the restriction of air observation would make accurate shooting most difficult. In fact, the power of the aeroplane against surface ships is held by most airmen to be such as to make it a more effective weapon in coast defence than the gun, which it is urged, it should replace.

(i) *Relative Hitting Power.*

As far as hitting the target is concerned there is, round for round, or rather bomb and torpedo for shell, probably not much in it between the aeroplane and the gun. Neither the airman nor the gunner is, one suspects, quite so accurate in practice as he would have his friends believe. The relative seriousness of a hit by a heavy bomb compared with that by a shell is a matter over which technical experts may wrangle; to the ordinary observer it seems that the element of luck enters too largely into the matter to allow of a decision. It may be taken, however, that, as a rule, a torpedo would have greater effect than the heaviest shell. The gun, however, holds one great advantage, for it can keep up a higher rate of fire, as it does not have to return to a base to reload. This means that, granted equal accuracy, the gun should secure more hits, as it will expend more rounds in a given time.

(ii) *Mobility.*

The aeroplane can locate and attack the hostile warship, long before it is within bombarding distance. The gun has to allow it to come within range, and this offers it the opportunity of doing damage which the aeroplane denies.

Then, too, air forces, by reason of their mobility, need not be allotted to a particular port, but can be held in some central locality, from which, if required, they can reach any threatened spot within a radius of a thousand miles in a matter of hours. Thus one squadron of aeroplanes could, it is claimed, do the work of several coast defence batteries. Roughly speaking, only one port in an area can be attacked seriously at a time, and most will never be attacked at all, their immobile defences being so much locked up and useless material and men. This suggestion has obvious advantages, but the objections to it cannot be disregarded. The air forces, although not locked up in a port, would have very definitely, to be locked up in an area. It would have to be clearly understood that they were not available outside that area

in any circumstances, or, inside it, for any other purpose than port defence. Otherwise there would be the greatest risk of their not being available when most needed. In spite of such a guarantee, the very mobility of the aeroplane makes it improbable that, when it came to the pinch, first line air units allotted to port defence would not be diverted to the main theatres of the air struggle.

Even were this temptation resisted, the attackers might, by seizing an opportunity when local atmospheric conditions, *e.g.*, the monsoon, would delay the arrival of the defence air force, get twelve hours or so in which to do their worst to a defenceless port, and that would be enough to destroy every useful establishment in it. Feints to draw the air force to ports it was not intended seriously to attack, or to divide it would have great chance of success, and might leave the enemy an easy prey at a vital point. At present, too, air routes between the ports of the Empire are not sufficiently developed to make the more of a considerable air force from one to the other a matter of ease or certainty. Even on a highly organised peace time commercial route, the Indian Air Mail has demonstrated that delays are constant and disasters unfortunately too common. In war, it is true, more risks can be taken, but this only means more delays and heavier losses. Many of our Empire air ways cross the territory of foreign powers, who, even if neutral in war, must close these routes to us. Several of the remaining routes which cross only the sea or British territories are within striking distance of main air bases of potential enemies. Although actual interception in the air is improbable such routes are precarious.

It would seem, therefore, that, if air forces are to replace naval and military defences, they must be definitely allotted to particular ports, otherwise there can be no certainty of their being available when most needed.

(iii) Attack on an Air Defended Port.

The effectiveness of aircraft being much limited by darkness, the dangers of night attack would be greatly enhanced, and the risk of such attacks increased. It is often overlooked that the power of the aeroplane to attack ships at a distance may, if aircraft are the sole means of defence, be turned against it. A ship cannot stand close in to engage a shore battery without vastly increasing its own risk. A capital ship which at 30,000 yards might treat with contempt the

efforts of a medium coast defence battery, would invite considerable damage from the same battery at, say, 8,000 yards. In fact, it is most unlikely that it would close to that range. The aeroplane bomb or torpedo on the contrary, is as accurate at fifty miles as at 5,000 yards, though, of course, the greater the range, the less the intensity of the attack. This seems to indicate that the correct tactics in a naval attack on a port, defended only or mainly from the air, would be to stand close in under cover of darkness, open intense fire at dawn with main and secondary armament on the air force ground establishments, and having demolished these, proceed to deal with other objectives at leisure. Air force aerodromes, hangars and workshops are large, conspicuous, and extremely vulnerable targets, which it will often be impossible to site so far inland as to be out of range, and an aerodrome under observed artillery fire of any intensity is for all practicable offensive purposes unusable. Then too, against a port in whose defence aeroplanes had replaced guns instead of risking capital ships because they alone could outrange the shore guns, vessels with less heavy armament would be employed because they could close the range without any corresponding increase in danger to themselves.

(iv.) Extent to which Air Forces could replace Land Defences.

Such considerations, while they show that aeroplanes cannot, without undue risk, be substituted for land defences, do not mean that they could not replace some guns. Heavy bombers and torpedo planes, could be substituted for heavy coast defence guns, provided that :—

- (a) The aeroplanes were permanently and instantly available.
- (b) There were enough of them to compensate for the higher rate of fire of the absent guns.
- (c) Medium and light guns remained.

Here the question of economy would have to be considered. It is doubtful if the necessary first line air squadrons, with their entirely British personnel, expensive and quickly obsolete equipment, and heavy upkeep charges, could be provided at a cost approaching the equivalent in heavy batteries, which although expensive to instal, cost comparatively little in upkeep, may have a considerable native personnel, and do not need frequent replacement.

19. *Forces likely to be Available.*

This brings us to the real crux of the question which is not, is the submarine or the aeroplane more efficient for coast defence than the gun, but, is it strategically sound to allot offensive naval or air formations at all to the defence of ports? It is no use hoping that because a flotilla of submarines, or a squadron of heavy bombers, or a battalion of tanks is the best unit for the defence of a particular port that it will necessarily be available for that purpose. The navy possesses barely enough submarines and destroyers to suffice for fleet duties, let alone to supply all requirements for anti-submarine work, protection of trade routes, and patrolling. It follows that, although possibly the most effective vessels for port defence, neither submarines nor destroyers will be available. No mobile naval forces of any strength should be allotted to the local defence of ports, and no clamour from our own people or feints by the enemy should make us violate this principle.

Similarly it is strategically unsound to allot first line, mobile air force units of high offensive capacity to port defence, when every available squadron will be required either to co-operate with the main naval or military forces, or to take part in the concentrated and sustained effort of the air force to gain and maintain supremacy in the decisive air theatre. The air force in this respect is on the same footing as the navy, and it would be as unwise to allot air squadrons to port defence as it would be to divert destroyer flotillas from the fleet. The port must hold out without their help. When the Fleet or the main Air Striking Force arrives to its relief, it will be accompanied by these flotillas or squadrons, which will then prove of infinitely more value than they would have been if devoted to local defence.

The naval and air forces allotted to port defence should be the minimum required to co-operate with the shore defences. The military forces should also be limited, and only where a port of first class strategic value is liable to large scale land attack should they include first line mobile formations.

20. *Units Available for Port Defence.*

(a). *Naval.*

Excluding submarines and destroyers as unlikely to be available, the naval defence will have to be content with trawlers, coastal motor boats and motor launches. The coastal motor boat is well suited to surprise attacks on heavy ships, but bombardment

will usually be during daylight and they will be escorted by destroyers and aircraft. The coastal motor boat will thus have little chance of reaching them. In addition its value for reconnaissance duties is very restricted by its poor sea keeping qualities and lowness in the water, which gives it a very limited horizon. It is not likely, therefore, that a large number of coastal motor boats will be made available for port defence. Practically the only type of vessel that can be reckoned on is the armed trawler or some equivalent auxiliary craft. Even these will not usually be retained in peace, as at most large ports there are a number of these that could be earmarked and taken up by the naval authorities on the threat of war becoming imminent. Arrangements must, however, be made to have available in the port at all times, guns for these vessels, as well as the necessary sweeping gear, mines, nets, and detector appliances.

(b) *Air Force.*

Some air force is very desirable, if not essential, for co-operation with the navy in seaward reconnaissance and with heavy or medium coast defence guns. In naval bases or other ports of primary importance it may be considered advisable to locate a few regular squadrons for these purposes, but their presence should be exceptional.

It is here that volunteer auxiliary squadrons, formed from the local flying clubs which exist in increasing numbers at large ports, could be most usefully employed. Their training, equipment, and difficulties of transport would not allow of their taking part in the main air offensive or fit them for co-operation with the fleet or field army, but for local reconnaissance or spotting duties they might be invaluable, if given a certain amount of training in peace.

(c) *Army.*

Heavy coast defence guns will be required only when attack by capital ships is anticipated, and even then the configuration of the coast may enable medium guns to hold attacking ships out of range of the port itself. Futuer increases in range and hitting power of medium guns may also enable them to replace heavy, especially in ports where the distance from his repair bases may make the enemy hesitate even more than usual to risk damage to his capital ships. A varying number of light guns and searchlights will always be required, not only to deal with the smaller surface craft but to cover mine fields. All

these guns should, as far as possible, be manned by either European volunteers or native gunners under regular supervision, so as to liberate first line troops for the field armies and for purposes of economy in maintenance.

In addition anti-aircraft artillery may have to be provided in varying quantities at the major defended ports. Some regular troops also for internal security, signal units, engineers and other technical units are almost bound to be required at every overseas port. If serious attack on the landward side is probable lower category troops to man the close defences, and a fully equipped mobile force will also be needed.

21. *The Role of each Service.*

The number of ports to be defended is so large, and their circumstances so varied that it is impossible to lay down a universal rule that in their defence any particular Service is invariably paramount, or to decide on any fixed proportion in which the Services should be represented. But it may be safely affirmed that in order to secure the most economical, effective and certain defence, and, at the same time, to leave the maximum mobile forces free to operate in the decisive land, sea or air theatres, the Army should, at the vast majority of ports, provide the chief elements of the defence.

Normally the division of responsibility between the services will be :—

(a) *The Army.*

- (i) Protection against attack by land.
- (ii) Internal Security.
- (iii) Defence against air attack by anti-air-craft artillery and small arms.
- (iv) Defence against bombardment by heavy and medium coast defence guns.
- (v) Defence against enterprises by light naval forces by medium and light guns.
- (vi) Protection with light guns of minefields and other obstacles laid by navy.
- (vii) Land reconnaissance and intelligence.
- (viii) Communications.

(b) The Navy.

- (i) Seaward reconnaissance and naval intelligence.
- (ii) Defence against submarines and light surface craft by patrols, minefields and obstacles.
- (iii) Examination service and control of shipping, navigational lights, marks, etc.
- (iv) Control of ships' wireless and port-war signal station.

(c) Air Force.

- (i) Reconnaissance, seaward and overland.
- (ii) Spotting for heavy and medium coast defence guns.
- (iii) Anti-submarine patrol.
- (iv) Defence against minor air attack.
- (v) Control of civil aviation.

Thus the Army, with the essential but limited co-operation of the other Services should hold the ports of the Empire as its contribution to sea power.

VII. CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION OF THE DEFENCE OF A PORT.

22. *Command.*

In theory the best way to secure control and co-ordination in any complicated enterprise is to place the whole undertaking under the command of one carefully selected and well qualified man. In practice, however, this absolute unity of command is not usually attempted in major combined operations. Reliance is placed on the senior officer of each Service co-operating with the others so intimately that, while none is subordinate and each retains his independence of tactical command, they will be as one in the strategical direction of the operation. Apart from the obvious difficulties in placing a senior officer of one Service under an officer of probably no higher rank in another, there is the objection that it is impossible to say which particular Service will play the chief rôle. At one phase it will be the Navy, at another the Air Force, and at yet another the Army. While this applies to large scale operations it is worth while considering, before abandoning the undoubted advantages of unity of command, whether it does so equally to port defence.

Normally there will be no large naval forces present, and any Air Force units will be allotted for co-operation with the other Services.

Nor, is it likely that there will be any naval or Air Force officers of high rank with these small detachments. Usually the Army will provide the bulk of the defence forces, both in numbers and offensive armament. It is logical, therefore, that the command should be vested in the senior military officer. An additional reason is that he is the officer most likely to be permanently present, and, as it is essential that the defence scheme should be able to come into force instantly in a precautionary period, he will be in the best position to take up the command.

There will, however, be ports, especially those not liable to land attacks, at which the naval or air force permanently allotted to the defence preponderate over the military. In these, of course, the senior naval or air force officer would take control. The principle to be observed is that there should be one commander, decided on in peace, and that he should come from the Service providing the main portion of the defence.

A clear distinction must be made between the forces definitely allotted to local defence and those, not so allotted, but based on or using the port. If this is not done there will be confusion and friction between their respective commanders. This applies also to naval, military or air establishments for the maintenance of mobile forces, not forming part of the defences, for instance a port with a small defending force might contain a large naval dockyard. The naval officer in charge of the dockyard, except in such matters as air raid precautions, guards for vulnerable points, etc., should then be under the naval commander-in-chief or Admiralty direct, and would exercise no executive control over the port defence.

23. *Staffs.*

The defended port commander should, except where large forces are present, be able to retain in his own hands direct command of his own Service. The senior officers of the other Services could act either as subordinate commanders under him or as his chief staff officers. If the former, they must be represented by liaison officers at his headquarters, and keep in the closest personal touch with him. It is preferable, however, to adopt the second alternative, that is to make them his actual staff officers. This ensures more intimate touch, a quicker access to information, and that their advice will always be immediately available. In addition, all orders to their own services

will issue through them, and a frequent cause of misunderstanding be thus avoided. Should their acting as staff officers make it difficult for them to exercise direct command of their own services, it would be better for them to appoint their seconds-in-command to do so, freeing themselves for intimate co-operation with the port commander. At the same time the senior officer of each Service should be allowed to correspond direct on disciplinary and administrative matters with the heads of his own Service, it being clearly understood that for all operational purposes he would be completely under the port commander.

24. *Sub-division of Defences.*

The defended port area may extend for a considerable distance inland, and on the seaward side will include the approaches to the port and all water from which it may be bombarded. The limits of this area and the responsibilities of each Service within it should be clearly laid down. When either the area or the forces employed become very large, it may be advisable to divide the defence into zones or sectors, each with a commander responsible for its defence and administration. No geographical boundaries can be laid down for the responsibility of each service, as the essence of co-operation is that their defensive measures should overlap. But there must be a clear definition of the action each should take to meet attack, and complete mutual knowledge of one another's plans.

25. *Communications.*

No scheme of control and co-ordination can work without an efficient communication system. In spite of increased uniformity in signal procedure it is no easy matter to link up units of every service, and further complications will arise as the civil telephones and telegraphs will have to be included. A small joint signal committee, consisting of the chief signal officer of each service with a representative of the civil telegraphs, would be most useful to co-ordinate all signal matters. Efficient defence will depend so much on communications that no pains must be spared to protect the main telegraph lines, exchanges and visual stations from bombardment or air attack.

Besides the provision of ample inter-communication facilities, direct liaison between units of the different Services must be encouraged. This is especially necessary where they have to act in direct support

of one another, as for example, the naval examination service and the light batteries covering the examination anchorage, and the approaches.

26. *Liaison with Civil Authorities.*

An attack on a port will bring the civil population into such close contact with the realities of war, that they must be regarded as the fourth partner in the defence. In fact its threefold aspect becomes fourfold.

In addition to existing volunteer units, further reserves of able bodied civilians to man defences or provide labour can usually be raised. The police and special constables can relieve troops of much internal security work. Civil hospitals, doctors, and voluntary aid detachments can be a most valuable reinforcement to the medical services. Civil transport resources will have to be exploited fully by a system of requisitioning.

The control of a large civilian population, liable to bombardment or air attack, is a difficult and complex business. Anti-air raid precautions, shelters, protection against gas, counter-espionage, sanitary measures, and possibly rationing, will all have to be provided for by the port commander. Probably the best way to ensure the necessary control is to appoint suitable, prominent, and loyal citizens as district commissioners, each responsible for an area. Obviously special legislation will be required and it must be drawn up in peace ready to become operative at once by ordinance. As soon as the precautionary period begins the chief civil official should be attached to the Port Commander's staff as political adviser. When serious attack is likely it will probably be advisable to proclaim martial law, the civil authorities then become definitely subordinate to the commander. At all stages a senior representative of the civil authority, usually a police officer, should be permanently at Port Headquarters.

27. *Measures in Peace.*

The organization of the defence is too complicated a business to be done in a hurry ; yet it will be required to come into force in a hurry, even before war breaks out. There is only one way to get over this difficulty. Every port must have ready in peace, completely worked out, its defence scheme for war. The officers who are to carry it out should have studied it on the spot and got into personal

touch. Unless these precautions are taken control and co-ordination will present insuperable difficulties.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS.

28. It has been seen that there is no kind of attack on a port, except possibly overland invasion, against which any one of the Services by itself cannot put up some form of defence, provided it is allowed to select suitable weapons from its armoury. At times, as in the case of heavy guns and aeroplanes, the relative values of the alternatives are so nearly equal, that a choice can only be made after due consideration of the particular local circumstances, and the demands likely to be made on the Services elsewhere. There is a natural tendency for the sailor, the soldier and the airman each to have such confidence in his own Service that he believes it capable of successfully carrying through an operation without the aid of the others. In this matter of port defence especially, the controversy has at times been in danger of dropping to the level of party politics, in which one side may never admit any truth in the arguments of the other. This is an attitude that should be foreign to the consideration of service problems, and the temptation to press the claim of one's own Service merely because it is one's own must be resisted.

Briefly, the essentials on which a sound system of port defence must rest are :—

- (i) An accurate estimate of the kind and strength of attack likely at each port.
- (ii) The allotment, from the available forces of each service, of those units which can most efficiently and economically meet this attack.
- (iii) The exploitation of all local resources to aid in the defence.
- (iv) Unity of command at each port, and complete co-operation between the Services engaged, based on a plan prepared in peace and ready for immediate enforcement.
- (v) Most important of all, the allotment of no forces to local defence which are required for the main naval, military or air striking force, on which all security ultimately depends.

None of these will be the work of one Service only, all must play their part. War itself is a combined operation, and there lurk tremendous dangers in forgetting this, and reverting to "Gallipoli tactics." No service can make war, or even part of a war, by itself ; in some operations one Service may take a predominant part but it will always require the help of the others. Port defence is no exception to this, and its problems will never be solved by the complete substitution of one Service for another, but by the co-operation of all to the common end.

THE ARMIES OF MALAYSIA AND INDO-CHINA.

BY MAJOR T. A. LOWE, D.S.O., M.C.,

The Highland Light Infantry.

According to an attractive little guide book issued by Messrs. Thomas Cook & Sons, the countries which constitute Malaysia are those which fit in most agreeably with the lines of communication available for tourists. It is pointed out how easy it is for the traveller to proceed from Singapore to Penang by sea, visiting Port Swettenham and Kuala Lumpur on the way ; how the Royal Siamese Railways will take him through southern Siam to Bangkok ; how it is possible from Bangkok to travel overland by rail and automobile to Saigon in Indo-China, and pause for a while to see the wonderful buried city of Angkor ; how a ship may be obtained at Saigon for the journey to Java, the garden island of the Far East. The term Malaysia is a useful one to describe such a tour, so for the purpose of this article it has been adopted. Geographically and historically it might be more accurate to describe the area as the Malay Archipelago.

During three years spent as a General Staff Officer in the Malaya Command, the writer had the good fortune to be invited to visit three foreign armies in neighbouring territories. In September 1926 the Army of the Netherlands East Indies was holding manœuvres in West Java, and the Commander-in-Chief extended an invitation for a British Officer to attend. In November 1927, the King of Siam, who had ascended the Throne but a year or two previously, celebrated his birthday with more than ordinary state as it was the first since the Court had come out of mourning ; the writer was appointed a temporary military *attaché* for the purpose of attending and visiting the Siamese Army. In November 1928, the French Colonial Army Headquarters invited a British Officer from the Malaya Command, to be present at their manœuvres in Tonking. Again the mantle fell on the writer for the very simple reason that there was no one else available to go. Assuredly it was a very lucky chain of events and circumstances. One arrived in Java as the guest of the Dutch Government, and in Siam and Indo-China as the guest of their armies. Every officer, civil and military, vied with his neighbour in showing hospitality and

welcome. There was no feeling of suspicion, no distrust, no whisperings about that fatal word "Intelligence." Questions asked frankly—so long as they were not stupid questions—were as frankly answered, while requests to see all that there was to see of a military nature met with enthusiastic compliance.

Most nations realize nowadays that Military Intelligence is merely a part of a General Staff Officer's duties. The subject has evolved out of its old "hush-hush" chrysalis and it is no part of the business of accredited visitors to foreign armies to adopt disguises or detective story methods. "Look up 'Intelligence' in the new volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*," remarks a character in one of Aldous Huxley's novels, "you'll find it classified under the following three heads: Intelligence, Human; Intelligence, Animal; Intelligence, Military." A good joke this and there may have been times when it described the truth, but not now!

1. *The Army of the Netherlands East Indies.*

The island of Java is only 38 hours by steamer from Singapore, and it is the most important of the Dutch possessions in the East. Java is about 660 miles long and varies in breadth between 33 and 120 miles. The main physical feature is the range of mountains, which rise in places to a height of 12,000 feet; in this range there are over a hundred volcanoes, fourteen of which are said to be continually active—the "safety valves" of the Malaya Archipelago.

Java is a very beautiful island, and unlike the Malay Peninsula where labour for all cultivation has to be imported, is rich in various forms of agriculture. Rice, sugar, tea, coffee, rubber and many other products, are grown by a huge indigenous population of over forty million natives. These people are mostly Javanese, though traces of many other races can be found. They love Java intensely, as the Maltese do Malta, and refuse to leave it for long even for a neighbouring island like Sumatra which could be developed in the same rich manner as Java but for the scantiness of its native population.

The voyage from Singapore to Batavia is of unusual interest. Dutch ships run twice weekly through an archipelago of innumerable little islands all of which are part of the Netherlands East Indies. Some of these are inhabited by Malays, who scratch a precarious existence out of growing cocoanuts. Others are uninhabited and barren. Most

of these islands, however, possess deep water anchorages, and it was hereabouts that the "Emden" was able to lurk on several occasions quite unobserved, and replenish her supplies of fresh water. I got into conversation with a fellow passenger, who was an employee in a famous Amsterdam firm of wireless apparatus manufacturers, and he explained how difficult such waters were to protect or defend, affording as they do unlimited opportunity for ships to play hide-and-seek. He hoped that wireless telegraphy would be the principal means of defeating such difficulties in the future.

Dutch colonists take a great interest in their Colonial Army, principally because they are all bound to do a period of service in it as young men when they first go out to their colonies. Previous military service in Holland, of course, renders an individual exempt, but many young men who wish to make good in the East, come out to Java straight from school and do their compulsory service then. Doubtless for this reason many of my fellow-passengers, knowing my mission which had been announced in the local press, came along and introduced themselves as old soldiers of the Dutch Army. They expressed great pleasure that a British officer was, at last, going to see their Army in being, a matter which they seemed to consider had been neglected for too long. In conversation I soon discovered that Java is much more a home to the Dutch than Malaya is to the British, or Indo-China to the Frenchman. Many Dutch colonists go to Java, build up their businesses and stay there, settling down in the country for life perfectly peacefully. They do not necessarily return to Holland at all; in fact many have no desire to do so. For this reason their interest in their own defence is noticeable. Colonial revenues provide the annual votes for armaments, and there is always much discussion in the newspapers when such matters are the business of the Parliament.

At Priok the port for Batavia, the ship was met by a *liaison* officer who had been sent by the Commander-in-Chief to meet me and to act as guide and interpreter. His *rôle* in the latter, however, was seldom required for most of the Dutch officers met with could speak English perfectly. When I commented on this fact an officer said, "Holland in Europe is a small country surrounded by vast ones. It is therefore necessary for us to learn French, German and English at our schools otherwise we would be unable to talk to our neighbours." No doubt this early training helps greatly in the acquisition of native dialects also.

The first two days were spent in Batavia, performing official calls and attending official luncheons and dinner parties. There is a garrison of about the strength of a brigade stationed in the neighbourhood of Batavia, but as this force was mobilizing for the manoeuvres no visits to military establishments there were paid. However, no time was wasted as it was necessary to meet all the leading Government officials and as many of the British community as possible. The manoeuvres were to take place in the mountains, near a small town called Garut, and on the way I was to visit Bandoeng where the Army Headquarters are situated. The British Consul-General conducted me to this city, situated at an altitude of over 2,300 feet in the midst of a beautiful plain, and there handed me over to the Dutch Commander-in-Chief and his staff. The following day was spent in studying maps and reading translations of operation orders and narratives, and then we set out for the manoeuvres by car.

Garut is an attractive town situated in the centre of a group of volcanoes. It is approached from Bandoeng by a hilly road running between fields on either side which are mainly devoted to rice cultivation. This industry is much encouraged by the Government who have installed a wonderful system of irrigation. Each little field is banked up and has its own water supply, and the fields in some cases are so small that the landscape looks like a sort of crazy pavement. Actually the country over which the manoeuvres took place was similar. The rice harvest had been garnered, so little damage was caused to the fields except when the tiny irrigation embankments got broken down. The only variation in the rice-field landscape is numerous clumps of bamboo trees which indicate the presence of native villages. These clumps protect the flimsy native dwellings from storm and heat. Spare bamboo poles are cut and used for innumerable purposes and I was soon to discover their military value. Bamboo in Java might easily be called the "Engineer's friend."

There was about the strength of a division employed in the manoeuvres which comprised allarms and about a squadron of aeroplanes. The troops, with the exception of a few white conscripts who formed a company of their own, were entirely natives, called to the colours from such places as Bali, Ambon and other islands of the Celebes. Javanese, too, figured greatly in the picture but mainly in the cavalry and as drivers for the artillery. The organization of

the infantry was of interest. Each battalion had three companies, and one of these wore special facings to their uniforms and were called storm troops. These picked companies seemed to consist of Amboinese, who have amazing powers of endurance. They can march thirty miles a day fully equipped and then sleep out in the open in the rainy season without suffering any apparent discomfort. They got lots of work to do during the manoeuvres, but every time I saw them they seemed to be thoroughly enjoying themselves and as keen as mustard.

The non-commissioned ranks are Dutch regulars who are seconded from the Army in Holland for a period. These men act as instructors to the native recruits and as section and platoon leaders when the Army is at exercise. In the field they live with their men and appear perfectly happy to eat the same food and share the same bamboo bivouacks. The native privates call these N. C. O.'s "Uncle," which may be described as a term of affection tempered with respect. This system seems to be a success, but that it is so is due to the fact that these native soldiers from the islands have very clean habits physically. They are keen on sanitation and bathing, delight in laughter and good humour and conduct themselves in a seemly manner before Europeans.

The officers are not seconded. They join the Colonial Army on similar terms to those which a British officer joins our Indian Army. The majority come out as subalterns after a year or two of service with the Army in Holland, and when they arrive they must commence immediately to learn the various native languages and dialects of the troops they will be serving with. Javanese and Malay, for instance, are two completely different languages, while Amboinese is a dialect of both.

The pay of an officer on joining is good, and he is provided with rations and quarters. There are no messes as the towns in the Netherlands East Indies are designed on the Continental plan and the open-air restaurant and cafe system is much in vogue. Matrimony amongst officers is encouraged rather than otherwise. It is considered no disgrace for a subaltern to join up like Mr. Bateman's picture, "complete with wife." Certainly the young wives who come out from Holland seem to know what they are in for, and make no fuss about being sent to wild and woolly out-stations in Sumatra and the islands. They are bound to spend a portion of their service in such places.

Tactically the manœuvres were similar to what one might see at divisional training at Aldershot. The novelty was entirely in the execution, and there were many points of interest for that reason. Owing to the nature of the country soldiers were seldom to be seen moving in extended order across an open rice patch. They were not allowed to do so, even though at that time the fields were caked hard with mud, because for the greater portion of the year these fields are flooded and would be quite impassable. Sections therefore advanced towards rifle fire in little worms and snakes, these formations rushing along the tiny embankments with surprising speed. When halted they seemed to take very effective cover, thus it was difficult to see an attack approaching a position. At least I fear I must qualify this statement. There was one factor which spoiled the whole thing, (which the Commander-in-Chief said afterwards it was impossible to eliminate), *i.e.*, a huge crowd of eager spectators. The Javanese consider that when manœuvres are held in their particular area it is a great honour to the municipality of that area. The entire local population stops work, (the smallest excuse justifies that at any time), dresses up in its best clothes and then follows the troops diligently. This crowd cannot be driven away. Many of its members are old soldiers who seize upon the opportunity of "swanking" and trying to explain to their friends what is going on. Also they like to assure themselves that the youngsters of to-day are keeping the old traditions going. From position to position the crowds follow, caring nought for the fact that they are giving away the whole show by doing so or that the defence is busy ranging on them all the time. Apart from this the troops advanced well. They knew how to provide covering fire with machine guns and automatic rifles and they never exposed themselves unnecessarily.

The artillery was entirely field. It was good at moving and taking up positions. Batteries seemed always to be in telephonic communication with their groups. But they, too, were at a disadvantage owing to the nature of the country because it was a reasonable certainty, when trying to "spot" positions, that they were in one of the clumps of bamboo trees. When firing started it was only a question of elimination to discover in which particular clump a battery was hiding. Perhaps for this reason they were able to clear out to alternative positions at lightning speed, if necessary.

One cavalry regiment only was employed in the exercises. The troopers were nearly all Javanese. The horses Australian. As their duties were entirely reconnaissance, and they were split up into troops for that purpose, it was difficult to see much of their work. Later on, however, I visited a cavalry depot at Bandoeng and found that the curriculum of barrack training was strenuous and efficient for both man and horse. An exhibition of jumping by Javanese troopers left no doubt in my mind that these natives could ride. There was every evidence that they are well trained in horsemastership as well.

There was the inevitable night advance culminating in a night attack—no manœuvres anywhere in the world would be complete without such an exercise! In this case the defence were in a position where a river had to be crossed, designed, of course, as an opportunity for the sappers to show what they could do about crossing it. The enemy had searchlights and the attacking force had to be provided with bridges. No pontoons were used but bridges were improvised in a very clever manner out of strips of bamboo and rope. The bamboo was cut into pieces of about four feet in length, and then these strips were tied together at both ends like a cork mattress. When rolled up for transport purposes the bamboo seemed to assume enormous dimensions, but they seemed quite light to carry, while the method of getting them across the river was the last word in simplicity. One man swam the stream taking with him a loose rope which he made fast to a tree on the far side. Then by means of a small pulley and block the bamboo bridge unrolled itself and floated across. Almost before the further end had touched the opposite bank the troops were running across one at a time. Most of them got over without a serious wetting although the bridge actually sunk to about three feet in the middle with the weight of one man. In this attack the defending troops were routed, not because they were unaware that the river would be crossed by means of bridges but because there were so many bridges hurled across that they could not concentrate their fire on all of them. The native “sappers” seemed to be able to manufacture these bridges with amazing rapidity. In the same way they can erect a hut or a bivouac with this material which is always to be found somewhere conveniently in Java.

The Quarter-master's branch had few difficulties, as our army knows them, on these manœuvres. Each battalion had its own travelling cooker and the cooks confined their efforts to curry. Rice

was always boiling and the native troops seemed to want nothing else except tea. Apparently the water was dangerous in Java and there was a standing order that no one must drink it, so tea was always available for the water-bottles. Soup is very popular and was issued when the troops were in billets, and sometimes small fish and sauces would be added to the rice. Haversack rations consisted of bread and biscuits.

The strength of the Dutch army in the Netherlands East Indies is about two divisions, but, owing to the scattered nature of the colonies which it is required to defend, considerable numbers of troops have to be used on small detachment duty in Sumatra, Borneo and the smaller islands. Native infantry is used for these detachments and communications are now maintained by portable wireless sets with which every detachment is provided. At intervals of every twenty-four hours each unit is called up by wireless and the news of the day is given. Sometimes, even, concert music from Europe is relayed.

This wireless communication has been found to be invaluable from a medical point of view. The Dutch have no specifically military hospitals. Their medical services are run by the Government for the benefit of the entire community, European and native. Army officers subscribe a small percentage of their pay for medical attention, and then have a definite claim for the best specialist advice if required. I visited one Government hospital in Bandoeng and was much impressed by the system adopted. There were specialists in tropical diseases, in medicine, in surgery and every other branch, but these were not necessarily Dutch medical men. Some were German and some were French. "We try to apply the best scientific thought of all nations," the Director of the hospital informed me, "all our X-ray sisters, for instance, are Viennese ladies who had much experience of this work during the war." The scheme seems to work well for once a week all the specialists meet together and discuss the progress of their cases in conference. This avoids the possibility of "sealed compartments."

After the manoeuvres I was enabled to see something of the permanent establishments of the Eastern Division. The journey from Bandoeng to Sourabaya took fourteen hours by train and was far from comfortable as it was a Sunday and there were many passengers. Neither was it possible to see much of the country. But these things

only increased the pleasure of the return journey to Bandoeng, which was made by air. It was a delightful experience to fly with the air mail from Sourabaya to Batavia in the early morning, and to see nearly the whole of Java spread out beneath like a map. And then to fly low over the volcanoes and see the active craters boiling with lava and sulphur. The total time taken to accomplish this journey, which included halts for mails, was about four hours.

The Eastern Division is similarly constituted to the Western one except that it possesses a brigade of pack artillery with mule transport. I spent a day in the field with this unit and we did some really rough marching in mountainous country. The mules seemed to be able to take the guns anywhere and the gunners were skilful at getting their guns into position with the speed and enthusiasm of a competition at Olympia.

The Navy took charge of me after this and I was allowed to see their workshops, submarine depots, dockyards and what ships were in port, before departing once more for Bandoeng to take my leave of the Commander-in-Chief who had been so hospitable and who had arranged such a delightful programme.

2. *The Siamese Army.*

The Kingdom of Siam is bounded on the north by the Shan States ; on the east by the French states of Laos and Cambodia ; on the west by Lower Burma ; and, in the south, by British Malaya and the Gulf of Siam. Its area is about 260,000 square miles.

The King of Siam is the only absolute monarch left in the world. He rules with the assistance of members of the royal family, but in all matters of legislation his word is supreme. The religion of the country is Buddhism.

The present King came to the throne in 1926. As a boy he was at Harrow and then he went on to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. His education was completed in France before he returned to Siam. His reign so far has been a happy and prosperous one for the country ; he is a wise, gracious and popular sovereign and has already earned for himself the loyalty and devotion of his people.

One of the King's first acts on ascending the throne of Siam was to set about the re-organization of his army. Although the Siamese had joined the Allies in the War, their principal military

contribution had been aeroplanes. After the War the Army was still in a somewhat medieval state as regards equipment and organization. There were too many senior officers, too many personal and court appointments, too many "camp followers" and "hangers-on." A scheme similar to the Geddes's "axe" was put into force, and though it caused a good deal of criticism and discontent as all such schemes must, there emerged in place of a scattered force of isolated units, an army of two well equipped and mobile divisions. One of these divisions is based on Chiangmai in Northern Siam, and the other—which includes the Guards and Household troops—is quartered at Bangkok. It was the latter that I visited on the occasion of the King's birthday celebrations in 1927.

The Siamese Army is a conscript one. Many of the soldiers come from Northern Siam and have a close physical resemblance to the Burmese. These "mountainy" men take to military training very readily, but the same can hardly be said about those who come from the eastern or Cambodian country. This country to the east consists of a vast alluvial plain some 50,000 square miles in extent and this forms one of the richest rice-growing lands in the world. The entire population works in the rice fields and the monotony of the work produces a sort of bovine stupidity. They supply their quota to the Army, but they do not as a rule find themselves posted to the best regiments.

My programme was arranged and personally supervised by a Siamese staff officer who had been a pupil in the Gymnasium at Aldershot when I had been adjutant there, for a period after the war. It was very pleasant to meet again in his own country, and I was informed that there were nine young officers serving in the Bangkok Division who had been either to Woolwich or Sandhurst since the war. Eventually I met them all and found that they were doing very well indeed, commanding either companies or batteries. I was bombarded with questions about "home," and when an Army List was produced, (which by a fluke I had brought with me), they pored over it to see what had become of their pals in the British Army. It was all very pleasant and entirely broke down any "foreign" atmosphere which a visit of this sort may easily beget. It so happened that Armistice Night happened during my stay in Bangkok, so I organised a small dinner party for these boys at a local hotel. The party was

a great success, so much so that the news was conveyed to me afterwards that had I included in the invitation certain senior Siamese officers who had also been to Woolwich and Sandhurst, we might have had a merrier time still. I wished heartily that I had done so.

There is a Royal Military College in Bangkok, and this we visited. It is run rather on the lines of West Point than of Sandhurst, as the boys who attend do not necessarily become professional officers. Most of them do get commissions when there are vacancies, but as the Army is small quite a number get jobs in civil life.

We walked round the College seeing classes in map reading, geography, mathematics, languages and literature in progress, until my guide—almost in a fever of impatience—conducted me to the gymnasium to see the system of physical training which he himself had introduced after his course at Aldershot. This was good, decidedly so! Small squads of boys under well trained instructors, were fairly flying to their work. “Scissors” over the vaulting horse, athletics, balancing, boxing, “Crow and Cranes,” bayonet fencing, and physical training—all going on at once in the liveliest possible manner. I wandered from one squad to another delightedly, and wished from the bottom of my heart that my Master, (Colonel R. B. Campbell) could have seen some of the fruits of his labours. Physical training suits the Siamese temperaments; they love it.

Then the whistles went and the whole College assembled for a grand parade under the Commandant. The boys drilled for an hour in close and open order to the music of a band and finished up with a smart March Past.

Our next day was spent with the Guards, inspecting barracks, watching drill, seeing the Palace guards change. Guards are guards the world over and the Siamese Guards are no exception. Their men are magnificent: fine physically, keen and intelligent. The barrack rooms were the last word in “spit and polish,” the saluting was smart, and, if an officer called a N. C. O. the latter sprang to it as if he had been bitten by a badger. Yet there did not seem to be any “Prussianism” about the Siamese Guards. The men seemed happy and healthy, they were well fed and looked proud of themselves.

The conscript system produces greater difficulties in the cavalry and the artillery than it does in the infantry. Out of eighteen months to

two years service, a lot of time is taken up if the recruit has to be taught to ride as well as his other duties. On the way to watch a cavalry regiment parading I was warned by my guide that a number of the troopers were recruits and might not therefore know their drill. But that the ponies were not conscripts and knew their drill very well because they stayed in the army for a lifetime. If only the recruits would leave the ponies alone the parade would be a success, if not, anything might happen. This was amply proved in the course of the morning's work.

The Siamese pony is a small beast of similar stature to the Shetland variety. These little chaps are used as troop horses but the officers ride Australian horses which makes a parade look queer and uneven. The ponies are as tough and wiry as ponies could be, and very intelligent. They knew exactly what their colonel was going to roar at them, so the evolution was performed perfectly. It was a case of "when father says turn we all turn," and highly amusing to watch. Sometimes the recruits stayed on, sometimes they did not. After the parade was over I rode one of the ponies round the parade ground, which caused shouts of delighted merriment from the troopers. Although I am only five feet eight inches in height, I could touch the ground from the saddle with both legs. Then the pony galloped with a nasty, short, jerky motion which jarred every bone in one's body. I sympathised with the recruits.

The same type of pony is used by the artillery for pulling their field guns. Six are harnessed to a gun, and so long as the country is flat they can manage very well, but if the country becomes hilly and difficult they cannot stand the strain. Siam is not a suitable country for artillery to work. In the rice deltas, owing to the mud and water, guns could not operate, while in the mountainous districts jungle and forest is so dense that movement with guns is impossible. It is not a country of roads. Most of the transport is done by water, *i.e.*, by rivers and canals. However, I watched a battery drilling and afterwards inspected their barracks and institutes. The officer who was in command of the battery had been to school in England and then had gone on to Woolwich. He told me that when he came back from England he could not speak Siamese, and was therefore very homesick.

The Siamese Air Force is under the control of their War Office, and it is said by experts to be one of the finest in Asia. Their main aerodrome is near Bangkok, and there they assemble all their engines and manufacture the woodwork. An air display was arranged for my benefit by pilots and their pupils, and some amazing "stunts" were performed—enough to prove that Siamese airmen are thoroughly at home in the air. They have "air sense," and realize that this arm is very important in the defence of a difficult country like Siam. Most of their original pilots were trained in France during the war, but they have a great respect for British aviation and British material for aeroplanes. Eventually it will come to pass that people will travel a great deal by aeroplane in Siam. The climate is ideal for flying.

3. *The Army of Indo-China.*

French Indo-China comprises the colony of Cochin-China, the protectorates of Tonking, Annam, Cambodia and Laos. The area of territory is about 288,000 square miles, or nearly half that of France. Indo-China is a country of great mountain ranges, great rivers and a wonderful seaboard. It is an intensely rich country and becomes richer every year. It is also a country of ancient civilizations.

There are two great native races in Indo-China—the Annamites and the Cambodians. Of these the French army is largely composed. The Annamites originally came from Southern China and settled about the delta of the Red River in Tonking, and along the shores of the China Sea in the territory which is now called Annam. They are very Chinese in appearance. The Cambodians are southerners and live in the vast delta of the Mekong River where they grow rice and catch fish. They are not at all Chinese in appearance but are rather similar physically to the Siamese.

Like the Dutch and the Siamese armies, the French army is conscript. But this means no very great strain on a population of over twelve million Annamities and two million Cambodians. There is a ballot and each man has a chance of being exempted—if he wants to be; quite a number do not—when he is called up. The Annamites provide the greater number of troops, not only because of their numbers but because they have been proved to be the best fighting material. Cambodians are recruited, but largely for political reasons. They are kept in special regiments and seldom taken away from their own country. The two races do not seem to "mix."

The French system of organizing their native army is entirely different to the Dutch. French officers are attached to native regiments for periods of two or three years only, and at the end of that time they move on to another unit. Before coming to Indo-China they may have been serving with Zuaves or Turcos in North Africa or some other French zone. They definitely spend their lives on colonial service and seldom return to the French Army in France where pay and conditions are quite different, but they keep moving about from one colony to another. The system works well except in one particular. Native languages cannot as a rule be acquired in periods of two years, especially a language like the Annamite which is nearly as difficult as Chinese. In order to overcome this difficulty attempts are made to teach the Annamites the French language, but this is only partially successful with short-service conscripts. It is found necessary therefore, to employ a sort of Adjutant-Interpreter to act as *liaison* between the officers and the ranks. This man is usually an educated Annamite, and he often finds himself in a position of great power which can be, and often is, abused. Attempts are now being made to extend the service of French officers in Indo-China because of this language difficulty, so that they will have more opportunity to study the language.

The manoeuvres were held in Tonking, but before they commenced an invitation to visit Army Headquarters at Hanoi was gratefully accepted. Hanoi is a very beautiful city situated on the Red River and about two hours motor run from the port of Haiphong. The Governor-General of Indo-China has a residence there, and so has the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Many civil service officials and army staff officers reside in the city.

There is an air of aristocratic good taste about Hanoi which is very surprising in the East. The Christian cathedral, the wide boulevards, the restful cafés, the luxurious shops and the solid opera house, all go to prove what sensible and progressive town-planning may do. A magnificent university completes the delusion that one is in France and not in the East at all.

I was the guest of the Commander-in-Chief, an officer with a magnificent record in the French Colonial Army. He had had much experience with African troops and had been to Indo-China previously as a young man. His enthusiasm for the latter country knew no

bounds: he said its development since his previous appointment there had been astounding.

We talked of the ancient wars in Tonking, wars fought on the Chinese frontier, and I heard of the French struggle against the northern hordes who wished to drive them out of the country. Very severe fighting it was too, until the French finally asserted their supremacy and the country settled down to the observance of law and order. Even now, however, the frontier has to be very carefully guarded and this employs a number of native troops. We talked politics; of Communism, and the problem of the educated native; of the spread of Chinese nationalism; of the white man's influence in the East. And when we had talked thus for some time I realized as never before that the military problems of the French in Indo-China, of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies and of the British in Malaya, are identical. We are European, and for that reason alone we are bound to be thrown more and more together.

I visited a regiment of Colonial Artillery. From the top of a high water tower young officers were practising "spotting" artillery fire on an ingenious map drawn to scale on the ground. An instructor was throwing bombs of white wool on the map and listening to his pupils picking up the map reference aloft, by means of a telephone. Elsewhere French gunners were busy with their 75's while mechanics worked blithely at Renault tanks and motor transport. Then I went on to a regiment of Colonial Infantry. Here a Signals officer belonging to Regimental Headquarters staged a demonstration of the "nerves" of a regiment at work in a battle. Actual war conditions were produced in the lecture room by means of strange devices and the signallers working in little group units, were worried and teased the whole time they were at work taking in and sending out their messages. Dummy aeroplanes came over and they had to dive for their gas masks, shell fire would arrive and cut their lines, Regimental Headquarters would get very worried and anxious about the "situation." I watched this demonstration for sometime and was very impressed with it. A brilliant attempt to get at the root of failure in war.

Then a visit to an Annamite regiment in barracks. More inspections of barracks, more demonstrations, this time of drill and guard-mounting. Then on to the Survey Section to witness the making of

maps. Then to the Headquarters of the Air Force, and so on : my delightful host planning each visit himself and throwing open his Command for my benefit, until we set off together for the manœuvres.

At the place where we left our car and were met by horses, there was drawn up the massed bands of the Foreign Legion, chiefly Austrian musicians as I discovered later. They played *The Marseillais* while we stood at the salute, and then, somewhat to my astonishment, they played three verses of "God Save the King." Our King was nigh unto death at the time, and it was the French manner of conveying sympathy—a very moving and delicate compliment !

For three days we watched the exercises, accompanied the marches, attended the officers' conferences and inspected the troops. It is not the purpose of this article to go into professional details about such things, but it is permissible to say that the visitor came away with the impression that the French maintain a very fine Army in their Colony. The weather unfortunately was very bad. The time was November, and perpetual rain and sleet seemed to be the order of the day. Yet the troops showed remarkable qualities of endurance. The Foreign Legion, of which there was a regiment taking part, were particularly impressive. The men were of good physique, well fed, well clothed, happy and contented. I spoke of "*Beau Geste*," and there was hearty laughter, as Mr. P. C. Wren's literary efforts seem to afford the Foreign Legion as much amusement and excitement as they do the British public. But some of the Legion resent the fact that their Corps has been chosen as the medium for this particular form of limelight, which they say bears little relation to the actual facts. "Why should he write about us instead of your own Brigade of Guards ? ", I was asked good-humouredly. "But they are not surrounded with your romantic associations," I replied, and again the laugh was general.

After the manœuvres there was a great review, all the troops who had taken part in the former being present. They marched past the Governor-General, with massed bands playing, and it was an effective display. The Annamites with their little Chinese helmets, the Foreign Legion with their bearded veterans, the French gunners with their nippy 75's. As a background the aeroplanes which had been engaged in contact work, were drawn up on the parade ground in flights. Soon after this I took my leave of the Commander-in-Chief and

proceeded southwards to Saigon, where another programme of visits had been arranged, *en route* for Singapore.

Saigon is called the "Paris of the East" and possibly for that reason French soldiers like being stationed there. It is the Headquarters of a Division, the one which is for the protection of southern Indo-China. There is an officers' club in one of the boulevards and once a week officers and their wives and guests dine in the open to the music of a military band. This is a homely and delightful social gathering at which senior and junior officers seem to mix freely.

Again I was taken round the various military establishments and given the opportunity of seeing all that I wanted to see. An officer who had been a famous French International Rugby player acted as my guide. We had many mutual friends in Britain.

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The object of this chronicle is to prove that the countries of Malaysia and Indo-China are very fair and fascinating lands. That they teem with interest from a military point of view. That they are controlled, defended and governed by European peoples (with the exception of Siam, of course), whose ideas on these matters though different to the British in many ways, are nevertheless helping the native races in their ambition for progress. These armies of the Archipelago are not designed for war but for security and peace—insurance against the richness of the lands.

FRONTIER CANTONMENT LIFE IN THE DAYS OF LAKE AND WELLESLEY.

BY COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL.

Although memoirs of life in the big Presidential cities of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta are fairly plentiful, descriptions of the small up-country military cantonments in the days of Lake and Wellesley are almost non-existent. Fortunately, we have the journal of Lieutenant John Pester, a subaltern of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry, stationed, in 1803, at Shikoabad, a small, one battalion cantonment on the then Mahratta Frontier, which was only fourteen miles distant. The place lies thirty-five miles east of Agra, which was then the headquarters of the administration of the great French adventurer, Perron, an individual who had come out to India as a boatswain in the fleet of the great Suffren, the *bougre determine* of our friend William Hickey's blue jacket acquaintance. Perron, in theory, was the servant of Scindhia, the forebear of the Maharaja of Gwalior, then the most powerful chief in India. In practice, however, he was a great and independent prince, commanding an army of 40,000 men, officered by adventurers, most of whom were British, or British half castes, including men like James Skinner and Hyder Jung Hearsey, both of whom achieved fame under Lord Lake within the next two years.

Shikoabad was in what were known as the Ceded Districts, of Allahabad, Corah and Rohilkand, which the Nawab Wazir of Oudh had been "prevailed upon" to hand over to the British in 1801, as the maladministration of that prince was such that there was every prospect of Perron taking them over if we did not. Lord Henry Wellesley, with his Headquarters at Bareilly, had been the Chief Commissioner of these districts, but had just gone Home.

According to modern ideas, Shikoabad would be reckoned an extremely good cold weather station, though abominable in the hot. Its nearest modern counterpart would be Muttra, minus railways or roads. The country in 1803 differed enormously from the present day as the now-existent wonderful irrigation system had not come into being. There were many patches of jungle and uncultivated ground while the fine trees now to be seen bordering the roads and

canals had not yet been planted. Roads, indeed, were quite non-existent, and in many parts of the country even carts do not seem to have been used at all, transport being usually by pack bullock. In cantonments there were dusty tracks, dignified by the name of roads, and these sometimes extended four or five miles out, but no more. The country was still in a very unsettled state and Pester had taken part, in the cold weather of 1802-03, in what was known as the Mud War, against refractory rajas who had refused to pay their taxes. The operations had taken the form of sundry sieges of fortified towns, and on one occasion, before Sarsni, the battalion had been badly punished owing to the assault failing through the ladders being too short. It was when before this place that Lake first came under fire in India. His horse, startled by a cannon shot, had reared up and rolled on him, while Pester's animal, close behind, had been cut in two by another. The incident took place in full view of the army, who were astonished to see the Commander-in-Chief get up and carry on his conversation just as though nothing had happened.

From that day forward, Lake's fame among the native soldiery of India grew, and never diminished.

The whole country was studded with small forts, for it had been in a chronic state of upheaval since the memory of man, and the peasantry tilled their fields with their arms close at hand, and no man's life was safe—except, for such was their prestige, the white sahibs and, extraordinary to relate, their memsahibs.

This prestige, it should be noted, applied also to the European and half caste adventurers in the service of the native chiefs across the Border.

Despite the state of unrest, Shikoabad had, as hubs of society, no fewer than five regimental ladies—a very much married battalion was the 1st/2nd B. N. I. While in the cold weather life was probably pleasant enough, these poor women must have had a terrible time in the hot weather and rains. Pester tells us that, from the commencement of the hot winds, that is about mid-April, until the beginning of July, they did not quit their bungalow compounds, and then only because the first rains had broken. There were, indeed, far more ladies in these up-country stations than is generally imagined, though a visit to the graveyards of the older cantonments will reveal the appalling mortality among them, and among their children. We

hear of seven at Bareilly, including a very attractive *chère amie*, whose protector was a thoroughly good fellow, with the result that the whole of the younger officers would rendezvous at his bungalow rather than at the mansions of the "regular" ladies. Bareilly, however, was a headquarters, and a relatively big station. At Anupshahr, right on the frontier, there was one, and the poor woman must have had a dull time.

At Mainpuri, a very small civil station, there were no less than three. The Collector here was then engaged in building himself a young palace, which cost him close on a lakh of rupees, that is, the best part of £10,000 as money went then, but the edifice was nearly destroyed by Holkar in his famous foray in 1804. At Futtygarh, on the other hand, there were quite a number of white women, for this was the advanced dépôt of the "Europe shops," and a number of the shop-keeping fraternity were here. The place being a garrison, as well as a civil headquarters, snobbery attained its maximum pitch, and the good ladies—"precedence" among Anglo-Indian women was a regular disease and has not yet died out—were often not on speaking terms.

When Holkar's foray took place in 1804, the whole of these women were herded together in the small fort, and it is satisfactory to learn that the common danger welded them together in a few days time, though their quarrels and bickerings rose afresh after the danger had passed. It is extremely doubtful whether most of these were pure white. At Futtygarh, indeed, it is certain that the majority were half castes. The white ladies, for the most part, were very second class, of the category now known as "Suburbia," and miserably poor, so poor, indeed, that once in India they could never raise the cash to get out of the country again unless they got married. Hence our forefathers alluded to the term "markets" and, sometimes, to the more vulgar term, "the Scotch cattle" when individuals in search of white wives went down to Calcutta or Madras on the arrival of a convoy from Home. Pester, the son of a Somersetshire squire, and an officer of a better-to-do type than most to be found in India, is most contemptuous in his references to Anglo-Indian women as a general whole, though he had several very great friends. "Poor, proud and prejudiced, attempting the airs and graces of gentlewomen, though it is probable that, before arrival in our markets, they had not had a change of dickeys twice in a month."

Poor class or not, they had stout hearts, and the natives respected them. In the case of pretty women, indeed, the credulous peasantry had the most extraordinary notions. An old native officer recounts hearing an old woman of his village describe how she had seen a sahib driving in a buggy with a lovely fairy by his side. In order to prevent her flying away—for she had wings, (probably a tippet)—the sahib kept his hand on her shoulder all the way.

Amusements, in the hot weather and rains, appear to have been confined to an early morning ride, starting at those unearthly hours our forefathers loved so as to avoid the heat of the sun—for the sun-proof helmet had not yet been invented—gambling and dinner parties. The fact was, night was more or less turned into day. Billiard tables, on the other hand, were in existence, though not made of slate, in nearly all cantonments, and continual reference is made to the game. Most ladies had “pianos” and musical evenings were usual and very popular.

The outstanding excitement, in that small cantonment of Shikohabad in the hot weather of 1803, was the arrival, in early July of all times, for the temperature must have stood at 110 or so, the rains not having broken properly, of a globe-trotting party *en route* to visit Agra and Fatehpore Sikri. It consisted of three ladies, the Honourable Mrs. Carlton, wife of the colonel of the 29th Dragoons, stationed at Cawnpore, the great cantonment of the day, Mrs. Cunningham with her husband, the Collector of Mainpuri, and a Miss Dunbar. Such an arrival at such a season would create excitement even now, so what it caused in 1803 can be better imagined than described. The news that Colonel Carlton “treated his wife very ill” and was “a perfect brute” created a tremendous stir in the susceptible hearts of the subalternhood of the 2nd Native Infantry, who at once set themselves to console the poor lady. We learn that “she looked very fine” and that a drenching downpour of rain had the effect of merely heightening her appearance. The party, after staying in Shikohabad a couple of days, passed on to Agra, the Mahratta commandant at the Frontier fort of Ferozeabad welcoming them with a salute of guns.

The Agra of 1803 was governed by a famous old Dutch adventurer, John Helsing, a brave and kindly man who entertained such visitors as came from the Company’s territory in right royal fashion, for he had accumulated enormous wealth and lived like a prince.

Charles Metcalfe, the future Lord Metcalfe, then a young and precocious Civil Servant, while passing through the Mahratta dominions to the Deccan, had been given a breakfast by Hessian of such gargantuan proportions that he placed it on official record. It consisted of excellent fish, ham, cheese and cream. The ham and cheese had come from Holland, a matter, in those days, of nine months travel. Unfortunately, in July 1803, this fine old adventurer was dying, the succession to the command being "inherited," as was the custom, not infrequently, in the native service, by his half caste son—a very unworthy inheritor too. The visitors, in consequence, were not received on the same scale of magnificence. It is, indeed, not likely that they had much reception at all, for no mention is made of it, although Agra had numerous adventurers and their families quartered there, including a certain Colonel Sutherland who had been cashiered from the 73rd Highlanders. He was an officer who, in the next six months, was to do his country good service in facilitating the surrender of Agra Fort to General Lake. Although, in high places, there were rumblings of war, nothing was known of its being imminent in Shikohabad, though, "like a thief in the night, the troops were warned to prepare for it within the next three weeks and within six weeks the battalion marched out to the bloodiest war native soldiery were to take part in until 1914, and, of the eighteen officers who left the small cantonment, only three were left after the horrible Fourth Assault on Bhurtpore eighteen months later, while 360 out of 600 men had fallen in three months.

The Agra trip lasted about ten days, all the sights, including Fatehpore Sikri, being visited. While passing through Shikohabad, on the return journey, about half the subalterns of the 2nd Native Infantry found urgent calls to visit Mainpuri, and, of course, to accompany the dashing Mrs. Carlton and the charming Miss Dunbar. This maiden, though "of very fine figure," was to our friend Pester, who hailed from the good town of Yeovil, in "Zummerzet"—cursed with speaking broad Scotch. As to whether this dire affliction distressed one third of the other officers of the battalion—for the Company's officers were very largely drawn from the North of the Tweed—may be doubted. We must remember that the custom of army officers being educated at the great public schools is a comparative novelty. The majority, being the sons of the country gentry and corresponding classes, merely went to the local grammar schools, though curious to

relate, there was an Etonian in the battalion. Such being the case, we may assume that most spoke the dialect of their country, and, what is more, were proud of it too. Pester, whose people were squires of some considerable position in Somerset, had intense pride in the West Country and gives details of a famous dinner in which "three honest gentlemen of Yeovil" all feasted together—and got extremely drunk into the bargain, breaking the candle glasses "as is the custom in wine parties in India."

On arrival at Mainpuri, the dashing Mrs. Carlton, instead of returning to the arms of her lord and master, the colonel at Cawnpore, decided to stay on with the Cunninghams for a period. She would then take a boat at Futtygarh and go straight down to Calcutta, nearly three months journey, and proceed Home by the first convoy. Our friend Mr. William Hickey, at that period a leading light in Calcutta society, living with Chief Justice Russell, must have met her there. Miss Dunbar, on the other hand, would appear to have found her society rather too stimulating—at least so we deduce, for she refused to stay, and proceeded to Futtygarh the following day. It is worthy of note that this young unmarried lady proceeded without any white male escort through a country still by no means in a settled state, and through which British officers invariably proceeded armed. It is true that Cunningham, being the Collector, provided her with an armed guard of local levies. None the less, the incident gives some idea of the prestige of white ladies. Sport in the Ceded Districts was abundant, and there was no close season for small game. The chief excitements however, were tiger shooting, and hog hunting. Round Mainpuri there were good jungles, not more than five miles distant—at the present day, irrigation has covered the country with rich crops. While the officers disported themselves in the daytime, the ladies entertained them in the evenings. At these entertainments an enormous quantity of Carboneille hock and champagne was consumed—we must remember that a Collector drew an enormous salary and had as many perquisites—and the ladies appear to have been responsible for very many sore heads and leathery tongues in the morning. The ideas of humour of these good dames might not appeal to present day notions, though, from what Hickey and other contemporary writers tell us, very many of our great grandmothers, including ladies of position like Hickey's own

sisters, they were not altogether unique. For instance, one evening, after a particularly successful "tyger" shoot, when they were holding high festival, one of the gentlemen—a fine fellow who died in the breach at Bhurtpore—whose potations certainly justified his action, retired to bed. The ladies, or rather Mrs. Carlton, for Mrs. Cunningham appears to have been less "high spirited," noticing his absence, requested that he be brought in to make his apologies for not being present in the drawing room. The unfortunate man was carried in on his bed, "completely sewn up," and the ladies "had a fine game with him." To do Indian society, lax as it was, justice, Pester tells us that, had the affair been known, it would have been deemed "highly indecorous."

On another occasion, while at tiffin on a roasting hot July day, some twenty cooly women ran into the dining room and, seizing on one unfortunate officer, carried him out and shut him up in a godown, or outhouse—a very enjoyable pleasantry. Taken on the whole, we are by no means surprised at Colonel Carlton, "treating his wife very ill."

The question will now be asked, how did these ladies travel, and that too at such a season. Dak bungalows and roads were, we must remember, non-existent. On the other hand, Mrs. Cunningham was the wife of the Collector, while Mrs. Carlton was a woman of position and means. They had the resources of high civil dignitaries at their beck and call—ponies, elephants and a double set of camp equipment. As soon as one camp was reached, the duplicated set of servants set out for the next, with the result that the travellers always found tents ready for them, double walled, with glass windows, *khus khus* tatties and *punkhas*. Even then they must have approached purgatory in the heat of the day. When within a few miles of the sundry petty cantonments, the officers would provide their ramshackle dogcarts, buggies and curricles—Mrs. Carlton liked being driven tandem—the very chic among subalternhood. A feature which would appear extraordinary to modern ideas was the custom of ladies being escorted by individuals other than their husbands, whose duties obviously held them, for journeys which might last for some weeks. That such affairs occasionally resulted in disaster may be admitted, but it is as well to appreciate their rarity. While at Mainpuri the officers heard the first talk of war, and as only Pester had been "put through it,"

there was much joy at the news—there always is among those who have only lightly tasted its pleasures. The Civil Authorities had received orders to prepare bridges fit to carry artillery over sundry rivers en route to the Mahratta frontier ; and the forts were being victualled up as granaries.

Almost immediately after came news that General Gerard Lake, the Commander-in-Chief in India, was to march from Cawnpore at the end of July with the European troops—a sure sign of heavy work, much as the arrival of the Guards Division and other famous formations in France was, for the “*gora log*” were only employed on very big occasions. The officers returned to Shikoabad, and we will now go into the details of “mobilisation” as practised by our great grandfathers in India.

Shikoabad was, it must be remembered, only very few miles from the frontier. Cantonments in 1803 differed from those of the present day in that officers built their bungalows—very pokey little erections—very much where their fancy took them, usually, it would seem, in some clump of trees with a well handy, with the result that they were very much scattered. We know, for instance, that Hammond, of the battalion, a fine officer killed at the Fourth Assault on Bhurt-pore lived two miles out. At Mainpuri, Wemyss, a Civil Servant, kept his native mistress three miles out, while the Agent to the Governor-General at Bareilly lived five miles out. The first question that arose was the disposal of the ladies, or at all events those who did not intend to follow their husbands into the field, as sometimes occurred. A Mrs. Griffin was the first white woman to dine in the fort of Gwalior, when the temperature stood at 118, while, in 1843, great ladies actually came within range of the cannon shot at Maharajpore.

All, except a certain Mrs. Wilson, decided to go down to Cawnpore, taking boat from Futtygarh as was usual. Mrs. Wilson, learning that the 1st/2nd were to be relieved by five companies of the 11th Native Infantry, resolved to risk it, and stay on, an extraordinary procedure. Within a fortnight of the 1st/2nd marching out to join Lake's army at Secundra Rao, Shikoabad was attacked by overwhelming numbers of enemy horse, commanded by a fine French officer named Fleury. The first attack was repulsed, but a second, made a day or so later, succeeded, half the officers of the 11th being killed or wounded and one third of the men. The detachment had to capitulate on the understanding that it would take no further part in the war.

Mrs. Wilson was carried off the first day—the attack had taken place before dawn and was probably a surprise—together with her children. The whole of the bungalows and contents were burnt and looted, and the troops carried off as much as they could, including Mrs. Wilson's spare clothing. Fleury, hearing of this, made his men disgorge the lady's gear and sent her off to Agra Fort, where the poor woman was most kindly looked after by the families of the adventurers, all of whom were stated to be French or Dutch. The considerate manner in which she was treated is evidenced by the fact that, two days after the first attack, simultaneously with the official report reaching Lake, then before the fortress of Aligarh, Wilson heard from his wife, the letter being despatched by special messenger.

Particular interest attaches to this body of enemy horse, in that from it is sprung the present First Bengal Lancers, the well known Skinner's Hindustani Horse.

Turning now to the officers, and how they "mobilised." In the days of which we write, organised lines of communication were unknown. The army carried most of its requirements with it, and the regular daily convoy system now in vogue had not come into being. Convoys—enormous ones, with 7,000 pack bullocks and sometimes even as many as 100,000 with 700 carts, would move at irregular intervals. Officers drew no rations, and had to feed and tent themselves, their servants and horses. With certain stores, usually wines, it was necessary to lay in a stock that would last for three months or so, for such things were quite unobtainable in the country. Messes in native regiments were not officially in existence, though one or two corps, notably the famous Lal Paltan of Clive, had one, and officers grouped themselves in small private messes, each providing his own table gear and each having usually to maintain his own cook. The preparations for a campaign thus differed for each officer in accordance with his own views and experiences. The wise ones, like Pester, believed in doing themselves well and even running into debt in order to secure good tentage and gear. Others, including an officer in the 15th Native Infantry, whose reminiscences are of much value and interest, fitted themselves out "on the cheap."

This officer rued his misplaced economy, for he found his tent, a cheap one, "either too cold on a cold day, or too hot on a warm one," and his other gear in like manner. Pester, on the other hand,

had fitted himself out with an enormous tent, so enormous indeed that he found it too cumbersome to move and Wemyss, a Civil Servant on the Headquarters Staff of the magnificent Lord Lake, tried to borrow it for himself. Pester, in consequence, had to content himself with a mere shack—a type of tent a major-general of the present day would be glad to occupy in mobile war. He packed ten dozen bottles of Madeira, four dozen of port, and beer in proportion, to accompany him. In addition he arranged for a pipe of Madeira to be in readiness at Futtygarh, a place at the time deemed safe from incursions of hostile horse, but which was burnt down, for the most part, by Holkar in the famous foray the following year—the Madeira, however, having been absorbed before that calamity occurred. He also had a tent for his horse, a very valuable Arab, bought in the auction of kit of the Deputy Quartermaster-General killed at Laswari. When this tent was stolen, the animal sometimes came into the his own tent, not a usual procedure as may be imagined.

It is not reasonable to suppose that his numerous servants went tentless. In lieu of our present day camp bed, he used his palanquin, which was, indeed, an almost essential article of equipment of all officers. He also took twenty-four suits of linen.

In addition, there would be a small menagerie, fowls of the robust and athletic Indian variety, probably a sheep, several dogs of weird and wonderful breeds, and usually a milch goat, “to supply milk for tea, a beverage of the most refreshing nature, particularly after a long march.”

In the England of the day, China tea was regarded as an effeminate beverage among men, hence the apologetic tone of Captain Thorn, an officer of the 29th Dragoons, in reference to it. In India it was extremely expensive, costing, at Calcutta, nine shillings a pound. Indian tea was, of course, unknown. Pester's equipage was, it must be owned, grander than that of most officers, but may be taken as the equivalent of the war-wise ones of some degree of seniority. Officers of the Bombay and Madras armies, drawing less “batta”—in the Ceded Provinces all officers drew double batta—and life being generally more expensive, had far less elaborate equipages. The superior luxury of the Bengal troops led to great soreness and jealousy when the armies of the different Presidencies worked alongside each other—and there was no love lost between the rank and file, for they had

about as much in common with each other as a Prussian and a Portuguese.

Pester does not give us the details of the transport required to carry all this, but we gather that he had at least one bullock cart and four camels, the camels being his own property. In other words, transport that would suffice six officers at the present day. On August 15th, 1803, the 1st/2nd marched out of Shikoabad for the last time, the 11th having taken over.

“The drums were beating the Grenadiers March, and all ranks in the highest spirits possible,” while the regimental ladies, with aching hearts, watched their husbands passing, all officers saluting them as they filed by. The officers of the 11th rode out with their comrades a little way, cursing their luck that they, too, were not to form part of the Field Army of the great Gerard Lake. A little more than a fortnight later, however, half of them were *hors de combat*, and the cantonment burnt while the 1st/2nd although it played a part in the battles of Delhi, Agra and Laswari within the next three months, was a lucky corps, losing but few, though, as we have said, it made up for it in the long run, at Deeg and Bhurtpore, where it lost considerably over half its strength.

DRILL—A PLEA FOR A REVIVAL OF THE DRILL SPIRIT.

BY AN INDIAN INFANTRY COMPANY COMMANDER.

Pre-War Drill Compared.

Before the War, according to the considered opinions of many senior British officers and senior Indian officers, the drill of Indian infantry battalions was uniformly good. Now-a-days the drill of an Indian infantry battalion is not only poor in quality, but is executed without that keenness and interest which accompanies the performance of work by men who know they are doing their job well. On those occasions when the battalion is called upon to demonstrate its efficiency by its drill, one at the most hopes the line will hold between flags A and B, or that the concerted noise of rifles moving to the 'present' hides the defects of style and method.

When comparative failure has crowned the efforts of a week of concentrated parades, one seeks consolation in such half truths as :—
 “The increase in weapons has decreased the time available for drill” ;
 “the Battalion is a field battalion not an ‘Eye Wash battalion’ ;
 “Drill has no place in a modern battalion.”

But in spite of such excuses outwardly expressed, one always—and naturally too—feels that the battalion ought to drill more cleanly and more precisely than it does, and that there must be something radically wrong with the present system of teaching drill.

Pre-War Drill Organization Compared.

Before the Training Battalion system was instituted the Adjutant, together with his Drill Staff, was responsible for the teaching of drill to recruits, and to the battalion. All future drill instructors were noted from the day they enlisted, through the stages of drill sepoy, drill naik to the rank of drill havildar and jemadar-adjutant. The drill havildar was the best of many naiks, who were in varying degrees drill experts. The Jemadar-adjutant was a super-expert ; he might, in this branch of training, be compared to the regimental sergeant-major of a British infantry battalion. The resulting staff was, therefore, from the point of view both of experience and natural aptitude

an expert one; and as the holding of an appointment on the drill staff was a sure road to promotion, competition to secure a vacancy was very keen.

Under the present system recruit drill is entirely separate from the active battalion. The cadre of instructors in a training battalion changes every two years. Instructors sent to the training battalion are nowadays expected to be capable of teaching musketry, bayonet training, elementary field training and, of course, drill.

The present training battalion instructor learned his field work from British officers and his musketry, etc., at Pachmarhi, or from experts trained there. His knowledge of drill he has acquired either during his three or four months' training as a recruit in a war depôt or from instructors who have received that amount of training. Because of his good musketry and bayonet training such an instructor can demonstrate perfectly a complicated movement comprising a series of long and short points and jabs, and his class of recruits vie with each other to emulate him in movement and spirit.

At drill, however, his lack of training prevents him from demonstrating with accuracy, precision or confidence the simplest movement, and the class, having no model, fall into similar faults in slovenly execution, and the more times they do the movement the more marked the fault becomes. Drill taught in such a manner must be not only time wasted, but is contrary to the spirit of drill which demands accuracy and precision.

British versus Indian Recruits.

The teaching of drill to the Indian Army follows slavishly the principles laid down in a publication issued by the War Office for the instruction of British soldiers. The principles and methods outlined therein are based on the knowledge that every British recruit appreciates military march time and can move naturally in time to march music. Some form of drill is included in every Elementary School curriculum and the teaching of physical training is also a subject which fills many hours in a school boy's life. Thus every such potential recruit has learned to control his body, to breathe correctly, and to perform simple military movements.

Compare with such a recruit, the potential recruit of the Indian Army; the '*Jawan*' fresh from his village. His natural walk bears

no resemblance to the march step which the Army authorities have decided to be the most economical in expenditure of strength. In walking the average Indian recruit makes little or no use of his ankle muscles, and the movements—if any—of his arms bear no relation to the movements of his legs. The rhythm he has to learn is entirely different from his native music, which suggests sinuous or spasmodic movements. His natural movements, in the main, are either opposite in nature to those he has to learn *e.g.*, the, *salaam* which with slow a motion places the palm of the partially closed hand on the forehead, combined with a forward inclination of the body, as against a military salute which necessitates the chest being raised as the back of the hand, fully opened, is swung smartly to the head, or demand the reconditioning of muscles which have by disuse become partially atrophied. An example of this loss of control is the ‘eyes right’ movement which no Indian can do without either bulging the eyes, inclining the head forward or backward or turning the shoulders.

It is therefore patent that by following blindly the methods laid down in Infantry Training, Volume I, it is impossible to teach correctly, controlled drill to the future sepoys, non-commissioned officers, Indian officers and British officers of the Indian Army; one must begin at a much more elementary stage, and proceed much more slowly.

System of Instruction.

To instruct an Indian recruit one has three tasks to perform :—

- (i) The elimination of his natural faults.
- (ii) The training of those muscles which in the case of a British recruit have been trained previous to his enlistment, but which are undeveloped in an Indian recruit.
- (iii) The inculcation of the drill spirit.

No instructor can hope for success unless he possesses :—

- (i) A sound knowledge of the muscular processes involved in each movement.
- (ii) Natural physical ability to demonstrate movements.
- (iii) Patience to teach.

The first lesson in musketry is the movement of the index finger of the right hand—a small matter but typical of the deep study which has been given to the evolution of the system of instruction.

Similarly in teaching the salute, the primary essential is that the recruit should be able to open fully his hand and at the same time keep the fingers and thumb straight and together.

To turn correctly and smartly there must be

- (i) Ability to balance on the heel and toe raised.
- (ii) Knowledge of the relative position of the body to the feet during the turning movement.

No movement in drill can be smartly performed and cleanly completed unless the body is correctly placed during the process of the movement, and immediately preceding the movement by which the drill motion is completed. Halting, about-turning and forming fours are only a few of the movements which habitually are followed by the reprimand "*Hilo mat.*" If recruits have absorbed the thirty pace, and are made to march along a straight line the word 'dressing' would disappear.

Has Drill any Value ?

A whole Army manual has been devoted to the teaching of drill and many hours of both the recruits period of training and of the trained soldier are allotted to the performance of drill.

The following extracts from Infantry Training, Volume I, show the value the Higher Command place upon drill.

Chapter II, section 12, para. i :

..... "drill is the foundation of discipline and *esprit-de-corps*."

Chapter I, section 3, para i :

"Discipline by means of which the *morale* of a force can alone be maintained, is the bed-rock of all training."

Chapter II, section 12, para. ii :

"Slovenly drill is harmful."

In spite of the introduction of new weapons and the advance of mechanization the words "A smart and well drilled battalion" are still considered synonymous with those "An efficient battalion."

The experience of the War showed that a well drilled and smart battalion was always capable of dealing effectively with the many and varied new problems which arose during the changing methods of fighting.

The *morale* of a war-weary battalion was not revived by periods of rest and idleness, but by a concentrated programme of intensive drill whereby its pride, self-esteem and *esprit de corps* were invariably restored. It is therefore clear that drill has a very definite value in the training of an Army.

In other branches of training, *e.g.*, signalling, musketry and physical training, it is not left to the battalion to create a standard of efficiency ; Army schools have been instituted and the existing system ensures the best men being selected as students. The more the standard of teaching drill is raised the more efficient our battalions will become. It is not a question of increasing the number of hours allotted, but merely one of improved methods of instruction.

Drill Spirit.

The British soldier differs from the Indian sepoy in his possession of a tradition of drill, and of those qualities which evolve from absorbing the spirit of drill. Both races possess martial qualities but drill is foreign to Indian life, and the spirit of co-operation and self-discipline are with him undeveloped. To maintain, at a reasonable standard of efficiency in an Indian regiment, a brass band, or drums and pipes, it is necessary for the men to receive periodic instruction from players who not only have the necessary skill but also in whom the spirit of music is present. The drill of a modern Indian battalion must in like manner be revived and the spirit which was possessed by the pre-war Regimental Drill Staff must again be inculcated within the battalion.

A cadre of drill experts must be carefully selected and trained who will be similar in every respect to the musketry specialists, and who will hold similar views regarding the importance of their branch of training. These men will raise the standard of drill in their own battalions and also, during their tour with the Training battalions, be a cadre of experts similar to the Physical Training Staff, replacing the mediocre non-commissioned officer who, being useless elsewhere, is generally considered capable of teaching drill.

Solutions.

To re-create the drill spirit and raise the standard of teaching, assistance from Higher Command is essential. The founding of a new Army school where drill alone shall be taught is, on financial grounds

alone, an impossibility but, fortunately, the necessity does not arise as institutions already existing can be with very slight additional expense adapted to the purpose.

An extension of the curriculum of the King George Schools to include a technical study of drill and the training of drill instructors will, amongst such good material, produce not only keen, skilful instructors but man in whom the true spirit will have been inculcated.

At the Kitchener College, Nowgong, are collected the promising non-commissioned officers and Indian officers of the Indian Army, and the formation there of a Special Wing, to which young non-commissioned officers, selected with the same care in choosing students for other army courses, could be sent, would speedily supply the cadre of experts which has disappeared with the disbandment of the Regimental Drill Cadre, and also would give the future Indian officers and British officers of the Indian Army an excellent opportunity of learning at first hand the principles and application of the most important branch of army training.

MY MANX CAMEL CORPS.

BY LIEUT.-COL. C. G. LLOYD, C.I.E., M.C.

The title, unfortunately, is a trifle misleading. It suggests the camel expert—the veteran who has commanded so many camel corps that he has to give them names or numbers in order to distinguish one from the other. That is not my case at all. I have commanded but one camel corps—the one specified above—and that only for a brief period. Any reader therefore who looks for pearls of wisdom concerning the manners, habits, ailments, or internal structure of these peculiar beasts will, I fear, be disappointed in this narrative.

But I must not be over-modest. If my knowledge about camels in general is small, I can claim that in respect of *Manx* camels, I am the greatest living expert. For I am, I fully believe, the only man alive who has held command of a completely tail-less camel corps.

The place was Western Persia, the period the last year or so of the Great War. As a result of the Russian break-up, a huge slice of the Central Asian plateau lay open to a Germano-Turkish thrust eastwards. Hence the genesis of our little “Hush-Hush Army”, designed for operations towards the Caucasus and Caspian Sea. The force of course was small, but the distances were great, and there was no railway. It was my special job to find road transport for the expedition, and my orders were to collect, organise, and put into work everything that was capable of carrying a load—human, bestial, and mechanical.

I had only recently started on this and was up to my eyes in work, when I received from Army Headquarters at Baghdad a cipher telegram which ran approximately as follows:—

Proceed ZAITUN forthwith and carry out surprise inspection Ex-Russian Camel Corps stationed that neighbourhood. This unit now in British employ, Commanding officer being Lieut. E. Shogitoff. Latter suspected wholesale frauds in connection abnormal casualties alleged to be due to *Shuturzigorski* a camel epidemic unknown to these Headquarters. Investigate circumstances fully and report by wire present strength, men and animals, also unit's carrying capacity and

fitness for service. If found necessary suspend Lieut. Shogitoff and assume control as Commandant. Further instructions on receipt your report."

The receipt of this wire upset me considerably. Apart from the interruption to my own urgent work, I had no technical knowledge of camels and, to be quite frank, no overwhelming desire for closer acquaintance. But an order is an order; so, having handed over my office to a deputy, I set out in a staff car accompanied by an armed sepoy.

The eighty-mile drive to Zaitun proved uneventful, and on nearing the outskirts of the squalid little town, I ascertained to my relief that the "RUSSKI" camel corps was still bivouacked in the neighbourhood. My informant, an emaciated but markedly intelligent boy, offered to show me the way, and I took him up on the running-board. En route I gathered from him that at that hour the camels would probably be out grazing; but that the Lieutenant Sahib, a Kafkazi (or inhabitant of the Caucasus) lived at the Serai half a mile further on.

Following the boy's directions we turned in at a ruined gateway and found ourselves in the usual large untidy compound. A few camels stood about, and the first impression I got on glancing at them was that none of them had any tails. I was about to approach them to investigate this surprising phenomenon when my attention was diverted by what appeared to be a gypsy caravan of six or eight roomy four-horse wagons locally known as fourgons. They were drawn up in a sort of *laager* in a shady and secluded corner of the courtyard.

"This" said my guide, indicating the wagon-laager, "is where the Lieutenant Sahib lives."

I rubbed my eyes, for I felt that the long drive in the glaring sun-light must have impaired their keenness. This surely could not be the headquarters of a military unit. Rather did it remind me of a village circus taking its Sunday morning's rest. In the background was a ragged line of mules and horses drowsing contentedly. Scraggy fowls scratched about in the dirt, and tethered to one wagon-wheel were two tame gazelles which made friendly advances. On a long line of washing which stretched right across the laager hung a collection of garments that for colour, design and variety surpassed anything that I had ever seen. I was standing there considerably bemused when a young woman suddenly appeared from behind the tilt of the

nearest wagon. She was a fine strapping wench of clean-cut and handsome features. Over her abundant hair she wore a striped kerchief; on her feet she wore soft leather riding boots; and over all, was a kimono-like wrapper which atoned for its grubbiness by its striking and colourful design. Altogether, a decidedly startling apparition to eyes accustomed for so long to the drabness of Mesopotamia. I gazed at her stupidly and I fear rudely.

She, for her part, was not the least taken aback and greeted me frankly and pleasantly. She spoke fluent Persian, eked out with a few French phrases. English she had none. I judged her to be Caucasian or possibly Jewish. "This" interpolated my Persian guide, "is Madame Shogitoff." Once again the lady bowed and smiled, and, in considerable embarrassment, I bowed and saluted in my turn. So this was Madame Shogitoff! The wife of the pestilent fellow whose alleged iniquities I had been specially deputed to unmask. Surely the business was embroiled enough already without this added complication. However there was nothing for it; one could not allow oneself to be influenced by a pretty face and a picturesque kerchief. So I assumed my most military air and informed her stiffly that I had come to see her husband Lieutenant Shogitoff—on business.

For a moment or two she eyed me intently as though seeking to divine my thoughts; and it seemed to me that a look of apprehension came into her eyes. But it was gone almost instantly, if indeed it was ever there; and with a gay smile and a flash of white teeth she lifted up her voice and loudly hailed someone by the name of Emmanuel.

A man's answering hail came from the interior of a wagon on the far side of the laager. Lieutenant Shogitoff, it seemed, was taking a *siesta* and strongly resented its interruption. A vociferous duet followed, and finally a man's head appeared in the curtained entrance of the wagon, and peered out at us. I caught a glimpse of a long sallow face, blue-jowled, a shifty pair of eyes set close together, and long drooping moustaches. Then the face withdrew into the darkness of the interior, and I distinctly heard a sound such as might be made by a scent-spray. (I was subsequently in a position to test my conjecture and adjudged it to have been correct.)

A couple of minutes later my host made his entry. He had obviously taken some trouble over his turn-out, though it had not

included a shave. The effect was most striking, suggesting as it did something between an Armenian brigand and a shooting-gallery proprietor. However, his manner to me was very cordial, not to say effusive. He spoke fluent English with a strong trans-atlantic accent picked up, it seemed, at the American college in Odessa where he had been educated.

My turning up like this, I was given to understand, was the one thing needed to complete a perfect day. He, Emmanuel Shogitoff, had ever cherished the most intense admiration for the British race. It was a race unique, sublime! Justice and Fair Play! Where could you find them but in Britain? To meet one of that race in the flesh, and particularly one like himself—of the officer class, why, it was a red-letter day indeed. “Wine,” he cried. “Wine and cigars for our illustrious guest!”

We sat down at a rickety table laid with small saucers containing sweetmeats and pickled gherkins. Two bottles of Caucasian brandy were opened by my host himself with all the due ceremony. A long dun coloured cigar and a sticky glass were pressed into my hand, and I was bidden to eat, drink and be merry. I did my best, though I was feeling far from merry. I abominate spirits in the forenoon; I hate dirty drinking-vessels; nor am I at all partial to Smyrna cheroots and dust-laden halwa. But worst of all was the constant harassing recollection of the very distasteful duty with which I had been charged. I was continually wracking my brain how I could introduce the motive of my visit with as little disturbance as need be. In the end, taking advantage of Madame’s temporary absence from the table, I blurted it all out bluntly and clumsily.

The effect on my host was electrical. His face went green, and his prominent eyes goggled at me in undisguised terror. I must confess I felt sorry for the poor devil, guilty though he might be. It was some time before he recovered sufficient equanimity to answer me coherently. He assured me with a ghastly smile that there must be some stupid mistake; that he could satisfy me in every single particular. His camel corps was up to strength and in excellent fettle. “Ready to march to Tiflis to morrow morning,” he added with a feeble attempt at jocularitv. I replied that I was delighted to hear it. My car was at his disposal and the sooner we started for his lines the better. To this he agreed, adding that he would be ready in two minutes. He went

off in the direction of the kitchen and I sat unhappily at the table fingering nervously a stick of grey nougat. From time to time, I caught the sound of whispering and I wondered to myself what exactly Shogitoff was telling her. And then suddenly she came out; and I saw to my great relief that she looked quite calm and composed.

She said something about my orderly and the car-driver. They also must have some refreshment. I did my utmost to dissuade her, but she smilingly ignored my expostulations, filled up two glasses with the Caucasian brandy, and went over to the car. I followed, beset with horrid tremors connected with poison. The two Indians did not know what to make of it. A memsahib—or a sort of memsahib—was urging them to drink, whereas the Major Sahib in rapid Hindustani was issuing *sakht hukms* to the contrary.

While we stood there, all at cross-purposes, there was a sudden sharp clatter of hoofs, and a mounted man crossed the courtyard at full gallop, dashed through the gateway, jinked to the left, and vanished from sight. I caught a glimpse of a long sallow face with drooping moustaches leaning low on the pony's neck. And that was the last I ever saw of Lieutenant Emmanuel Shogitoff.

It had all happen so swiftly that I was taken completely un-awares. By the time I had recovered my wits, the fugitive must have been half a mile away. In any case, it was ridiculous to attempt a pursuit in the car, for there was not the slightest hope that our man would be so complaisant as to follow the motor road. At the time I cursed myself heartily for my stupidity and lack of foresight; but, really, looking back on it I cannot find myself to be seriously blameworthy. I turned angrily on Madame Shogitoff who quite obviously was privy to the plot.

"It seems Madame," I said sternly "that Lieutenant Shogitoff has deserted his post. Are you aware of the penalty for desertion in war-time?" My hostess did not bat an eye-lid. "Desertion?" she repeated with every show of amazement. "My husband hasn't deserted. He has just had bad news about his mother in Vladikafkaz. I fear very much she is sinking rapidly."

It was said so seriously that I found it difficult to preserve my gravity. And after all what if he had run away? My business was primarily with the camel corps, not Lieutenant Shogitoff. The camel

corps had not run away. As though to confirm my reflections, a long string of government camels at that very moment filed into the serai. I eyed them critically and found to my relief that their condition was by no means bad; and then I looked at them again. *They had not a tail among them.* My eyesight after all had not been at fault. "Curiouser and curiouser," I said to myself, with the immortal Alice.

I turned to my hostess. "Forgive me madame," I began, not without irony, "you are so good at explaining things that I venture to ask you why your husband's camels have no tails." "Haven't they?" she said carelessly. "It must be due to that terrible epidemic—the *Shuturzigorski* I think they call it." I re-examined the camels. "No madame," I rejoined, "you are wrong this time. This is no tail sloughing caused by disease. Clearly each tail has been neatly amputated—in short, a surgical operation." "It may be so," she replied gravely. "I have often heard my husband say that a camel's tail is a useless appendage; an encumbrance, a dead weight. So why not cut them off? We humans do very well without tails. Then why not camels?"

While I was still struggling to find an appropriate rejoinder, my hostess, humming a gay snatch of song, retired once more to her kitchen. It was my Persian boy who elucidated the mystery. With the Russians (a suspicious race) the practice was this; If a camel died on the march you had to produce the tail before their remount department would issue a fresh camel in replacement. This practice was continued when these transport detachments were taken over by the British. It was our friend Emmanuel who conceived the profitable idea of extending this procedure to the living as well as the dead. Whenever, therefore, he found himself short of cash, his first step would be to report a serious epidemic of *Shuturzigorski*, knowing well that the British had probably never even heard of this rare disease. Then he cut off a few score tails, sent them to the base and drew an equivalent number of remounts. He sold these and pocketed the proceeds. It was a regular gold-mine.

There is little more to add. Within a week or two, I was relieved of my command, and I subsequently learnt from my successor (dead now poor fellow) that his Manx camels showed no signs of having

suffered by their mutilation. On the contrary, they normally used to carry a load of six maunds instead of the usual five. So possibly there is something after all in Madame Shogitoff's contention that a camel is better without its tail. Anyhow it is an interesting theory, and I present it to the experts for what it may be worth.

THE £ s. d. OF A FOX HUNTING HOLIDAY.

BY P. C. PRATT.

This article, designed principally to aid the soldier on leave from India whose aspirations towards a season's hunting are possibly tempered by the uneasy recognition of a somewhat anæmic bank balance, should, perhaps, open with a quotation from the late Mr. Surtees; but the startling originality of such a course deters me and I prefer to begin with an aphorism by that equally celebrated and still more prolific writer "Anon" who once made the profound observation: "where there's a will there's a way." And that may be said to express the attitude of him who, while feeling the urge to spend his leave in the healthiest and most satisfactory way, finds himself compelled to look his affairs very fully in the face and say: "thus far shalt thou go, and no farther!"

I admit that it is difficult to generalise. One man's English home is in the midst of a fine hunting country, while another dwells in London, or in the heart of a manufacturing district. Much of what follows, therefore, cannot be expected to apply universally, but if I prove—as I hope to—that a season's hunting is within the scope of a man of quite modest purse, I can safely leave to him who knows what he wants to "see that he gets it!"

The first question to be considered is, for the man who can choose, the particular Hunt to which he shall attach himself, and on this point there is a great deal to be said. First of all, he may not wish to tie himself down to a single district. Anyone without friends and associations attaching to a particular country may prefer to gain experience with different packs over vastly differing terrain, hiring his mounts as he goes. That, however, is an expensive way of working for anything like regular hunting and not to be recommended, its only advantage being that of variety.

The better way both for pleasure and comfort is to choose our country and horse, and to make the best of them. The joys of hunting are vastly increased as one begins to share them with hunting field friends—than whom there are none-better. Also, a strange-

horse takes much of the pleasure from the game until one has tried him out and found what he can do ; in other words until he has ceased to be strange. Now to most people one particular district in England is more attractive than another, either because they know it or because they don't, and it is quite impossible in the scope of this article to describe the hunting countries peculiar to each, nor is it necessary, as we are not now concerned with the more expensive packs over the best country of big grass fields and tall fences where two good horses are almost a minimum. Such as the Croome, Pytchley, Mr. Fernie's and The Warwickshire are rather beyond our ambitions at present and may well be left for some happy day in the future.

I will content myself with giving a few particulars of certain Hunts representative of those which I deem to be more suitable from the point of view of sport coupled with financial considerations. The subscriptions and other terms mentioned are the special rates charged serving officers on leave, roughly half those in force for ordinary members. Indeed, the New Forest Hunt is the only one I am definitely aware which makes no such concessions. The Fernie, on the other hand, charge one-third their usual rate, but even so, the fee is £25 for a two-day week, and the horse must be a thoroughbred of an all-round type.

First the Tedworth Hunt which is, of course, by reason of its situation, peculiarly military in character. The country is mostly downland with a good deal of timber that wants jumping. Subscriptions of officers quartered on Salisbury Plain are paid regimentally and work out at a very low figure for each individual. It may be taken, therefore, that an officer not so situated would find his two days a week covered by a £5 subscription. And let me say here that I am writing chiefly for the one-horse man, who will not be out more than twice a week, on which point I shall have more to say later. There is with the Tedworth, as with almost every Hunt, a daily cap of half-a-crown for the wire or poultry fund, to which each person out is expected to contribute.

The South Staffordshire Hunt also has something of a military nature owing to its situation near the Barracks of the Staffordshire Regiment at Lichfield. No cap is sought from officers on leave for an occasional day, and no definite subscription has been laid down. Such matters, in this as in most cases, would be settled between the

individual and the Hunt Secretary. The country is a close one and the fences are mostly hedge and ditch calling for a horse that is a bold jumper, but need not be of the fastest. The Albrighton, lying in parts of Shropshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire, is a very varied country, many of the fences consisting of hedges on banks, with a ditch on the take off or landing side and calling for a clever and active horse which it should be within the power of our "Hypothetical Huntsman" to obtain. The usual concessions are made in the matter of subscription. The Albrighton Woodland, hunting part of the Albrighton country within a few miles of Birmingham would, I believe, be an excellent choice. Convenient livery is obtainable at Harborne and elsewhere and expenses generally are moderate. The country is varied and not too difficult, while, owing to its wooded nature, runs are not so fast but that a quite moderate horse can easily hold its own.

The country of the Atherstone, another Midland Hunt, lies between Coventry and Leicester. This would be a somewhat ambitious move for our "H. H." to make, as parts are rather stiffly fenced with cut-and-laid, and there are many big ditches, so that a strong, fairly fast horse is required. The terms for officers on leave, are however, said to be very moderate, and it may be worth an enquiry.

So also the South Berkshire, hunting a good country whose banks and ditches call for a good stamp of horse, is perhaps, something of a tall order for us, but at least those who like the district can do no harm by thinking it over. The Old Berkeley, on the other hand, covering parts of Hertfordshire, Buckingham and Middlesex, would seem well suited to his needs. Not only are the usual terms always halved for officers on leave, but special arrangements would willingly be made if necessary. As it was put to me: "Officers are always very welcome, and the O. B. H. would never prevent them hunting for financial reasons." The country, also, is not too difficult, and admits of a quite ordinary horse being used with good effect. A convenient centre would be Berkhamsted where there is at least one excellent Riding School that takes horses on livery at very reasonable rates. It is, moreover, within easy reach of Town.

Further north, the Rufford Hounds hunting parts of Derby and Nottingham are worthy of consideration. There is no definite scale of subscription, but I am assured that serving soldiers are always given special consideration, even to the point of waiving all claims.

Similarly, the Downham Hunt, covering part of West Norfolk, leaves the matter of subscription payable by officers on leave for them to decide what they can afford to give. The country is largely light plough, and not too difficult.

The Wheatland in Shropshire is another good country with plenty of grass and all kinds of fences. A clever short-legged horse suitable for the work required will not be beyond our reach. Additional Hunts that deserve consideration include the Brecon, hunting the Beacon and river Wye districts, which is a good sporting country, inexpensive and not demanding too much in the way of horse-flesh; the Cumberland and Cumberland Farmers; the Bedale in the North Riding of Yorkshire, with its hedge and ditch fences; and the Hambleton in parts of Hampshire and Sussex, varied as to land—mainly pasture, downland, and woods—and also as to fences, which include some banks. All are Hunts that would suit the short-legged, medium bred horse we have in mind.

There are too, the Exmoor, the Dulverton, and the West Somerset, mostly moorland, calling for a moderately fast, low set horse; while, should we be lucky enough to pick up a better class animal, preferably of Irish extraction, the Dorset Hunt, with its flying fences, would suit us admirably. In addition, there are many private packs owned and maintained by the Master, to whom, as a rule, no subscription is payable, the majority of whom are delighted to welcome soldiers on leave, if by any means a *liaison* can be brought about. Such Hunts as the Cheshire Forest, a fine little pack with which I have had excellent sport; Mr. David Davies', in the Montgomeryshire Hills; Colonel Spence-Colbys, a wooded country situated in Gloucester and Hereford; or the Tedworth Woodland, lying between the Tedworth and Vine countries will, if an invitation be obtained, give good sport under the pleasantest conditions.

To sum up, then, our Hunt Subscription for a two-day week will not exceed £15 for the season, and may, if we cannot give more, be as low as £5. At least, it can be taken for granted that sooner than see a good man unable to hunt, a Master would in nine cases out of ten waive the question of subscription altogether and with an air of receiving, rather than of conferring a favour, for such is the democracy of the hunting field.

Now as to the very important question of a mount. I take it one horse has got to see us through—and one good one is better than a

pair of duds. Are we going to buy or hire? If we hire, we have no control over its treatment in stables, we are tied to the apron-string of the liveryman, and it is going to cost us probably three guineas for every day's hunting. On the other hand, should a long spell of frost appear, or even foot and mouth disease break out, or should the horse fall sick or break its leg out hunting, the responsibility and loss are not ours; and of course, we have not the trouble and expense of his keep. I like to think, however, that there will be many to whom the horse is not merely a "vehicle," a means of progression, and who would not be equally satisfied—and perhaps feel happier—in a tank. The man who "hunts to ride" is deeply—and to a certain extent rightly—scorned by your true hunting man; but I freely confess that he to whom hound work means little but "horse work" everything has more of my sympathy than the over keen follower who would prefer to break a horse's wind rather than miss the kill. At all events, if he intends to hire, no more need be said, as his £3 per day clears him. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that we want a horse of our own, and instead of paying about £90 for the season's hiring, we prefer to spend £50 or £60 on our own account. This can be done privately, or at a sale, or the sum can even be halved by some cavalry friend buying for us a charger, cast on the score of age, but otherwise sound, which will have years of good work before it. But (except in the last case, when one must "take it or leave it"—though its history can generally be learnt) however one buys, a trial in the hunting field should be insisted upon. Many a good-looking horse, a cool jumper in cold blood, will be unmanageable to hounds, and one of the things to be avoided at all costs, is making oneself a nuisance at the covert side by kicking or undue restlessness, and equally when hounds are running, by the horse bolting, or barging at a crowded spot. Moreover, many a good-looking and apparently high-spirited horse will turn out a craven in the face of a stiff open ditch or a wide stream; and few things are more annoying than to see the field streaming away into the distance while one's horse trembles before a perfectly reasonable jump, or while one crawls in a bedraggled state from a stream wherein one has been deposited by a sudden and unexpected stop. Look out, then, for a horse that is handy, well-mannered, intelligent and stout-hearted. A short-legged animal, about 15 hands 2 inches is the best for general work, if up to one's weight, and if there is a touch of breeding, so much the better. But don't demand a great turn of speed, which is always

costly. In close country, pace is not so important as the qualities I have mentioned, and may, indeed, be a positive disadvantage where there is much wire and where sudden changes of direction are frequent. In this class of country, where earths are plentiful and checks constant, the steady and resolute little horse will generally serve to keep you up with the leaders and more often than not bring you in at the kill. It must be remembered that a five-mile point, covering perhaps twice that distance in actual running, is unlikely to occur without sufficient check to enable such a horse to keep in touch. Of course any horse we contemplate buying must be able to pass a stiff examination by our own Vet.

And now, having bought our horse, what are we going to do with him? Are we going to put him out to livery at some Riding School or Stables? Can we afford an efficient groom at from 45/- to 50/- per week? Or do we wish to keep the "personal touch," to make a friend of our horse and in so doing undertake a burden that will bring from us many a groan and sigh at having to leave fireside or bed at the dictates of stable duties, but which will repay us a thousand times for our pains and discomforts by the knowledge we shall gain of horses in general and the intimacy of one in particular. Many men are good horsemen, but singularly few ever become horsemasters in the true sense of the word. So in the hope that a goodly number will be persuaded to take the stony path of personal attention, and to eschew the soft and easy way of the livery stable, I will give a rough estimate of the cost of a suitable establishment. First of all, one has got to live somewhere oneself and to take a cottage or small house with a stable, or out-buildings that can easily be converted, is certainly no more expensive than living in a hotel. That is the object to have before one, the achievement of which should not be too difficult in view of the present state of the property market!

If you are a married man, you will probably need a gardener. Engage one who can relieve you with your horse. The social events incidental to a season's hunting make a certain elasticity in your personal duties essential. If you do not need a gardener, a useful lad with some experience to work under supervision may be hired for about 20/- per week. Remember, you are not now in India, with its obligation to maintain a large staff of more or less useless servants to look ornamental, (while the sweeper does the work) together with their indigent families. There is a no indignity here in a man tending his

own horse, in fact, very much the reverse ; and the man whose horse knows and loves him, is he who has tended the animal in the stable, as well as ridden him outside.

As to equipment, a good second-hand saddle and bridle may be picked up for about £6 or £7 ; but knee-caps (essential with roads as they are to-day), night-rug, grooming kit and other stable furniture, will bring the total to at least £10. Don't be over-elaborate ; a night rug is no warmer for having your initials in the corner, and over-elaboration in buying equipment merely adds to the bill without adding to efficiency. A pair of hand clippers, if the horse has a hogged mane, will pay for themselves, but clipping out—which will certainly be needed at least once in the season—can be done at the nearest livery stable. You have to remember that you are setting up for a short season, only, and that at the end of your allotted span of leave will probably be selling everything. Shoeing is an important item, and in choosing your establishment, the distance from the nearest forge is a point that may well be taken into account. Shoes need renewing about once a fortnight and will have to be “removed” and re-fitted after seven or eight days. The cost is 9/- for new shoes and 4/- to 4/6 for “removes,” so that this item is a considerable one.

As to your own outfit, unless you already possess hunting kit—the regulation black coat, top hat and black boots, I advise you to do what many officers hunting for short seasons do constantly, that is, hunt in “ratecatcher.” It is perfectly *comme il faut*, and cuts your cost by anything from £10 to £20. All that you require is a smartly cut and well fitting sports coat—a brown or reddish colour looks best—with a hunting “bowler” hat. Your own riding breeches will do perfectly—these can even be used with “hunting black”—and you may use your Army riding boots. If you wish to get black ones, I strongly advise you to pocket your pride and go to some good dealer in mis-fits where you can probably pick a well-fitting pair by a good maker for less than half the price charged by the same man for a pair made to order. The price in the last case, with trees, will certainly not be less than ten guineas.

A plain white stock looks better than a collar and tie and—once its intricacies have been solved—will prove warm and comfortable. A vest, in which alone you may “express your individuality,” string gloves, and a plain stout crop with lash, complete your outfit. The small

question of a hat-cord, whether to wear one or not, is a vexed one, but with a well-fitting bowler, it should not be necessary.

Now, as to selling off at the end of your leave when circumstances compel your parting with your mount that has now become an old friend. There is a strange phenomenon connected with amateur horse deals in that one nearly always has to sell at a lower price than one pays. It is strange, but true. Nevertheless, a £60 horse that has been well cared for, certainly should fetch a good price, and I believe £40 will be a safe figure to take for purposes of calculation. Saddle and bridle, if good and comfortable, I advise you to keep as they are always useful and will help to reduce the cost on the next occasion if, as is probable, you have made arrangements to repeat the visit in three or four years' time.

The average first cost then, of a four-months season, may be summarised as follows :—

				£
Hunt Subscription	10
Horse	60
Equipment	10
Boy's Wages	16
Horse Food and Bedding	25
Shoeing	5
Wire Fund Cap	4
Additional personal Kit	5
				<hr/>
				135
Less re-sale of Horse (say)	40
				<hr/>
				95
				<hr/>

The cost for the next season, or of the first one to those who already have the kit and saddlery, should be about £10 less. On the other hand, it is well to realize that, as "the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft aglee," so sickness or injury may lay the horse up for the season, reduce his value to nothing, and cause us the expense of veterinary treatment—and of another horse, if we wish to continue to hunt. However, knowing the worst that can happen, the average so far exceeds the best obtainable from any other holiday that few would hesitate to take the risk.

A word in passing, on the cost of feeding which, you will notice, I have put at £25. To keep a hunter in hard condition he must have

at least 16 lbs. of oats a day. In four months, he will eat nearly a ton of hay, besides chaff, bran, linseed, etc., all of which must make a very big item in your expenditure ; an item, moreover, that does not, and must not, allow of cutting.

And now, to summarise the relative costs of keeping a horse ourselves or at livery, or hiring for four months. These will be approximately as follows :—

(a) *Hiring*—if done for two days per week during the whole period, say 5 guineas per week. (Allowing four days with no hunting, due to frost) Total .. £75

(b) *Livery*—for the whole period, say £2-10-0 per week plus net cost of horse £20 and shoeing £5. Total .. £65

(c) *Personal Attention*—

				£
Horse food and bedding..	25
Boy's wages	16
Stable equipment, etc.	4
Shoeing	5
Net cost of horse	20
Total				70

And the points to remember in connection with each are :—

(a) *Hiring*.—No responsibility for horse's keep or welfare, but use of horse for two days per week only. Money saved in case of frost, etc.

(b) *Livery*.—No responsibility for horse's keep, but all in connection with his health. The horse is at your disposal at any time for hacking or exercise.

(c) *Personal Attention*.—Full responsibility, but complete control and an absorbing occupation.

Having dealt with economy of cash, may I be permitted a word on economy of horse-flesh ? For from that results not only the success of our season's hunting, but also a satisfactory sale at the end. And here I must say that the advisability or otherwise of taking entire charge of our horse chiefly depends on our knowledge and experience. It would obviously be foolish for one inexperienced in horse management to undertake sole charge of a hunter, with or without the aid of a "useful lad." The things that can go wrong are so many and varied

and withal so vital, that failure to recognise a symptom immediately it appears may result in the permanent injury or death of the horse. In the absence, therefore, of personal knowledge, a really competent groom is essential, otherwise, we shall do far better to keep our horse at livery with some well-managed riding school—pure and simple livery stables being almost non-existent in these mechanical days—at a charge of from £2-10-0 to £3 per week.

As to the treatment of the horse himself, one of the chief points to be remembered is that he is as subject to fatigue as we are, and it is when he is tired that accidents are most liable to happen. It is a painful sight to see an obviously weary mount put at a stiff jump at the end of a heavy day merely to gratify the rider's vanity as a "first fighter." If a bad fall results, the blame will be entirely the rider's. It is the greatest mistake in the world for a one-horse man to try to compete with a more fortunate fellow riding his second and fresher mount. Again, it is not a sign of sportsmanship to stay out until hounds are counted if one's horse is spent, nor will the decent members of the field feel anything but contempt for a man who insists on doing so. If the horse is to last the season he must not be worked to death, and every possible chance must be taken to rest him. For instance, after a twelve-mile hack out to a meet, there is no sense in sitting "on top" for half an hour before hounds move off. Similarly, when hounds are working in a wood, it is often possible to dismount for a few minutes and even to ease the girths occasionally. One continually sees a large field held up under conditions that make a quick get-away impossible and scarcely a soul takes the opportunity of resting his horse. The only possible excuse is a horse that cannot be mounted when other horses are on the move, and that, for an army officer, should be an exceptionally difficult one, such as we are not likely to have bought.

The ride home must always be regarded as part of the day and borne in mind when deciding whether the time has come to leave hounds. It should always be taken very quietly and if the horse is exceptionally weary, an occasional bit of foot-slogging on the part of the rider will be an act of mercy and good sense, and incidentally, warm one's own frozen feet! Always be on the look-out for a lost or twisted shoe, as grave damage can occur from this cause in a very short time. At all times it is well to remember that galloping on tarmac, besides being dangerous if persisted in, is stark ruin to a horse's feet.

On arriving home, a "chilled" drink is the first duty to our horse followed by a bucket of gruel or a bran mash. If the horse is very wet, either with sweat or rain, he should be dried and loosely rugged before being left. We may then snatch a wash and a meal ourselves after which the horse must be thoroughly cleaned and given a feed. From the time we get home to the final moment of shutting the stable door on a tired but comfortable horse munching contentedly at his hay-net, will not be much less than two hours; and if we are wise, we shall then proceed to clean our saddlery, which will not be improved by leaving till the morning.

If this careful process be followed regularly, the best results will be obtained. It will not be wise to expect or insist on a regular two days a week. If the horse is in good condition, he can probably do it more often than not. For safety's sake, however, reckon on having three days a fortnight which, with occasional hold-ups on account of frost, will probably be near the number without much additional sacrifice. After each hunt, the horse will certainly need one day's complete rest, but for the remainder of the time he will be available for much pleasant hacking round the country, and at the end of the season will be in a condition to recover a considerable proportion, if not the whole of our original outlay. And, of course, there is always the chance of a "bargain," that dream of every horse owner, the hundred and fifty guinea hunter we "picked up for a song."

But good or bad, win or lose, we shall have "lived our life," and come what may, shall go back to harness with a fund of yarns and memories that shall last us until it is time to return for a fresh batch.

CLOSE SUPPORT OF INFANTRY. AN INFANTRY OFFICER'S POINT OF VIEW.

By

CAPTAIN D. MCK. KENNELY, 5TH MAHRATTA LIGHT INFANTRY.

“Close support artillery is placed under commanders of forward units to assist their advance and to deal quickly with unexpected resistance.” F. S. R. Vol. II, Chap. VII, Sec. 66.

This rôle appears to be a simple one but in actual practice close support guns seldom have the opportunity to perform their task quickly, with the result that their assistance is not as effective as it might be.

There are two methods of employing close support artillery :—

- (a) The battalion commander keeps the guns “in his pocket.”
In this case the battery or section commander moves with the battalion commander: the guns making suitable bounds in rear of Battalion Headquarters.
- (b) The battalion commander details a section to move in close support of a leading company. If he is lucky enough to have another section he keeps that “in his pocket.”

The first method has several points in its favour: the guns are not unduly exposed: the questions of crest clearance, ammunition supply and control are less difficult than in the second. Above all the battery or section commander from his central position with the battalion commander is in touch with the situation and is able to cover the front of the whole battalion.

The second method is tactically unsound for artillery. The guns often have to cross open ground within close range of enemy machine gun and artillery fire and sometimes become involved in the infantry fight. In all probability ammunition is exhausted owing to the difficulty of supply in a forward area and the section commander loses touch with the situation on either flank. If the artillery has been allotted for anti-tank purposes then the latter method is advisable as it is difficult for guns to knock them out except by direct fire, but it

cannot be regarded as the normal method of employing close support artillery owing to its many tactical disadvantages.

The first method has one great drawback: communication is slow and some links in the chain of communication are weak. Should a company commander wish to send a call for support to Battalion Headquarters he can send the message by visual (Morse flag or shutter) but even with the assistance of the battalion code the message is rather long. In all probability, owing to dust and smoke, company headquarters are not in direct communication with the battalion advanced signal centre or with Battalion Headquarters and some time elapses before the company signallers can even get in touch with either station. Then if the message is taken by a connecting link, such as the battalion advanced signal centre, much time is wasted in receiving and sending on the message to Battalion Headquarters. It must also be remembered that these battalion stations may be busy sending and receiving other messages. There is not much doubt that company commander commonly find it quicker to send the message using their second means of communication—by runner.

Both methods are slow and unreliable. The runner may be knocked out, the company commander cannot dispense with both runners; visual communication will probably break down as, generally, connecting links are not arranged between company headquarters and battalion advanced signal centre and from the latter to Battalion Headquarters. In peace time we manage to scrape along somehow or other, as visibility is usually good. The bulk of artillery is in Brigade and Divisional control and covers the movement of infantry by a series of concentrations according to a time table, or with a barrage. Naturally, much time is spent in training on these principles, while close support being regarded as of less importance has little attention paid to it. The fact that battles seldom start with a deliberate attack is forgotten. The enemy has to be encountered first and if he can be kept on the run by quick and effective close support so much the better. In addition, at some stage of every battle decentralisation of guns becomes necessary. Without it continuous support would be impossible. If infantry cannot communicate its needs quickly to close support artillery, how will it be able to do so to decentralised batteries?

Aeroplanes supply valuable information to artillery, but when troops are in close contact it cannot be accepted as reliable until confirm-


ed by ground reports. In war when two opposing armies have joined in battle only the foremost troops can tell the position of the enemy with any accuracy ; aeroplanes cannot distinguish friend from foe. Quick ground reports appear to be the only solution : a short message in code passed if necessary through connecting links by a recognised system through the army. This code message should be the first means of getting the guns on to the target, being confirmed later by a written order in case of a breakdown.

Below are given two suggested methods of sending a call for support from the company commander to Battalion Headquarters. A call for the support of machine guns may be sent by the same system. Red and yellow semaphore flags (one foot square) are used for sending the message and part of the semaphore alphabet is adopted. Each company commander of forward companies has with his headquarters two runners and two signallers who are all trained in this system. A further pair, either reserve signallers or selected soldiers, work as a connecting link between company headquarters and battalion advanced signal centre.

Suggested Codes.


Directly a company commander has decided that he requires artillery or machine gun support and has selected the target, he orders one or his runners to send through the support call :—

Diagram 1.



- (a) For artillery support the semaphore flags are waved two or three times in line with the shoulders to above the head. (See diagram 1).

Diagram 2.



- (b) For machine gun covering fire the flags are waved below the shoulders. (See diagram 2).

The target is described by either of the following methods :—

- (a) By map reference using the semaphore system. For instance the co-ordinates are 713452: the signal for this is GACDEB.
- (b) From a previously selected reference point. For this the oriented clock code and semaphore system are used. For example, the target is at eleven o'clock and eight hundred yards from the reference point. The message in semaphore is R. P. K. H. (Note the first twelve letters of the alphabet A to L including J represent the numbers one to twelve).

Employing either of the above methods the message can travel from link to link in under twenty seconds or roughly six hundred yards in half a minute with good visibility, and three hundred yards with poor visibility. The same code may be used with the helio, lamp, shutter or Morse flag. The message will not be so distinctive and will take longer to send in Morse, but with good visibility connecting links will not be necessary. For instance, the same message by helio would be OBS RP KH. All calls for support should be repeated after an interval of a couple of minutes to ensure accuracy.

It will be noticed that no mention is made of the altitude of the target to give the gunners their angle of sight. The reasons for the omission are :—


- (a) In war the Forward Observing Officer, battalion or battery commanders are seldom in direct visual communication with the company commander concerned. It is therefore useless to send "Up fifty" "Down hundred," etc.
- (b) Artillery officers will probably obtain this information more accurately from the map than from forward troops.

The allotting of reference points needs consideration. It is suggested that in mobile warfare the F. O. O. moving with battalion advanced signal centre should be responsible for this. Immediately troops become engaged he selects a reference point and enters it on flimsies. Copies of the flimsy are sent to each leading company commander and one copy to Battalion Headquarters. The reference point should be approximately one thousand yards in front of the leading troops and near the battalion dividing line. In a deliberate attack the battalion and battery commanders in conjunction would select the reference point.

The message by semaphore is confirmed in the following manner :—

Before the start of any operation company commanders prepare flimsies by entering on them all necessary details, *i.e.*, grid numbers, the selected reference point and date, etc. After sending through the first call for support the company commander enters on the flimsy :—
 (a) a line marked in red with hachures denoting the position of our foremost troops ; (b) a cross marked T for the target stating its nature ; (c) a line from T to R. P. with the clock and distance marked on the line. (See diagram 3).

Diagram 3.



The flimsy is given to a company runner who takes it to the connecting pair of signallers. The latter are in close touch with a mounted orderly provided by the battery. The message is handed to the mounted orderly who rides with it to the F. O. O. or Battalion Headquarters according to his orders.

For the observation of fire two letters only are sent through by the company commander or F. O. O. A letter for the clock and one for the range. For instance a shell falling at eight o'clock and

four hundred yards from the target would be reported H. D." (Note that the clock is always given before the range). A direct hit is signalled "O. K." and "stop firing" by waving a flag in a complete circle.

That is the broad outline of the suggested method of calling for support. Many small details regarding the working of the system are omitted for the sake of brevity, but these should present no difficulty. For example, the attachment of a couple of men of the intelligence section to leading platoons would be of great assistance to platoon and company commanders. A company commander would then only have to check and sign the flimsy prepared by one of these men and forwarded by a platoon commander before despatching it to the mounted orderly.

The visual method of communication may be adapted for signalling between piquets and guns or machine guns in mountain warfare. Communication should be direct, for the only practicable method of selecting a reference point is for the signaller himself to be the reference point. Other methods are likely to cause confusion. Map references too are difficult to give in mountainous country, so there appears to be no alternative to the direct method. The chief difficulty will be to attract the attention of battery observation points and machine gun sections by the "support call," but it is suggested that the large artillery piquet screen be employed to do this with, if necessary. The message itself would be simple, consisting of two letters only: the first for the clock and the second for the range (using the oriented clock code system). Should trained signallers be available then the two letters preceded by O.B.S. may be sent through in Morse.

Some objections may be lodged against these methods of communication. For instance, it entails the use of a new code, but it should be remembered that all ranks are instructed in semaphore and that the knowledge of only fifteen letters of the alphabet is necessary—R. P. for "reference point"—O for "O K" and the numeral O and A to L including J for the clock and distance up to twelve hundred yards. These letters are sufficient to send any map reference. Our present system requires specialists whereas the suggested method can be learnt in a day by a man of ordinary intelligence. It may be contended that there is not always sufficient cover for semaphore signalling, but a

company commander may overcome this by dropping one of his trained signallers with the connecting link. The message would then be sent by shutter for the first stage, being sent on in semaphore by the connecting link.

A possible objection by artillery officers may be that they cannot spare mounted orderlies to work behind company commanders. There is little doubt that the weakest link in the chain of communication is in forward areas and if artillery is to help in *liaison* that is where its assistance is required. It is stated in *Artillery Training*, Vol. III, Section 8 (5). "The responsibility for establishing *liaison* between two parties must be shared by both."

Every year many infantry officers are attached to artillery, and *vice versa*, to facilitate co-operation between the arms. Practically every company commander is capable of directing the fire of a battery on to any given target. It is suggested that little benefit will be obtained from these attachments until a company commander, under war conditions, can communicate his needs more rapidly to the guns.

SOME THOUGHTS ON BURMA.

By

CAPTAIN A. G. FULLER, INDIAN ARMY.

In political matters the talk which precedes action is generally considerable and often justified, either by the vastness of the problem or the seriousness of its import. Discussion clears the air. The settlement of the Indian problem has proved no exception to this, and in the meantime the people of Burma are left to wonder. The separation of Burma from India has been recommended by the Simon Commission in a report which has been eulogised as the greatest contribution to political science for many years.

The British Government is reported to have expressed its approval, and in the meantime the Burmans live on in patient expectation of the consummation of their hopes, while the Indian politician looks around for further arguments against them.

While the political side of Burma's future may thus be left, speculation may be made as to likely changes in the forces now responsible for her external defence and internal security. In this matter there are certain avenues of approach which all must tread. The Simon report dismisses the external defence of Burma in two lines. It says "The land frontier of Burma on the East is so difficult that it seems scarcely possible for any large body of men to cross it." The same can of course be said with equal truth of the North, North-Eastern and North-Western frontiers. No one will cavil at this statement, but it is as well to mention that there is quite a well-organized power on the Eastern frontier, with the largest air force in Asia, while in Burma there are no air forces at all. So long, however, as Burma remains inside the Empire the prospects of hostilities with Siam need not be seriously considered. History does however supply us with instances of conflict before the British connection, which are worth remembering.

Responsibility for external defence is bound to rest for sometime to come on Imperial forces, and presumably assistance will always, in the first instance, be available from India, as it now is, any views to the contrary notwithstanding.

The question which remains is that of internal security. This is at present provided by the Civil police, Military police and, in the last resort, regular troops. The military police has a dual rôle. In the first place it is essentially a civil body, and as such forms a reserve to the civil police force. In the second it has a military organisation, is officered by regular officers of the Indian Army, and guards the frontiers. The diversity of these duties, the distances which prevail in a very undeveloped country, and the strategic points which facilitate the approach and attract the invader, indicate and determine its distribution. The nature of its likely employment therefore calls for a good deal of dispersion.

Let it be accepted that, all things considered, this force of forty officers and ten thousand men is the most economical way of meeting the two contingencies. Its personnel is recruited from Gurkhas, Indians (mainly Punjabi Mussalmans) with some Karens, Kachins and Chins who are indigenous to the country. It is also important to note here that Burmans have not, as yet, any appreciable representation in the force, but this is not due entirely to their supposed unsuitability for military service.

The information given in the Simon Report as to the composition of the military forces in Burma is inaccurate. This would be a bold statement to make were it not for the fact that it can be readily verified. The report says:—

“ Apart from this semi-military force (*i.e.*, the Burma Military Police), mainly recruited from the martial races of India, and from the non-Burman inhabitants of the Hill tracts, there are normally stationed in Burma only two Infantry battalions and two companies of Sappers and Miners.

That, but for the existence of a powerful army in India, Burma, would require more troops for its own security there can be little doubt. The troops stationed in Burma are moreover British and Indian troops.”

The garrison of the Province is as follows:—

1. *At Maymyo. District Headquarters.*

- 1 Indian Mountain Battery.
- 1 British Infantry Battalion.
- 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
- 1 Indian Infantry Training Battalion.
- Supply Depot, etc.

2. *At Mingaladon. Headquarters, Rangoon Brigade Area.*

- 1 British Infantry Battalion.
- 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
- Supply Depot.
- Ordnance personnel.

3. *At Mandalay.*

- 1 Field Company Sappers & Miners.
- 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
- 1 Indian Pioneer Battalion.
- Supply Depot.

2 and 3 comprise the Rangoon Brigade Area. The troops at Mingaladon supply detachments at Rangoon (two companies) and at Port Blair in the Andamans, one company.

The question which remains to be considered is whether this force is sufficient for the internal security of the province.

In area the country is larger than France and has a population of thirteen millions. Of this number ninetyone per cent. are indigenous, while ten out of every thirteen are Burmans proper, with the high literacy percentage of fifty one per cent. for males and eleven per cent. for females, a much higher performance than India. Class antagonism is notably absent and Burma is remarkably uniform in race, language and religion. "To those whose experience has lain in other parts of India it is the homogeneity of Burma which is the most striking characteristic. The Burman, being a Buddhist, recognises none of the social divisions of caste and custom erected by Brahminism." (Simon Report, Vol. I page 79): These are outstanding facts which must receive the fullest consideration in any discussion on the internal security of Burma. To study the question in the right perspective it will be advisable to retrace our steps a few years to get a comparative view of events.

Ten years ago Burma was a peaceful country. Political agitation was practically unknown. There was no field for extremists, and the few disturbances, or "rebellions", which did occur were due to the interference of pseudo-priests in politics, an interference not countenanced by the Buddhist religion; and the misguided efforts of a few disgruntled Burmans to claim Theebaw's throne. Such movements are not unknown in other countries where the monarch has been deposed.

Later, in 1925, there was a serious no-tax campaign in Tharrawaddy, the scene of the recent "rebellion", which was put down with some difficulty, and necessitated the intervention of the military police. The tax complained of on this occasion, the Thathameda or capitation tax, is not a British invention, and was one of the more peaceful means employed by Burmese kings to raise money. It has always been unpopular, and there is no reason to believe that it will not be heard of again. Up to this point agitation in any serious form, with this one exception has been negligible, and so continued until last year, when the bubble burst. Immediately prior to the first outbreak of rioting in Rangoon there was no indication of trouble whatever. It was the direct result of a labour dispute, pure and simple, accentuated no doubt by racial feeling between the Burman and Indian labourer. But it is equally certain that towards the end of the upheaval there were signs that the Indian agitator was present, and had it not have been for the presence of the troops, which brought about the collapse of the rioting, the strife would have assumed a political and more widespread nature. It is necessary to understand all this, and to appreciate the one fact which emerges, that until Burma is entrusted with the management of her own affairs the slightest disturbance, no matter what the cause, will afford an opportunity for poisonous propaganda directed, in the main, against the British. Burmans are as incredulous as Indians, and a widespread agitation would place on the existing forces of law and order an impossible task, and one which they would be quite inadequate to undertake. When Upper Burma was annexed in 1885 the fact was hailed with jubilation, but it took three years to pacify the country at an enormous cost in life and treasure. The "subaltern's war" may occur again, for the communications in the country are little better than they were then, and the great jungles are still capable of hiding the most ubiquitous of raiders, and of furnishing an arena for the perpetration of heinous crimes, as recent events have shewn.

With a separated Burma we may be fairly certain that she will be capable of controlling the activities of those whose outlook does not coincide with her own, and that she will have the good sense to tread the path of peace and progress. It seems a reasonable belief that after separation other methods of agitation may be expected, and this must not be lost sight of in any review of internal security needs.

As will be seen from the figures given, the size of the present garrison is small when compared with the area of the country and the size of the population. This is due to lack of money, and a wider margin of security would no doubt afford greater peace of mind to those responsible for tranquility, which is so necessary for expansion and orderly development. Let us take it for granted that the present garrison will have to suffice, since Burma will require all her new resources to further the great plans for development which must, even now, be taking shape in the minds of her administrators. But let us hope that if it is found possible to increase the military budget, that the increase will be spent on the provision of more British troops. This opinion is put forward because of the military aspirations of the Burmans themselves. At present there are no Burmans in the army, a significant fact when it is remembered that ninety per cent. of the population is Burman.

Neither can it be argued that the military qualities of the Burman are similar to those of the Bengali, who, as we know, has no military traits whatever. If it were so the answer would be easy. It is necessary to again refer to the Simon report for the official reason. In Vol. I, page 80 it is stated "The strict economy enforced of late in the Indian Military budget has left the Indian Government unwilling to continue the experiments which have from time to time been made with the recruiting of Burmans. Burmans are less amenable than the martial races of India to military discipline, and Burman units are consequently at present more expensive and less efficient than Indian units....But Burman public opinion earnestly desires these experiments to continue and were Burma responsible for her own military budget, would certainly aim at their continuance."

That Burma does aim at the continuance of these experiments there can be not the slightest doubt, although it must be said that those most loud in their demand for a "Burmese army," and who extol the Burman as the most desirable and suitable material for military requirements, need not be regarded as possessing expert knowledge on the question, for they are, in the main, politicians unacquainted with the needs of the army. Those who know the Burman as a soldier will, I believe, have no difficulty in subscribing to the views of the Commission. But such a statement does little justice to the man and ignores the difficulties and prejudices which those responsible for raising the first Burmese units had to overcome. That they

apparently did not overcome them was no fault of their own. If the old units are to be resuscitated these experiences should serve as a guiding star, not only to the individuals on whom the special burden will fall, but to the authorities who will direct and lay down the policy for the process. There are sufficient officers in Burma, with a knowledge of the Burman, to know what is required. Hybrid organizations, where civil officers direct in one sphere and military officers in another are a failure.

The civil officer will have his special part to play. He can assist recruitment in the districts enormously by his advice and propaganda, and especially in the verification of character and ruthless pursuit of the deserter. These were two great blots on the old system, which doomed it to failure.

There will be no dearth of applicants for admission, but there must be the most critical discrimination in their selection. It is notorious that a vast number of recruits for the army in the war years were unsuitable in every way. This, in the judgment of many, was the reason for the death from inanition which the units suffered.

The army was made the dumping ground for the undesirables of the villages. The headmen were glad of the opportunity to rid themselves of many a pest, and no better means had offered itself for many years. Criminals were there by the score, who made the enforcement of discipline a heartbreaking job, and, in addition, contaminated those decent Burmans who, for patriotic reasons had enter the service. Moreover, the Burman was well served when he wished to rid himself of an irksome service, for it was only on rare occasions that deserters were apprehended, and their number ran into hundreds. None but the best will do for any new units, and if success is to follow they must be secured. It will be a slower process, but will provide a sound and sure foundation on which smart and efficient Burmese units can be built. The critic of this will naturally point his finger to a further remark of the Commission which reads, "It has been found difficult to recruit Burmans even for the Military police." If this is so, how can the army hope to succeed? The answer is that police service is not attractive compared with the army, and that the pay and conditions of service are far less beneficial. This should not be taken to imply that the present army pay satisfies the Burman, for it never did. The standard of living in Burma is higher than in India.

In Vol. I, page 79 of the Simon Report can be read "Extremes whether of wealth or of poverty are far less marked than in any other province, and the average standard of living is decidedly higher in Burma than in India." This is another point to be remembered.

The argument as to desirability of including Burmans in a future "Burma Defence Force" has been considered in some detail, because it indicates difficulties which need to be faced during the transition period, when Indian units will have left Burma, and only units raised from indigenous races will remain with the two British battalions. Clearly a weakness will result, which will not disappear until the new units raised to replace them are as efficient as those they replace. This will take some years. This strengthens the argument for an increase in British troops, and even when Burma has her own efficient defence force, there will be a need for something besides units of indigenous troops to maintain order and sustain public confidence. Those gaps which will occur in the garrison when the Indian units leave, for they presumably will leave Burma if she is to be taught to shoulder her responsibilities, should be sufficient to satisfy the demands of the most vocal Burmese advocate. Political expediency and a growing sense of Nationalism, which has received a great flip with the growing importance of separation from India, will demand liberal treatment for Burmans in the army, especially as Burma must "foot the bill."

The likelihood of a separate military force for Burma has caused some speculation in the minds of British officers of the Indian Army, now serving with units raised in Burma, as to their own future.

Will officers be seconded from the Indian Army? Will there be a separate officer cadre for Burma, or will officers be seconded for five years as is done in some regiments in Africa. This latter idea seems to be popular in some quarters. But it appears to be a fatal proposition, not only for existing units, but for any new ones to be raised. Units raised in Burma have especial difficulties, which are now appreciated, and chief among them is the language. There are many tongues and many differences among the men, and no *lingua franca* as yet, although Burmese is likely to emerge as such. Under the new conditions which will prevail it will be more necessary than ever that officers should know their men intimately.

This entails not only a close study of their psychology, but a knowledge of at least two dialects, and these dialects are not easy.

This cannot be done in five years. Even if it could, as soon as an officer is settled and is becoming useful his tour of duty would be over. Prolonged, personal touch must be maintained at all costs, and this can be obtained without any dislocation by letting things remain as they are. Officers can still remain on the general list of the Indian army for service in Burma, where they can equally well qualify for command of Indian units as they do now. The balance is easily maintained by posting younger officers from India. If this is not done, under existing time scales for promotion there will be no prospects of advancement for anyone, and we shall be back again to the "bearded subalterns" of John Company's army, with all the attendant evils!

MORE MUSINGS ABOUT ADMINISTRATION *Versus* TRAINING.

BY

MAJOR C. W. SANDERS, 1ST PUNJAB REGIMENT.

There is an increasing tendency for those interested in their military profession to grumble at the ever-increasing amount of office work and the resultant lack of time for training. How are we to study and keep our men and ourselves abreast of the times if we have to spend most of our hours and mental energy in administration? This is the prevalent complaint and there have been from time to time various proposals submitted for improvement.

The object of this short paper is to review briefly the state of affairs to see if they are as bad as they are painted. It may be confessed at once that the conclusions are, shall we say, retrograde and the writer is prepared for the weight of public opinion to descend on his head; but this will probably be considered either thick enough to withstand the blow or empty enough for no great damage to result.

Let us first consider the case of administration. Admittedly in staff offices the flood of paper may well cause thinking people to consider the investment of their money in soft wood syndicates. But this article is written from the point of view of a regimental officer in an Indian Infantry Active Battalion.

The contention is that the company commander cannot get out and train his men owing to his time being taken up with administration, and Captain Bower, in a recent article in this journal, submitted a proposal for centralizing all the administration of a unit under a junior officer, the Quartermaster, so as to free company commanders. While most emphatically agreeing that office work should be reduced to the necessary minimum and that the crime of making paper is one for which the only punishment should be death, the writer wishes to remind officers that a successful commander must have considerable administrative ability. It must be remembered that the higher the command the more general administrative responsibility there is, often including, in the case of a commander of an army in war, the problems of the civil administration of the theatre of operations, and that at a time when all his energies should be directed towards planning the defeat

of the enemy. Is it therefore wise or good training for war or for high command to relieve company commanders from all administrative duties? Admittedly Captain Bower agrees that they should still check their mens' receipt of pay, etc. but will they, or can they, do this satisfactorily if they are not responsible for their company books and accounts? The answer is a definite negative. Furthermore, at what stage in his regimental career will an officer start learning administration? To follow the proposal to a logical conclusion, an officer may suddenly find himself in command of a battalion, where he is responsible for everything, with no experience of administrative details or accounts. If the Quartermaster be a permanent officer, an excellent suggestion with safeguards, it means that still less will other officers in the unit have opportunity for learning this part of their profession.

To deal with the complaint that administration is so heavy these days that insufficient time is available for training.

Let us be honest with ourselves. How many company commanders in an efficiently administered unit, with a practical commanding officer, have to stay in office more than an average maximum of two hours a day, with considerably less when on field training? There is a limit to the amount of hours of useful instruction which can be allotted for the training of the sepoy, especially in individual training. What then would company commanders do during the remainder of the working day if they did not have to attend to the administration of their companies? There is a limit to the amount of tactical exercises without troops and private study which can be effectively undertaken in any given period. Furthermore it is again stressed that, unless an officer is prepared to spend time and thought on the welfare of his men, he is only doing half his duty. It is submitted that, now that we have more or less cleared up the arrears of office work due to the war and to post-war reorganization, the paper in a unit is very little, if any, more than it was prior to 1914. If, in addition, it is realized that there are now no recruits, except the odd band boy or bugler, that the annual weapon training courses have been reduced to a most practical minimum and that increased responsibilities have been given to Indian officers, including the command and administration of companies, there seems little justification for the complaint that there is less time for training now than before. Admittedly there are more weapons to

be taught, that the soldier now goes to school and that there is an all-round increase in the standard which is expected of him, yet all these are training and not office problems ; they are full of interest and to fit all these subjects into the training year requires much thought and careful organization. Do we organize our time for training economically ? It has been stated above that the sepoy can only stand a limited number of useful hours a day of individual instruction, so that, it is submitted, his programme can be completed without difficulty, although the generous leave and furlough terms do not leave all the time required to hammer out some of the details of field work to the full extent one would wish.

On the other hand, are we training the sepoy on the right lines as regards field work and so as to make the best use of the time available ? Here again the answer is considered to be "no." In a recent article by a keen student of human nature the writer wished to simplify command in the Indian Army in the field by the use of such inspiring orders as "chalo bai," or as the British N. C. O. would translate it "ere, get a move on you perishers." The result anyhow is the same, a clear well-expressed order about the intention of which there can be no doubt and one that appeals to the mentality of the recipient. He is right. So muddled is the poor sepoy becoming with all the instructions now received, especially in field work, that, whereas in the old days, if you told him to go and take an objective, he would unhesitatingly do so. Now when he hears the first round of enemy blank fire, he usually lies down and wonders, all of him from platoon commander downwards, what the devil he must do to please the sahib, thereby doing the one thing calculated to destroy his peace of mind for the rest of time. This seems to be somewhat of a digression, but, before wanting more time, let us check our methods and go up and look at the wood for a bit instead of dodging about amongst the trees.

Are we obeying our manuals and concentrating chiefly on making the soldier a good man at arms, filled with the offensive spirit, disciplined, fit and cheerful, able to march and undergo hardship and to show practical initiative ? If not, what are the remedies and how can we make better use of the twenty four hours, daily granted for work and other things ? The answer, it is submitted, is that the teaching of the soldier as regards field work can be simplified by concentrating on boldness, a vigorous offensive when required and good use of

ground. We know that the man will fight well when the time comes and he has forgotten to think what is required of him, so let us encourage simplicity.

On the other hand the training of the leader who plans and initiates the operation requires all the time and energy available, though each exercise or discussion wants careful limitation as to time and the lessons to be brought out. But it is held that a great deal of extra time can be made available if we really devolve more responsibility on the N. C. O. instructor for the teaching of individual work. It should be recognized that during individual instruction of the men officers could go away two or three days a week to prepare programmes, carry out tactical exercises without troops and discuss problems on the sand model or in the Mess or Indian Officers' club instead of feeling they should stand about on parade, probably in little bunches discussing their next shoot. It is easier and more efficacious to come on parade, say, three days a week fresh and with an observant eye for faults, either on the part of the instructor or the man than to keep up to the mark when on parade all the time every day. In the first case, like the spectator, you see more of the game, in the second, unless exceptional, you are apt to become stale and unobservant. Naturally each case must be treated on its merits and there are times when the continuous presence of the officer is necessary, but the object of this brief paper is to try and encourage a broader vision and to submit for discussion that there are many possibilities for the reorganization of our working hours. The writer is only too well aware that the ideas given above are not new and that some have been adopted in certain units, but he does consider that there is room for improvement as a whole.

To sum up. The paper situation in a unit is not so alarming as is often made out. There is certainly room for much improvement, especially in connection with the methods of the audit branch and by giving commanding officers more powers, but these questions are not within the scope of this paper. But the amount of administration devolving on company commanders should not, to any great extent, limit training if the time for this all-important branch of his work be more practically arranged and more trust be placed on subordinates. Further, administrative responsibility is essential for all commanders if they wish to insure the comfort, health and contentment of their

men and are to train themselves for higher command. If thought, method and commonsense be brought to bear on current problems and in the preparation of programmes, there should be time to teach the man and to encourage the leader to develop his powers of command, while, at the same time, enabling every one to play games, shoot and take the leave which is so essential to the well-being of all ranks.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

MILITARY WIDOWS' FUND, INDIAN ARMY.

Sir,

In an editorial note in the July issue of the journal you invite discussion regarding a Military Widows Fund, Indian Army. This is a subject in which I am interested, particularly now that there is such a fund, *viz.*, "Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine Officers Provident Fund" *vide* "Extract from the Gazette of India" Army Department No. 163 dated 21st March 1931. Having read carefully through the rules of this fund it struck me that there were certain points on which more information was required. A letter was therefore sent officially to the Controller Military Accounts, Presidency and Assam District asking certain questions, and a short time ago his answer was received. As there may be several other readers who like me are interested in this fund I append below certain of these questions and answers.

Q. 1.—Reference, Para (4). Is it permissible, for an officer who wishes to become a subscriber, to pay in a lump sum on joining? If so, what is the limit of the amount.

A. 1. Para. 4 does not apparently make any provision for the lump sum payment.

Q. 2. Reference, Para. (4) (iii) (iv). An officer fixes the amount which he wishes to subscribe monthly. Must the original sum fixed be contributed the whole time he is in that rank or may he vary the amount periodically to suit his wishes, *e.g.*, a captain subscribes for one year at Rs. 60/-, later goes on furlough and wishes to reduce to Rs. 40/- and after four months furlough he wishes to reduce to Rs. 20/- Is this allowed?

A. 2. It is held that these Rules on the General Provident Fund will apply *Mutatis Mutandis* to the Indian Army Fund as well.

Q. 3. Reference, Para. 6 (i) What is the current rate of interest?

A. 3. The rate of interest on subscriptions for the current financial year is five per cent.

Q. 4. Reference, Para. 6 (vi) Is it possible to give a rate of interest below which it can be guaranteed the current rate of interest will not fall? Unless something on these lines can be given it would seem to me that though the scheme can be called attractive in many ways, it will not induce a large number of voluntary subscribers to join.

A. 4. The question seems premature. The fund has hardly been in operation for three months and it will serve no useful purpose by attempting to answer it now.

Q. 5.—Reference, Para. 9 (vii). One of the most attractive features of the scheme from the point of view of a married man is that a lump sum will be available for his family. Such a lump sum though is often required by the said family without delay. Can it be guaranteed that the family will be paid the sum standing at the deceased's account in the shortest possible time after the notification of death? For example, say within fifteen or twenty days at the most.

A. 5. The points may involve legal and technical difficulties and each case will have to be decided on its merits.

There are certain factors which influence any prospective "investor" of money which should be always considered and as regards investing in this provident fund it seems to me that some of the more important questions are as follows:—

- (a) If death occurs then will the widow receive her dues quickly say, within two or three weeks? As seen above this is not guaranteed.
- (b) As an investment, is the investor getting an adequate rate of interest on his money? At the moment yes, but if the rate fell to one or two per cent then I should say no.
- (c) Is rebate of income tax allowed on these subscriptions?

The rules do not say, and this did not occur to me when the letter was sent to the Controller of Military Accounts raising the other queries.

Then there is the question of the lump sum subscription. Would it not be of advantage to the Fund itself, as well as to the individual if the latter was allowed to contribute a lump sum to the fund on joining. This would I think appeal to officers of say fifteen years service or over. I cannot see any disadvantage to this plan.

If agreed to I suggest that conditions attached to this subscription should be as follows :—

- (a) One payment only would be allowed.
- (b) It should be paid on becoming a subscriber.
- (c) The amount which could be subscribed would be limited according to the number of years of service of the subscriber, *e. g.*, Rs. 100/- or Rs. 50/- for each year of service.
- (d) Any amount up to the total amount authorised under para. (c) would be accepted.

As the scheme stands at present I personally am no longer interested as I consider I can get more certain if not better terms privately ; but should the doubtful points mentioned above be definitely cleared up then I should have no hesitation in becoming a monthly subscriber.

Yours faithfully,

E. R. S. DODS, CAPTAIN,
2/4th Bombay Grenadiers (K. E. O.)

SPORTS.

Sir,

As I feel that many of your readers must be interested in the preservation of sport, I wonder if you would allow me to draw their attention to the British Field Sports Society and its work.

Founded at the end of 1930 under the presidency of the Duke of Beaufort it already has a membership of close on 4,000 and its influence in the sporting world is making itself felt. This is not to be wondered at as it is supported officially by such bodies as the Masters of Foxhounds Association, Master of Otter Hounds Association, Association of Masters of Harriers and Beagles, the National Coursing Club, the Field Trial Council and many others.

Its principal object is to counteract the growing volume of anti-sport propaganda in the press and elsewhere, organised by societies who have as their objective the abolition of all Field Sports. That this propaganda was having a disastrous effect on uninformed public opinion in the large industrial areas there is no manner of doubt, but this is now being more than countered by the British Field Sports Society.

It is impossible in the short space of a letter to give more than a brief outline of our work. In addition to that mentioned above, we hope to help sport in many ways—such as veterinary research, game rearing and the preservation of fish, whilst it is proposed to form as soon as possible an Information Bureau for the use of members, through which it will be possible to obtain particulars of sporting quarters, stabling, fishing, etc., procurable throughout the country, which should be particularly useful to overseas members.

The subscription has been placed as low as one shilling so that it will be possible for sportsmen to join, whatever the depth of their pockets, but larger sums are very welcome as there is a lot of work to be done and the opponents of sport have enormous funds at their disposal. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that that influential body, the R. S. P. C. A. has a Bill before Parliament intended to put an end to Stag hunting, and should this pass there is little doubt that it will be the thin end of a wedge designed to destroy sport in the United Kingdom.

In conclusion may I be allowed to say that all subscriptions will be very gratefully received at this address, however small, and that I shall be very glad to give any further information on the Society and its work which correspondents may desire.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

J. W. FITZWILLIAM,

(*Secretary, British Field Sports Society,
St. Stephen's House, Westminster,
S. W. I.*).

THE BATTLE OF CORYGAUM.

Sir,

1. Is the spelling of 'Koregaon,' as used in the article which appears in No. 263 of the Journal of the U.S.I. India,* necessary, or even desirable?

2. "Corygaum, 1st January, 1818" as a battle-honour was borne by the Madras Artillery of the Hon. East India Company's service; and is to-day borne by The Poona Horse (17th Queen Victoria's Own Cavalry); and by the 4th Bombay Grenadiers, in virtue of its 2nd battalion being the present day representative of the 2nd

*Vol. LXI. April, 1931. No. 263, pp. 221-3.

Battalion, 1st Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, in 1818. It was in consequence of 'Corygaum' that the title 'Grenadier' was conferred upon this battalion.

3. As this 'affair' has hitherto been known and officially recognized as The Battle of 'Corygaum,' it seems a pity to introduce a new spelling of the place-name, which can only add to the difficulty of remembrance, and cause confusion.

4. Lieutenant Pattison, who is mentioned in the article, should be Pattinson-Thomas George. He was dangerously wounded, and died on 4th January, 1818.

5. The artillery of the force consisted of two 6—pounder guns, manned by a detachment of the Madras Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant William Chisholm who was killed.

6. A pamphlet of 32 pages, published in 1839, will be found in Vol. viii of *Madras Artillery Records*—"Correspondence"—entitled "Sketch of the Column at Corygaum, with a plan of the village, some letters, private and public, the General Orders, and the Dispatch from the Honorable Court of Directors, relating to the action on the 1st January, 1818." It was printed at Madras, by J. B. Pharoah.

7. Major P. J. Begbie's *History of the Madras Artillery*, published in 1853—vol. ii, pp. 42-5-describes the 'affair' in detail.

8. The India medal (Sky-blue ribbon), with clasp 'Corygaum,' was granted for this service—General Order (India) of 14th April, 1851.

9. The article by Colonel Kenyon states that "during recent years * * * * the monument has been sadly neglected." But why?

10. The following extract from a General Order by The Honorable The Governor of Bombay, in Council, dated at Bombay Castle, 13th December, 1824, shows that land was assigned to pay a care-taker "for ever."

"The Hon. the Governor in Council is a pleased * * * * to appoint Cundojee Mullojee, now a Havildar in the 1st Company of Invalids, but late of the 2nd Battn., 1st Regiment Native Infantry, and wounded at the Action of Corygaum, to the charge of this Pillar,

and to declare the trust to be hereditary in his Family for ever ; but, in case of the failure of any male Issue to the person enjoying the grant, it will rest with the Government to appoint a Successor. * * * *

“ A Piece of Land adjacent to the Pillar, or an annual sum of Money, will be further assigned by Government for the future maintenance of the Persons in charge of this trust.

“ By Order of the Honorable the Governor in Council.”

(SIGNED) “ W. NEWNHAM, CHIEF SECRETARY.”

11. Has the “ piece of land,” or the “ annual sum of money,” mentioned in the Order, also “ been sadly neglected ” ?

12. From the *East India Calendar*, 3 vols., published in 1826, the following paragraph from vol. iii, page 461, gives further details about the founding of the monument—

“ Extract of the account of the Ceremony of the laying of the first stone of the monument erected by order of the Bombay Government, to commemorate the victory of Corygaum.

BOMBAY, APRIL 7TH, 1821.

“ The foundation stone of the monument, destined to perpetuate the defence of Corygaum, was laid by Colonel Huskison, on behalf of Major-General Smith, on Monday the 26th ult. This interesting ceremony took place at half past five in the evening, in presence of the chief civil and military authorities of the Deccan. The party assembled in an adjoining suite of tents, and marched in procession to the spot, where they were received under a general salute, by a detachment of artillery, two companies of grenadiers, from the 1st or Corygaum regiment, and the band of H. M's. 47th regiment.

“ A brass plate with the following inscription :—

‘ This foundation stone was laid, Anno Domini 1821, the Most Noble the Marquess of Hastings, Governor-General of India, and the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay,’ was then deposited in the foundation stone, with a few British coins, and a scroll of parchment, containing the names of the persons present at the ceremony. The Colonel then

ascertained with true masonic precision, the correctness of the level, when three volleys of musquetry, and a royal salute from the artillery, announced the termination of the ceremony."

2. Do the brass plate, the British coins, and the scroll of parchment still exist ?

Yours faithfully,

J. H. LESLIE, LIEUT.-COLONEL,
*Editor of Journal, Society for Army Historical
Research.*

THE BATTLE OF CORYGAUM.

SIR,

With reference to the contribution, "The Battle of Koregaon" by Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Kenyon, R.A., in the April 1931 number of your Journal to which my attention has been drawn by past officers of the Regiment, I, as Honorary Colonel, send you the following which may be of interest to your readers.

At the end of his article Lieut.-Colonel Kenyon says, "of recent years this gallant action had been almost forgotten and the monument had been sadly neglected." The battalion concerned in the battle of Corygaum is now called the 2/4th K. E. O. Bombay Grenadiers. The title 'Grenadiers' was given for its share in the battle. The irregular cavalry engaged became "The Poona Horse." The age-old custom of commemorating the battle on the 1st January—"Corygaum Day"—with a special and unique parade on which the colours are garlanded and trooped is still kept up.

On the 1st January 1928 the most striking addition to the old ceremonial was made. The sword of honour which was presented to Captain Staunton in commemoration of the battle by the East India Company was, and will always be, trooped with the colours. This sword was given to the battalion by Miss M. Cahill, a descendant of Captain Staunton, in 1926.

After the parade the rest of the day and night, as circumstances permit, are given up to entertainments such as sports, nautch, dance or dinner, etc.

The neglected state of the monument at Corygaum was brought to the notice of the military authorities and the Government of

Bombay a few years ago by Lieut-Colonel C. P. F. Warton, the then commandant. The reply received was to the effect that the work would be done, but that funds were not available.

Besides the 'Corygaum Sword' the battalion has Captain Staunton's medals including the Corygaum medal which was specially re-cast for us at Calcutta, as the original medal was not issued till sometime after Captain Staunton's death.

We have also a 'Coatee' worn at the battle and kept as an heirloom by the hereditary keeper of the monument who with his son handed it over to us for safe keeping at an annual memorial celebration. I trust these extra details may be of interest to those who study the past history of the Indian Army and show that 'this gallant action' has not been forgotten at any rate by the battalion concerned.

Yours truly,

S. M. EDWARDES.

MILITARY NOTES.

FRANCE.

MILITARY SECTION AT THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE STUDY OF TREATIES.

A decree was issued by the President of the Republic on 9th May, creating a military section for the study of treaties to be attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The section will comprise—

A general officer.

A colonel or lieutenant-colonel.

A subaltern officer.

Two permanent civil employees.

This personnel will be under the War Department for administrative purposes.

“ AGENTS MILITAIRES.”

A bill was introduced in June, 1931, suspending recruiting for the *Agents Militaires*, an organization of civilians employed in mobilization centres and for routine duties in the army, for the purpose of freeing conscripts for training purposes. The bill was introduced for reasons of economy since many of the *Agents Militaires* are drawing army pensions in addition to their civilian pay. It is proposed that their duties shall be performed by permanent staff non-commissioned officers and men who will continue in the service until the age of 60 or 65.

MOBILIZATION.

A bill was introduced in June, 1931, for the purpose of enabling the national defences to be manned speedily upon the outbreak of war. It is proposed to legalize the individual calling up of certain reservists on government initiative, to supplement the *Disponibles* classes (which correspond to our *Section A* of the Reserve) who are considered inadequate for this purpose.

Steps are also proposed to ensure that sufficient trained specialists are available for this preliminary mobilization.

INDO-CHINA.

French army manœuvres.

Manœuvres took place in Tonkin in January last. Practically the whole of the Northern Division took part.

Considerable political importance was attached to these manœuvres, to which many foreign missions were invited.

The following troops took part:—

Red—

- Divisional Headquarters.
- Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
- 9 battalions infantry.
- 3 groups artillery.
- 2 sections armoured cars (10 cars).
- 1 company engineers.
- 1 platoon cavalry.
- 2 flights air force.

Blue—

- Brigade Headquarters.
- 5 battalions infantry.
- 1 group artillery.
- Detachment engineers.
- 1 platoon cavalry.
- 1 flight air force.

ITALY.

EXPENDITURE ON TRAINING.

The Committee responsible for the compilation of the Annual Budget Report draw attention to the increased allotment of 22 million lire for training and put forward the following recommendations for the consideration of the Minister of War:—

- (a) There should be more exercises without troops for the commanders and staffs of higher formations and the training of generals and senior officers should be increased.

- (b) The scale on which large concentrations of artillery fire are practised should be increased so that commanders and staffs of higher formations and of artillery commands may be accustomed to the organization and application of fire power.
- (c) A larger number of reserve officers should be called to the colours during the summer training period.
- (d) Winter courses for reserve officers, of whom 7,000 attended in 1929 and 11,000 in 1930, should be made compulsory and steps should be taken to overcome difficulties raised by firms who employ reserve officers.
- (e) Guards and "employments" of all kinds should be reduced as much as possible in order not to take men away from training.

As regards recalling personnel to the colours the Committee evidently desire to concentrate on reserve officers and specialists. The Minister of War however appears to have decided to recall only 2,500 to 3,000 reserve officers as in previous years and to utilize the additional funds in calling up for the first time a batch of 20,000 other rank reservists belonging to the Perugia and Chieti Divisions for a period of 20 days.

MOROCCO.

FRENCH ZONE.

Railway Construction.

The section of the new railway from Oudja through Berguent to Bou-Arfa has been officially opened. This line is the first step towards the future Trans-Saharan Railway. It is intended to continue the railway through Bou Denib southwards round the Atlas Mountains linking up with the existing line at Marrakech.

Work is also proceeding actively on the section of the line from Oudja to Taza, which, when completed, will give communication by Railway from Tunis to Marrakech.

SPANISH ZONE.

Reorganization.

By a decree of 3rd June, 1931, the Provisional Government has ordered the separation of the functions of High Commissioner and

Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in Morocco ; the High Commissioner will be a civilian. The decree divides the Protectorate into two military areas (*circunscripciones*) instead of four ; the eastern includes Melilla and the Riff ; the western, Ceuta-Tetuan and Larache.

Consequent changes in artillery commands and ancillary units are decreed, but it appears that these will only entail a small reduction in the strength of the Spanish Army in Morocco.

Appointments.

On the above reorganization, Senor Don Luciano Lopez Ferrer, for the last eight years Spanish Consul-General in Gibraltar, has been appointed High Commissioner, and General Don Miguel Cabanellas, the recently appointed Captain-General of Andalusia, has been transferred to Morocco as Commander-in-Chief. General Don Jose Sanjurjo who has been temporarily filling the dual appointment of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief has returned to Spain and resumed the active command of the Civil Guard.

Brigadier-General Don Leopoldo Garcia Boloix, the commander of the Riff military area, and Brigadier-General Don Gregorio Benito Terraza, the commander of the Ceuta-Tetuan military area, have been respectively appointed to command the new eastern and western military areas.

PORTUGAL.

MANIFESTATIONS IN HONOUR OF THE DICTATOR AND THE ARMED FORCES.

The Minister of Marine and the expeditionary forces sent to Madeira to quell the recent insurrection there, returned to Lisbon on the 12th May, on board the "Carvalho Araujo" and the "Vasco de Gama" and were given an official and enthusiastic welcome.

Special honours were accorded to the Minister of Marine on the successful termination of the mission on which he had been sent. He was greeted on arrival by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and by a large gathering of officials and civilians.

The Expeditionary Force was warmly cheered on disembarking. The streets through which the troops marched were lined by naval and military units of all arms. The Expeditionary Force assemble in

the *Praca do Comercio*, which was beflagged for the occasion. From there they proceeded to the *Avenida da Liberdade*, where they marched past the President of the Republic, the members of the Government and other authorities.

On 17th May a series of ceremonies took place in honour of the President of the Republic, the expeditionary troops and the armed forces of the nation in general.

The principal ceremony consisted of a military parade in which, under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel de Sousa, units of all corps of the army and navy, numbering some 6,000, marched past General Carmona, who took the salute from a balcony of the palace of *Belem*.

During a speech made at a function arranged by the *Union Nacional*, the Prime Minister made the following statements:—

- (1) The Military Dictatorship will only hand over its powers to a Government which, on the conclusion of the Dictatorship's transitory action will be freely established according to the future constitution, with the supremacy of the civil authority and the assurance of the regular functioning of the powers of the State.
- (2) It will severely repress with arms any revolutionary attempts of whatsoever nature.
- (3) It will be obliged to punish with all severity, for the good of the nation, anyone who, abusing the tolerance shown up to date, may provoke disturbances.
- (4) The moment for the establishment of constitutional normality will depend upon the national and international situation of the Portuguese nation.

The Prime Minister and the Minister for War have carried out a long series of visits to the barracks of the various units of the Lisbon garrison.

During these visits the two ministers confirmed the Government's recent political statements and were promised the loyal support of the different units.

SPAIN.

SPANISH REPUBLIC.

New national flag.

The new flag adopted by the Provisional Government for the Spanish National Colours is formed of three horizontal bands of equal width of red, yellow and dark purple, with the coat of arms in the centre.

The old Colours, of red and yellow, which have been in use for a century and a half, are being deposited in the various museums.

All units of the army, the *Guardia Civil* and the *Carabineros* will use the same flag. The possession of special Colours, which was formerly the privilege of certain corps, will no longer be permitted. All military forts and camps will use the same flag.

The promise of allegiance to the flag will in future be as follows :—

C.O. : “ Promise to be faithful to the Nation, loyal to the Government and to obey, respect and not forsake your Commanders.”

Recruit : “ Yes, I promise.”

C. O. : “ The law will uphold you and the Nation reward you if you do so ; if you do not you will be punished.”

At this ceremony the old custom of forming a cross with the C. O.'s sword and the Colours is to be discontinued.

REVIEWS.

U-BOAT STORIES. BY NEUREUTHER AND BERGEN.

(*Messrs Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1931*). 10s. net.

The U-Boat campaign, the most ruthless and dangerous threat which the Germans employed against England, and which was responsible for more innocent deaths than even the invasion of Belgium, is an interesting study of the lengths to which a nation will go to preserve its existence. In essence it was a logical reply to the British blockade which was slowly starving Germany. Owing to the clever propaganda produced during the war the people of the British Isles looked with horror and a burning indignation at the inevitable cruelties which the wholesale sinking of British and neutral merchantmen involved. That U-Boat commanders were guilty of the greatest brutality and a cynical disregard for the exiguous decencies of war cannot be denied; neither can it be denied that this very savagery brought its own retribution in the shape of the United States of America. Germany disregarded the opinion of the world and was beaten in the end, both under the sea and on the land.

But if we accept the old adage that "all is fair in love and war" these U-Boat stories, written by submarine commanders and even engine-room artificers, will show us ourselves from the other fellow's point of view and the new angle of vision will do us no harm. The attitude of the Germans who volunteered for the hazardous duty in submarines is summarised in the preface written by the German seascape artist, Claus Bergen, who contributes the best story in the book: "Humanly speaking, the strongest impression that stayed with me was the spirit of fine and loyal comradeship, the iron bond that united officers and crew in the narrow space of the vessel, cut off, as they were, from home, far out upon an enemy-infested sea, completely self-dependent, beset by a hundred lurking perils and with death always before their eyes, offering their lives in chivalrous combat for the honour of their Fatherland. That could equally well have been written by Kipling for his "Land and Sea Tales."

Running through the whole book is this theme of loyal, perilous service of men who believed that every liner, cruiser or fishing smack sent to the sea bottom was another nail in England's coffin, and their jubilation at every success is only natural in the circumstances. That they were brave men with the dice often heavily loaded against them is proved in many of these ingenious narratives. Towards the end it is apparent that the anti-submarine measures evolved by the British Admiralty were having increasing effect and, as we know, they succeeded finally in reducing this, one of the deadliest attacks which the British Empire has ever had to face, to comparative harmlessness. The book has some excellent coloured plates, but in these days of financial stringency is too highly priced to be sought for by the general reader.

W. E. M.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK 1930-1931.

(THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA, 1931).

The Year-Book has been in existence since 1924 and the current edition is therefore the seventh which has been published. During this period the book has been considerably extended in scope. It was originally published in order to implement the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League. This paragraph states that "Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."

The present edition contains monographs on the Armed Forces and the budgetary expenditure on Armaments of sixty-two different nations, both members and non-members of the League. There are no important omissions. The information with regard to China has been expanded and there is a new monograph on Egypt.

Each monograph opens with a general heading giving figures with regard to the area, population, extent of railways and the length of the frontiers and seaboard of the country under reference. This is followed by a detailed description of the system of command, organization and administration of the various defence Services.

Details are given of the systems of recruitment and training and, in some cases, of civilian mobilization in the event of war. In the case of the Air Force the numbers of the various types of aeroplanes in commission are given, and in the naval sections there are full details of the war vessels extant and under construction.

In each case the monograph concludes with an analysis of the budgetary expenditure on armaments of the nation concerned.

In the latter part of the volume are included a series of tables relating to the principal products and raw materials of importance to national defence. Firstly, a series of tables are provided to show the sources of origin of the various products which vary from coal and iron ore to oats and sheep. Then follow statistics of the principal exports and imports of products and materials important to defence by the various nations.

The book concludes with two annexures. In the first will be found the texts of the principal treaties and international agreements dealing with the limitation of armaments and the demilitarisation of zones. The second annexure contains a recapitulation table showing the chief characteristics of the armies of the different nations, a table showing male populations and graphs to illustrate the rise and fall of the naval strengths of the various countries from 1913 to 1929.

All through the volume it has been the aim of the editors to present the information as far as possible on the same lines in the case of each country.

It will be seen therefore that the Year-book presents a very complete picture of the military strength, both actual and potential, of the nations. The Disarmament Conference opens at Geneva in February 1932. Before the Conference the League Secretariat is to publish a special edition of the Armaments Year-book. This edition will be based upon the information which all the nations have been asked to send to Geneva by the 15th September this year, and will doubtless be more authoritative and complete than its predecessors. The present volume however, is well worthy of study by any one who wishes to realise the magnitude of the problem with which the Conference is faced. In addition, candidates for the Staff College and promotion examinations will find here complete and concise information with regard to the Armed Forces of the Empire.

J. B. B.

MESOPOTAMIA 1917-1920—A CLASH OF LOYALTIES.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR ARNOLD WILSON, K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*The Oxford University Press, London, 1931*). 25s.

In publishing his second volume on Mesopotamia Sir Arnold Wilson has once more proved that he can be just even towards those whose ideas and feelings he does not share. This gives his opinions the more weight. The book is indeed both criticism and defence, and coming from the pen of so able and authoritative a writer is sufficient indication of the problems facing those in authority not only in war, but in the more difficult period immediately following the cessation of hostilities.

We see here the conflicting demands of strategy and politics : the one favouring concentration of troops, the other sometimes demanding dispersion : and we learn that a broad outlook and the will to co-operate on either side go a long way towards reconciling opposing views.

It is refreshing to read the author's appreciation of the sympathetic attitude of Sir William Marshall and Sir George MacMunn to the problems confronting the civil administration, though one is tempted to ask why such co-operation should be regarded as the exception instead of the rule. Is the clash of loyalties between political and military authorities inevitable? There is apparent a tendency to think that it is : a tendency as unprofitable as it is dangerous. That is one of the reasons why this volume should be read by members of the United Service Institution. Our loyalties are to one head only and they should not clash.

The story of the gradual spread of revolutionary ideas into Iraq from Syria, financed, as the author asserts, by the government of Damascus from subsidies paid it by the British Treasury, discloses the gulf that existed between the various departments of State responsible for the Levant and the Mediterranean. Inter-communication and co-ordination were weak. The Middle East was not regarded as a whole, and there was a lack of a common policy between the British authorities in Syria and Mesopotamia. So much so that not only is British money from Syria stated to have found its way into the pockets of Mesopotamian revolutionaries, but rifles supplied to

Lawrence's Arabs seem also to have had a ready market on the Euphrates.

The period was one of peculiar difficulty for Sir Arnold Wilson, subordinate as he was to the military command in Iraq and yet in correspondence with the Foreign and India offices, and the Government of India. Prevented by considerations of high policy at Home from giving to the population of Iraq the eagerly awaited announcement as to the type of government under which they were to live, he yet managed to effect many administrative improvements and to lay the foundations of local Government in town and country. The burden of responsibility and pressure of work were great, and the author pays a just tribute to the Services, and in too many cases the sacrifices, of the political and other military officers under him.

Apart from the historical and political aspects of this book, its main interest to the military reader lies in the description of the vast and intricate organization necessary for the development of the local resources and communications of the country ; the employment of local labour ; the relief of famine ; and the protection of refugees ; in addition to the general administration of the occupied territory. All these form part of the responsibilities of a commander in war and require, for their successful accomplishment, wide study, and sympathetic handling.

R. A. S.

SADDLE ROOM SAYINGS.

BY WILLIAM FAWCETT.

(Messrs. Constable & Co., Ltd., 1931. Obtainable from the Oxford University Press, Bombay). 8s. 6d.

The title of this book is perhaps a little misleading, as it really describes only the last chapter.

The first chapter is an interesting study of the evolution of the English thoroughbred, but the bulk of the book deals with the breeding and training of hunters.

Mr. Fawcett, who is a well-known authority on the subject, has written of the hunter from foalhood to maturity, and his remarks, which all have a light crisp touch, concerning stables and stablecraft, breeding and buying, making and breaking, are founded upon a deep practical knowledge.

The author is not content to take facts as they are ; he balances one against the other, and enquires into cause and effect. As he himself says, " There is always so much to be learned " of horses ; one can never know all, and there will be few to whose store of horse knowledge this book will not contribute.

At the same time it is very readable, being well stocked with horsey anecdotes, strange stories of the wiles of horse copers, etc.

M. S. B.



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
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*Statement of accounts for the year ended
31st December 1931.*

THE UNITED SERVICE

Balance Sheet as at

Rs. a. p. Rs. a. p.

CAPITAL.

As at 1st January 1931	64,739	1	7		
Add—Excess of Income over Expenditure during the year ended 31st December 1931	6,023	11	6		
							<hr/>	70,762 13 1

LIABILITIES.

Electricity	41	6	0		
Audit Fee	225	0	0		
							<hr/>	266 6 0
Members and Subscribers at credit				770 12 0
Amount due to Lloyds' Bank, Ltd., London				47 13 4

Carried over

 71,847 12 5

INSTITUTION OF INDIA, SIMLA.

31st December 1931.

PROPERTY AND ASSETS.

BUILDING.

			Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
As at 1st January 1931	19,691	2	6			
Add—Additions in the year	444	1	0			
			20,135	3	6			
Less—Depreciation at $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	302	0	0			
						19,833	3	6

LIBRARY BOOKS.

As at 1st January 1931	10,595	4	6			
Add—Additions in the year	1,284	13	4			
			11,880	1	10			
Less—Depreciation at								
5% on opening balance	530	0	0			
50% on purchases	642	0	0			
			1,172	0	0			
						10,708	1	10

FURNITURE AND FITTINGS.

As at 1st January 1931	2,598	2	0			
Add—Additions in the year	138	1	0			
			2,736	3	0			
Less—Depreciation at 6%	164	0	0			
						2,572	3	0

PICTURES AND SCULPTURES.

As at 1st January 1931	3,218	5	0			
Less—Depreciation at 3%	97	0	0			
						3,121	5	0

MEDALS AND TROPHIES.

As at 1st January 1931	3,140	5	3			
Less—Depreciation on Rs. 1,245-15-3 Trophies at $1\frac{1}{2}$ %	12	7	0			
						3,127	14	3

SUNDRY DEBTORS.

Members and Subscribers at debit				743	4	0
Carried over				40,105	15	7

THE UNITED SERVICE

Balance Sheet as at

	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Brought forward ..		71,847 12 5

Total ..	<u>71,847 12 5</u>
----------	--------------------

THE UNITED SERVICE

Revenue Account for the

			Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
To—								
Establishment	7,619	2 0			
Contingencies	338	15 10			
Printing and Stationery	439	11 6			
Insurance, Rates and Taxes	646	6 0			
Electricity	177	9 0			
Postage and Telegrams	771	1 2			
Exchange and Bank Charges	62	12 0			
Repairs to Building	25	9 0			
Repairs to Furniture and Fittings	92	2 0			
Audit Fee	225	0 0			
						10,398	4 6	
Prize Competitions	318	10 8			
Lectures	109	7 0			
						428	1 8	
U. S. I. Journal expenses—								
Printing	6,427	10 6			
Premia	2,475	0 0			
Postage	1,396	8 6			
						10,299	3 0	
Arrears of Subscription written off	888	4 0	
Depreciation—								
Building	302	0 0			
Library Books	1,172	0 0			
Furniture and Fittings	164	0 0			
Pictures and Sculptures	97	0 0			
Medals and Trophies	12	7 0			
						1,747	7 0	
Surplus—								
Excess of Income over Expenditure..	6,023	11 6	

Total .. 29,784 15 8

INSTITUTION OF INDIA, SIMLA.

year ended 31st December 1931.

			Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
By—								
Government Grant		9,000	0	0
Members and Subscriptions		15,223	0	0
Arrears previously written off recovered		30	0	0
Entrance Fees	1,109	0 0			
Life Subscriptions	240	0 0			
						1,349	0	0
Tactical Schemes	560	14 0			
Army List pages	201	0 0			
						761	14	0
Sale of Journal	219	6 0			
Advertisements in Journal..	738	1 0			
						957	7	0
Interest on Investments		2,266	10	8
Sale of Periodicals		144	8	0
Sale of Catalogues		52	8	0

Total	..	29,784	15	8
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P. N. S. AIYAR & Co.,
Government Diplomaed Accountants, Auditors,

THE UNITED SERVICE

MACGREGOR

Cash Account for the year

To—				Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Balance on 1st January 1931 with Lloyds' Bank, Ltd., Simla			821	3	2
Interest on investments realised			218	8	0
Total	..						1,039	11	2

*Balance Sheet as at**Balance of Fund—*

As at 1st January 1931	4,479	3	2	Rs.	a.	p.
Add—Excess of Income over Expenditure	51	8	0			
							4,530	11	2

Total	..						4,530	11	2
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INSTITUTION OF INDIA, SIMLA.

MEMORIAL FUND.

ended 31st December 1931.

By—				Rs.	a.	p.
Gratuity	100	0	0
Medals	67	0	0
Balance with Lloyds' Bank, Ltd., Simla	..			872	11	2
			Total	..		
					1,039	11 2

*31st December 1931.**Investment—*

				Rs.	a.	p.
Government Promissory Notes $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ Face Value						
Rs. 6,300 at 58-1-0	3,658	0	0
Balance with Lloyds Bank, Ltd., Simla	..			872	11	2

Total	..				4,530	11 2
-------	----	--	--	--	-------	------

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CONTENTS.

Secretary's Notes.

Editorial

1. Side-Lights on Soviet Oriental Policy, by Captain G. E. Wheeler.
2. Signal Security, by Major R. T. O. Cary, M. B. E.
3. Hints on making a Bandobast for a Shoot in the Central Provinces, by "A Forest Officer."
4. Pickles, A.D.C., by "Mouse".
5. The Travels of Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan.
6. Stonewall Jackson—Then and Now, by Captain R. N. Gale, M. C.
7. The Philippines and the Pacific Problem, by Captain M. E. S. Laws, M. C.
8. Three Arms and Six Legs, by "Phoenix".
9. Shan Hai Kuan, by Major E. W. N. Wade, M. C.
10. The Next War Medal, by B. Arless.
11. Examination for Promotion—A few Suggestions, by "Longtimber".
12. Who was Thackeray's Major Gahagan?, by Colonel E. B. Maunsell.

Letters to the Editor.

Military Notes.

Reviews.



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The *Times Literary Supplement* of October 30th, 1930, reviewed the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society as follows:—"This number completes the 17th volume of a publication which has no rival in the English language in the wealth of fact and discussion on Central Asian affairs which it brings together."

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| 2. The Adjutant-General in India. | 10. The Military Secretary, A. H. Q. |
| 3. The Quartermaster-General in India. | 11. The Engineer-in-Chief, A. H. Q. |
| 4. The Master-General of the Ordnance in India. | 12. The Director, Medical Services,
A. H. Q. |
| 5. The Air Officer Commanding, R. A. F. in India. | 13. The Director, Military Operations,
A. H. Q. |
| 6. The Director, Royal Indian Marine. | |
| 7. The Secretary, Army Department. | |
| 8. H. A. F. Metcalfe, Esq., C.I.E., M.V.O.,
I.C.S. | |

Elected Members.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 14. Major-General E. F. Orton, C.B. | 17. Brigadier J. Morrison. |
| 15. Major-General H. F. E. MacMahon,
C.B., C.B.E., M.C. | 18. Lt.-Colonel H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O. |
| 16. H. Williamson, Esq., C.I.E., M.B.E. | 19. Major C. A. Boyle, D.S.O. |
| | 20. Major A. F. R. Lumby, C.I.E., O.B.E. |


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Elected Members.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Major-General H. F. E. MacMahon,
C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (President). | 3. Brigadier C. G. Ling, D.S.O., M.C. |
| 2. Major-General W. L. O. Twiss, C.B.,
C.B.E., M.C. | 4. Brigadier J. Morrison. |
| | 5. Major C. A. Boyle, D.S.O. |
| | 6. Major A. F. R. Lumby, C.I.E., O.B.E. |

Additional Members.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 7. Brigadier P. S. Stoney. | 10. Lt.-Colonel W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E. |
| 8. F. Tymms, Esq., M.C. | 11. Wing Commander A. R. C. Cooper |
| 9. Lt.-Colonel A. B. Haig, M.C. | 12. Captain W. E. Maxwell. |



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(From an officer who succeeded in gaining admission to the Staff College at the 1931 Examination).

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United Service Institution of India.

JULY 1932.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Editorial	284
1. Side-Lights on Soviet Oriental Policy	296
2. Signal Security	305
3. Hints on making a <i>Bandobast</i> for a Shoot in the Central Provinces	313
4. Pickles, A.D.C.	318
5. The Travels of Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan	326
6. Stonewall Jackson—Then and Now	341
7. The Philippines and the Pacific Problem	348
8. Three Arms and Six Legs	353
9. Shan Hai Kuan	358
10. The Next War Medal	366
11. Examination for Promotion—A few Suggestions	373
12. Who was Thackeray's Major Gahagan ?	382
Letters to the Editor	396
Military Notes	405
REVIEWS.	
1. The Soldier and the Empire	424
2. Armaments Year Book (Special Edition)	425
3. Historical Record of the 4th Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment	425

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1932 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

G. R. F. Tottenham, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
 H. A. F. Metcalfe, Esq., C.I.E., M.V.O., I.C.S.
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 P. R. Cadell, Esq., C.S. I.
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 „ E. W. N. Wade, M.C.
 Captain J. D. deWilton.
 „ E. J. R. Emtage.
 „ W. H. E. Gott, M.C.
 „ R. A. Grant.
 „ C. I. Jerrard.
 „ W. H. Emsden-Lambert.
 „ C. S. W. Rayner.
 „ S. E. Tayler.
 „ S. J. Pope.
 Lieut. C. J. W. Simpson.
 F. F. P. Gill, Esq., Indian Police.
 H. C. B. Jollye, Esq., Indian Forest Service.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 3 0

to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged ; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset.

The Reading room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, "works

of reference " or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5) Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed.

(6) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9) Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11) A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12) Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
The Armaments Year-Book, Special .. 1932 .. edition		The League of Nations.
Margaret Outram, 1778-1863 .. 1932 .. (Presented by Messrs. John Murray, London.)		Mary F. Outram.
Elementary Tactics.—The Art of War.. 1932 .. Vol. I (Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Coy., Ltd., London.)		R. P. Pakenham- Walsh.
The Annual Report of the Smithsonian 1931 .. Institute, 1930 (Presented by the Smithsonian Institute, Washington.)		..
The Handbook of the Turkish Army 1931 ..		Official.
The Indian Ocean .. 1932 .. (Presented by Messrs. G. G. Harrap .. & Co., Ltd., London)		Stanley Rogers.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

A Short History of British Expansion, 1930 .. 2nd edition.	James A. Williamson.
The Duke .. 1931 ..	Philip Guedalla,

BOOKS PURCHASED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
The Pound Sterling—History of English Money.	1931 ..	A. E. Feavearyear.
Six British Soldiers	.. 1931 ..	Hilaire Belloc.
The Soviet Five-Year Plan and its effect on World Trade.	.. 1931 ..	H. R. Knickerbocker.
The Life of Sir Charles Monro	.. 1931 ..	Genl. Sir George Barrow.
The Religious and Hidden Cults of India.	.. 1931 ..	Sir George MacMunn.
The Moral Issue of India	.. 1931 ..	Robert Stokes.
The Unseen Assassin	.. 1932 ..	Sir Norman Angell.
Behind the Scenes of International Finance.	.. 1932 ..	Paul Einzig,
The Dragon's Teeth—A Study of War & Peace.	1932 ..	Col. J. F. G. Fuller.
Manchuria—The Cockpit of Asia	.. 1932 ..	Col. P. T. Etherton & Hessel Tiltman.
The Official History, Military Operations in Gallipoli from May 15th to the Evacuation, Vol. II, with maps and appendices.	1932 ..	Aspinall Oglander.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. VII.	G. P. Gooch & H. Temperley.
The Caste System of Northern India	E. A. H. Blunt.
Problems of Imperial Defence	.. Cole
The Statesman's Year-Book, 1932

VI.—Army Examinations.

(a) *Promotion*.—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from October 1932, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (b) (iii) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (d) (iii):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	October 1932	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the War with Germany to June 1917.
2	March 1933 ..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..
3	October 1933	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).
4	March 1934 ..	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.
5	October 1934	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.	..
6	March 1935	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.
7	October 1935	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.

(b) *Staff College*.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated

below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted.)

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

Naval and Military Despatches . . A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q standpoint.

Reports of the Dardanelles Commission. . . Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I.
(C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) ..The best unofficial account and
criticism of the strategic con-
duct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV,
(F. J. Moberly).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April
1917 (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

Mesopotamia, 1917—20, A Clash of Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W.
O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula—Waterloo, 1808—15, also
Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

- History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).
 Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).
 The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).
 John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).
 Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).
 A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).
 The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).
 Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—1709 (A. Kearsey).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

- Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).
 History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).
 History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).
 A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861-1862 (A. Kearsey).
 The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).
 History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).
 Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).
 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).
 Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).
 Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

- Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).
 Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).
 My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

- Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).
 Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).
 Official Account : The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military).
 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.
 Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).
 A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).
An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign, 1796-97.*

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).
Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army.*

A.—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SINCE 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.
Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B.—FORCES OF THE EMPIRE.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).
Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.
The Statesman's Year Book.
Army List.

C.—FOREIGN ARMIES.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.
War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(Contains much concentrated information).
The Statesman's Year Book.
Whitaker's Almanack.
The Colonial Office List.
The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).
The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).
The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).

- The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
 The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
 The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
 The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
 England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).
- B.—BOOKS ON SPECIAL PORTIONS OF THE EMPIRE OR WORLD.
- The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).
 General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
 India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).
 India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).
 Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
 Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
 The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
 Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
 The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
 History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
 The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
 International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
 What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
 Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

- Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
 Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
 Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
 Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

- Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).
 Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1931 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(A) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram. (Reprinted May, 1928).*

To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2.

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Orders for night attack.
- (ii) Outposts , 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.
- (iii) Move by M. T. , 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(D) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes—*
1928.—Three Tactical Schemes, complete with maps
and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

- (i) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.
- (ii) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.
- (iii) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (i).)

1929.—Three Tactical Schemes, complete with maps
and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

- (i) Withdrawal—Appreciation.
- (ii) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (i).)
- (iii) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1931.—Strategy and Tactics papers, complete with maps and
solutions .. Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

- (i) Training for War (Protection).
- (ii) Advanced-Guard and Attack.
- (iii) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (i).)

(E) *Mountain Warfare.*

A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted
May, 1928) Rs. 2-8

(F) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram (Reprinted May, 1928).*

To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2

(G) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*

(i) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions)
(1930) Re. 1 each.

(ii) The History and Organization of the Empire
(1931) Re. 1 each.

(iii) Organization, Administration and Transport-
ation (Peace), (1931) (with suggested
answers) Re. 1 each.

(iv) Withdrawal (without map), (1931) .. Re. 1 each.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of précis of lectures delivered to the Army Head-
quarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment.
These précis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who
have not attended the lectures. The date of the précis is given in
each case.

- (i) Night Operations (1931) Rs. 2/- each.
- (ii) The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) .. Re. 1/8 ..
- (iii) The Third Afghan War (1931) „ 1/8 ..
- (iv) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930) „ 1/8 ..
- (iv-a) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) „ 1/8 ..
- (v) American Civil War (1930) „ 1/- ..
- (vi) Military Evolution, and the Influence
of modern inventions on Warfare (1931) .. „ 1/- ..
- (vii) Supply of a Division in War (1930) „ 1/- ..
- (viii) History and Organization of the Empire (1931) .. „ 1/- ..
- (ix) Hints on working for examinations (1930) .. As.-/8/- ..
- (x) The Employment of Artillery (1930) -/8/- ..
- (xi) Artillery (1931), 1st Lecture -/8/- ..

(xi-a) Artillery (1931), 2nd Lecture	As. /8/ each.
(xii) Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	” ” ”
(xiii) Wireless Communications in the R.A.F. (1931)	” ” ”
(xiv) Air Co-operation (1931)	” ” ”
(xv) The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	” ” ”
(xvi) Anti-Gas Defence (1931)	” ” ”
(xvii) Tanks (1930)	” ” ”
(xviii) Armoured Cars (1930)	” ” ”
(xix) Military Engineering (1930)	” ” ”
(xx) Signals in the Division (1930)	” ” ”
(xxi) Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	” ” ”
(xxii) The Organization of the British Army (1930)	” ” ”
(xxiii) Mobilization (1930)	” ” ”
(xxiv) Reinforcements (1930)	” ” ”
(xxv) Military Law, I (1930)	” ” ”
(xxv-a) Military Law, II (1930)	” ” ”
(xxv-b) Military Law, III (1930)	” ” ”
(xxvi) The “ Q ” Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	” ” ”
(xxvii) The Auxiliary and Indian Territorial Forces (1929)	” ” ”
(xxviii) Training (1930)	” -/4/- ”
Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on “ Transpor- tation in War ”	” -/12/- ”

X.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—concl'd.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

(i) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(ii) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award).

1889..BELL, Col. M. S., v.c., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1891.. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
- 1892.. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893.. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZALDAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894.. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895.. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896.. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897.. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898.. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899.. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900.. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901.. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902.. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903.. MANIFOLD, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904.. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905.. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906.. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.
- 1907.. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908.. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909.. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1910.. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
 TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
 KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911.. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
 GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912.. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
 WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
 MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913.. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
 SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
 WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914.. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
 MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
 HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915.. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
 ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916.. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
 ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917.. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918.. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919.. KEELING, Lieut.-Col. E. H., M.C., R.E.
 ALLA SA, Jemadar, N. E. Frontier Corps.
- 1920.. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
 AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921.. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
 SHER ALI, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922.. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
 NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923.. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
 SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
 HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924.. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
 GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1925..SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
 JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926..HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C.H.G.H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927..LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928..BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
 MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929..ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
 GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930..GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
- 1931..O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
 KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932..BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
 SHIB SING NEGI, No. 4013 Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay).

- 1872..ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879..ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880..BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882..MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883..COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884..BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887..YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888..MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
 YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1889..DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890..MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891..CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893..BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894..CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895..NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896..BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

1897..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

1898..MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.

CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).

1899..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., s.c.

1900..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.

LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1901..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.

1902..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.

1903..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.

BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1904..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.

1905..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

1907..WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.

1908..JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.

1909..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.

ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1911..MR.D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.

1912..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.

1913..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).

1914..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).

NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).

1916..CRUM, Maj. W. E., v.D., Calcutta Light Horse.

1917..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.

1918..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.

1919..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.

1920..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.

1922..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.

1923..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.

1926..DENNY, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.

1927..HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.

1928..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.

1929..DENNY, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.

1930..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.

1931..FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

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EDITORIAL.

In what we are content to call the Dark Ages the Popes undertook many of the functions the League of Nations now attempts to perform. They organized international movements against what they believed to be dangers threatening Christendom, arbitrated between quarrelsome Princes, and at times enforced their awards by direct action either spiritual or physical. The Papal judgments in these mundane matters may not always have been sound, but in some instances at least they anticipated in a surprising way the efforts of present day idealists. One Pope even went so far as to propose what would now be termed 'qualitative disarmament'. He declared that the recently introduced gun-powder was an ungentlemanly weapon, more suited to assassins than to soldiers, and likely to increase to an untold degree the horrors of war. All enlightened Princes should, therefore, abjure its use and trust to honest steel. Perhaps he was right. But there was always the Turk outside the Christian League, and the Princes themselves soon realized that artillery concentrated in their hands was the answer to their troublesome nobles whose strongholds had up to then been such hard nuts to crack. So the Turk took no notice, while the Princes returned polite replies full of admirable and chivalrous sentiments—and ordered a few more culverins a couple of inches bigger in the bore than any yet designed.

The Geneva Conference, having discussed various schemes for the prevention of war and for disarmament, found it impossible to agree on the practicability of any of them. It reached, however, in its turn the old Papal conclusion that certain types of modern weapons should be anathematized. Unanimously the nations agreed that those weapons which are particularly offensive in character or which are aimed chiefly against the civil population should be banned

or at least greatly restricted in use. So far so good ; it then only remained to pick out these weapons. Expert committees were formed to select them, and it was only after they had met that it began to be realized how extremely difficult it is to divide modern armaments into those that are defensive and those that are offensive.

Great Britain and the United States point to the submarine as incontestably offensive and directed mainly against the civil population ; lesser Powers at once reply that it is their only defence against great surface naval superiority. Tanks and heavy mobile artillery appear essentially offensive to some nations ; to others they are merely a defensive counter-poise to the overwhelming numbers of their neighbours' conscript armies. Even the bombing aeroplane, which at first sight seems from its very nature the most offensive of all weapons, is claimed as really defensive. If one nation prepares an aerial offensive against another, the threatened nation has no effective defence but to collect a force of bombers that will enable it to put the attacker's ground establishments out of action and thereby paralyze his bombers. Thus identical types of machines may be offensive on one side and defensive on the other. The obvious answer that if *all* bombers are abolished none will be needed for defence is countered by pointing out that big civil aircraft are all potential bombers, and they cannot be abolished. As the instructors used to say at the Staff College, " It's all very difficult ".

An interesting point which has emerged from these discussions is that the weapons which, generally speaking, are accepted by a majority of States as offensive are identical with those denied to Germany and the defeated nations of the Great War—in fact they were denied to them because they were offensive. If the allied nations now deprive themselves of these weapons what will become of the victors' relative superiority ? What of the Treaty of Versailles ? France and the bloc of smaller nations she leads wish to perpetuate Germany's military weakness. It is an understandable attitude, but it is a grave obstacle to any real disarmament and could be removed only by great self-sacrifice on France's part or by some guarantee of security from the other Powers accepted as adequate by France. Prospects of the difficulty being overcome in the immediate future by either of these methods are not hopeful.

Realizing this the General Committee of the Conference adjourned to allow the leading statesmen of the Great Powers to meet and try to reach some agreement. There can be no doubt that if any real progress at all is to be made, the discussion must be raised above the level of the detailed arguments of experts. All the same one need not envy the statesmen their task.

* * * * *

**The Hoover
Proposals.**

Into the midst of the conferring statesmen the American President has thrown his disarmament scheme, which, whatever its merits and whatever its eventual fate, has put new life into the almost moribund Geneva Conference. In detail there is nothing new about his proposals. The reduction of capital ships and submarines by one-third, of aircraft carriers and destroyers by one quarter; the total abolition of tanks, heavy mobile artillery, bombing aeroplanes and aerial bombardment; and the scaling down of land forces, have all individually in some form or other been put before the Conference by other nations. There are, however, two innovations. Mr. Hoover has combined both quantitative and qualitative disarmament in one bold scheme, and he has attempted to divide land forces into two categories, with different scales of limitation for each. His first category he calls the "Police Contingent", composed of the forces required to maintain internal order and to police frontiers; the second, the "Defence Contingent" consists of all forces maintained to meet the fear of foreign aggression, *i.e.* all land armaments other than the "Police Contingent". The strength of the "Police Contingent" is to be based on that allowed to the defeated Central Powers, which, according to Mr. Hoover, averages 2.32 per thousand of their total population. Nations with large colonial possessions are to be allowed an increase on this to 2.64 per thousand of their overseas population. The "Defence Contingents" of all nations are to be reduced by one-third in numbers.

As was to be expected the American proposals have met with a mixed reception. Italy, and of course, Germany, accept them as they stand; Japan is distrustful, especially of the naval clauses; Great Britain gives a somewhat qualified approval; France is definitely hostile.

The French attitude towards the Hoover scheme is one of intense suspicion. In French eyes it emanates from a doubtful source. France has not forgotten, and will never forget, that a President of the United States once promised her a guarantee of security against future German aggression and then failed to produce it. Mr. Hoover is on the verge of a presidential election and Frenchmen cannot dismiss the idea that this dramatic attempt to gain what Americans are fond of calling the "moral leadership of the world" is designed more as a vote catching device for use at home than as a carefully thought out solution of European problems. Their doubts are strengthened by the enthusiastic acceptances of Italy and Germany. Many of the American proposals are unpopular in France, but the great stumbling block must be the limitation of land forces. Here France

will feel that her security is vitally affected. Her home "Police Contingent" would be only about 96,000 against Germany's 141,000, and even if the 163,000 which would be allowed for the French Colonial Empire were included, few Frenchmen would accept this as redressing the balance. The total French land forces, exclusive of reserves, number at present, about 694,000; subtracting from this 259,000 for "Police Contingent", a "Defence Contingent" of 435,000 is left. This is to be reduced by one-third, leaving France and her Colonies with a total force both "Police" and "Defensive" of approximately 549,000 only. In other words France is asked to reduce her army by over 145,000 men, deprive herself of tanks, heavy artillery and bombing aircraft, while the German land forces may be increased by some 25,000. It is most improbable that any French Government, which accepted such drastic reductions, without compensating and adequate guarantees against Germany, would continue in power for a week. Already the French representatives at Geneva have stated that the Hoover proposals can only be considered in connection with their original suggestion of an International Force under League control. As most nations are agreed that this particular proposal is impracticable, it looks as if another deadlock will be reached.

The attitude of the British delegates towards Mr. Hoover's proposals is one of general approval tempered with some criticism. In place of a reduction in the total tonnage of capital ships they advocate a decrease in the size of individual ships, and go beyond the Americans in urging the total abolition of submarines. Newspaper reports give the impression that Great Britain is prepared to accept the abolition of heavy artillery, large tanks, and bombing aircraft, but it is unlikely that with its overseas internal security commitments a British Government would be prepared to give up all forms of tanks and air bombardment. As for land forces, if Great Britain is considered alone, the total British Army falls just short of the numbers allowed for the "Police Contingent"; if the whole Empire is considered as one unit, its total land forces are very much below the permitted "Police Contingent." This only demonstrated the plain fact that no portion of the British Army is anything but a "Police Contingent" and there should, therefore, be no question of quantitative reduction.

The American proposals must also be considered from the peculiar standpoint of India—and India in this matter is very definitely in a completely different position from any other nation. To begin with there is no relation between the strength of her armed forces and those of any Great Power. Every European country, including Russia, and every member of the League of Nations outside Europe could disarm completely without it affecting in any way the strength of

India's defence forces. India's requirements are based on what is necessary only to defend her land frontiers from aggression by her immediate neighbours and to maintain internal security. According to Mr. Hoover's allowance the "Police Contingent" for India would reach the respectable total of 815,000 men. At present her total forces, including military police, irregulars and Indian States Forces, amount only to about 275,000 men so that India could increase her army by 540,000 men before she was considered to have any "Defence Contingent" at all. This astonishing figure brings out very clearly the smallness of the present Indian defence forces compared with those of other nations. Even were our small field army classed as a "Defence Contingent" and considered without any reference to its "Police" duties, there could be little argument for its reduction. States on India's borders are not members of the League, and he would be an optimist indeed who expected the Afghan tribesmen to join in the world fervour for disarmament to the extent of giving up a third of their rifles. Disarmament in India cannot be based on what is found possible or advisable in Europe—it must be considered separately on its own merits.

* * * * *

The personal negotiations between Mr. de Valera and British Cabinet Ministers, which at first raised hopes that a way out of the rather artificial difficulties between Southern Ireland and the rest of the Empire would be found, have broken down. They could hardly do otherwise when Mr. de Valera adopted so intransigent an attitude. He declared that his object was a Republican Ireland to include Ulster; that between this Republic and the British Commonwealth there might, in some circumstances, and for some reasons, be some form of association; and that in this case the King should be recognized as the head of the association. Meanwhile, even before this happy state of affairs could be reached, the British Government must accept the abolition of the Oath of Allegiance and the withholding of the land annuities. From this position he has not retreated beyond stating that he is now prepared to accept the original British proposal for arbitration on the question of land annuities, but only subject to certain conditions of his own. These are that the personnel of the arbitration tribunal should not be restricted solely to citizens of the Empire and that other payments besides the annuities should be considered. Mr. Thomas, in the House of Commons, gave the only possible reply when he said that the Cabinet could not accept these conditions, and further that the Government would never consider the coercion of Ulster, nor could it enter into any agreements with a country which repudiated its solemnly accepted treaty obligations.

Southern Ireland is, therefore, faced with the choice of remaining in the Empire or leaving it. If she chooses to leave no force will be used to keep her in ; but she cannot have it both ways, she must be either in or out, and if out, she becomes a foreign nation. There are signs that a great many people in the Free State are beginning to realize what this may mean to them, and it is by no means certain that Mr. de Valera will have a real majority of his countrymen behind him when it comes to following him into the wilderness. The Senate has considerably amended the ' Oath Bill ' as passed by the Dail, and it seems that if he sticks to his guns he will be hard put to it to avoid another general election in the near future. He cannot be very confident as to its result. But he and his separationists backed by the intimidation of the " Republican Army," may carry the day so that it is by no means a mere academic exercise to estimate the effects on the Empire of a Free State secession.

The main implications of Southern Ireland becoming a foreign nation would be economic, military and political. As far as the Republic itself was concerned, it would become, as the *Times* describes it, "a small agricultural *cul-de-sac* in Western Europe." The foundation of its prosperity must remain agriculture, but its produce would be largely shut out of the best and nearest markets, Great Britain and Ulster, by the tariffs applied to foreign imports. British manufactures, which find at present a considerable market in the Free State, would similarly suffer, and the Republic might bargain for mutual preferences, but it would not be well placed either industrially commercially, or geographically to do so. It is safe to say that both countries would suffer economically from the threatened tariff war, but that the loss to the smaller would be incomparably the greater and might indeed be something not far short of ruin.

Militarily the Republic of itself would constitute little threat to the remaining United Kingdom—indeed it would be wise not to provoke its northern neighbour alone. Were the Empire at war with another foreign power, however, the position would be altered and Southern Ireland might become a serious menace. The loss of Irish harbours to the British Navy and still more their use as bases for hostile submarines, raiders or aircraft, to say nothing of the distraction of disturbances on the Ulster border, would cause considerable embarrassment. In addition food supplies to Great Britain from Southern Ireland would assume great importance in any war with a naval power.

It is for these reasons that, whether any part of Ireland is a Republic or not, the British Empire can never allow it in peace or war to be occupied or dominated by any great foreign power. When, if ever, the Irish Republic arrives, Great Britain will have to declare a very strong "Monroe Doctrine" concerning it.

The political aspects of separation, while they might prove tragic enough for thousands, are not without humour. Mr. de Valera has always relied on the overseas Irish at least as much as he has on the native population. All Southern Irishmen resident in the Empire would, if he had his way, become aliens, and as far as one can see, they would have little cause to thank him. The innumerable doctors qualified in the Free State who practice in Great Britain, the Civil Servants, the officers and officials of all kinds could no doubt preserve their livelihoods by taking out naturalization papers, but the large Irish labouring populations such as collect in Glasgow, Liverpool and other great cities of the Empire would be in an unfortunate position. With so many native unemployed in the United Kingdom there would be the strongest feeling against letting these foreigners become naturalized so that they could either take work from Englishmen and Scotchmen or draw the dole. Irish immigration into the United States has been drastically cut down of recent years; it is hardly likely that it would be permitted unrestricted into Great Britain.

The situation in India would be harrowing! The I. M. S. would be threatened with almost total extinction; the Police paralysed; the Veterinary Services would wither away; racing would collapse; there would be horrid gaps in the Army; the outlook would be gloomy indeed were we to lose the Southern Irish who now serve India. And if they all took out naturalization papers, it would never be quite the same. They could never pass as English, still less as Scotch—and they would not want to, why should they? Let us hope then for everybody's sake that Mr. de Valera will suddenly get a little common-sense, or, if that is too much to hope for, that his followers will.

* * * * *

The Indian Army as a whole is unquestionably a more efficient and more formidable fighting force than it has ever been in the past, yet in one respect, and a very serious one, most authorities are agreed that it falls below the pre-war standard.

Languages
and Efficiency.

That is in the British Officers' knowledge of their men's vernaculars. There are those who would have us believe that in the palmy days before 1914, all British Officers of the Indian Army spoke Urdu and a vernacular or two fluently, but the present generation of officers has seen too many of its seniors spluttering hopelessly in orderly rooms and on parade to believe that quite so high a standard prevailed. Nevertheless, most of them will admit, that in the old days not only was the average officer's power of expressing himself in Urdu greater than it is to-day, but a very much higher proportion could talk to their men in their own particular vernaculars. Not content with a working knowledge of Urdu, officers went on to learn at least one of the languages spoken by their sepoys amongst themselves and in their own homes—Pushto, Punjabi, Marathi, Nepali and the rest. Before the war every officer had to pass an obligatory test in the vernacular or most important vernacular of his unit, and many afterwards voluntarily took the Lower and Higher Standards of the language. During the war obligatory examinations naturally lapsed, and in the re-organization that followed only Urdu survived as a compulsory test—all other languages became optional. As a result, though most war and post-war officers have a smattering of their men's vernaculars, few have made any serious study of them, and in spite of the high monetary rewards offered for the Preliminary, and First and Second Class Interpretership Examinations in these languages, few candidates presented themselves for any except Pushto. There are six battalions of Mahrattas in the Indian Army, yet only one officer has presented himself for examination in Marathi during the past nine years; there are several regiments of Gurkhas not one of whose officers has attempted to qualify in Nepali; and the record of other classes is often not much better. Of course there are officers who speak languages well but have never bothered to pass examinations in them, yet it must be admitted that these are the exceptions and that, speaking generally, a lamentable neglect of the vernaculars prevails. Such neglect is definitely dangerous. It is difficult to know what a man really feels or thinks unless you speak his own language. The sepoy appreciates, more than is sometimes realized, the compliment the Sahib pays him when he strives to master his perhaps uncouth native tongue. The attempt is evidence of a real effort to understand him, a real desire to learn about his customs and beliefs, and it never goes unanswered. Knowledge of his language is the closest and strongest link in the

bonds between officer and sepoy. Without it there is always danger of misunderstanding ; sometimes even of lack of confidence.

Why is it, then, that so many officers have since the war neglected Urdu and still more the other vernaculars ? There are many reasons. Chief amongst them is the greatly increased amount of work the young officer is expected to do. In olden days when he had finished his parades and a modicum of office work, he was free to wander about the lines, chat to the men, study their languages ; now he has three times as much to teach them on parade, twice as much office work, and on of top all this his own education—and it is this last which, however much we dislike to admit it, draws him away from his men and their languages. There is that T. E. W. T. for next Tuesday to be studied ; the C. O.'s weekly discussion on a chapter of F. S. R. II that has to be prepared for ; the Command or what-not essay that must be written ; the entrance test for some small arms course that has to be mugged up ; and, hanging like a pall over all, those never ending examinations, retention, promotion and Staff College. True these examinations at any rate were there before the war, but of recent years they have loomed much larger on the young officer's horizon. He simply has to pass the first two, he can take no risk of failure, for failure means he has lost his job. No wonder that he will spend no time on other studies until these are behind him. Then, rightly or wrongly, having survived two or three reductions, he expects more, and believes that only when he can write p. s. c. after his name will he be safe from future sweeps of the axe. So once more he shoves his legs under a desk and starts cramming. He would like nothing better than to see more of his men, speak more of their language, understand them better, but the principle of security cannot be disregarded.

A good deal to improve matters has been done in the last year or two by reintroducing for the compulsory Urdu examinations the old Higher and Lower Standards and—a most important innovation—allowing a choice of either Persian or Nagri script. Similar examinations have now replaced the Preliminary and Interpretership examinations in other Indian Army vernaculars and the War Office have agreed to give fifty bonus marks in the Staff College examination to any officer who has passed one of these within the previous five years. There has been a strong feeling in some quarters that qualification in at least one vernacular in addition to Urdu should

be made compulsory, but it has been decided for the present to give the new system a chance of producing larger numbers of officers who will study and qualify in their units' vernaculars. Many experienced Commanding Officers are now encouraging their young officers as soon as they have passed the Urdu Higher Standard to continue straight on with the study of the regimental vernacular. Allowing a subaltern two years with his Indian unit in which to pass in Urdu, another eighteen months or at the most two years should see him through the vernacular. He is then solidly grounded on the foundations for a useful regimental officer—a knowledge of his men's languages. Promotion, examinations, Staff College and the rest can, and should, come later. He will have plenty of time for them.

Lectures.

Arrangements have been made for the following lectures to be delivered in the Gaiety Theatre, Simla, commencing at 5-30 p.m. each day :—

Thursday, 14th July—

“A Head Hunters' Frontier”. By Dr. J. H. Hutton, C.I.E., I.C.S.

Thursday, 21st July—

“The International Economic Crisis and the Gold Standard”
By J. B. Taylor, Esq., I.C.S.

Thursday, 28th July—

“The Committee of Imperial Defence”. By Lt.-Col. H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O.

Thursday, 4th August—

“The Round Table Conference”. By W. H. Lewis, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.

All members resident in Simla will be sent tickets for these lectures. Members resident in other stations who will be in Simla on any of the above dates are asked to inform the Secretary who will send them tickets.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALS, 1932.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Council of the United Service Institution of India have awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medals for 1932 to the following :—

- (i) *Silver Medal for Officers, British or Indian*, Captain E. St. J. Birnie, Sam Browne's Cavalry (12th Frontier Force).
- (ii) *Silver Medal with gratuity of Rs. 100 for Soldiers, British or Indian*, No. 4013 Rifleman Shib Singh Negi, (10th Bn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.)

Short accounts of the work for which these medals have been awarded follow.

Captain E. St. J. Birnie.

Captain Birnie accompanied the Smythe Expedition as Transport Officer on its successful ascent of Mount Kamet in May and June 1931, and on the 23rd June climbed to the summit of Mount Kamet himself. Afterwards he went with Messrs. Smythe and Shifton to the Arwa Valley where a three weeks' exploration of the glaciers west of the Mana Valley was carried out, including the climbing of an untriangulated peak placed by aneroid at 21,000 feet. A pass across the range was established on 20th of July, and Captain Birnie accompanied by a porter made the first crossing into Tehri-Garhwal. He returned into British Garhwal by a second pass later in the day.

A few days later Captain Birnie with six porters made a five days' reconnaissance in Tehri-Garhwal establishing two more passes, and returning across the range by a third route south of the only triangulated peak, Satopanth II, in the area. All the routes established were over 20,000 feet in height, and a map of the area was made.

Captain Birnie ran a considerable risk when already tired from the previous ascents, in carrying on by himself with porters, exploring passes, and establishing routes. His reports gave valuable information to the Military Survey Department of India.

Rifleman Shib Singh Negi.

Rifleman Shib Singh Negi underwent considerable hardship and at times personal risk of life in obtaining maps and photographs of the ice barrier on the Shyok, in addition to further maps and photographs of military importance.

On the 6th July 1931, he was sent up to the Chong Kumdun to carry out the mapping of the ice barrier. He camped there for the night, and was joined by a British Officer next day.

On 8th July they and three Ladaki coolies attempted to climb the ice barrier and gain the lake on the far side, with the intention of ascertaining the difference in level between the lake and the ice barrier and, if possible, the depth of the lake. The barrier was climbed at a point immediately below its junction with the small side glacier. After proceeding about two hundred yards across the ice, the party came on a sheer drop of about forty feet. The Ladaki coolies could not proceed beyond this point, their local shoes (Paboss) would not grip and they had had to be dragged up by sheer force on the rope. This meant that the British Officer and Shib Singh Negi (both wearing crampons) would have to proceed alone, and should either have become a casualty in the badly crevassed surface neither would have got out. The ice barrier could be properly crossed with safety only by a party of four or more, all wearing crampons and at least two ropes. In the circumstances further attempts to cross the barrier had to be abandoned.

On 17th July, Rifleman Shib Singh Negi mapped the upper portion of the lake.

SIDE-LIGHTS ON SOVIET ORIENTAL POLICY.

BY CAPTAIN G. E. WHEELER, 5TH/7TH RAJPUT REGIMENT.

A proper understanding of the position of the U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis the Middle East requires not only a knowledge of the conditions, so different from those of twenty years ago, prevailing in the Middle East to-day, but also a dispassionate view of the nature and working of the whole Soviet machine.

There are two main theories regarding the policy of Soviet Russia in the Middle East which may be briefly examined. The first of these is that the U.S.S.R. faithful to its ideal of World Revolution, aims at planting Communism in the different countries of the Middle East. To this end it "disseminates propaganda" and strives to promote discord among tribal elements with a view to embarrassing the existing régime and thus paving the way for Revolution. All the U.S.S.R.'s commercial operations are considered to be part of this policy. They have been described as "economically unsound" and must therefore be continued from purely political motives. The second theory, which is of more recent origin, is that Communism is being used as a cloak for pursuing the old policy of aggrandizement ascribed to Imperialist Russia.

It will be the object of the present article to discuss these theories both in the light of recent events and also of certain publications of both Soviet and other origins. An attempt will be made to show that while the ambitious nature and far-reaching effects of Soviet designs have been greatly exaggerated, that very exaggeration has led to a neglect of certain basic features of Soviet Oriental policy. By attributing to the U.S.S.R. plans which are not in its own interest or only realizable in the dim future, an attitude of mind may be induced which will ignore the gradual progress of an influence of which the very nature is imperfectly understood. Such an attitude will be dangerous, especially from the point of view of the British Empire.

In such a short sketch as the present one it will not be possible to discuss either the Modern East or the Soviet machine at any great length. It will be necessary, however, to pass in review one or two of the outstanding points in these problems. The situation prevailing

in the Middle East from the end of the Great War until about 1925 has been admirably described by Mr. Toynbee in his *Survey of International Affairs*. Briefly, this situation was, that with the wane of Imperialist influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey, the U.S.S.R. sought to set itself up as the patron and mentor of these countries. Many initial successes were scored such as treaties, trade agreements and concessions, but it gradually began to appear that the unexpected growth of Nationalism resulted in the presence of all foreigners being resented alike. The revolt of these countries against Imperialist influence, moreover, did not mean that they wished indefinitely to oppose the "Imperialist" nations. They wished rather to be received into the comity of civilized nations and to participate in their political and cultural advantages. Such advantages were by no means apparent under the Soviet régime and for this reason Soviet advances began to become less and less welcome. The gradual realization of this situation resulted in a modification of Soviet Oriental policy which began to be felt as far back as 1926.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that during the whole of this post-war period, the instigators of Soviet Oriental policy were very far from being in accord with each other. Although Soviet protestations as to the non-official character of the Komintern cannot be accepted, it must be realized that the Komintern and the *Nar-komindel* (People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs) are frequently at loggerheads just as in the British Empire two government departments, such as the War and Foreign Offices, may be unable to agree on a matter of policy. This lack of team-work in the Soviet organization is well brought out by one Agabekov in his book of memoirs recently published in Berlin. He shows, moreover, that the inferior ability of Soviet representatives and the intrigue, suspicion and cupidity which were rife both in Moscow and abroad, militated most seriously against the even march of Soviet Eastern policy.

Now it must be understood that, up to 1926, there was serious justification for the belief that the U.S.S.R. aimed at the rapid planting of Communism in the Middle East and particularly in Persia where Soviet agents and clubs existed in most of the larger cities. Several small disturbances were unquestionably provoked by Soviet agents and the support of many important commercial and religious personalities had been, at least temporarily, secured. In Afghanistan, also,

the Komintern was seriously at work and was at any rate spending considerable funds in propagating Communism. In 1926, however, a change could be observed. Many Soviet representatives were removed and replaced by men of a quieter and less obviously proletarian stamp. Attempts were made to interest Persians in Soviet culture, methods of locust destruction, etc., and from that time forward real evidence of intensive propaganda or of attempts to promote discord is lacking. But in the minds of many of the inhabitants of the Middle East and of European residents and representatives, a habit of thought had been acquired, namely, that all disturbance was attributable to Soviet intrigue and that all or much of Soviet trade was bogus and "a cloak for more sinister activities." It was at this time that a Persian was heard to observe that the increase in earthquakes was undoubtedly due to Soviet influence.

In order to study the period from 1926 onwards, recourse may profitably be had to Agabekov's book of memoirs mentioned above. This book, which consists of the revelations of an agent of the Oriental Section of the *Ogpu* in the Middle East, has attracted attention principally on account of the descriptions which it contains of intelligence "coups" carried out by the author in Persia and elsewhere. These descriptions are sensational and have, moreover, an undeniable air of truth; but the real importance of the book lies in the insight which it gives into Soviet Oriental Policy. Perhaps the most striking impression which can be gained from these "Memoirs" is the fact that the U. S. S. R. was, at all events from 1926 to 1928, genuinely afraid of British "machinations." The British were sabotaging the Perso-Soviet Trade Agreement; the British were behind the activities of the Armenian Dashnak Society and of the White Russians; the British had engineered a mutiny in the Persian Army and a rising in Pusht-i-Kuh; they had "built a road from Iraq to Lake Urmia and (*mirabile dictu*) had organized a flotilla on the lake itself"; they had handed over the Sheikh of Mohammerah to the Shah in return for His Majesty's agreement to employ British advisers in the Army and purchase munitions in England.

It will be clear to anyone who has followed recent history in Persia that many of these extraordinary reports were probably originated, for obvious reasons, by the Persians; others were mere figments of the imagination. It is, however, impossible for anyone acquainted with

Soviet mentality and its attitude towards "intervention," not to realize that, in almost every case, these preposterous stories were genuinely believed by the majority of Russians. To illustrate this point it will be convenient to recount briefly an incident of which the present writer had first-hand knowledge and to which Agabekov obligingly supplies the sequel. In 1926, a mutiny headed by a Persian officer named Salar-i-Jang broke out near Bujnurd in Khorassan. This mutiny which was comparatively easily suppressed, at first appeared to assume alarming proportions. General Jan Muhammad Khan, who was commanding the Persian Eastern Division at Meshed, attributed the whole affair to Soviet intrigues. This, indeed, was the general impression formed except by the American Financial Adviser, who knew of the arrears into which the troops' pay had fallen and the acquisitive proclivities of certain Persian Officers, and by one or two others. Agabekov, who was in Moscow at the time, relates how the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed reported that the mutiny had been provoked by the British giving the names of "the British agents who were in touch with the leaders of the movement"! Later, but too late, it was discovered that the mutiny had "a revolutionary character" and might have been profitably supported. It was at this juncture that Apresov, the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed, was relieved by a man of greater ability and quieter and more conciliatory character and Agabekov himself went to work in Persia. There are grounds for assuming that a change in Soviet policy begins at this point.

It is of great interest to examine the instructions which Agabekov received. All his tribal work was for the purpose of preparing the ground "in the event of a collision with England." The Kurds were to be "prepared" on account of the strategic position which they would occupy "in the future conflict between England and Russia." The Bakhtiaris were to be prepared, "in the event of an attack by the Imperialist powers on the U.S.S.R.," to harass the British rear and destroy the Anglo-Persian oilfields. Agabekov's other duties were of a more ordinary nature; he was to improve the espionage organization and examine trade possibilities in certain specified directions. He was also to study the question of planting an espionage organization in India.

Agabekov was of course an agent of the *Ogpu* and not of the *Komintern* who might reasonably have been expected to deal with

questions of revolution and provocation. He shows, however, that the Communist Party of Iran was, in Meshed simply a pro-U.S.S.R. group, while in Tehran its ranks were filled with Persian police agents.

Some mention must be made of Agabekov's account of the flutter caused in Moscow by the Afghan rising in 1928 for it surely affords a most interesting study in national psychology. It is certain, however, that the U.S.S.R. firmly believed that Great Britain had engineered the rising and this conclusion was reached by the most tortuous reasoning imaginable. In spite of the excellent information at their disposal, they found that the British had decided to overthrow Amanullah as, "relying as he did on the Southern tribes of Afghanistan, he would inevitably have to assume an aggressive policy against India." This same reasoning moved the U. S. S. R. to resort to armed intervention in favour of Amanullah with disastrous results for its policy in Afghanistan.

A word must be said regarding Soviet Commercial activities. Recent experience of Soviet dumping in Europe has probably by now brought the question of Soviet trade in the Middle East into proper perspective, but, up to the end of 1930, it was stoutly asserted by many that Soviet trade in Persia, and particularly in the Persian Gulf, existed for the sole purpose of political propaganda. It may well be that this fatal but persistent misapprehension has played some part in the serious losses which the British and Indian piece-goods trade has sustained in the Persian Gulf of recent years. It was always believed that the Soviet trade venture in this region would "fizzle out" owing to the alleged impossibility of profitably selling goods at such low prices. The fact is however, that under a system of state controlled production such as exists in the U.S.S.R., it is difficult to lay down the law about profitable selling-prices, and it now seems likely that Soviet enterprise in the Persian Gulf has not only secured a new market for its produce but has in the meantime actually paid its own way.

With regard to the second theory mentioned above, that Soviet Oriental policy could be identified with the old policy, it can be asserted with considerable confidence that, in the present condition of the U.S.S.R., to follow such a policy would be ruinous not to say impossible. According to the best authorities, the U.S.S.R. has no wish whatever to involve itself in war for the present, for war would inevitably prejudice its vast economic plans. Now an active imperialist policy

presupposes a readiness to go to war. Moreover, as an attempt will shortly be made to show, war, as an active instrument of advancement in the East, has been discarded by the U.S.S.R. in favour of something much more dangerous and subtle.

It will be convenient at this stage to summarize the conclusions to illustrate which an attempt has so far been made :—

- (a) The possible original designs of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East were checked by the growth of Nationalism.
- (b) Sporadic attempts to promote discord or overthrow existing régimes were, to a great extent, abandoned in 1926.
- (c) Soviet policy in the Middle East has been, since 1926, largely defensive being actuated by an exaggerated fear of England. Espionage, however, has been developed and elaborated and the work of “*osveshchenie*” (throwing light upon) of social and economic conditions, sedulously pursued.
- (d) Trade conducted on lines peculiar to the Soviet system has been pressed forward and has had some success.
- (e) Inability and lack of desire to go to war militate against the possibility of the U. S. S. R. pursuing a policy of Imperialist aggrandizement.

Assuming the foregoing conclusions to be correct, it would, however, be the very greatest error to suppose that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its idea of soveitizing and “emancipating” the East or that the profound and drastic alterations which are being made in the vast stretch of country between the Caspian and the Himalayas, will not, in time, produce an effect on the rest of the Middle East. In addition, it should be realized that the U. S. S. R. actuated as it is by a spirit of burning fanaticism, is firmly convinced that the Middle East needs and seeks emancipation from British rule and influence. Failure to grasp these facts connotes a fundamental inability to understand the potentiality of Russian influence in the Middle East.

At this juncture it may be asked why Russia, which has so often failed signally to appreciate the situation in Persia and Afghanistan and under whose rule millions of Moslems are reported to be groaning, should be likely to succeed in winning the sympathy and allegiance of Middle Eastern peoples. To answer this question it will be necessary to enquire into the present situation in Turkestan in order to get a general impression of the U. S. S. R.’s method of treating its own subjects.

In the absence of strictly impartial accounts of present day Turkestan, recourse must be had to publications of Soviet or quasi-Soviet origin. In her "*Orient Sovietique*," Lydia Bach writes of the seven and-a-half million Soviet citizens in Soviet Central Asia that "what is done to them and what they do has a repercussion beyond the frontiers amongst their neighbours of the same race in Persia, in Afghanistan, in China and in India. The Soviet Government's Oriental policy is based on the policy of nationalities. According to the doctrine proclaimed by Lenin, the East, thanks to the support of the victorious proletariat and by means of the Soviet system, will attain directly to communism without passing through the capitalist phase. It is necessary to rouse its mentality, create a new culture which will, according to Stalin's formula, be 'national in form and proletarian in essence.' The social reconstruction in U.S.S.R. extends also to the eastern Soviet republics. There is a Five Years Plan for Central Asia. It envisages the economic survey and the industrialization of the country, the building of factories, of railways, of electric power stations, and the intensification of agricultural production, notably that of cotton which will tend to become the sole product of certain regions."

This then is the Soviet plan in Central Asia. The criticism will at once be made that the plan is only workable with the willing co-operation of the population whose culture is of too long a standing not to revolt against enforced innovations. It is just this error that prophets of the U. S. S. R.'s downfall have fallen into so many times during the past twelve years. Calvin Hoover in his admirable study of Soviet commerce has shown that force is the keynote of Soviet policy. He believes that without force a socialist régime could not be inculcated. The Russian people have been forced into their present position; they are being forced to collectivize and industrialize the country, forced to change their mentality and forced to despise the past and glory in the present and future.

No serious student of affairs in "European" Russia who has based his studies on impartial authorities, can fail to be aware that, in spite of numerous obstacles and countless mistakes, impressive successes have been scored on the industrial, and, latterly, even on the agricultural "fronts." Collectivization, in spite of its unpopularity, has been applied and, according to the "*Times*," there is little doubt that it will increase the agricultural output of the U. S. S. R. beyond all

knowledge. The fact must be faced that if there is a strong likelihood of the success of Soviet economic planing in the West, the same likelihood exists in the East.

Apart from the book above quoted, another and more detailed account of Soviet work in Turkestan exists in "Kochevniki" (The Nomads) by N. Tikhonov. This is a well-written account of a journey carried out by a Soviet publicist in Turkestan who aims at acquainting the rest of the U. S. S. R. with the political and social condition of their Oriental comrades. Allowing for the fact that the book is certainly biassed and that many awkward facts are probably glossed over, it cannot be denied that it contains an extraordinarily graphic description of the people with whom the author came into contact. The accounts of collectivization at work among the Jamshedis, Baluchis and Turkomans may be highly coloured, but their extreme interest cannot be ignored, more especially as they are accompanied with telling criticism of existing Soviet methods. The remarks of the educated Turkoman who made comparisons, highly unfavourable to the former, between the Soviet workers in Turkmenistan and British officials in India, will come as a surprise to those who believe that self-criticism in the U. S. S. R. is non-existent.

The whole question of the stabilization of nomads through the medium of collectivization should and must be studied by anyone interested in the future of Central Asia, and if any measure of success results from the experiment, it must be expected that repercussions will be felt in Persia and Afghanistan. It must be regretted that "Kochevniki" is not a more serious and connected study, but the suggestiveness of these fragmentary sketches and impressions is nevertheless effective.

A digression must now be made to the subject of the scientific study of conditions in the countries of the Middle East which forms an important part of the Oriental policy of the U. S. S. R. It is here that the U. S. S. R. shows itself in a particularly enterprising and therefore dangerous light. While the rest of the world seems to regard the Middle East either as a repository for attractive antiques or as a plastic mould for the reception of Western civilization, the U. S. S. R. is trying to understand it as it really is. In this connection, a few words must be said of the Leningrad Oriental Institute which has already produced many works of an original character. These works contain much that will be distasteful to Western European orientalists

for they are confined almost exclusively to the Modern East and have little to do with ancient literature and language. The Institute has pointed out that its publications are not intended to have an international appeal, and this is insured by the fact all the grammars and dictionaries are in Russian. The general object of the Institute is to teach the most modern forms, not only of the many Tartar dialects spoken within the U. S. S. R., but also of Arabic, Persian, Turkish and the principal languages of India. The chrestomathies published by the Institute make a special point of selecting material likely to give information on or stimulate interest in the social and political conditions prevailing in the countries in question. The chrestomathy of modern Arabic is an extremely important work, not only from the language point of view, but for its bringing into prominence the literary work of Arabs, both men and women, in the field of politics and social reform. The very existence of such work must be unknown to many. The Persian and Urdu chrestomathies too, are surprisingly up-to-date and practical in their scope. The effect of such work may easily be that the Middle East is presented not as a vague world, shrouded in religious prejudice though coloured with romance and poetry, nor yet as an arena for foreign political, commercial and military prowess, but as a real world where real people are striving to tackle modern problems and expressing themselves in modern languages.

If the Soviet economic menace is a real one and of the nature indicated above, what is the remedy for it, or rather what is the prophylactic against it? To expatiate on this theme is beyond the scope or ability of the present writer. It will be sufficient to say this: that most Englishmen are convinced that whatever success Communism may register in the U. S. S. R., it is not the proper unit of progress in the world as they know it. Military science holds that success in war consists in obtaining and maintaining the initiative. It also urges the importance of studying the weapons and methods of the enemy and adjusting one's own weapons and methods accordingly. Soviet influence in the East is of a nature more complicated and subtle than armed force and requiring even more skill and foresight to combat it. That influence is operated and aided by fanatical zeal, ruthless reconstruction, and painstaking and penetrating research. To fail to realize this situation and take intelligent steps to meet it, is to court danger.

SIGNAL SECURITY.

By MAJOR R. T. O. CARY, M.B.E., ROYAL CORPS OF SIGNALS.

The Signal Service of an army equipped with reasonably modern apparatus for the transmission of orders, reports, etc., is under two very definite obligations to the commander:—

- (a) To provide for the accurate and speedy handling of its signal traffic,
- (b) To guarantee that, as far as is humanly possible, the subject matter of its signal traffic shall, where necessary, be denied to the enemy, *i.e.*, a reasonable degree of signal security must be provided.

In considering the second of these obligations it will be simplest to discuss in turn each of the four main systems of military communication, Visual Signalling, Line Telegraphy, Line Telephony, and Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony.

Visual Signalling presents comparatively little difficulty to security methods. In mobile warfare messages sent by visual will be normally of only such local importance, the signaller will be so much on the move, and the difficulties of interception so great (except in the case of flags) that the correct handling of the apparatus at his disposal will grant to the operator the security he desires. In fact, a high standard of training and discipline amongst signallers generally in the use of visual methods will solve fully ninety per cent. of the problem.

In position warfare visual signalling is not, generally speaking, a suitable method to employ. During the Great War as soon as the opposing forces settled down to trench warfare, visual methods of signalling, with the exception of the daylight lamp, were almost completely dropped. The success of the lamp was due in no small measure to its adaptability to concealment. It could be operated from a distance, and with careful sighting, as for instance aligning the lamp on the distant station through a length of drain pipe, it was almost impossible for signals to be intercepted by an enemy station.

Line Telegraphy.—For line communication between two points A and B, two main methods, may be employed.

- (i) Earth return circuits,
- (ii) Metallic return circuits,

With the earth return one half of the circuit is an insulated wire or cable, and the other the earth itself; the complete circuit being from the instrument at "A" through the wire or cable to the instrument at "B," and back through the earth to "A," thus completing the electrical path.

With the metallic return the earth is not employed as a conductor, the return path being provided by a second wire. The latter system therefore, though admittedly more efficient, necessitates the use of twice the quantity of wire for any given distance—a serious consideration especially in mobile warfare.

When a current of electricity is said to flow through a circuit, the following effect, amongst others, is always present. Lines of force are thrown out from the centre of the wire, even though it is insulated, and spread away from it in the form of concentric circles, gradually diminishing in force the further they get away from the wire. If one were to throw a stone into a perfectly calm pond it would illustrate very clearly the effect produced by passing a current of electricity through a wire, the ever widening rings in the water corresponding to the lines of force emanating from the centre or core of the wire.

If we then produce a second circuit and place it within range of the lines of force emanating from the first circuit, the result will be what is known as an "induced current" in this second circuit, due to the lines of force of the first cutting it. Thus it is possible to pick up and record the signals sent out by one circuit in another, even though they may not be actually touching.

Most people, at some time or another, have experienced the annoying situation when the third, and generally unwanted, voice appears in an ordinary civilian telephone conversation. It is quite likely that they have been the victims of "induction," and that certain telephone circuits have become mixed up without actually touching. In metallic circuits this effect is hardly noticeable unless cables run close to one another for considerable distances, and for all practicable purposes we may take a well laid and well maintained metallic circuit as safe.

With earth returns risk of the enemy's over-hearing is largely increased. The earth, though quite a good conductor for the passage of a current of electricity, does not confine it to a narrow and well

defined path as does an insulated cable. For example, in a telegraph circuit from "A" to "B" using an earth return, to complete the circuit the current has to pass either one way or the other through the earth. The majority will of course pass in a direct line from "A" to "B" or *vice versa*, but the remainder will radiate out through the earth in the form of "earth currents" in the same way, but to a far greater extent, than would the lines of force from a cable.

Now the fact of the earth being common to any two opposing forces simplifies the task of the listener-in. All he has to do is to employ sufficiently sensitive apparatus to pick up these earth currents and the trick is done. It is obvious that the closer the listener is to the opposing circuit the more effective will be his listening apparatus. Equally the more sensitive and up to date the apparatus employed the greater will be the distance from the cable line at which this form of listening-in can be employed. With the almost daily improvements in valves alone, the risk to signal security from earth currents has correspondingly increased, until at present the employment of ordinary telegraph methods with earth returns in forward areas is dangerous.

A safeguard would be an instrument that, while capable of transmitting and receiving Morse signals, would make it impossible for those signals to be intercepted without direct access to the line. Such an instrument has been designed. Briefly, it employs such a minute quantity of electrical current in the line circuit that the earth currents, though still present, are so reduced and controlled in their effect that, unless the line is actually cut and a similar instrument joined in the circuit, over-hearing is impossible. Even in the most forward areas the likelihood of an enemy agent, armed with a suitable instrument, being able to establish himself in such a position as to allow him uninterrupted use of the cable lines of the opposing force, is very remote.

Line Telephony presents a different problem. It can definitely be overheard on either earth or metallic circuits, though as in the case of telegraphy, to a far greater extent with earth returns than with metallic. At the present time there does not appear to be a telephone instrument which cannot be overheard. It has not yet been found possible to reduce and control the electrical currents used in telephony as can be done for telegraphy, and telephony with earth return circuits is, therefore, a real danger to signal security.

The danger can however be anticipated and minimised to a very great extent by care on the part of those using the telephone. The substitution of false names for units can be employed, and will go a long way towards making conversation unintelligible to the enemy, though it should be impressed on all concerned that in no circumstances can users of the telephone be too careful. During the Great War on several occasions a chance remark by a telephone operator gave the enemy listener-in the information he required. Such instances usually occurred when a combination of telegraphy and telephony were employed. A message might be transmitted by Morse signals with the safe form of instrument already described, but when the message was sent, the same cable line could be used for speech, which was *not safe*. An operator would frequently use the telephone to acknowledge the message sent by Morse, and in the normal course of events this gave little or nothing away. If however he was careless he would sometimes slip in a chatty remark, such as, "I got that message O. K. Cheerio, we're over the top to-night," thus notifying the enemy that an attack or a raid was contemplated. Of course such incidents were comparatively rare, but they illustrate the care which is necessary in using the telephone.

Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony are in a totally different category from the systems already described and it is in the employment of these means of communication that the greatest danger to signal security lies. Wireless has reached such a pitch of perfection today that it is undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule for communication by this means to break down, and this reliability increases rather than decreases the danger to security. It may be taken that any signals sent by wireless either by telegraph or speech are broadcast. The more reliable the set, the easier it is to intercept its signals.

Take first the telegraphy side of wireless. Every user of the ordinary civil telephone system is allotted a number, which, used in conjunction with the name of his town or district, identifies him as the possessor of a telephone and enables him to communicate with others similarly provided with identification numbers. To enable one wireless set to communicate with another, it is necessary to use a similar system. Every army wireless station must therefore be allotted a call which may be either a group of figures or letters, or both. By sending out a call to the station desired, followed by its own call, one

station is able to get in touch with another, but, this communication is being broadcast and both friend and foe will know that A B C is calling D E F. It may be argued that such information by itself is not of much value to the enemy's intelligence service, and up to a certain point that is true. It is only when it is considered in relation to other factors that its real value to the enemy is apparent. By the use of direction finding apparatus the position of a wireless station may be more or less accurately determined. A B C calls D E F, and immediately the enemy's intelligence service intercepts these signals and locates the two stations. At the moment we will assume that the calls A B C, D E F mean little or nothing to the enemy intelligence. As traffic between these two stations proceeds however, the situation clears. The actual volume of traffic, even if the subject-matter is not understood, will enable the intelligence branch, in conjunction with the known position of the stations, to determine which is the higher and which is the lower formation to which the sets are presumably attached. An increase in the volume of traffic may indicate the movement of troops, or again, an attack. In a comparatively short time it will be possible to put together a fairly accurate 'order of battle' which will, of course, be checked by other means at the disposal of the intelligence service. Further, no wireless station specially serves one particular unit; it is rather in the position of a local post office, from which deliveries of messages to individuals and units must be made. This involves the use of "Addresses to" and "Addresses from" as a portion of any signal message to be sent. These addresses can be, and of course are, disguised by the use of code names in substitution for the real ones. These may be satisfactory for a limited period only, but it will not take the enemy intelligence long to realise that "Mutt" and "Jeff" are in reality 1st Brigade and 1st Division. It will therefore be necessary to change these false names at frequent intervals. This in itself involves a tremendous amount of organization and a very perfect system of distribution. All such names must be in possession of units at exactly the right moment and all units have to take them into use at the same time. Should distribution in any way fail chaos will ensue and may take days to put right. In the meantime communication by wireless may become hopelessly disorganized and therefore unreliable.

Secrecy can be preserved by the use of a suitable cipher, but this method has its disadvantages. Enciphering a message of any

length takes time and needs highly skilled personnel, while deciphering at the other end again adds to the length of time it takes to deliver a message. It will therefore frequently be found that it is not worth while to send a particular message by wireless, as the time taken in enciphering, transmitting, and deciphering, will delay it so long that it will not be of much practical value to the recipients. Unquestionably the necessity for cipher does restrict the use of wireless on many occasions. Even though by the use of cipher the meaning of the message is denied to the enemy, there are many other factors which may enable him to obtain valuable information. The use of an originator's number is a case in point. When the Brigade Major of a Brigade uses the letters B.M. and a number to identify a message, it may mean that he is in fact giving to the enemy the information that it is a message from a brigade to another unit. From his point of view the frequent change of his originator's number is likely to lead to confusion when a reference to a previous message has to be made, and provides yet another of the straws likely to break the camel's back, yet if he continues to use the same reference letters he is undoubtedly giving away information to the enemy.

It is not of course for the Signal Service to decide the relative importance of signal messages. This is entirely the responsibility of the originators, who, in the majority of cases, will be the staffs of the formations engaged in the operations. A very thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of wireless on the part of the staff is therefore necessary before "Signal Security", certainly as regards wireless, can be made really effective.

Should an originator consider that his message will be of little or no value to the enemy, then he can instruct the Signal Service to send it in clear by any system they like. On the other hand he may frank his message so that if it is sent by wireless it must be in code. This understanding on the part of the staff is an absolute necessity to the efficient working of such a system. A mistake in the franking of a message may mean all the difference between success and failure in an operation. Replies and references to previous messages sent should also be treated with great care. A doubtful point of identity revealed by the interception of a message may be completely cleared up by a reference to the reply to that message.

With wireless telephony the difficulties are of course magnified considerably. One force will possess experts in the language of the other, and even though the users of the wireless telephone exercise the greatest care to avoid using the real names of units, formations, etc., the very tone of their conversations may give away valuable information. A study of telephone conversations will soon enable a listener-in to determine who is giving orders and who is receiving them. The natural anxiety of a user of the phone under particularly trying conditions may also help the listener-in to a better understanding of the situation.

The question of volume of traffic has already been mentioned as a source of valuable information to the enemy. The regulation and control of such traffic will, of course, be an important contribution to wireless security. Well thought out and carefully manufactured false messages, sent by the less frequently used wireless stations, and at times mixed up with traffic on all sets in the area, may prove to be a source of great embarrassment to the enemy intelligence. If a code that is not too difficult to decipher is employed, an even greater confusion may be created in the minds of the opposition. This again requires very careful organization, as, if badly handled, it is likely to defeat its own ends.

This article has dealt only with the main difficulties of signal security. Visual signalling, line telegraphy and telephony can all be dealt with by the exercise of reasonable care. Wireless is undoubtedly the main problem and, in order to ensure a system of "Signal Security" capable of guarding against the dangers inherent in wireless communication, the following measures must be taken :—

(a) Wireless calls must bear no relation to the units served by any particular W/T station and they must be changed at frequent and irregular intervals.

(b) Addresses "To" and "From" must be suitably disguised by false or code names and changed frequently.

(c) The same procedure must be enforced with names of units, etc. appearing in the text of the message.

(d) Originator's numbers must bear no relation to the originator himself.

(e) Employment of cipher will in the majority of cases be necessary.

(f) The volume and direction of signal traffic must be controlled.

There is one school of thought which maintains that the measures necessary for a really efficient system of signal security are too complicated, cause too much delay, and throw too much of a strain on staff and signal service to make them worth while. Their contention is that the gain in speed and simplicity will more than outweigh any advantage the enemy may obtain from lack of secrecy. Whether this opinion is correct or not is a matter for argument, but it is one which every officer should consider. The true solution lies, probably like that of most war problems, in the nice balancing of security against simplicity and speed.

HINTS ON MAKING A *BANDOBAST* FOR A SHOOT IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

BY A FOREST OFFICER.

Whenever I come across in remote spots young men, who generally have never had an opportunity of learning about the India outside cantonments, I fully realize how much more difficult things are for them in every way than for an official with local influence and plenty of subordinates to help him. However, my experience is that most men enjoy the novelty of the situation, and I am sure those who have tried would agree with me that no one, who is keen to get out in the jungle and can put up with roughing it, should be deterred by the difficulties of the *bandobast*. If two men go together I believe the problems that arise will be more a source of amusement than anything else. I recollect my feelings of puzzled embarrassment on meeting two subalterns of a British regiment in the jungle, who solicited my help as regards “*madchens*” and a “*charmer*”. I realized just in time that it was “*machans*” and a “*chamar*” that they were after, and though my mind jumped to all the problems they must be facing with so meagre an equipment of Hindustani, I realized later that I never met two fellows who enjoyed themselves more. I shall assume that the reader is equally new to the country and wants information *ab initio*.

The shooting in Government Forest, the only forest areas where any control over shooting is exercised, is administered by the local forest officer on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner who is the head of the District. It is always wise if you visit the headquarters of the district before proceeding to your shoot to call not only on the Forest Officer, but also on the Deputy Commissioner and the District Superintendent of Police; their advice is sure to be helpful and you may get quite unexpected assistance, as nowhere are you likely to meet a finer tradition of helping the stranger at your gate.

The local forest officer is called the Divisional Forest Officer and it is to him you address your application for a Shooting Block. His Division is divided into about half a dozen Ranges of 100 to 200 square miles each, in charge of Range Officers who rank with Indian Officers

in the Indian Army. These Ranges contain two or three shooting Blocks ; some good but most of them indifferent. The first consideration is to find out the names of one or two good Blocks and the name of the Division, and the only way to do that is to keep your ears open and jot them down against the day you may require them. You can, of course, leave it to the Divisional Forest Officer, but there is always a demand for his best blocks, and if the choice is left to him he will naturally incline to give the most popular ones a rest.

The rules allow you to apply for a Shooting Permit for a Block up to three months in advance of the day you mean to enter it, and you will be wise to do so. Possibly you may be able to get two Blocks the cost of each being Rs. 25 per month, but if your leave is only a month I advise you to concentrate on one area and get to know it. March and April are the best months.

Don't expect game to abound in India as it does in the pictures of " Africa Speaks " ; wherever you go in the Central Provinces you will have to look for it, and you will find your powers of patience tested far more than you expect. Against my will I once gave an inferior Block at a moment's notice to two subalterns who had got their leave and nowhere to go. Ten days later I got a note, " You were quite right this Block isn't much good. As a matter of fact the only living animal we have seen is a pig, so we have decided to spend the rest of our leave in Mussoorie." Two days later, " I am awfully sorry I wrote you that note when we were feeling rather fed up. We have had a wonderful time since then. Yesterday I got a solitary bull bison in the morning, and in the evening I saw tracks of tiger and sat up over a live kill. I got three tigresses in five minutes and my friend got the fourth further down the *nullah*." Again, I lay emphasis on patience. Tigers trek round in wide circles and there is always hope.

The permit issued to you will show you the number of sambhar, cheetal, barasingha and bison you may shoot, the address of the Range Officer and details about closed seasons. The numbers allotted are governed by the annual limit for the Block and by the length of your permit. You will never be given more than one bison and generally two of each of the others. Tigers, panthers, bear, nilgai and pig are unlimited, but that is because they are classed as " vermin " and not because they are so numerous, except in the case of pig. Always shoot pig, there is no question of their being ridden, they are a plague

to the crops and your best means, not only of testing your shooting and your rifle, but what is also important, of making friends with your hosts, the local junglies. A dead pig the first night in camp is a fine introduction and it has helped beginners more than they know. All concerned appreciate evidence that this strange Sahib, who cannot talk to them, can anyhow hit the mark and that his *bandook* can kill, because no one knows what circumstances may not arise before the uninvited guest takes his departure from the neighbourhood, and not everyone looks forward to being mixed up unarmed in other people's tiger beats. Kill all the bears you can and don't treat them with contempt. The villager has no more dangerous enemy.

When you are told the Block you want is available, send the fee by Money Order and make out a concise list of questions, leaving space for brief answers, *e.g.*, Railway Station, Post Office, Distance to Block, best centre, is there a Forest Rest House, may I ask the Range Officer to get me kills and send carts to the Station, can I take a car or hire a motor lorry? Ask the Divisional Forest Officer to fill in the answers.

And here a word of warning. The Forest Officer's duty is confined to issuing a permit, providing a Forest Guard to watch your movements and keep him informed, and to running you in and finding you if you break either Forest laws or Game laws. Dismiss the illusion that Forest Officers are maintained by Government to run shoots for themselves and other people. Whatever the Forest Officer, or his Range Officer, or his Forest Guard do to help you is done of their own free will.

Help you will certainly want one way or another from all these individuals, and you are pretty certain to get it so long as you set about it the right way, *e.g.*, always offer a Range Officer a chair.

It is difficult to think of all the things you want to know, especially as I must be brief. Note the following:—

(i) *Maps*. Ask the numbers of the one inch sheets which cover the Block and order on a Money Order form from—The Map Record and Issue Office, 13, Wood Street, Calcutta, paper Rs. 1-8-0, linen-backed Rs. 2-4-0 per sheet.

(ii) *Weapons*.

(a) If you can afford it a D. B. H. V., 400 or 450, and a small bore magazine rifle for stalking—Rigby, Mannlicher or Springfield—is the best equipment you can have. The former is only really necessary for bison.

For tiger or panther you are just as well off with the old .500 D. B. black powder rifle, using low pressure cordite cartridges, which are smokeless. This should cost about Rs. 150 compared with Rs. 750 for a H. V. rifle. Bullets for bison should be nickel-capped and pointed; for the soft skinned cats they should be hollow-nosed or copper-tubed so that they break up at once. There is always a danger with H. V. rifles that the bullet will pass straight through a tiger. You may not be able to tell if you have hit at all and it may be difficult to find any blood trail to help you. Remember with all game it is often the second shot which counts, so what you want is to knock the animal down with the first and be able to finish it off with the second shot, preferably without frightening the animal or giving away your position by having to click a magazine. You are more likely to do this with the old .500 D. B. rifle than with any H. V. rifle. If you do use a H. V. rifle be sure to have soft-nosed or hollow bullets.

Whatever rifles you take, practice with them on the range first. Confidence in your weapon is half the battle and always carry your rifle yourself, otherwise you will miss your chance.

(b) 12 bore shot-gun with

(i) 50, 4's and 50, 6's for peafowl, jungle-fowl and green pigeon.

(ii) 20 lethal bullets. Try them on the range. I saw one gun give a bull at 100 yards.

(iii) 25 S. S. G's.

Increase your confidence by having more ammunition with you than you are likely to want.

I suggest following up a wounded panther with S. S. G's. in both barrels, and a wounded tiger with a lethal bullet in right barrel and S. S. G. in left barrel, especially if on foot and you can't locate the animal. If possible always have buffaloes or dogs ahead to distract the animal's attention from human beings. Buffaloes are no use in the heat of the day. Dogs can be invaluable and can generally be trusted to look after themselves.

(iii) *Expense*.—Rs. 500 a head per month should cover you, apart from travelling expenses. Take fifty rupees worth of annas and plenty of silver rupees. Notes and four anna bits are not popular in the jungle. Pay beaters

and villagers with your own hand—don't leave it to your orderly or soldier servant, he will regard aboriginals as monkeys quite unworthy of full pay. Ask the Range Officer the daily rate for labour and carts and pay it out yourself at once. Nothing serves to establish good relations more, and it accords with the tradition of the best men in the country. The friends you can make among these simple folk will be one of your pleasantest memories.

Kills (buffaloes) cost about Rs. 10 and you should ask the Range Officer to help you arrange. Two men are required for tying up and visiting each kill. The rope should be one a tiger can break.

All you can hope for in the way of supplies are a few eggs, chickens and milk. Take stores, vegetables, fruit, etc. If there is a Forest Rest House it will be furnished, but has no lamps, crockery or plate. See yourself that drinking water is boiled and guard against being bitten by mosquitoes as much as possible.

(iv) *Rewards*.—Tiger and panther Rs. 15. Wild dog and bear Rs. 5. Send a receipt to the Divisional Forest Officer, quoting details and he will arrange payment by Money Order from the Treasury to the address given. It is customary to give the amount to the man who is with you at the time.

(v) *Miscellaneous*.—Don't forget :—Mosquito nets, quinine, aspirin, chlorodyne, permanganate, bandages, etc., plaster, iodine pencil, mosquitol for sitting in *machan*, soda sparklet, alum for skins, skinning knives, water bottle, cough lozenges if you are liable to cough in a *machan*, torch and refills, whistle, kukri, crepe-soled boots (not shoes), spine pad, pigsticker topi, fishing rod, field glasses, camera and books.

Books of local interest recommended are :—

- (a) Shikar Notes for Novices, by the Hon. James Best, I.F.S.
- (b) The Animals of Central India, by A. A. Dunbar-Brander, O.B.E., I.F.S.
- (c) The Highlands of Central India, by Forsythe,
- (d) Seonee, by Sterndale,

PICKLES, A. D. C.

By "MOUSE."

It is with the greatest diffidence that I approach the question of *aides-de-camp* at all. Although he follows the second oldest profession in the world, the A. D. C. has suffered the derision, the abuse and the envy of all the centuries and centuries. Wits have used him for their gibes. Humorists have caricatured him for their base ends. Novelists, dramatists and diarists have dragged him in by his shortest hairs to establish their *aplomb* with the *au fond* of the *haut monde*. He, poor devil, is the whipping-boy of society. Nobody treats him seriously; nobody loves him; nobody sympathises with him, and nobody has stood up for him—until I undertook to write this article. (In Australia he is called a "Gent's help"; but the Australians are low.)

The *genus* A. D. C. is neither so distinguished nor distinct that it deserves the exaggerated isolation which falls to its ordinary lot. By some historical mischance the idea has grown that an *aide-de-camp* is a hot-house bloom; it looks beautiful, it smells agreeably, it is nice to touch, it has been nurtured amid the most delicate and refined surroundings and—if exposed to the blasts of the outside world—it wilts. Nothing could be further from the truth. Most As. D. C. thrive on blasts. The job calls forth a soldier's greatest attributes; force of character, courage of a high degree, verve in dealing with subordinates and ladies, quickness of judgment in an emergency, leadership, organization, administration, decentralisation, tact in dealing with superiors and in getting your own way (think of the number of Generals who failed to persuade or cajole politicians during the Great War all for lack of training as junior officers), and a cheerful appearance in the midst of the most depressing circumstances. There has never been a perfect A. D. C. Such an one would combine the appearance of a rejuvenated Field-Marshal with the sex appeal of a film star, the originality of a Fortnum or Mason, the character of a Sir Galahad, the plausibility of a Colonel House, the charm of a Henry Wilson, the ability and tenacity of a Ford, and the versatility of a polo pony in a pagal gymkhana. A few As. D. C. have reached almost these heights, but two of the best just failed the attainment of perfection on their appointment as Commanders-in-Chief in India.

Personally I am rather sorry for *aides-de-camp*. When they appear officially they are in the limelight of pitiless publicity. If one of them loses his stirrup, his head or his temper, it is a matter for six months discussion and a lifetime of memory. This may appear to be an over-weighted statement, but I know a man in India who is still trying to live down an upside-down spur and he has told me in confidence that he owes his present obscurity to this ghastly aberration of his bearer. There is the unfortunate story also of the young gallant who kissed the wrong woman at the right moment and has spent his time ever since kicking his heels and himself in the backwater of a garrison town. As. D. C. have many opportunities certainly, but temptation and disillusion are their step-sisters.

Having written this long-felt want among *aides-de-camp* it is, therefore, with peculiar sadness that I conduct the reader to an historical aspect of A. D. C.-dom wherein the hero shows up in a sorry light ; but the same reader will concede, I hope, the truth of the old saying that this exception proves my rule. By holding up " Pickles " to the horror of the multitude I do not wish to testify that all As. D. C. are of immaculate conception, but rather do I wish to show that even the most inefficient of the breed may conceal virtues which place him definitely upon a higher plane than the late Captain Scott Jervis, 106th Light Infantry.

Captain Jervis, A. D. C. to His Excellency Sir William Mansfield and Comptroller of the Commander-in-Chief's Household, was court martialled in Simla in 1866, and the proceedings form one of the most remarkable events which convulsed Simla society since the Mutiny. Jervis was apparently a popular young character with a quick temper, an easy-going nature, and an astonishing disregard for the ordinary rules of discipline and everyday courtesy. He was the defendant. The plaintiff was His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Mansfield, late Chief of the Staff in the Bombay Army where he had " served with much efficiency during the mutinies and thus carried great weight in all military affairs." If one hazarded a judgment of his character from reading between the lines of the court martial proceedings the result would be the figure of an irascible, foolish, badly advised old gentleman who allowed his better feelings to be overcome by his natural anger at finding that for several years he had nursed a viper in his bosom.

This famous court-martial assembled on 25th June 1866 and finished its work about nine weeks later—on 30th August. The President was a Brigadier-General and the Members were seven Colonels, four Lieutenant-Colonels and three Majors. The prisoner was arraigned on five charges which I will condense from their legal phraseology into more homely language :—

1st Charge : Scandalous behaviour, unbecoming the character of an officer and gentleman while employed as Aide-de-Camp, in that he—

- (a) At Mahasoo during the months of September, October and November 1865, misappropriated property valued at Rs. 920-10-8 “for the entertainment of his own guests.”

The list of property included :

- 100 bottles of sherry.
- 61 bottles of champagne.
- 88 bottles of claret.
- 114 bottles of beer.
- 1 bottle of Worcester sauce.
- 1 tin of ham.
- 1 tin of pate de foie gras.
- 3 tins of truffles.
- 4 tins of asparagus.
- 1 lb. of tea.
- 1 bottle of mixed pickles.

- (b) At Calcutta in February 1866 debited the sum of Rs. 700/- in His Excellency's accounts, the same sum being the cost of his own private table expenses.
- (c) At Calcutta or Simla dishonestly misappropriated to his own use stable gear of the value of Rs. 275/-.
- (d) Charged to His Excellency's debit the sum of Rs. 47-14-0 which sum was expended privately by Captain Jervis for his own use.

2nd Charge : Refusing to produce his account books before a Military Court of Enquiry on 14th May 1866.

3rd Charge : Neglecting to obey the order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to attend a Committee of Audit on the 22nd May 1866.

4th Charge: Disobeying the lawful command of his superior officer (the Deputy Adjutant-General) to deliver him his sword when placed under arrest on 9th June 1866.

5th Charge: Conduct unbecoming the character of an officer in having at Simla on the 22nd June made use of highly insubordinate expressions in a letter to the Adjutant-General in regard to his appearance before a General Court-Martial:—"In reply, I have the honour most solemnly and emphatically to protest against this proceeding as unwarranted by law, principle or justice, and to state with every respect to His Excellency that nothing short of physical force will induce me to be present at the Court, and that if dragged there as a prisoner by violent means, I shall take no part in the proceedings."

Before this odious arraignment the prisoner adopted a defiant attitude. With the able assistance of a civilian counsel, M. W. Taylor, he made three pleas in bar of trial. Before these were accepted by the Court it had to close twice in order that it might discuss quietly the shockingly forcible language used by the accused. If one observes the chronological order of the five charges preferred against Pickles, one sees that he imagined from the beginning that he was being made the public and official delinquent for a personal and private spite, and that the injustice of such a proceeding turned his mind so violently "redwards" that he threw all caution, all discipline and all ordinary feelings of gratitude or respect, to the winds in order either to save his skin or vindicate his character.

In his pleas in bar he reiterated vehemently (a) that the Commander-in-Chief being in fact the plaintiff could not legally convene the court to try him; (b) that the orders he was charged with disobeying were illegal and (c) that the Commander-in-Chief had over-ridden the Judge Advocate in not allowing him, the accused, to call certain witnesses for the defence. To this the Judge Advocate made good legal answers which led to further judicial quibbling and counter-pleas—all too involved to follow—which resulted in the Court closing again. Eventually all the pleas were disallowed and the prisoner was asked to plead "Guilty or Not Guilty."

The prisoner replied: "Under protest—not guilty."

The Prosecution.—The case for the prosecution lasted for twenty-one days and was a long, tedious business brightened by passages at arms between the prisoner, the court and the various witnesses. Pickles was assisted by his civilian counsel whose arguments and

suggestions were so technical and abstruse that the court had to keep closing for days at a time to enable it to counter the various legal points raised. The first witness for the prosecution was His Excellency, Sir W. Mansfield. He produced an excellent memorandum written by himself for the guidance of his Personal Staff. Two extracts make quaint reading: "The Commander-in-Chief expects that his Personal Staff will not give in to the temptation of high play," and "Pique on the part of a member of the Staff towards their guests, cannot be permitted." In the evidence later produced it was found out that this latter order had been included for the special benefit of Captain Jervis, who on one occasion had been rude to the Quarter-master-General of the Bombay Army.

The "Pioneer" published the daily proceedings, and unpleasant excitement ran high through Northern India during the *six days* when the Commander-in-Chief had to submit to a merciless cross-examination. Jervis, prompted by his skilful counsel, plied his late master with embarrassing questions in an attempt to prove that the "misappropriation" was normal and had been practised by all members of the Staff for many years. He got the admission that the Commander-in-Chief himself had been his guest for four days during the period of the alleged consumption of the stores in Mahasoo. He insinuated that Lady Mansfield was at the bottom of the whole trouble. It all makes very distressing reading, and no one was more distressed than the Commander-in-Chief. He kept his temper admirably but on occasions was stung to make some acid answers. For instance: "The prisoner, although trusted in so many things was, I am happy to say, not trusted with my banker's book." (Here the prisoner rose and threw himself on the protection of the court). And again: "I consider that there is a suggestion of untruth running through both the letters which have been read by him in which he tries to make out that three officers of high rank on the Headquarters Staff of the Army were under my influence."

President: (who had evidently during the latter part of witness's answer been reflecting over the previous portion and who spoke with a dignity and deliberation which produced a profound impression upon the whole assembly) "Your Excellency, the prisoner has asked for the protection of the Court; it is the wish of the Court that Your Excellency should in giving evidence refrain from all expressions and remarks distressing to the prisoner....."

After the Commander-in-Chief's evidence there was a host of witnesses ; the Military Secretary, an Aide-de-Camp (who, it was insinuated, had been expelled from a Masonic Lodge, black-balled at the Bengal Club and assaulted in the Simla Club), a khansamah, Nunee Khan, a khitmatgar, Hussein Khan, the English butler, Abbey, a Chaprassi and finally the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

The Defence.—The prisoner produced a defence which covers thirty-one foolscap pages of close print. On the first charge of misappropriation he pleads that no fraudulent intention was proved. He had merely *borrowed* the stores intending to pay them back later. He cited instances of the Commander-in-Chief lending stores to his Staff on previous occasions. He showed that the present action had been taken against him after Sir William Mansfield had held a private enquiry among the menial staff at which he, the accused, had not been present. In his indignation Jervis made some splendid oratorical flights : “ For, gentlemen, while the evidence shows His Excellency exerting himself for the purpose of eliciting evidence against me, while it discloses members of His Excellency's Staff hunting for proofs, writing and telegraphing to Calcutta tradesmen with a view to the preparation of these charges, I myself have scrupulously avoided holding any, even the slightest communication with any soul, European or Native, from the first commencement of the controversy until now. I have met accusation with open and indignant denial, nay, I have given offence by the warmth, perhaps even the defiance, of my manner and language, rather than exhibit any desire to conciliate or conceal.” He concludes his refutation of the first charge with the native admission : “ I have, as I have before stated, *never made out the accounts at all.*”

The second charge, that of neglecting to obey an order to attend a Court of Inquiry, Jervis counters by producing a letter from the A. G.'s Department “ requesting ” him to attend. “ How then my neglecting to comply with a “ request ” which I submit is synonymous with an “ invitation ” can be converted into the military offence of “ neglecting to obey an *order* ” I am unable to understand. I submit this point, Gentlemen, to your serious attention.” He adopted a similar defence for the third charge and pointed out that at the time of the Audit Committee the whole case was under discussion, and therefore *sub judice*, between the Commander-in-Chief and his counsel,

Equally ingenious is his defence against the charge of disobeying the lawful command of his superior officer regarding handing over his sword when placed under arrest. The prosecution could produce no order or regulation to show that an officer should deliver up his sword. "The warrant for such a demand, it may be said is *custom*, but the prosecution has altogether failed to establish it, Colonel—himself having only been able to state in his evidence that he "thinks" such a custom exists. And he, Gentlemen, is the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army." Pickles clinches his argument with a recent ruling (hearsay) made by the authorities of the Horse Guards that such a demand is unauthorised by law and "may with impunity be resisted."

The last charge, that of using highly insubordinate language in a letter to the Adjutant-General, the accused finds "extremely difficult to meet." He pleads that owing to his sense of deep anger and indignation at the whole proceedings which "if I may say so without disrespect were so unfair, so illegal and so ruinous to me that I might as well submit to *any* penalty as a stand such an ordeal". In other words he preferred being hanged for a sheep than a lamb.

The prosecution replied for thirty-one pages, and on the whole appeared to demolish fairly successfully most of the accused's defence. New documents were produced to which the prisoner took legal objection and after much bitter argument was allowed eight days to make a rejoinder.

On Wednesday, 29th August, the Judge Advocate made his summing up, on the whole fairly impartial, but showing here and there a certain amount of bias against the prisoner.

Finding.—The Court found Jervis Not Guilty of the 1st and 2nd Charges, but Guilty of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges. He was sentenced to dismissal from the Service and "in consideration of the extenuating circumstances disclosed in the proceedings" the Court recommended him to mercy. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the Court to re-assemble on 12th September to re-consider its finding of acquittal. The Court adhered to its previous finding. The Judge Advocate was then ordered to prepare a general critical report of the whole case which he concludes with a valuable paragraph showing how a skilful civilian counsel had "made rings round" the Court. This led to useful corrections in the Army Act regarding the laws of evidence and legal procedure. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed the sentence

and in his remarks wrote that the finding of acquittal on the first and second charges was contrary to the clear and sufficient proof produced by the prosecution. He refused to countenance the recommendation for mercy and Captain Jervis was dismissed the Service.

I have it on good authority that Pickles returned to England, and appealed to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, who befriended him. Jervis was re-instated for one day in which he sold his commission for £1,800.

I am dashed if I can see where the moral of this story lies, except perhaps that it shows that for *Aides-de-Camp* it isn't all beer and pickles.

THE TRAVELS OF RISALDAR SHAHZAD MIR KHAN.

This is the first of a series of extracts translated from the autobiography of the Late Khan Bahadur Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan, O.B.I. of the 11th K. E. O. Lancers (Probyn's Horse). An Urdu edition of the book under the title of "Shah Safar Sari-i-Dunya" has been issued to units of the Indian Army, but portions of it are, it is thought, of such general, and at times historical, interest as to justify publication in the Journal.

The author was the son of Rahmatullah Khan, a Lambardar of Pirpai in the Nowshera District of the North-West Frontier Province. He enlisted in Probyn's Horse on 14th February 1882 and right up to his death at his home on 12th October 1924 he continued to render devoted service to his country.

It must be remembered that Shahzad Mir Khan's descriptions of people and places are those of fifty years or so ago, and that he looked at both East and West through Oriental eyes. Times have changed and many of his strictures and comments might not now be justified, were perhaps not justified even at the time he made them. But they were made in good faith and by a trained and keen observer, while many of the more unusual of his personal experiences have been vouched for by independent witnesses.

Only a few copies of the original book in lithographed Urdu were published, and as in it names were spelt more or less phonetically it is difficult and sometimes impossible to identify them. In translation the author's turns of phrase have as far as possible been preserved, but, in deference to Western susceptibilities, it has been necessary at times to depart from his honest habit of calling a spade a spade.

It is hoped that these articles in the Journal will be some tribute to an Indian Officer of the best type.

INTRODUCTION.

I have written those things which I have seen and heard. All religions are treated equally in this book, and no one should cast religious aspersions at it.

THE REASON FOR WRITING THIS BOOK.

Several British Officers, and Indian friends of mine, who knew that I was a great traveller, have encouraged me, and even insisted that I should write a book telling of my adventures during my various

travels. This meant, of course, that I should write an autobiography. It was no easy matter to compile the book, as the events covered a period of twenty-seven years, but as I had kept careful notes of each journey in my field books, the task was not impossible.

Now the writing of books is the business of poets and their ilk, and so it will be unnecessary for me to say that all I have done is to write down in my own uncouth language what I have seen and heard. I have been fated to travel much in my time, and have experienced the ups and downs of fortune, and I record these paltry details merely as a memorial to myself in this world. Moreover, I do not think it right that I should keep sealed up in my heart the wonders that I have seen. I have never had any idea of making money out of selling books, or becoming a merchant. Indeed my intention was to have sixty or seventy copies of the book printed at my own expense, and to present them to my friends as souvenirs. Should any Sahib think that the book is not in good taste, and that I have written it with the sole object of self-aggrandisement, I ask him to be good enough to spare me from such criticism. In truth my only desire was that I should leave these memoirs of my adventures, and so complete my life.

CONCERNING MYSELF.

I was born in 1863. Without going into the details of my childhood, suffice it to say that I stayed at home till the 31st January 1882, when I started on my travels as you will see from what follows.

On the 1st February 1882 a boy friend of mine persuaded me to go off with him and see India. I was sure that my father and mother would highly disapprove of our scheme, so the initial difficulty was to find some way of obtaining the money necessary to put our plan into execution.

In accordance with the well known proverb, "All is fair when necessity presses," I went to a native banker, or '*sahukar*,' called Das Mull, a splendid fellow, with whom I used to deal, and told him that I wanted some money. He asked me what I was going to do with so much, and I told him that my brother, who had taken up a road repairing contract, wanted it to pay the coolies. He thereupon gave me the money, and I went home. That evening, in order to put my near and dear ones off the scent, I told them that I was thinking

of going over to Peshawar for a day or two, and asked them if I could do anything for them. Some of them gave me commissions to do, and the others thought nothing of it.

We started off that very night and next morning reached Khairabad. In those days the railway had not reached Peshawar, and I knew nothing of the world at all.

The only place I had heard of was Calcutta, so I asked the *Babu* at the Station to give me a ticket to Calcutta. He told me that I could not get a through ticket to Calcutta, and gave me a ticket to Lahore. There I took a ticket to Amritsar, where I remembered that there was a young man called Hikmat, of my village, who had enlisted as a sowar in the 11th Risala which was at that time in Umballa Cantonment. I thought that, as I had got so far, I might as well go and look him up. So I took tickets for us both to Umballa City, for in those days I knew nothing about Cantonments and such things!

We arrived at Umballa City at about 6 a.m., and went straight away to the Cantonments, and eventually found our way to the 8th Troop of the 11th Risala. I remember that it was a Sunday, but notwithstanding that, Colonel Prinsep Sahib Bahadur was going round the lines, and my companion and I were brought up before him. We were then sent to the Doctor Sahib for medical inspection! Well, I was passed fit, but my companion was not and I told them that I refused to serve without him. However, no one would listen to what I said, so what could I do? They sent my friend back to his home, and kept me. A few days later, the news reached my home that I had run away, and had enlisted in the Army. My brother was sent off post haste to the Regiment to bring me back. He turned up sure enough, but, the Risaldar Major, the late Muhammad Akram Khan Sahib, told him that it was impossible for me to go, and packed him off home again! For a few days I remained on as an '*umedwar*,' but on the 14th February 1882 I was enlisted, and so all the plans I had made to see the world and to make my fortune were dashed to the ground.

I now began to get a little sense in my head. I had been taught to read and write a little at home, and so I was able to start straight away learning Urdu in the Regimental School. In two years' time I had learnt quite a lot of Urdu, Persian, sums, and so on. It took me five months to pass out of riding school. I learned a little English, but

acquired a thorough knowledge of the Roman alphabet, which is used for signalling, and managed to pass top of the signalling class.

Personal effort is a good thing, and it was thanks to my hard work that I did pass first. Nevertheless I must own that my success was chiefly due to the instruction given me by my Commanding Officer, Colonel Boyle Sahib Bahadur. This Sahib treated the men as if they were his own children, and was an indefatigable worker. He was especially kind to me, and helped me in my work tremendously. It was he who made me efficient, and made a man of me. He praised me very highly in Durbar before everyone when I passed my signalling examination.

Two and a half years later, I was given leave home, and I saw my relations and dear ones again. On return from leave I got orders to go with a Commission, the details of which will be found in the account of my first journey.

This introduction was written on the 25th November 1909.

MY FIRST JOURNEY.

The Herat Boundary Commission under General Lumsden, via Multan, the Bolan, and the Quetta Valley, 1885.

I do not know exactly how many men there were, but there must have been about two hundred of our Regiment, and two companies of the 20th Punjabis. We all assembled at Quetta, and moved off towards the Registan, or the sand desert of Baluchistan. Our first camp was at Chaman where we met the Afghan detachment under General Qazi Sad-ud-Din Khan, who was ready to help us in every way. Up to that time no troops had ever traversed the route by which we were going. In the whole of Afghanistan there was no sign of a road of any kind, and, as our way lay through heavy sand. The going was terribly difficult. If men strayed to the right or left of the track they were soon lost in a cloud of sand that was just like a stream of water. In order to cope with this difficulty we arranged with the local Baluchi nomads who graze their herds and flocks in these parts, to get fires lit on mounds by the side of the track. Thereafter, the smoke from these guided us by day, and the fire by night.

In camp everything was covered and buried in sand. Our cooking pots and other vessels were full of it. The water was dreadful. At one halt, to taste it by way of an experiment, I put half an ounce of

sugar into a small quantity of it, but even so it tasted as if I had put a half ounce of salt into it. Many a time we obtained our water on camels sent by the Amir of Kabul.

The Koh-i-Zal.

Zal was the father of Rustam, the famous hero, and in this country there is a mountain called after him. About nine miles to the north-east of the mountain is a large pond on the north side of which there is a stone fort, encircled with broken down wall. It is said that in this fort was the throne of Rustam.

I would very much like to know what the kingdom of these "Hero Kings" consisted of in this desert. No one lives here, there is no sign of cultivation whatsoever, and the wind that blows makes one's ears bleed. The only people we saw from Chaman to the Helmand were wild Baluch shepherds and cattle drivers. Every now and again, they brought for sale melons, wrapped up in leather, which were very sweet. There was good water in the Helmand, and when we reached Herat we saw a lot of vineyards. Herat is a fine city surrounded by a moat. The inhabitants, however, are just like Indians: that is they have soft tongues and flabby bodies. They were very afraid of us soldiers, and the shop-keepers would run away from their shops to the hills at night: the only discomfort, though needless, which our presence caused them.

The Commission waited for about a year in the hope of meeting the Russian Mission, and of settling the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan. The Russians, however, did not turn up. Eventually General Lumsden, in despair, returned to England, and the command devolved on Colonel Ridgeway Sahib. Half the escort, both Cavalry and Infantry, returned to India. The first winter we spent under canvas in Bala Murghab, and the second at Charshamba, where the Shrine of the 'Ashab-i-Kahf' is located. The whole story of these people will be found in the fifteenth Chapter of the Holy Qur-án.

The Ashab-i-Kahf.

There is a cave in a hillock near Charshamba, the entrance to which faces the east. A man can walk in without bending his head. The path inside the cave winds about till a wall is reached. Against this wall is a ladder about four feet high. On climbing the ladder, in a cavern can be seen the recumbent forms of three men, covered over

by a sheet; the bodies are moulded in clay and are quite recognizable. At their feet, on the face of the rock, has been carved the figure of a deer, and beyond that a greyhound, and beyond that again a hawk. About twenty-five paces to the east of the entrance to the cave is a round grave, on which there is a large grave stone. The story of the Ashab-i-Kahf is well known so I will only give a brief summary of it.

Oqianus was a shepherd who used to graze his flock on the slopes of the hill of Charshamba. One day he discovered a gold mine. By degrees he collected a number of servants and retainers, and made himself a king. He gave out that the hill had become gold, and that henceforth all men should bow down and worship him and his idols. Then two of the Ashab-i-Kahf, who were relations of Oqianus, refused to obey this edict, and said that man should bow down to God alone.

Oqianus gave orders that the Ashab-i-Kahf should be arrested and executed. In terror of their lives, they started off that night, and at dawn met a shepherd, to whom they told their story, and asked if there was any place in which they could hide as they feared that the King's horsemen must be very close. The shepherd showed them this cave, and went in with them. His dog tried to follow him but they would not let it go in. However, it insisted on following them, so they cut off its legs, and killed it, and buried it just outside the cave in the grave to which I have referred. This was the dog which is spoken of by Shaikh Sadi (on whom be peace). All three of them then lay down and went to sleep. At last when they woke up, one of them went off to the bazaar, and paid for his purchases with coins of the time of Oqianus. The shop-keeper informed him that Oqianus had been dead for 309 years, and that another King was then reigning. People asked him if he had found the treasure of Oqianus. He was then taken before the King, to whom he told the whole story. The King ordered two of his courtiers to investigate the matter. Off they went, but for many days did not return and all hope of them was given up. So the King, accompanied by his Wazir, went out to find out for himself what had happened. They pretended, however, that they were going hunting. From the models of the hawk, deer, and hound, which I have described, it would appear that they found the cave. There are many variations of this story, and the numbers of the sleepers given vary from seven to three.

Whilst in Afghanistan most of my time was taken up in signalling and survey work. When General Ridgeway was sent to Persia, I volunteered to go with him, and was fortunate enough to be selected.

In Persia.

One day when I was walking through the bazaars of Meshed, I gave a baker three pice, and asked for some bread. He gave me three flaps of bread, each of which was about one foot broad and two long. I told him that I only wanted three pice worth of bread and asked him why he had given me so much. He replied that he had only given me what was due to me. I took one of the flaps and gave him back the other two. On another occasion I bought a pice worth of grapes, and was given about a pound of them. In those days everything was wonderfully cheap, especially cloth and silk. The Persians keep their houses scrupulously clean. In Meshed is the Shrine of the Eighth Imam, Imam Reza, who died from taking poison. The dome is covered with gold tiles, and a priceless turquoise is suspended from the roof. I fancy that this must be the most beautiful shrine in the whole world. In Meshed, prisoners are released every year in the month of Muharram. The best turquoises, cloth, and silk in the whole world are sold in the bazaar, a part of which belongs to the Shrine.

Immorality in Persia.

During the course of an evening stroll through the bazaars, one will be asked right and left if one wishes to arrange a *sigha* or temporary marriage. The natural answer is, "Yes, for everyone must marry!" Whereupon it will be asked if such a marriage is to last for an hour, a night, or a year. Such marriages are obviously illegal, and so all the women in Meshed are prostitutes; which, indeed, is the case throughout Persia. Moreover, should a Persian woman do any small thing to annoy her husband, he always has three stones up his sleeve to throw at her; that is to say, the words "*talaq, talaq, talaq*,"—the threefold divorce. Thus all the women are without husbands, and so become prostitutes. The beauty of Persian women compares favourably with that of any women in the world, and you can 'marry' as many as you please in Persia, but they will not leave their own country. No woman is treated with any respect, for even if the wife of an important official be seen going for a drive in a carriage, the soldiery and other passers by will call out to her "Hullo, old strumpet!"

Barbers are freely enlisted in the forces of the Shah, and it is quite a common sight to see a sentry on guard, with his rifle leaning up against the wall, busy shaving a client. The troops seem to be always on guard, which duty they will gladly undertake for an indefinite period for a few pice. The men are very strong, but, like the Chinese, are a drunken, besotten lot of hermaphrodites. They drink all day long, and all night as well.

The Shah is very easy-going, and has not much authority. The British, and Russians have their Trade Agencies everywhere; the Russians especially in the north, and the British in the south.

The Affair of Panj Deh.

On our return from Persia we received the Russian demands regarding the frontier, which were to the effect that whether the Amir liked it or not, the village of Panj Deh was to be included in their territory. The Russian commander then wrote a letter to the Afghan Officer commanding the garrison in Panj Deh, telling him that he intended to occupy Panj Deh at 10 o'clock the next morning, and advised him to evacuate the village forthwith if he wished to avoid open hostilities. He added that the Russian Government had decided on this course of action as the Afghans were friendly to the British, and because Panj Deh was a Turkoman village, and all the Turkomans were Russian subjects. The Afghan Commander of Panj Deh replied that, as the Amir happened to be in India at the moment, he could not evacuate the village without orders and he was prepared to take the consequences.

Prior to this the Russians had got their infantry into an entrenched position in the snow at some distance from the village. At 10 a.m. on the next day some Russian cavalry were to be seen approaching Panj Deh. The Afghan infantry and cavalry deployed, and, a long way in rear, the Kabuli levies made a great to-do. When within striking distance of the Russian cavalry, the Afghan cavalry charged. It appeared that the Russian cavalry were immediately thrown into confusion, for their troops wheeled outwards and fled right and left. The Afghan cavalry careered on, and ere long came under very heavy fire from the positions occupied by the Russian infantry in rear. The Afghan force was thrown into confusion and was decisively defeated. They suffered very heavy casualties, which included a Colonel killed.

Some of our fellows had managed to attach themselves to the Amir's troops, and had a great time. Dafadar Qutab-ud-Din of the 11th only just managed to get away with the British flag! Our Mission retired to Charshamba in a blinding snowstorm, and the Regiment only just managed to get over the pass. I was with the rear guard. The whole baggage train, including the officers' kits, went astray and was looted. About forty of the hired transport mules died from the cold, and a number of our own camels and mules also perished. Many of our followers, including the armourer, died and the whole party suffered terribly. I personally had my foot frost-bitten.

Our men pitched their tents in the snow, though no one would have believed it possible, and gave shelter to those who were unable to proceed. God reward them for their bravery! Eventually we reached Herat, the place where they call a chittank a maund. From here as I have related above half the party returned to India, and General Lumsden went home to England.

This fight at Panj Deh suited the British well, as before that, for twelve years, the Amir had been practically a pensioner of the Russians, and lived either in Bokhara or Samarkand. The British had established him on the throne at Kabul, and the action at Panj Deh had definitely made him an ally of the British. A year later the Russians announced that they were ready to settle the frontier question!

The Russian Troops.

Political pourparlers continued, and at last we received orders to meet the Russian Mission, which consisted of about a troop of cavalry and a company of infantry, and was located at Zulfiqar. Their Company Commander was a Muhammadan, whose name I have forgotten. In the Russian Army they promote Native Officers to high ranks. They said that there was a Turkoman General called Muhammad Ali with the escort, but I never actually saw him.

The Cossacks appear to be well-built and strong, and they wear hats just like those worn by Indian Christians in Railway stations in India. The Infantry wear long boots of soft Bulgarian leather, and coats down to their knees of some waterproof material. Their rifles are similar to the single-loader Lee-Metford. The Cavalry have stars on the front of their caps, and wear long coats, red leather breeches, and long Russian leather boots. They are armed with the same rifle as the Infantry and long swords with handles like that of a reaping hook. Their horses are nothing more than strong, sturdy, fat little

ponies. On the saddle they carry a sort of pad, which is kept in place by the surcingle. When a sowar wants to rest, he takes it off, and puts it under his head, the rest of the saddle being left on the horse. Their bridles are like our watering bits, and they have a drinking cup fixed to one of their stirrups. Their feeding arrangements are very simple. When they get into camp, they slaughter, and cut up a sheep. These joints are thrown into a large cauldron and boiled. Next day the cauldron is carried along on a camel. Each man has a tin bowl, which he dips into the cold greasy broth, and into this he throws pieces of cold and stale bread. This is all they get. There are no servants for the Officers or anyone else, and they have no 'followers' of any kind. The Officers' and mens' food is all cooked by the men themselves. 'Guides' are the only non-combatants in their formations.

Their Officers get very little pay. They all have beards, and are very clever at intelligence work. The men are conscripts, and have to do six years with the colours after which they can extend if they wish. They are all under-fed, and a portion of the little pay they are entitled to is usually appropriated by their Officers.

When the men are on guard, they have to find their own accommodation for the night. So they will force their way into anybody's house. I will not shock you by describing the dreadful things they do in other peoples houses. Once, when I was with the Pamir's Commission, a Muhammadan killed a Russian soldier who had assaulted the women in his house, but the unfortunate man had all his goods and chattels confiscated. The Russians are very friendly and hospitable, and a guest's health will be drunk two or three times, he being made to drink wine with his host whether he likes it or not.

Should an Officer get annoyed with a subordinate, he will merely order two of his men to knock him down, and to beat him as hard and as long as they like. I myself saw a Dufadar treated in this manner by a Captain when I was in the Pamirs. When a Russian soldier addresses an officer, he has to keep his hand at the salute the whole time that he is talking to him. Russia is a hard country. Every day the Cossacks break the ice on the frozen rivers, and wash their horses all over. We used to keep putties on our horses legs all day and night, and yet they would paw the ground all night, and suffer much from the cold. The Russian horses did not feel the cold at all,

Delineating the Frontier.

At last we started to delineate the frontier in co-operation with the Russians, starting from Zulfiqar. All Turkoman settlements and lands were ceded to Russia. We surveyed the whole line from Zulfiqar up to the Oxus, or rather the Hamun, as far as Chah-i-Gulfam.

The Oxus is crossed by a ferry pulled by horses. The river is very broad and when the boats are half way across the horses are nearly exhausted and one can hear them snorting, and puffing, and blowing from a long way off. It is the custom to let the foals follow their mothers. On the Oxus is Kelif, the Port for Balkh and Bokhara. Here too the boats are pulled across the river by horses. North of the river at this place there is a hill which is covered with trees, to the branches of which flags have been tied. Exactly opposite, on the southern bank is another hill on which similar flags have been erected. I climbed up this latter hill, which is called Mujawir. Here I saw a great big stone on the surface of which were some faint indentations. I asked what was the signification of the flags and of this stone with its indentations. They told me that when the Imam Ali was on his way to Afghanistan from Shahr-i-Sabz, some of the people of Shadian had set out to kill him. He, however, to escape them, jumped his horse, Duldul, right across the river from one hill to the other, and the horse landed with three feet on this stone and the fourth sank into the ground, and made the hill subside a little. One can see the hoof marks quite clearly. God alone knows the truth of this story, for the jump he is supposed to have made from one hill to the other was about a mile wide. It is beyond all human comprehension. However, everything is easy in the sight of God!

They told me that it is the big stone that is called Mujawir, for it is where the Imam Ali sat and rested.

The Oxus, at this point flows very quietly, though people say that in its course it can be heard to murmur, "Hazrat Ali has frightened me with his sword Zulfiqar!"

Most of the Turkomans are nomads and own large flocks and herds. The men wear long coats, long boots, and fur caps. Their women wear turbans on their heads, and long coats, which they fasten round their waists with a *kamarband*. On their feet they wear red leather shoes with broad toe-caps. They have flat noses, and their faces are wan and drawn; they are slipshod, untidy, and unattractive, and are of no use. The staple food of these people is milk and meat.

The stage beyond Kelif is Takhta Pul, and the one beyond that Balkh, which is a very ancient city. Here there are many gardens, but few inhabitants. The few people who live there are nearly all Jews. The people of Balkh, and the glory of the city have departed to Mazar-i-Sharif.

Mazar-i-Sharif.

This is a new city full of lovely gardens, one march to the east of Balkh. It is the Headquarters of the Governor of the Province of Afghan Turkistan. When I was there the Governor was one, Muhammad Ishaq Khan, who had made himself very unpopular with the Amir. The latter had ordered his recall for some time past, but Muhammad Ishaq fearing that the Amir would arrest him, had disobeyed the summons. I heard that eventually the Amir made him an outlaw. Muhammad Ishaq then collected a gang of ruffians and fought the Amir's troops well and hard, but was at last forced to take refuge in Russian territory.

The city is called 'Mazar-i-Sharif' or the 'Noble Shrine' because it is built round the mausoleum of Hazrat Ali Sahib (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad). It is said that no one knows the exact spot where his grave is; but it is written in a book which is kept in the Shrine, that Hazrat Ali, before he died left instructions that his body was not to be buried. So when he passed away, they put his body into a coffin, which they tied on a camel and then drove the camel out into the desert. No one knows what happened to the camel, but in the book it is written that, one night Hazrat Ali appeared in a dream to two hundred pious Muhammadans of Balkh, and told them where his coffin was to be found. He ordered them to inform the King, and tell him to build a great dome over his resting place. These good people went off and told the King of the vision they had seen. The King's Wazir ridiculed the whole story, and so the King would have none of it. A few days later the Wazir was stricken down with some illness, and was sick nigh unto death. After a while those good people again saw the vision in their dreams, and again informed the King of what they had seen. This time the Wazir helped them and persuaded the King to have the dome and the surrounding courtyard built. This is the Shrine that one sees to-day, which is called the '*sakhi*' or 'generous' shrine. The coffin is ten feet long, and is surrounded by a railing four feet high. They say that Ali was fourteen feet tall; but God alone knows the truth!

Many cripples, the halt and the maimed are said to have been cured at this Shrine ; and so its precincts are always thronged with the sick and poor.

About six miles to the south of Mazar-i-Sharif, and about twelve miles from the hill of Shadian, there is a fort on the top of a hill. In the days when Hazrat Ali was in the country, it was inhabited by infidels. A watercourse, which is used as a road, leads up to it ; and along the side of this there are still the remains of a wall. The building itself is still in perfect condition, except for the doors, and it is just the same as it was in those days.

They say that Hazrat Ali, who on one occasion wanted to spend the night there, broke down the doors, and went in. The infidels, who were living there rushed at him, and he only just managed to get out of the door and escape. He then mounted his horse Duldul and galloped up a very steep hill which was as slippery as glass. At the top of the hill he found a vine from which he ate some fruit. I never actually saw it myself, but I saw the marks of his horse's hoofs on the hill-side ; and I was told that the vine still exists.

We return to India.

We stayed for a long time in Shadian for the reason that after a long stay in a cold country it is not wise to go to India in the middle of the hot weather. We spent the summer therefore in Shadian and returned to India at the beginning of the winter. On our way back from Turkistan, we came to a village on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush. In all the countries I have ever been to I have never seen such a lovely village. It is called " Taj Kurghan," and certainly it is " The Crown Fort." It consists of a small bazaar, on both sides of which are shops. For some distance before you get to the bazaar you pass under an arcade of vines with their branches interwoven and clusters of grapes hanging down in profusion. The shops themselves, and indeed, the whole bazaar is covered and roofed in with vines which shade it from the sun.

Beyond the village there is a hill which is of a reddish colour on the slopes of which there is not a vestige of vegetation of any kind. I was told that this is attributed to the curse of Imam Ali, who during a battle in these parts, demanded his horse, and was told that it was out grazing on this hill. Imam Ali thereupon cursed the hill and the grass on it, after which the hill dried up and has been barren ever since.

When we arrived in Kabul we attended a Durbar, putting on the best uniform we had and turning out as smartly as we could in the circumstances. The Amir started off by saying that he blamed us, the British, entirely for everything that had happened; for having lost Panj Deh to the Russians, and for the casualties that his troops had suffered. "You obviously have connived at it all," he said, "or, at any rate, you must have known that it was going to happen—I am furious about it—You surely should have let me know about it!"

The Amir then continued in Persian:—"If only you had let me know, I would either have settled the matter with the Russians by peaceful negotiation, or would have forced them to accept our wishes at the point of the sword. So you see, all that has happened is thanks to you."

He then told us the following story:—

"Once upon a time the King Akbar was walking through the bazaars with Mulla Dopiazza and his Wazir Birbal, when a prostitute detached herself from the crowd in front of them, and with a wanton gesture embraced the Mulla Dopiazza. The latter at once turned and imitating her action, embraced the King in like manner. The King naturally was furious, and asked him what the Devil he was doing. 'I'm sorry,' said Dopiazza, 'but I thought that such behaviour must be some new form of etiquette which Your Majesty had approved of, for without Your Majesty's permission, she would never have dared to do such a thing.'"

"The cases are analogous," said the Amir "It was you British who started all this political whoring and caused all the trouble."

We were very disappointed that this was all the reward the Amir had to give us for two and a half years' hard work. We were too afraid to sleep that night. Everyone said that no one had ever been known to have returned safe and sound from Kabul.

However we were given a good breakfast next morning, and a band was sent to play to us. We were also plied with a surfeit of sweets and fruit, and were saluted right and left by the Afghan troops. These latter, in those days were not all dressed in uniform, moreover some were armed, but others merely carried sticks on their shoulders.

The best troops we saw in 1887 were the Turkoman cavalry, but now, I believe, they are all good. When, on our return from the

Herat Boundary Commission we emerged from the Khyber Pass, we found the troops of the Peshawar garrison lining both sides of the road from Jamrud to Peshawar. We were given a very good time in Peshawar, and were feted everywhere.

We then went by train to Lahore, where we camped near Anarkali. Here an English Prince and the Viceroy of India inspected us and then we were all given eight months' leave.

In 1888, when I came back from leave I rejoined the Regiment at Nowgong Cantonment where I was put in charge of the Signallers.

To be continued.

STONEWALL JACKSON—THEN AND NOW.

BY CAPTAIN R. N. GALE, M.C., THE DUKE OF CORNWALL'S LIGHT
INFANTRY.

The Question.

Between the 22nd March and the 25th June 1862, Stonewall Jackson with a force roughly equivalent to the modern division covered 676 miles in 48 marching days : during this period at least five battles were fought. The romance and the glamour, quite apart from the military achievements, of the Valley Campaign have made it probably one of the widest read of military actions. There can, of course, be little doubt but that much of its attraction is attributable to the biographer of General Jackson. The telling way in which Colonel Henderson has woven the life story of the West Point graduate into his account of the exploits of the Confederates in Virginia, leaves one, in so far as the military aspect is concerned, with the impression of distinct bias. Granting all this, however, the actual facts must remain. Kernstown and the retreat to Elk Run ; the move to Stanton and the battle of McDowell ; the advance up the Lauray Fork resulting in the discomfiture and retreat of Banks over the Potomac ; the miraculous escape of the Valley Army from the position in which it found itself after this exploit ; and, finally, the battles of Crosskeys and Port Republic, are all military achievements which need the embellishment of no biographer to add to their lustre.

With the advantages that modern inventions would have given to the Federals, the student of military history is apt to wonder very much whether, given present day means of reconnaissance, communications and staffs, Stonewall Jackson could have achieved the strategic and tactical successes for which his campaign is so famed.

The Human Factor.

In considering their actions commanders, and often governments, are affected by the human factor. General Allenby's strategy in Palestine at the end of the War is an excellent example of this. It is claimed in some quarters that one of the greatest causes of our failure on the Gallipoli Peninsula was due to our not realising the fine fighting capabilities of the Anatolian Turk. In the campaign under consideration the actions taken by commanders on either side were again and

again biased, either consciously or unconsciously, by estimates of the abilities or weaknesses of opponents. In estimating the possibilities of achieving results in 1932 comparable with those realised seventy years ago it is, therefore, only fair to make the following presumptions.

In the first place we must presume that there are the same civil and governmental conditions. We must visualise Lincoln and Stanton, constantly worried about the safety of Washington, interfering with the plans of their military Commander-in-Chief ; and on the side of the Confederates, Jefferson Davies backed so strongly by Lee. Then again, we must assume the same military commanders. Jackson's knowledge of Banks and the latter's fear of Jackson ; Lee's knowledge of Abraham Lincoln ; Fremont's energy until he was faced with the prospect of battle ; Ashby's daring, as well as a hundred and one other equally important personal factors, governed the moves and counter-moves of both commanders and politicians. Lastly we must presume that the troops of both sides were animated by the same spirit. A spirit which is so reminiscent of that which inspired the Anzacs and so many of our other Dominion and Colonial troops during the Great War.

Importance of Information.

It is difficult to say in which direction modern developments have made most difference to the conduct of war both in the strategical and in the tactical fields. The factors selected in this article are not necessarily claimed to be the most far reaching, for in war each development will play its part as a section of the mosaic which goes to make the whole.

Since 1862 great strides have been made in the collection, collation and distribution of information. The development of the air arm has made long distance reconnaissance more effective. Large concentrations and big movements of troops can, under reasonably good conditions, be seen from the air. Close reconnaissance makes it more difficult for troops to conceal positions which they have taken up ; the extent of positions can be gauged ; the movement of reserves can be located and the position of supporting artillery can be fixed. By means of wireless and other telegraphic means, information, from whatever source it is obtained, can be transmitted more surely and more readily than in the past. Finally the staff organization of a modern army is such that information from all sources can be readily

checked and systematically correlated. The same staff can be expected to distribute information in the shortest space of time and to all to whom it may be of interest.

It is difficult to over-stress the importance of information. Lack of it means doubt, and doubt and uncertainty are among the worst enemies a commander has to fight. Given knowledge and given ample warning, then bold movements can be made. These can be undertaken, moreover, in comparative certainty as to both their possibility and their effect. The gaining of information is a first principle, the neglect of which will nearly always spell disaster.

Two Principles Regarding Information.

There are, however, two fundamental principles in dealing with this question of information. If these are neglected, no matter how improved the means of obtaining, transmitting, collating and distributing, little, if anything, will be gained from all that the most modern of developments can achieve. In the first place it must be asked for. The commander must be quite certain what he wants to know. He must also ask in such a way that those who seek out his information can be in no doubt as to his requirements. The second principle in regard to information is that it is useless if not acted upon. Preconceived ideas as to the action that an enemy might take should never be allowed to discountenance contrary information, until every step has been taken to justify the commander adhering to his original idea.

Application of the Principle of Information in the Valley Campaign.

During this campaign there were many occasions on which, had information been fuller, in the Federal camps, vastly different results might have been achieved. The point of interest is the extent to which information would, in reality, have been fuller had all present day resources been available.

Among the most interesting of the occasions to which reference has been made were :—

1. The return of the Confederates to the Valley on Sunday, the 4th May.
2. Stonewall Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley.
3. The almost miraculous escape of the Valley Army on the 30th and 31st of May.

The Return of the Confederates to the Valley on Sunday, the 4th of May.

On April 30th, if not before, General Banks had certainly made up his mind that Stonewall Jackson was retreating to Richmond, disorganised and demoralised. It does not appear to have been until the 3rd May that he thought Jackson was advancing on Harrisonburg.

The concentration of railway vehicles at Gordonsville would, it is fair to presume, have been seen, had the Federal General had the benefit of air reconnaissance. This would merely have strengthened Banks in his belief that Jackson was leaving the Valley. The latter's movements between the 1st and 3rd of May were carried out in such appalling weather conditions that little or no air reconnaissance would have been possible. In any circumstances such information as the air would have given him would but have confirmed the fear which on the 3rd of May had definitely decided him, quite contrary to all his previous reckoning, that Jackson was marching on Harrisonburg.

General Banks knew that Ewell's division had concentrated at Elk Run, but over-estimated his strength. This General seems to have had a tendency to over-estimate the strength of his opponents, and it is extremely doubtful if his air arm, in view of the weather and the topographical conditions in the Elk Run, would have given him any more reliable information than that which he had.

As Banks, however, had by this time been ordered to withdraw to Strasburg, it is not likely that air confirmation of either Jackson's or Ewell's movements would have produced anything more than did his despatch of the 3rd May, which, in point of fact, only actually resulted in his being permitted to retain Shield's division.

Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley.

On the 23rd of May Banks was completely surprised by Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley. Whilst it is true that he was very inferior in strength to Jackson, it is not easy to understand why he did not make better use of the 3,500 cavalry under his command for providing him with information. On the 20th of May he sent a battalion of 100 infantry and 30 troopers 11 miles down the Lauray Valley. In spite of reports received from this reconnaissance to the effect that Confederate troops were expected to advance by this road, he took literally no steps to satisfy himself as to the truth of this report. His only action, in fact, was to withdraw this weak reconnaissance

detachment. A force of 300 cavalry with clear orders to look for an approach up this line, and to give him full details as to the strength of such columns as might advance by this route, might have told him much. One cannot help but contrast this negative attitude with the action which a man of the energy of Stonewall Jackson would have taken. Perhaps the most interesting lesson to be learnt from the study of these operations, is the bold offensive use Jackson made of his cavalry and the importance which he attached to the gaining of information.

To take the actual facts as we know them, General Jackson entered the Lauray Valley on the 21st of May and from the wooded slopes of the hills developed his attack on Front Royal of the 23rd May. During this period Banks did not send a single trooper down the Lauray Valley. He was convinced that Jackson would approach his position *via* the main turnpike. It is scarcely likely, therefore, that this same General, suffering from the same pre-conceived idea, would have ordered a close air reconnaissance of the Lauray Valley. Presuming, however, that he had been persuaded by his staff to do so, it is doubtful if he would have credited the resultant information as an indication of anything more than the move of a portion of Jackson's force. One can rather imagine him looking fruitlessly for his opponent on the direct road to Strasburg.

Topographically these valleys offer far greater chances of concealment to the movement of troops from air observation, than a commander might normally expect. Rain, and the almost invariable clouds which at this period hang over the hills, would all tend to increase the difficulties for the air observer. In fact, it would seem that with the display of a little skill the movement of troops could be so concealed as to make estimates of their numbers, if not their actual discovery, by close reconnaissance machines, extremely difficult. We can be quite sure that a man as astute as Stonewall Jackson would have taken full advantage of both these factors.

The almost miraculous escape of the Valley Army on the 30th and 31st of May.

The inactivity of Fremont and Shields which resulted in the Confederate Army being able to make good their escape on the 30th and 31st May, had only one cause. This was lack of information.

Had the two Federal commanders known Jackson's actual strength and had they been in close communication with one another, the dead weight of uncertainty which clogged their movements would very largely have been lifted. Fremont with a force of 15,000 had allowed his advance to be checked by Ashby, with but 300 troopers. Fremont, we know, was considerably stronger in cavalry, which, boldly handled, should have shown him the absurd weakness of Ashby, quite apart from indicating to him at least Jackson's movements if not his actual strength : but once again it is the Confederate General who makes full use of his reconnaissance troops gaining contact with his enemy and never leaving him unwatched for an instant.

Now to turn to the other side of the picture. On the Sunday, on the road to Front Royal, Confederate patrols only encountered a few scouts. Shields, apparently deceived by the demonstration of but a brigade from Winchester, had allowed the day to pass without decisive action ; beyond pushing a brigade towards Winchester and taking up a generally defensive attitude, the Federal General did nothing. It will thus be seen that neither Northern Commander seemed to realise the vital necessity of obtaining information of the enemy's real strength, movements or intention. Neither seemed to realise what the paralysing effect of not having this information would be and, as a corollary, neither seemed to realise that to gain information no effort is too great. These Generals could not, moreover, complain that they were without adequate means of obtaining such information. Had both of them been equipped with up-to-date machinery in the form of air reconnaissance, wireless telegraphy and intelligence staffs, it may be claimed on their behalf that they would have shown greater enterprise, but once again climatic conditions, over which they had no control, would have reduced the effectiveness of close air reconnaissance to an almost negligible quantity. But both knew of Jackson's movements, each knew where the other was, and any more detailed information regarding their enemy would unquestionably, even under present day conditions, have had to be fought for.

Conclusion.

In fact it is extremely doubtful if Banks, Fremont or Shields would have gained materially had they had to fight their battles with all the advantages that modern communications, staffs and air

services would have given them. Each showed a fatal lack of appreciation of the real value of information. Where Stonewall Jackson fought to gain knowledge of his enemies, the latter appeared satisfied, either to wait on events, or to rely on their own judgment—judgments based on what they wished their enemy to do rather than what he was doing.

To many this indictment of these Federal leaders may seem to be too sweeping. I suggest, however, that without knowledge of the enemy's position, his strength and his movements, a commander is at so great a disadvantage that not only is he justified in taking almost any steps to satisfy his very justifiable curiosity, but that it is indeed his bounden duty to take such steps. At Kernstown Jackson fought for knowledge. He lost his battle, but he had gained contact and knowledge—contact, which from that moment until he finally left the Valley, he never for one hour lost. When he retreated he left Ashby in touch. When he slept, Ashby was awake. The Federals were always aware of Ashby's presence. When Jackson left the Valley on the 3rd May, Ashby remained in constant touch with both Banks and Fremont. When Banks went to Strasburg, Ashby followed.

Stonewall Jackson's secrecy, and the methods he employed for covering his own movements, are no more worthy of study than are the steps which he took to keep himself informed of the activities of his opponents.

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PACIFIC PROBLEM.

BY CAPTAIN M. E. S. LAWS, M.C., R.A.

The United States House of Representatives has recently passed a Bill under the terms of which the Philippine Islands will be granted complete independence within eight years. Though the bill in question is not yet law, it is unlikely that the decision to withdraw from the Philippines will be seriously opposed in the Senate, since, as far back as 1916, the latter body was in favour of granting independence to the colony within a period of four years. It is proposed therefore in this article to consider the probable effect of this policy on the Pacific problem, with special reference to the interests of the British Empire.

In 1898 the United States, already indignant at the mysterious destruction of the battleship *Maine* in Havana Harbour, declared war on Spain with the avowed object of freeing Cuba. On the last day of April, Commodore G. Dewey entered Manila Bay with a small cruiser squadron and next day destroyed the Spanish Fleet. Three months later after capturing the island of Guam, a force of 11,000 United States troops arrived and on August 13th Manila surrendered. The islands, together with Guam, were later ceded by treaty to the United States while Cuba became virtually an American Protectorate. Thus as a result of this war America abandoned her policy of isolation and became to some extent at least, an Imperial Power.

Cuba was evacuated in 1902, though the United States retained a naval base at Guantanamo and reserved the right to intervene at any time in order to protect the independence of the island. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who had for years fought against Spain, expected to receive similar treatment, and when they were disappointed rose against the Americans. Spasmodic guerilla fighting went on till July, 1907, when a civil government was set up which included some Filipino representatives. From then onwards the policy of educating the people for the responsibilities of self-government has been pursued with great energy, and the demand for independence has become increasingly insistent. A general election was held in 1907 when the first Legislature met, and step by step since then American control has gradually been relinquished. During this period the

islands have developed, trade has prospered and a comprehensive educational policy has been firmly established. The time is fast approaching for America to withdraw her last vestige of control and for the complete independence of the islands to be announced.

The occupation of the Philippines and of Guam by the United States was followed by the opening of the Panama Canal. Though by the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, the Canal is "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, in peace or war, on terms of equality," it has been heavily fortified and is garrisoned by a division of American troops. The Canal allows the United States Navy to be rapidly concentrated in the Pacific if necessary, and its use would obviously be forbidden to an enemy Power in time of war. To protect her lines of communication from the Pacific Coast to the Philippines, America also established a series of naval bases in the Pacific—at Dutch Harbour (Aleutian Isles), Pearl Harbour (Hawian Islands 4,700 miles from Manila), Guam (1,500 miles from Manila) and Pago-Pago (Samoa). Of these, Dutch Harbour, an ice free port, flanks the approaches to San Francisco from Japan, while Pearl Harbour, which is now a first class base with a large military garrison, is a convenient station from which to operate in defence of the Panama Canal.

Just before America acquired the Philippine Islands, Japan extended her possessions by seizing Formosa and the Pescadores from China (1895). In 1902 she consolidated her position by making a defensive treaty with Great Britain, while three years later she virtually annexed Korea and established herself at Port Arthur. Her naval bases at the Pescadores (500 miles from Manila), Formosa and in the Japanese islands themselves, enabled her to threaten the Philippine Islands and the long line of communications to Guam, Pearl Harbour and the Pacific Coast. After the Great War, Japan acquired as a Mandatory Power, the Ladrone, Palau, Caroline and Marshall Islands, thus definitely establishing herself athwart the direct route between Manila and Pearl Harbour. It at once became clear that modern aircraft and submarines based on these islands, would make it very dangerous for an American fleet to operate in the Western Pacific and would prevent the movement of troops by sea between America and the Philippines.

The situation thus created appeared so dangerous that a conference of Powers was held in 1921, which resulted in the Five Power Naval

Treaty. By this it was agreed that certain restrictions on the size and number of naval units should be enforced by Great Britain, United States, Japan, France and Italy and that until the end of 1936, no fortification of naval bases in the Western Pacific should be permitted. This latter clause prevented the completion of the ex-German naval station at Jaluit in the Marshall Islands by Japan, and also stopped the further fortification of Guam by America, but the general situation still remained favourable to Japan at the expense of the United States.


The already difficult position in which America was thus placed as regards the defence of her possessions in the Pacific has been made still more dangerous by certain economic factors. It is now realised that Japan must face two questions which at present menace her very existence as a nation, and the possible solution to both these problems may well involve her in hostilities with other Powers. The first of these economic problems concerns trade and the second emigration. Japanese industries have developed at an extraordinary pace during recent years and the obvious market for her manufactured goods is China, where a large population only awaits tranquility and ordered government in order to absorb the products of the Japanese factories. Furthermore, Japan needs coal and iron which can most conveniently be obtained from China, so that the main requirements of Japanese industrialism—a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods—are available. Japan therefore is determined to capture this outlet for her trade and there is always the possibility that trade rivalry may lead to international friction, for at the present moment China is probably the most tempting market for the industrialists of Europe and America. It is this need for a market that has prompted Japanese policy in China for several years and has already led her into difficulties which she has attempted to overcome by the use of force.

The problem of emigration is no less likely to cause international friction. Japan is overpopulated and must seek an outlet for her surplus workers. China is already overcrowded and though Manchuria has absorbed a certain number of Japanese colonists, this province alone, even when it is fully developed, cannot accept the total number of those who will be forced by economic pressure to leave their own country. The United States has since 1903 restricted Japanese emigration into the Pacific Coast States by law, and it is evident that no outlet

for colonists can be sought in that direction. In 1924 a particularly stringent Anti-Immigration Act, designed primarily to prevent Japanese settlers entering the U. S. A., was passed by Congress. Australia and New Zealand, being thinly populated and having temperate climates, are suitable for Japanese settlement, but both countries are firmly determined not to admit aliens who would almost certainly introduce a racial problem which it is most desirable to avoid. Thus in whatever direction she turns in an effort to find a suitable outlet for her surplus population, Japan is bound to be opposed by one of the great Powers. This has naturally led Japan to safeguard her position in the Pacific as far as possible and she has succeeded in securing control of all the approaches to China by sea.

The British interests in the Pacific are more easily defined. We must at all costs retain control of the approaches to the Indian Ocean and keep open our sea communications with Australia and New Zealand. In addition our trade interests in China are considerable and we naturally desire to keep our share of this market, but no trade route vital to the Empire passes through the Northern Pacific. Our chief bases in the Pacific are at Esquimalt, Sydney, Hong-Kong and Singapore, of which the two latter are the most important, since it is in the Western Pacific that our chief interests and dangers lie. Hong-Kong is the chief British trade centre in China, but, under the provisions of the Five Power Naval Treaty its defences cannot be increased and its docking facilities are inadequate for capital ships. Singapore is now being developed as a Naval and Royal Air Force base suitable for a battle fleet and is well adapted for a naval force charged with the defence of the eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean and of our sea communications with Australia. The minor naval base at Wei-Hai-Wei on the north China coast has now been given up by the British. Sydney is the principal base for naval forces in Australian waters, and defended fuelling stations exist at Thursday Island, Fremantle, Albany, Port Adelaide, Melbourne, Newcastle, Brisbane, Hobart, Auckland, Dunedin, Wellington and Port Lyttleton.

Under these conditions it is of interest to consider how the American evacuation of the Philippines will affect the general situation in the Pacific. Strategically America will profit since she will no longer need to maintain a garrison in a dangerously isolated situation far from support; the loss of a naval base in the Western Pacific is not so serious as it may at first sight appear, for the communications with



BRITISH NAVAL BASES thus SYDNEY

BRITISH DEFENDED FUELLING STATIONS thus BRISBANE



Manila would be so precarious in time of war that it could hardly be expected to withstand a determined attack. Economically America will to some extent gain by the new situation since Philippine exports to the U. S. A. will be classified as foreign goods, and will have to pay tariff, while at present they are given preferential treatment. On the other hand the evacuation of a colony will affect American prestige in the East and particularly in China, where the U. S. A. has special trade interests. Japan will no doubt rejoice at the surrender of an American base in the China Seas, wherein she can brook no serious rival. Not only will the evacuation of the Philippines remove a possible menace to her trade activities, but it will also tend to open the way to her emigration policy southwards. Her island possessions in the Pacific will then stretch south-eastwards from Japan to the Equator, barring the westward routes from the United States.

The new policy is perhaps not so favourable for the British Empire. In view of Japan's need for an outlet for her surplus population, it is natural that Australia and New Zealand should regard with suspicion the removal of any obstacle from her path towards the south. It will therefore be greatly to our interest to ensure the effective neutrality of the Philippines in order to prevent any power from obtaining a footing so close to Australia. At the same time the American withdrawal will not adversely affect the safety of our main line of sea communication with Australia, nor will it alter the problem of controlling the eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean.

It may be expected therefore that the strict neutrality of the Philippine Islands will be an essential part of our policy in the Pacific in the future. To enforce this justifiable demand a British fleet may at any time be required, and such a naval force must be provided with a fully equipped and conveniently situated base. The wisdom of developing the naval and R. A. F. base at Singapore becomes even more apparent in these circumstances and should to some extent allay any anxiety in Australia and New Zealand which the recently announced American policy in the Philippines may cause.

THREE ARMS AND SIX LEGS.

BY "PHOENIX."

Can we afford luxuries ? Ask anyone. We cannot.

Can a desperately hard-up and hard-bitten army afford a Rolls-Royce which can do eighty miles an hour on a by-pass road, but which will ruin its lovely paint, damage its streamline body, and be a confounded nuisance if asked to move across muddy, stony and broken ground ? It cannot.

This article isn't about Mechanical Transport or armoured cars. It is about cavalry. I propose giving the cavalry a bunt from behind. As a cavalryman myself I feel entitled to do so.

I have been through it all. The shining boots (seven pairs !), the perfect breeches, the thrill of the lance pennons and the feeling of compassion for the P. B. I. I know it well. I have known the keen interest and pride in a squadron of shining, well-trained horses ; the anxiety for their welfare ; the fear that they may get damaged, lamed or made thin and unsightly by overwork or rough usage. Any cavalryman worth his salt, feels all these things and quite rightly. Who has any use for the casual horsemaster, the horse soldier who does not care for his horses ?

Equitation and the training of horses fills up so much of the horizon. For them we prepare soft riding schools. Carefully we deal with the ground round the jumps. We choose flat open parade grounds with as good surfaces as possible. On these we parade day by day. As for the jumps they are mostly imitations of obstacles found in England and places outside India ; the thorn fences, brushwood hedges, the banks and walls and timber jumps of other countries. Over these we train our horses. The take-offs and the landings are sound and soft. All this is good gymnastics—physical jerks which balance and supple a horse without risking the blemishes and breakdowns of rough country. It is all estimable and necessary. True, but what is the effect on the mind of the cavalryman, both officer and man ? Mentally well-balanced as he may be he cannot but regard these conditions as those normally suitable for the horse ; he cannot but consider that anything rougher and more likely to damage a horse as a thing to be avoided. The fact is, however, that horses can adapt

themselves to circumstances. Given practice in moving over rocky country they learn to put their feet down without suffering damage and, what is more, their feet harden and so withstand the jar. It is surprising how much can be done to acclimatise a horse to the horrible going on the North-West Frontier.

We hear of the expression 'cavalry country.' In most minds this conjures up soft going, undulating country with obstacles, if any, of a kind to be found among the Troop jumps of a cavalry parade ground.

The army in India is trained for a specific purpose, for operations in country as is to be found on the North-West Frontier and beyond. Cavalrymen hope that when war comes they will be asked to move over great open spaces where the mobility of the horse can be used to the best advantage. But war on that scale, if it comes at all, comes but seldom and few men and horses will see it. The war we are all likely to see is something less pretentious and on not so grand a scale. It is the war we have in peace time; the little actions on the North-West Frontier in normal times and the bigger actions of small expeditions in the same place. If we can tackle these smaller operations we can with ease take on the bigger wars and the open plains.

The cavalry spirit is a thing to be nurtured. Much has been written of it, and it is continually referred to in speech. Many do not know its meaning and indeed the experts differ to some extent in its definition. A spirit of dash, of adventure, of taking risks, of speed, of quick results? Is it necessary to sit on a horse to achieve all this? The same spirit pervades the airman and the sailor in his destroyer. It will be found in the commander of light tanks and armoured cars.

There seems to be the fear that if you allow the cavalryman to get off his horse he will lose the cavalry spirit. Carry this to extremes and you will say that it is better for the cavalryman to sit on his horse and do nothing than to get off his horse and get busy on his feet. Mounted infantry tactics are looked on askance. They are contrary to the cavalry spirit which is epitomised in the mounted charge, the *arme blanche*. If to allow the cavalryman to get off his horse to fight on his feet is going to damage his cavalry spirit then by all means forbid any such thing. But it is not so. The spirit of dash, of adventure, of taking risks and of quick results can be introduced into all work. The methods employed by cavalry on foot necessarily differ from those practised by infantry, and they must be taught.

A perusal of the records of early frontier operations will show numerous references to "spirited cavalry charges," usually carried out by one or two troops or less. They were monotonously successful. In those days the cavalry had no firearm; the enemy often had no rifle or gun. There was only one thing to do—to charge. We can do more now; we have rifles. So have the enemy and the charge is consequently more hazardous and less likely to be successful if carried out haphazard.

II.

All the above has been a kind of turning movement. I could have said at once at the end of my first paragraph that cavalry which can only sit on its horse and charge may be lovely as the Rolls-Royce saloon but it isn't any use in, say, Waziristan. I could have gone further and said that a cavalry regiment that wins all the musketry and machine gun competitions, which gets an O. K. report for signalling, which scores full marks at inspections, whose officers have all passed for promotion or the Staff College, such a regiment, I say, is about as useful as a broken curb chain if, when called upon to work in rugged frontier country, its horses all go lame and knock themselves to bits.

The Rolls-Royce engine is all right and can negotiate Waziristan if given the means, say, another pair of wheels or a track. "But that costs money" sez you. "So does an investment," sez I, "and if you don't invest you don't draw any dividends." We cannot afford the Rolls-Royce which is fit only to adorn the garage and the broad highway. We cannot afford a cavalry which does not pull its weight in frontier operations.

"But" sez you, "the cavalry have rifles. Why can't they do all that is required?"

(Now, that is the question I wanted you to ask because it enables me to write what follows.)

"Because," sez I, "they havn't got bayonets!"

Isn't it curious that at the end of one of our big wars—I refer to the one about fifteen years ago—all cavalymen whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa were armed with the bayonet, and a few years later the cavalry had no bayonets? The only reason for the adoption of bayonets was that the cavalry found that they had need of them. In peace, one presumes, they do not have need of them? They are not picturesque, they are an extra weight on the horse, they give the

cavalryman yet another weapon to learn, they are costly to supply, they—oh ! all kinds of things. Yet when the next war comes along the cavalry will demand bayonets and of course will get them.

One hot summer morning the writer of this paper took out a weak squadron, about fifty strong, to round up some raiders. The raiders were duly encircled. The cordon was drawn tighter, until the gang was confined to a small area intersected by deep fissures and caves. Bullets were being freely exchanged ; the horses had by now been left behind in safety under cover. The time had come to finish the show and go in. The time had come for the '*arme blanche*.' "What to do ?" as the *babu* says.

The alternatives were :—

Go in with the rifle alone and trust to snapshooting.

Go in with the sword or lance alone ; the rifle slung.

Go in with the rifle in one hand and the sword in the other.

No, Sir ! Not against a desperate gang of Pathans who are nice shots at fifteen yards and who also had knives. The Indian officer wanted to send back to cantonments for bayonets borrowed from the infantry. We were saved the trouble. The infantry came themselves in lorries, fixed bayonets and walked into the gang. There were a few casualties. The gang went to ground in the caves and eventually the remnants of them surrendered.

The cavalry regiment embroiled in this very small affair demanded bayonets and got them. (*N.B.*—The late war was still on). A mighty oath was taken that never again would the infantry be allowed to pick the fruit of such encounters. More however came of it than that. There was more doing on the North-West Frontier in those days than the chase of raiding gangs. This regiment decided that what an infantryman can do a cavalryman also can do—within limits.

Piquet a hill ? Yes, certainly, so long as it isn't too high.

Attack home across country which is too difficult for horses ? Oh yes, so long as we don't go too far from the horses. Armed with bayonets it was possible to relieve the infantry of many jobs.

Did this regiment lose its cavalry spirit ? It did not. Confident in its powers even if dismounted, it took chances when mounted which it would not otherwise have risked. The horses, after several years on the frontier had feet of iron, and what is more they knew how to put them down when moving fast on the rock strewn hills and valleys. Few went lame.

Our Rolls-Royce had its six wheels and its track. The cavalry could take on jobs it could not manage before. No longer relegated to the open country and fire action it could pull its weight under all circumstances.

If any cavalryman or other reading this article doubts the necessity of the bayonet for frontier fighting let him do this. Let him set his squadron the task of establishing a piquet on a hill which offers good cover and which is presumed to be occupied; occupied, not by the usual weak-kneed 'enemy' of T. E. W. Ts. but occupied by determined, well-armed tribesmen. Let him lead the foremost troop to the top. Let him meet the counter-attack of the tribesmen as the covering fire lifts. Does he want a bayonet? I'll say he does.

I'll say more. I'll say that it is definitely unfair to the men to ask cavalry to carry out their legitimate tasks in frontier warfare without bayonets.

As there is no manual which gives in detail and fully the tasks of cavalry in modern frontier fighting, the reader and I may differ as to what constitutes a legitimate task. He may take it that it is more than is contemplated by the "normal warfare" cavalryman.

III.

I like writing stuff like that! It makes a soldier's life seem romantic and what not. Let us now come down to real life, in other words money. Someone said that money and the medicals are the only things that matter now. '*Eheu fugaces*,' (whatever that may mean.)

It is said that one never sees a dead donkey. They occur all the same. What has happened to all the old bayonets? Less than 9,000 are needed to arm all the cavalry in India and less than 2,500 to supply those stationed on the North-West Frontier.

The real trouble is that the cavalry don't want the bayonet *Now*! Life is already full of difficulties. "Why add to them?" Well, because.... Well, read this article again from the beginning.

[Editor's Note.—*Readers who may be interested in the subject of the above article will find much valuable and practical information in "The uses of cavalry in operations on the North-West Frontier of India," by Major C. A. Boyle, D.S.O., which appeared in the July 1926 number of this Journal.*]

SHAN HAI KUAN.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF A BRITISH MILITARY CAMP IN NORTH CHINA.

BY MAJOR E. W. N. WADE, M.C., THE EAST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT.

It does not fall to the lot of every British soldier to be stationed in far distant North China.

The pleasure of being encamped in such a delightfully quaint and picturesque place as Shan Hai Kuan, nestling, as it does, under the shadow of the "Great Wall of China" will, therefore, only have been experienced by a few lucky units and individuals.

To those who have stood upon the greatest wall in the world and gazed from mystic China into warlike Manchuria—the stronghold of the late Dictator, Chang Tso Lin—this brief account may revive pleasant memories and, moreover, it may possibly prove of interest to those who may be fortunate enough to draw "North China" out of the "Reliefs Bag."

The Great Wall is an everlasting monument to the labour of a great Empire now sadly shattered and rent asunder by internal strife. It was erected for the defence of the Empire against neighbouring hostile tribes; wild and savage hordes which swept down, from time to time, from the North.

The normal British garrison in North China is one battalion distributed as follows:—

At Tientsin	.. Battalion Headquarters. Headquarter Wing and three companies.
At Peking	.. One company, Guard to the British Legation.

The usual tour for a battalion in North China is two years. But owing to the very abnormal conditions which prevailed during the time that my battalion was quartered there, from 1925 till 1928, its tour was extended for an extra year.

"Abnormal times" indeed, for in these terms do the local foreign inhabitants describe the present period of unrest in modern Republican China.

The old "China-hand" will, however, tell the new arrival that everything in China always has been and always will be abnormal from a western point of view. Almost everything, one soon discovers, is topsy-turvy and contrary to British and European customs. For instance, amongst the things which appear strange to, and most impress the British soldier on landing in the country are, the wearing of trousers by the women whilst the males garb themselves in long full skirts; the wearing of white at funerals and scarlet at weddings and the inhuman and brutal public executions, where men are beheaded, for what we would call trivial offences. For example, two Chinese soldiers were beheaded in Peking in 1926 for forcing an entry into a theatre without paying. The writer saw their heads, suspended in baskets from poles, outside the theatre in question in the famous Chien Men. They remained there for several days. Great crowds visited the scene completely blocking the traffic in the street. It is all very strange and incomprehensible to the Western mind.

Shan Hai Kuan is the sea-side resort to which the Tientsin garrison moves for the summer. The move generally takes place early in May, the troops returning to barracks at the end of September. From May to September the weather is ideal, though a considerable rainfall is often experienced at the end of July and in early August.

There are two very good reasons for this move to the sea from hot and stuffy Tientsin. The first and chief one is to allow the Battalion to carry out field training and to fire weapon-training courses, both of which are impossible at Tientsin owing to lack of facilities, since no open range or suitable training areas are available. The second reason is a matter concerning the health of the troops and their families.

The climate of North China is one of extremes—extreme heat in the summer, (114 degrees is often registered in Peking in July), and extreme cold in the winter. Ice, snow and driving cold winds are normal conditions from November to March, whilst the river Hai Ho at Tientsin becomes filled with lumps of floating ice. Shan Hai Kuan is several degrees cooler than either Peking or Tientsin in the summer, since there is always a fresh breeze blowing off the sea.

Although it is not always feasible, owing to the various "war situations", to send the whole Battalion away together, every

endeavour is made to get them down in parties and for the women and children to go also.

The City of Shan Hai Kuan is situated at the extreme eastern corner of the province of Chih-Li, about four miles from the Manchurian frontier. It is a walled city, the eastern face of which forms part of the Great Wall. It stands on the Peking-Mukden railway and for this reason is a city of some importance from a Chinese military point of view. A considerable number of the late Chang Tso Lin's troops (a weak Division), under the misnomer of "Security Troops", used to be stationed there. The city lies about midway in an open, but well cultivated, plain stretching from a high and imposing range of mountains to the sea. The name is very apt as the literal translation of Shan Hai Kuan is "between mountains and water."

Strategically it blocks the Mandarin road and railway from Peking and Tientsin to Mukden just west of the Manchurian border. Shan Hai Kuan played a very important part in the campaign of 1924-25. Much of the heaviest fighting took place to the north and north-east of the city.

Tactically, the walls and the series of ridges of hills in the vicinity, lying astride the main line of communications, form an exceptionally strong zone of defence against an enemy advancing either from east or west. The defence of the plain is also assisted by the main range of mountains which runs more or less, parallel to the road and railway communications.

The Shan Hai Kuan position, with one flank resting on the sea and the other secured in the mountains is, undoubtedly, the key to the defence of the bottle-neck entrance to Manchuria against any attack from the West along the railway.

Historically the city is interesting, for it was here in 1644 that the great Ming General, Wu Sen-Kwei, requested the Manchus to come to the help of the Mings and assist him to recapture Peking from the rebel troops of Li. The Manchus accepted and drove through to Peking, which they took. Having occupied it they refused to restore it to the Ming Dynasty.

The mountains which tower above the city, silent witnesses of the fierce and bloody battles of past ages, have also the reputation of housing the ever present bandit gangs. A Chinese bandit may be a perfectly peaceful farmer at one moment and a fierce cut-throat the

next. It is all a matter of necessity. The so-called bandit mobs of latter years have been recruited from disbanded, disillusioned and unpaid soldiers, who have deserted from their respective "War Lords" another curse of these never ceasing civil wars—illegitimate children of this impossible Republic. These self-styled and self-appointed War Lords have been in local control—as far as control in any shape or form is possible in China today—of vast areas ever since the fall of the old Empire.

The British camp, which takes its name from its proximity to the city, is located in a south-easterly direction, about three miles distant on the coast. The old Chinese Fort No. 1, now known as the British Fort, and over which the Union Jack flies, stands some sixty feet above the sea. The exterior of the fort itself is in a somewhat derelict condition, the bulk of the stones which faced the earthworks having been removed by enterprising Chinese to build houses for themselves and bungalows for the foreign summer visitors.

The fort is, however, of certain historical interest as it marks the extreme end of the Great Wall where it stops a few hundred yards short of the sea. There is an old Chinese legend that in B. C. 260, the Emperor, standing where the British Fort now stands, looked out to sea and called the place the "Beginning of the World". In those days it might easily have appeared to be so. But to return to modern times; the officers are accommodated in tents on a grassy plateau within the walls of the fort. Here, also, are situated the Commanding Officer's and the Quartermaster's bungalows, quarters for the married N. C. O's. and men; and the Officers' Mess. This is an airy building attractively placed amidst trees and fronted by brightly coloured flower-beds. All of these are permanent buildings of stone or brick. The Commanding Officer's bungalow, Officers' and Sergeants' Messes each have a hard tennis court.

Just outside the main entrance to the fort and to the north-west is a pretty and well wooded natural arena, known as the "Dell". Here, owing to the broken nature of the ground, the training of small units, *e.g.*, sections and platoons, can be carried out. In these pleasant surroundings the Band plays in the evening and the Drums beat "Retreat." Both of these performances provide endless entertainment for the Italian, French and Japanese troops who are also stationed

in ex-Chinese forts along the western side of the Wall. The Drums, in particular, seem to interest them considerably.

From the British fort the Wall runs almost due north for some twenty-five miles and then turns in a general westerly direction to the north of Peking.

The main camp is about a quarter mile from the fort and is exceptionally well placed on flat and dry ground under the shade of tall trees. There are permanent buildings for offices, dining-halls, Sergeants Mess, Stores and Institutes. A bath-house and modern stables have recently been erected. The camp runs its own Cinema which is greatly appreciated by the troops. The camp is surrounded on the north and west by cultivated areas, on the south by the river Ta Shih Ho, whilst on the east, and only a few hundred yards distant, is a 600-yards rifle range of eight targets, running almost parallel with the camp area. Still further to the east is private land reaching down to the sea, upon which a dozen or more modern bungalows have been built. They are very conveniently placed for the camp and several are usually occupied by officer's families, though the rent is rather exorbitant.

The camp and fort are connected with Shan Hai Kuan station by a trolley line off which branch lines run to the French and Italian barracks. The trolleys are mule or pony drawn and complete the journey in about twenty minutes, not always, however, without incident. These mules—even in China—live up to their universal reputations and become easily scared, with the result that the trolley leaves the line scattering passengers and baggage broadcast in the adjoining fields.

There are several rivers in the vicinity, all of which have their origin in the neighbouring mountains and flow in a general southerly direction to the sea. The most important of these is the Shih Ho; with the exception of this river they all become practically dry in the summer, being converted into rushing torrents when the snow and ice on the mountains melt in the spring.

The valley of the Ta Shih Ho is quite beautiful where it winds its way down the steep and wooded ravines in the mountains. Many pleasant and interesting trips can be made into these mountains and along the coast to the neighbouring sea-side resorts of Chin Wang Tao

and Pei Tai Ho. The former is one of the few ports in North China which is free from ice all the year round ; it is at this port that the British regiments for duty in Peking and Tientsin disembark.

Pei Tai Ho is the Brighton of North China, it is the fashionable summer resort of the foreign communities of Tientsin and Peking. The majority of the personnel of the Peking Legations move here for the hot weather season. In the case of the British Legation a special compound was allotted to it by the Chinese Government after the Boxer rebellion of 1900. The chief attraction of the place, other than the bathing, is the low range, known as the Lotus Hills, situated near the western end of the Town. Though not of any considerable height, they are very well wooded and afford an excellent view of the surrounding country.

In the mountains above Shan Hai Kuan there are three temples which well repay the energy expended in reaching them ; they are, the River Temple (Erh Leng Miao), the Grove Temple and the Cave Temple. The River Temple is eight miles from camp and stands perched alone on a medium sized hill overlooking the Ta Shih Ho. From this point a superb view of the river can be obtained as it bends in and out in the valley below. Lying some half-mile beyond the temple hill, a gigantic single rock rises from the river ; in a cavity half way up the side is a shrine, this is known as the Grotto Temple. Good bathing can be obtained in a deep pool of very clear water which skirts the rock.

The Grove Temple is seven miles from camp, lying immediately north of the city. It is concealed in a grove of trees at the top of a mountain some 1,500 feet high. It is reached by a precipitous zig-zag path, terraced with rough steps, up which a donkey or sturdy little Mongol pony will carry one with little or no trouble. Some 300 yards to the east of this temple the Great Wall snakes its way up the side of the mountain lending quaintness to the scene and creating an atmosphere of antiquity. From here one can see for miles eastwards into Manchuria and looking towards the west, to the Lotus Hills beyond Pei Tai Ho.

The furthest and, perhaps, most interesting of the three temples, is the Cave Temple. This lies up in the mountains in a north-easterly direction, about ten miles from camp. It is approached through a

ruined gateway in the Wall built across a deep and narrow ravine. It is a strenuous pull up to the top. The temple itself is contained in a large cave which extends right through the hill, the exit overlooking a wild and rocky river bed, dry during the summer months.

All these temples are within walking distance, but in the hot weather season donkeys or ponies are the usual means of transportation. With the exception of the River Temple, they require a full day to do them properly and with comfort. A donkey and boy can be hired for the day for one dollar and fifty cents, equivalent to about two shillings and nine pence in English money.

With regard to recreation and sport available at Shan Hai Kuan, a most important item where the British Officer and soldier are concerned, the bathing in the camp area is excellent and the beach is sandy and clean. The troops take full advantage of it and it is more difficult to keep them out of the water than to get them in. Regiments in occupation generally hold aquatic sports with excellent results. Two football grounds are available and matches are played with the Italian Naval Detachment quartered in the next fort. The Italians have taken up "Soccer" with the utmost keenness and are rapidly becoming formidable opponents.

There are also facilities for cricket and athletics, a good hard running-track having been recently made.

Riding is a very popular pastime; the troops patronise the China pony extensively. A pony can be hired for two dollars for a whole day. Just before returning to winter quarters a Gymkhana is usually held, it has proved very popular with all ranks.


Tennis has already been referred to. Fishing, both sea and river, is fair. Shooting is altogether another question, for Shan Hai Kuan and vicinity provides an excellent area for this sport. Snipe, duck and teal are plentiful and many good bags are obtained yearly.

Finally, there is the point of view of military training for which Shan Hai Kuan affords good facilities. A large portion of the time available has to be given up to firing the numerous weapon training courses which have to be carried out each year; the Army Rifle Association competitions must also be completed. The time left for field training is, therefore, none too plentiful. In spite of this, however, much good work can be put in by companies on the Shih Ho

plain training area. In addition the area lying north of the railway and east of the city offers good ground for battalion exercises. Field firing can be carried out at the foot of the mountains though, owing to the distance from camp, it entails spending the night in bivouac. For the training of leaders, (Officers and N. C. O's.) a variety of suitable localities can be found.

This district being entirely agricultural, the country side is covered with high standing crops up till about the end of August. The month of September is, therefore, the most suitable for the training of the larger units.

To sum up, Shan Hai Kuan offers splendid facilities, both for work and recreation, to suit all tastes. There are, indeed, many worse places in which the British soldier finds himself encamped.



THE NEXT WAR MEDAL.

BY B. ARLESS.

A Commandant of the Staff College once declared that, in his opinion, all young officers on first receiving their commissions should be issued with half-a-dozen assorted and artistic medals. After that, for every four or five years satisfactory behaviour they should be allowed to discard one, until, at last, with high rank they would attain the quiet dignity of unadorned chests. Then, as somebody said on seeing the plainly dressed American Ambassador surrounded by glittering European diplomats, they would look 'devilish distinguished.' Perhaps the Commandant's proposal went too far, but few fighting soldiers can have failed, at some time or other, to have shared his irritation at the fact that the amount of variegated ribbon on an officer's chest may sometimes be in inverse ratio to the number of times he has exposed the bosom it now adorns to the enemy's fire. Indeed a man may wear a brave array starting with a couple of decorations, and running through four or five war medals, *via* a Coronation medal, to the Ruritanian Order of St. Bibulous with palms, and yet never have heard the crack of an enemy bullet in his ear. Of course, one realizes, that an officer with a string of decorations and medals has probably at some time been under fire; the trouble is that there is no set relationship between the number of his medals and the amount of fire he has faced. It is quite arguable, and in many instances, no doubt, true that the soldier safe in rear can do as much to win a war as the one in the forefront of the battle. But human nature being what it is and physical courage being rightly rated as the first of military virtues, it is not surprising that there is a strong feeling that medals should have a closer connection with risks actually run in action.

War medals were originally intended only for those who fought, but it is interesting to see how the circle of their recipients has gradually widened. The Chinese claim to have invented war medals, as they seem to have originated most things, untold centuries ago, but the first British ones were those Queen Elizabeth struck to commemorate the Armada's defeat. They were granted only to certain officers who had taken a leading part in the sea fighting. Some fifty years later

Charles I presented 'badges of silver to wear on the breast of every man who shall be certified under the hands of their Commanders-in-Chief to have done Us faithful service in the Folorn Hope.' There is some doubt as to what exactly constituted the 'Folorn Hope' in the Royalist Army, but it was plainly intended to limit the award to men who had been closely engaged with the enemy. It is also noteworthy that, for the first time, men as well as officers were eligible. The Commonwealth, not to be outdone, followed this in 1650 by the issue of the Dunbar medal to commemorate Cromwell's brilliant defeat of the superior Scottish forces, his 'crowning mercie'. This was the first war medal in the modern sense, for every soldier in Cromwell's force got it, and there was no difference in size, design or metal between that given to the Commander-in-Chief and that received by the smallest drummer boy. No special condition was made that the recipient must have taken part in the actual battle; in the words of the Parliamentary declaration, it was to be bestowed on all, 'both officers and soldiers that were in the Service in Scotland'. Still, the Protector was not likely to have left undue numbers in the back areas in an emergency and it is safe to assume that few men who got the medal did not see some fighting.

A most prolific issuer of medals in the next century was the Honourable the East India Company, and it is noticeable that it always endeavoured to limit their award to those who had been actively engaged by specifying the actions at which they must have been present or the particular commanders under whom they must have served. Battle fields were still small and fighting was at close range; to be present at a battle usually meant to be under fire. It is curious that out of nine medals thus issued between 1784 and 1826 only one, that for the storming of Seringapatam, was awarded to all ranks, British and Indian; the other eight were for the native ranks only, no Europeans, officers or men, being eligible. The type of medal also usually varied with the rank of the recipient—for Subedars a gold one, for jemadars silver, and for sepoy's bronze.

The Waterloo medal was, like the Dunbar one, a general issue for all ranks, but special pains were taken to include certain units which had been sent on detached duties just before the battle and had for this reason missed being present at it. There was thus introduced into medal distribution a tendency to include those who, as one might

say through no fault of their own, did not take part in the actual fighting. Speaking generally this widening of the scope of medals persisted throughout the Nineteenth Century, although it was often limited by the custom of specifying that only troops under certain commanders or in certain formations were eligible. It was not until the South African War that all pretence that a medal of necessity meant fighting was abandoned. In 1901, the 'Queen's South African Medal' was awarded not only to all ranks, including nurses, in South Africa, irrespective of whether they had been in action or not, but in addition to the troops stationed at St. Helena, whose participation in the war had been limited to guarding Boer prisoners. In 1902 the range of the medal was further extended to include also the Militia Battalions* which had relieved regular garrisons in Mediterranean stations. For the first time, too, a man could receive two British medals for the same campaign. Medals were evidently becoming cheaper.

Finally the Great War came, and, colossal in everything, its scale of medal issuing passed all records. First, the '1914 Star' was awarded to all personnel, military and civil, who served in France or Belgium on the establishment of a unit of the British Expeditionary Force between August 5th and November 23rd, 1914. It thus included large numbers who had seen no fighting. An attempt was made to render the medal more valuable in 1919 when a clasp, which carried with it the small star worn on the ribbon, was granted to those who had come on duty within range of the enemy's mobile artillery, but a certain number of rear units were also specifically included. The '1914-15 Star' was even more widely distributed as it included everyone, who had not received the '1914 Star' and who was on the establishment of a unit of the military forces in any theatre of war up to 31st December 1915. The most widely embracing of all, however, was the 'British War Medal', whose familiar yellow, blue, white and black ribbon may be worn by anyone who either entered a 'theatre of war' on duty or left his or her place of residence and rendered 'approved service' overseas, *i.e.*, not necessarily in a theatre of war. The Royal Navy gave it to all personnel who performed twenty-eight days' mobilized service anywhere. The British edition of the

*For these battalions the medal was inscribed 'Mediterranean' instead of 'South Africa.'

Allied 'Victory Medal'* was somewhat more restricted than this, but it was given to all who had served on the establishment of a unit in any theatre of war at any time—a wide enough category.

Thus, after the Great War, when medals had been broadcast in millions, no one could tell what they stood for. A man might have all three British medals and yet have passed the war in greater safety than many a civilian in London ; another man might wear only two and have endured almost three years of constant hardship and danger. Medals might mean nothing, or they might mean everything. Still, it is hard to see how this promiscuity could have been avoided in so tremendous a struggle. Whole nations were mobilized, contending forces were strung out across continents, and the complexities of modern armies, combined with the enhanced range of their weapons, made it almost impossible to draw a dividing line between combatant and non-combatant. There was, indeed, a great deal to be said for giving a medal or two to everybody who put on uniform. The vast majority who served were temporary soldiers, and, whether they risked their lives or not, they sacrificed much. To the regular soldier war with all its dangers is his opportunity, his great chance for advancement in his profession ; to the civilian turned soldier it is almost invariably the opposite. He abandons or at the best interrupts his career, usually at its most critical period ; man for man, he risks much more for his country than the regular, and, whether he fights or not, no one need grudge him his medal.

In great wars, therefore, medals must of necessity and probably in justice, be lavishly distributed without much regard to the relative risks run. But should this apply equally to the small wars that fall to the lot of our Regular Army even in these days of peace pacts and disarmament conferences ? This question is especially interesting to the Army in India, for here every few years is almost certain to occur some tribal rising on the North-West Frontier or some disturbance elsewhere that will mean active, and really active, service for soldiers and airmen. These ' wars ', insignificant though they may be compared with the great wars of history, entail severe hardship and not a little danger to those who take part in them. Should this be recognised

*America gave this medal to all who had served on active duty with the United States Army ; France to all who served a minimum period of three months at the Front.

by the award of medals for them, and, if so, what should be the basis of distribution ?

There seem to be two schools of thought on this subject. Indeed, one is reminded of the military attaché, who, when asked what importance was accorded to medals in the Balkan State to which he was accredited, replied that it was really rather hard to say, as the Commander-in-Chief never wore any, while the War Minister appeared at every ceremonial parade in an entirely new set ! On these lines one school would grant medals for a minor campaign or Frontier skirmish much as they were distributed in the Great War ; the other, arguing that this would be to make a farce of them, says no medals at all for anything less than a ' real ' war with thousands of casualties. While these two views are being urged one against the other, it is not unlikely that many a brisk little bit of fighting will pass unmarked by a medal.

The first point to be decided is whether for a regular army it is a good thing to have war medals at all. The almost unanimous opinion, in spite of Commandants of Staff Colleges, is that, properly distributed, they are an immense help to morale. Especially is this so for Indian troops, to whom, as the old ' John Company ' so well recognised, a medal means ' izzat ' and ' izzat ' means everything. But the award of a medal should be an individual thing, granted because a man has borne himself stoutly in the face of the enemy. Whether he did so with thousands of others in a great battle, or with only his own regiment or even company in a skirmish against the Badmash Khel is immaterial. We must get back to the old ideal that a medal is an acknowledgment of danger encountered or risk accepted. The rough test should be—has the soldier's duty caused him to run a real chance of death or wounds ? If it has, then he has risked his life for his country, and the least his country can offer him is a medal.

It may be urged that the difficulties of applying this rule in practice would prove insurmountable. What would constitute a risk sufficient to justify a medal ? How would it be possible to select men who had undergone the risk ? What about men, who, although in hostile country, had never actually met the enemy ? Would the higher commanders and their staffs ever qualify for a medal under these conditions ? Admittedly these are difficulties, but it has to be a very big difficulty to be insurmountable—especially if it is to be attacked by the British Army.

First, the test for risk should be casualties, both our own and the enemy's, with, of course, the assessment made chiefly on our own losses. The type of enemy should also be considered; fifty well armed Mahsuds would be a distinctly more 'risky' proposition than a hundred bazaar Redshirts. By combined consideration of the total casualties to the forces engaged and of the strength of the hostile resistance, it should be possible to decide whether any operation or action is worth commemorating. Again, to ensure that, generally speaking, only those liable to the risk qualified for the award, it would be essential to abandon the Great War practice of giving medals to everyone who happened to be in some huge area designated a 'theatre of war'. The man who unloads the *ghi* tins at railhead, twenty miles from the nearest hostile tribesman, performs an honourable task, and, no doubt, contributes by his labours to the success of the campaign—but the consciousness of this must be his reward. We cannot have a repetition of the Third Afghan War, when every man west of the Indus qualified for a medal. For the small Frontier or other operation in India definition by geographical area, always peculiarly liable to abuse, should be replaced by the older system of limiting the medal to those who served on certain dates either in particular units or under specified commanders. It will be known what units or formations were in contact with the enemy, and commanding officers can be trusted to see that correct rolls of men present with them at the time are submitted. In most minor campaigns this would restrict the medal to officers and men of mobile columns which had engaged the enemy, to the transport and supply personnel who had maintained them, to the garrisons of attacked posts and to airmen who had flown over hostile territory. Troops who remained in their cantonments or normal stations and those in posts not seriously molested by the enemy would not qualify. Higher commanders and their staffs would probably come under one of these latter categories, and would not, it is to be feared, obtain the medal, but, if the system had been in force for some years they would probably have had earlier opportunities of gaining it. In any case, they and similarly situated officers and men would be eligible for other awards in the form of decorations, brevets and mentions in despatches.

Some such recognised system by which troops who had actually fought in even a very small war could be sure of receiving a medal would have much to recommend it. In the course of years the number of

operations for which a General Service Medal was issued might be large, but the number of recipients would be comparatively small, and they would be carefully selected. The value of the medal as a morale raiser would be enhanced, for it would really mean something both to the man who wore it and to those who saw him wearing it. Frontier and similar service involving hardship and separation from families would become more popular, and the soldier, especially the Indian soldier, would feel that risks cheerfully faced were appreciated by those on whose behalf they were incurred. Those who venture their lives against the King's Enemies do not often gain great material reward ; let them at least receive the little " badges of silver to wear on the breast of every man who shall have done faithful service " in face of the enemy.

EXAMINATIONS FOR PROMOTION—A FEW SUGGESTIONS.

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SUBJECTS (a) & (c).

BY "LONGTIMBER".

"The principle duty of a commander is to make decisions. If his decisions are to be sound, it is not sufficient that he be possessed of personal courage, a strong and resolute will, and a ready acceptance of responsibility. He must have, in addition, a thorough knowledge of the principles of war,....."

(*Field Service Regulations* 1929, Vol. 11, Ch. 1. Sec. 5 (2).)

During recent years the writer has been given the opportunity to study carefully, as a member of several examining boards as well as from the Staff point of view, the arrangements for preparing and carrying out practical promotion examinations both at home and abroad.

As a result of these observations, it would appear that the percentage of "Failures" might possibly have been considerably reduced if the candidates had had a clearer conception of what was required of them. It is, however, fully recognised that it is the duty of all officers to keep themselves efficient and up to date, and to prepare themselves for promotion. There may, however, be some who find it difficult to make a start when they find themselves face to face with an approaching examination.

It is hoped that the following few hints and suggestions may be of some assistance to those candidates when commencing to work for promotion.

It will, no doubt, be admitted that the individual training of the officer is, unquestionably, of paramount importance. An officer should consider the passing of his promotion examinations to be a serious matter. He should also remember that his failure reflects indirectly upon his Commanding Officer and the unit responsible for his training.

It is contended that with efficient preliminary instruction and guidance, it should be well within the capabilities of the majority of candidates to pass their examinations successfully at the first attempt.

It is interesting to note that in the latest edition of " *Training and Manœuvre Regulations* ", which deals with, among other matters, the individual training of the officer, no mention is made of this subject. A few notes dealing with the necessary study and systematic preparation required for all types of examinations, would, perhaps, not be out of place in this volume.

From observations in the field, many candidates lack method when submitting their answers to problems. What they would appear to need is a guide to the type of problem they are likely to be set, a method to work upon together with suggestions of how to set about preparing themselves for these tests.

Although it would seem unnecessary to mention it here, yet it is desirable that candidates should realise the amount of work and forethought which is entailed in the preparation of the schemes which are set for solution.

Immense trouble is taken by the Board in making out the " *Scheme* " in order that it shall fit exactly into the available ground and be within the scope of the candidates. The scheme and problems, as worked out by the Board, are, in the majority of cases, submitted to the Headquarters of the Command or Formation concerned and are carefully checked by the General Staff to ensure that the examination complies with the official syllabus as laid down in King's Regulations, and that the problems are not too ambitious.

The Examining Boards of to-day fully realise their responsibilities and all possible steps are taken to perfect the scheme. Great care is also taken to see that only reasonable and common sense questions are asked.

Granted then, that the Board is correctly constituted, that the scheme complies with the syllabus and that the candidate is given every facility to display his knowledge. To what causes, then, may a candidate's failure be attributed ?

In the writer's humble opinion the cause of a candidate's downfall can generally be traced to one of the following :--

- (a). Inability to apply correctly the " *Principles of War* " in a practical manner in the field.
- (b). Insufficient instruction and guidance prior to the examination.
- (c). A candidate's own neglect to prepare himself thoroughly for the test.

To deal with these in detail :—

(a). The most common cause of failure is the inability to apply in practice what has been learnt in theory. These practical examinations are, nothing more or less than, a test as to whether the candidate can put into operation on the ground the instructions which are contained in the training manuals. At the commencement of this article will be found an extract from Field Service Regulations, which lays stress upon this point.

It is the disregard of the doctrine expounded in our training regulations which is the root of the trouble. Many candidates, though they may be familiar with the principles contained in the text-books, are unable to transfer their knowledge to minor tactical situations in the field. In a recent report, issued by the War Office, on a written examination for promotion, the following appears :—

“ Tactics papers showed the need of continual practice in applying the principles of Field Service Regulations to practical problems ”.

These remarks apply in an even greater degree to those tests which are carried out on the ground, and nothing but sound training and perpetual repetition *on the ground* will overcome this source of failure.

(b). It has already been stated that the second main cause of trouble is due to lack of guidance and instruction prior to the examination. This may, or may not, be largely due to the candidate himself. Young officers are apt to refrain from asking their seniors for assistance, for reasons which are obvious to all. This should not, however, prevent senior officers from volunteering their help.

“ It is the duty of senior officers with their greater knowledge and wider experience to encourage and guide their juniors in their individual studies ”. (*Training and Manœuvre Regulations 1923, Ch. 2, Sec. 8 (4).*)

Again, King's Regulations 1928, para. 78 state :—

“ A. C. O. is responsible for the systematic and efficient instruction of officers under his command in all professional duties, and for their due preparation for examinations for promotion. ”

There is no need to enlarge further upon this matter as the extracts from the regulations speak for themselves and clearly indicate responsibility.

There are some to whom the method of examination comes as a total surprise. They do not appear to realise that the old slow system of long-winded written answers with, more or less, unlimited time, is a thing of the past; and that quick and definite verbal answers are now required by the examiners.

Unlike the written papers, the authorities do not publish any reports upon these practical tests. The reports upon the written examinations contain specimen papers together with helpful remarks and criticisms on the candidates' work and are certainly of enormous assistance to future candidates. It will be understood, therefore, that officers working for the practical, as opposed to the written examinations, do so somewhat in the dark.

It is put forward as a suggestion that some form of circular, compiled from reports and remarks made by Examining Boards each year, in which attention would be drawn to prevalent faults, etc., committed in practical examinations, would be extremely useful to prospective candidates. The correct interpretation, as portrayed in the training manuals, could be indicated in this annual summary. It is a well known fact that a large number of officers patronise the "Crammer," chiefly because they do not know how to set about tackling an examination and require someone to put them on the right lines. In other words to teach them how to work systematically. In these days of financial stringency the "Crammer" is an expensive and quite unnecessary luxury. Any officer of average intelligence and possessing sufficient determination can quite easily dispense with his services.

(c). Finally, there is the individual who is responsible for his own defeat. Reference is made to those who approach the examination in a casual, apathetic and half-hearted manner. The candidate who considers that little or no previous study is necessary to defeat the examiners and who takes only sufficient interest to enable him to attain the minimum marks required to pass. This type of person is, happily, in the minority and the Army of to-day can well afford to lose him.

For some time to come, for economic reasons, "Quality not quantity" will have to be the Army's slogan. It will be necessary to make up for loss in numbers by increased efficiency in our officers.

An endeavour has been made above to outline briefly some of the reasons for failure in these examinations. The possible remedies will now be considered.

At a time like the present, when the Army is slowly but surely recovering from the effects of a great war, candidates will be well advised to present themselves for examination at the earliest possible opportunity. It is a mistake to put off the evil day in the hope that examinations will become easier or, perhaps, be abolished altogether. On the contrary, one is justified in assuming that, as the standard of military education and training improves year by year, there will be a tendency to increase the standard of efficiency required from officers.

Practical examinations are now held twice yearly, generally in the spring and late summer, in all Commands at home and abroad.

The first thing, therefore, is to decide when to take the examination.

As the winter months are set apart for the individual training of officers and men, this period should prove most suitable to the majority of officers for preparation for the written papers. Normally, the individual training season is one of progressive revision, it is, therefore, a time when the candidate can brush up his elementary knowledge and this forms a useful foundation upon which to build up a sound system of study in the required subjects.

On the other hand, the collective training season presents the best opportunity for working for practical subjects, *i. e.*, (a) and (c) examination. Since the bulk of the training and instruction is taking place out of doors and on the training areas.

The next point to bear in mind is that sufficient time must be allowed in which to reach the standard of efficiency required in all subjects.

Individuals vary to a great extent in their aptitude for examinations. The length of time required for preparation must, therefore, be dependent upon the capabilities of each person,

From two to three months will, normally, be found to be sufficient.

How should the candidate set about his work ?

To obtain the best results and in order not to waste time by unnecessary repetition, the candidate is recommended to work upon systematic lines. The importance of working methodically and with a definite object in view cannot be overstated.

For this purpose the following suggestions, which are not exhaustive, are put forward as a guide :—

(1). Commence by reading paras. 850—863 and Appendix X, of King's Regulations, 1928. These give in detail all the information available in regard to the carrying out of the examination.

(2). Study the Syllabus thoroughly. The syllabus indicates to the candidate what he will be required to know and the forces with which he will be called upon to deal.

(3). Digest the advice given upon " Individual Training " which is contained in the Training and Manœuvre Regulations.

(4). For easy reference write down on the first page of a note book the various headings of the subjects which are to be studied, together with the books of reference required.

For example :—

SUBJECT.	BOOKS.
<i>Tactical Protection.</i>	.. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 2, 1929.
<i>Training. Attack</i>	.. Infantry Training, Vol. 2, 1931.
Defence	.. Section Leading in attack and defence.
Co-operation	Notes on elementary Tactical Training.
of all arms.	Artillery Training.
	Cavalry Training.
	Tank Training.
	Training and Manœuvre Regulations.
<i>Weapons</i>	.. Small Arms Training.
	Machine Gun Training (S. A. T. Vol. 3, 1931).
	Tank Training.
	Artillery Training.
<i>Map Reading</i>	.. Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching.
<i>Field Works</i>	.. Manual of Field Works.

SUBJECT.	BOOKS.
<i>Military Hygiene</i>	.. Manual of Military Hygiene. Manual of Military Sanitation.
<i>Administration</i>	.. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 1. 1930.
<i>General Information</i>	.. Field Service Pocket Book.
<i>Military History*</i>	.. Selected works on the Great War 1914—18. Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, etc., etc.

(5). To organise the work systematically, divide the period of preparation into stages and make out a rough programme as a guide. This programme should be adhered to as far as possible otherwise continuity becomes broken and precious time will be wasted in unnecessary repetition. Moreover, there is the danger that important points may thus be overlooked.

For instance, it will be assumed that the candidate has allowed himself two months for the purpose.

The programme when roughed out will be something like this :—

PERIOD.	WORK.	REMARKS.
<i>1st Fortnight</i>	Read up training manuals. Make notes.	.. To get a general grasp of the subjects required.
<i>2nd Fortnight.</i>	Read in detail selected subjects. Work out small schemes on sand table. Work out short schemes on paper. Make notes.	.. Do not try to learn too many lessons at a time. Work subject by subject, <i>e.g.</i> , Read up Protection, then work out scheme on "Out-posts." etc., etc.
<i>3rd Fortnight..</i>	Outdoor schemes on ground with assistance. Practice message writing. Short operation orders. Map reading and use of compass on ground.	Get C. O. or senior officer to set scheme, work out on ground with criticisms. Ask Signal Officer and Adjutant to help. Get p. s. c. or experienced officer to check. Ask experienced officer to train you in this.

* See list of books recommended and issued by the War Office with reference to study for examinations.

The above is only an outline and other books can be added as desired.

PERIOD.	WORK.	REMARKS.
4th Fortnight	Continue schemes with quick decisive answers. Revise notes. Get C. O. to test if fit to be examined. <i>Note your weak points.</i>	Include co-operation of all arms. Bring in Administrative, Hygienic and Supply questions.

(6). T. E. W. T's, visits and attachments to other arms are all excellent training for practical examinations. The candidate is also recommended to attend lectures and demonstrations which bear on the subjects under consideration.

(7). The following general hints may also prove useful. Work out in detail the establishment, equipment, armament and transport of the arms of the service with which you will have to deal.

A working knowledge of the characteristics of the different arms is essential.

Work out the system of supply of rations and ammunition in the field and of the evacuation of the sick and wounded. These are best shown by diagrams for instructional purposes.

Bear in mind that most of the undermentioned points are certain to arise during the course of the examination :—

Reconnaissance. (Personal and by Patrols.).

Protection on the move.

Attack, not on a large scale, but in order to bring out the action of small units, under varying circumstances. (*e.g.*) Companies, platoons, sections. Batteries, squadrons, troops, sections of Tanks and Armoured cars. Machine gun platoons.

Exploitation of success.

Message writing and simple operation orders, both verbal and written.

Communications.

Supply.

Billets, including Sanitation and Hygiene.

Defence, company and platoon areas, section posts.

Consolidation.

Field works, siting of trenches and obstacles.

Map reading, locating points, use of prismatic compass, use of reference points.

Remember that aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles, wireless, light artillery, smoke, gas and mechanised artillery must not be omitted when considering the battle of the future.

(8). Finally, on the day of the examination, study the scheme, map and ground very carefully.

Interpret the questions intelligently and give quick and clear concise answers.

Especially have a sound reason for every action you take and, most important of all, try to *apply* your book knowledge to the problems in a *common sense manner*.

The old saying—“ He who hesitates is lost ” still holds good on the modern battle-fields of to-day, it applies equally well to practical examinations for promotion.

WHO WAS THACKERAY'S MAJOR GAHAGAN ?

BY COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL.

The originals of Thackeray's characters are always a matter of interest, and that of the very overdrawn personage—Major Gahagan—is no exception. A country like India will always produce wonderful personalities, though, unfortunately for the gaiety of nations, the now widely spread knowledge of the sub-continent causes them to become rarer and rarer. Many books harp on the yarns told by old Anglo-Indians, and Gahagan may, of course, have been merely a skit on the breed in general. If, however, we look into the lives of certain Indian officers we can discern a distinct resemblance between Gahagan and a certain adventurer officer, Gardner of Gardner's Horse, now the 2nd Bengal Lancers. Thackeray's swashbuckling major repeatedly refers to "one eyed Holkar," meaning Jeswant Rao Holkar of Indore, one of the most bitter enemies with whom the British have had to cope in India, and Gardner was, for some years, in his service. He was the son of an Irish officer of the 16th Foot, and his mother a New York lady. He was born in 1770, before the trouble with the American colonies broke out, and received his earlier education in France, and not, as most officers of his day, at the nearest grammar school. Certain of his idiosyncrasies, we may assume, were due to a combination of these facts. He was granted an ensigncy in the 89th Foot in 1783, at the advanced age of thirteen, but the regiment was disbanded the same year and he remained on half pay for the next six years, when he was appointed to the 74th Foot.

The 74th were in India and Gardner did not join them, but was transferred from corps to corps until 1794, when he joined the 30th Foot. Part of this regiment was on board *H. M. S. Terrible* in Admiral Hotham's action in March 1794 in the Mediterranean and Gardner was present with it. In 1795, however, he took part in the more serious operations of Quiberon Bay, one of those abominably mismanaged affairs in which the British politicians persist in dabbling, and here he came into contact with Lord Moira, afterwards better known as the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India. Writing of the affair in 1814, when news had reached Gardner that Hastings

was about to make war with the Gurkhas, he states "The business made a great stir at the time, but His Lordship was strenuously defended and the constant attendance I gave him at the time, the strong expressions he then favoured me with, and the offer he made me to accompany him to La Vendée—he cannot have forgotten these things." Gardner was anxious to obtain employment in the campaign, but Hastings does not appear to have placed much stress on his service of twenty years previously. We see, indeed, a germ of Bill Adams and the Battle of Waterloo in the statement.

In 1796 Gardener went on half pay. In other words, he retired from the service, and, according to his own account, went to Alexandria and thence to India. In some quarters it is stated that he joined his regiment in India and then retired, but this is uncertain.

A feature which will strike the reader as curious is that Gardner had served in no fewer than five different units between 1789 and 1796, a fact which tends to indicate something unusual in an officer, and his going on half pay in the midst of a great war adds to the impression. The tone of certain of his letters and observations in later life indicate that he had not been too happy. He had a kink. In the regular service, we must remember, anything savouring of the flamboyant or the theatrical is strictly taboo, and ridicule will soon cure any trend to the marvellous. In other words, what in certain circles is described as a brilliant imagination soon becomes stifled—certain present day "students of war" and similar heroes attribute this to "the military mind." The cult of the tremendous demands freedom of thought and this is only obtainable in some irregular service, and the irregular horse in particular, for here the swashbuckler flourishes both among the officers and among the rank and file—and, to do them justice, when it comes to the pinch they are none the worse soldiers for it. Gardner, in strict point of fact, was an extremely quiet, gentlemanly man, much liked by those who really got to know him, but he may have taken some knowing. His kink lay in his capacity for the marvellous, and there seems but little doubt but that his idiosyncrasy was well known in India, though Keene attempts to defend him from being Gahagan's original.

The state of affairs in India in the late eighteenth century made the country the paradise for the adventurer. The Moghul Empire was in decay, and everywhere new principalities, based

on the stout heart and the strong arm, were arising from the chaos. No native chief was held of account unless he had Europeans to lead and train his troops. It is not too much to say, indeed, that without Europeans to do so he stood a very good chance of sinking to be a mere vassal. Under such conditions Europeans had risen to positions almost princely in their nature, and, in Hindustan, a Frenchman, Perron, was actually the ruler of the Doab, with the blind puppet Moghul in his charge, and with an army of 35,000 men, officered by Europeans, who included a number of British and British half-caste officers. This Perron was, in mild theory, the servant of Scindhia, the Mahratta. In the Deccan a certain Monsieur Raymond had attained much the same position under the Nizam of Hyderabad. Officers, both King's and of the Honourable Company, who had come to grief, either through their own misdemeanours or by bad luck, found salvation in such employment and among these was one Smith, who had fought under Abercromby in Egypt in the 36th Foot. This officer had a brother, also an adventurer, and it was due to this brother that we learn so much of adventurers in general, and of Gardner among them. In 1796, in so far as the British dominions in India were concerned, there was a period of peace, though the Company's officers were restive at the unfair conditions of their service as compared with the King's. Gardner may have been affected with this restlessness, or, like many of his type, may have found the discipline of the regular service irksome. Whatever the case, he decided to become an adventurer.

The service in India which held a prestige second only to that of the Honourable Company was that of Perron. This Perron's predecessor, the great Savoyard, de Boigne, had been careful to recruit his officers from every race in Europe, and British half-castes, the sons of British officers, formed nearly half the cadre. In 1796, however, there were signs that Perron was about to favour his own countrymen and oust the British from the more senior commands. This became more and more apparent as time passed. In the Deccan, under Raymond, only French officers could obtain service.

Gardner, accordingly, decided to try elsewhere and succeeded in obtaining employment under the Holkars of Indore, a state

at that juncture well administered by the wife of the reigning Holkar. This chief was succeeded by Jeswant Rao Holkar, a brave but ferocious ruler. Hence all sorts of trouble arose and the real adventures of Gardner commenced. War soon broke out with Scindhia and many bloody battles took place, in one of which, fought near Ujein in 1801, no fewer than eight out of twelve European officers on Scindhia's side were killed. The heads of these unfortunate men were cut off and carried to Holkar, who rewarded this piece of atrocious mutilation by giving the bringers a sum of Rs. 1,000 each. Three of these victims were the sons of officers in the Company's service, probably by native women, for it is extremely hard to say where the half-caste began and the pure white ended, for all, or nearly all, except James Skinner, called themselves European.

Gardner, an English gentleman, must, indeed have been edified at this act. Nonetheless, in common with sundry other British officers, he remained on in Holkar's service.

About this period Gardner was despatched on a diplomatic mission to the Nawab of Cambay. Here occurred a romantic incident. The flamboyant manner in which Gardner described it to Lady Fanny Parkes is worthy of repetition. " During one of the durbars at which I was present, a curtain was gently pulled aside and I saw, as I thought, the most beautiful eyes in the world. It was impossible to think of the Treaty ; those bright and piercing glances, those beautiful black eyes completely bewildered me. I felt flattered that a creature so lovely as she of those deep black, loving eyes should venture to gaze upon me. To what danger might not the veiled beauty be exposed should the movement of the purdah be seen by any of those present at the durbar ? On quitting the assembly I discovered that the black-eyed beauty was the daughter of the Prince. At the next durbar my anxiety and agitation were extreme to behold again the bright eyes that haunted my dreams. The curtain was gently waved and my fate was decided. I demanded the princess in marriage. Her relations were at first indignant and then positively refused my proposal. However the ambassador was considered too influential a person to have a request denied and the hand of the young princess was promised. The preparations for the marriage were

carried forward. "Remember" said I, "it will be useless to deceive me. I shall know those eyes again, nor will I marry any other." On the day of the marriage, I raised the veil from the countenance of the bride and in the mirror placed between us in accordance with the Mussulman wedding ceremony, I beheld the bright eyes that had bewildered me. I smiled. The young Begum smiled too. She was only thirteen years old when she was married, an event which probably saved both our lives."

When we remember that the officers of Gardner's day were far less well-read than those of the present, that their speech was far more direct, and that a "literary gent" or one of the type, was regarded very much askance, what wonder that the mere style of the narration did not excite ridicule? In what circle of officers of the present day would not the same thing happen? We know of one or two characters, both serving and retired, who are given to a certain flamboyancy, but how many men take them seriously?

In 1803 the great war between the British and the Mahratta Confederacy broke out, and this included the battles of Assaye, Delhi and Laswari. In its early phases Holkar held aloof, watching, with peculiar satisfaction, the routing of his brother chiefs, Scindhia and the Raja of Berar. Holkar, according to Gardner's account, decided to despatch him to negotiate with Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.

The negotiations, whatever they were, proved abortive, and Gardner returned empty-handed. It is significant, in this connection, to note that not one word of this attempted *rapprochement* appears in either Lake's or Wellesley's despatches, and these go into the dealings with Holkar prior to war with him breaking out, in great detail. No mention is made, even, of any visit to Lake's camp on the part of Gardner by any officer in the army. We are reluctantly compelled to believe that Gardner's diplomatic mission existed only in his imagination. About the end of 1803, however, things in Holkar's camp were becoming unpleasant, and Gardner, on visiting the chief after a short period of absence, was insulted by him. Holkar was sitting on the floor, "propped up with cushions and more or less

intoxicated—his constant custom of an afternoon.” After upbraiding him, Holkar wound up with an assurance that, had not Gardner returned when he did, he would have thrown down the wall of his private tent, in other words, he would have violated the sanctity of the zenana. Now prudence is but seldom strong in a European provoked by an Asiatic, and Gardner’s case was no exception, for the insult was a deadly one.

“ Drawing my sword ” he afterwards used to relate (we can almost picture Gahagan holding forth on such a point) “ I attempted to cut Holkar down, but was prevented by those around him. Ere they had time to recover from their amazement I rushed from the tent, sprang upon my horse, and was soon out of reach of pursuit.

In Gardner’s account of the adventures and perils that followed we can almost recognise the great Gahagan.

In his flight he fell into the hands of Amrit Rao, the Peshwa’s intriguing brother. The Peshwa, in theory the senior chief of the Mahratta Confederacy, was supposed to be the ally of the British, and of Arthur Wellesley in particular. Amrit Rao invited Gardner to take up arms against the English, who, it would appear, had just routed the armies of Scindhia and the Berar raja at Assaye. Gardner was lashed to a charpoy. The “ colonel ” remained staunch and, in the hope of wearing him out, his execution was suspended and he was placed under a guard. Walking one day by a steep cliff, which led by a precipitous descent to the Tapti, Gardner was suddenly inspired to make a dash for liberty. Crying out “ Bismillah ” (Gahagan went one better and said, “ Bismillah, hobarchi bahadur”, which, being interpreted, means “ May the peace of Allah rest upon you, O cook of much courage ”) he leapt down a precipice fifty feet high, and made for the river.

He plunged in and, taking cover in some friendly jungle, remained in the water with only his mouth above the surface. He then assumed the disguise of a grass-cutter—or says he did, for of all unlikely disguises to pass muster in Central India, that of a grass-cutter is the most unlikely. The fraternity are of miserable physique, wear but few clothes and are as unlike a

European as it is possible to be. Gardner, on the other hand, was exceptionally tall and well proportioned.

In this marvellous disguise Gardner tells us that he succeeded in finally reaching Lord Lake's army. Now the distance from the Tapti to near Agra, where Lake was at this period, is some four hundred and fifty miles. Arthur Wellesley, on the other hand, was barely one hundred miles off and had just routed Scindhia and Berar at Assaye and Argaum. Furthermore, we learn from the Wellington Despatches that quite a number of adventurers had succeeded in joining him. As to why our hero did not attempt to join Wellesley is, therefore, not quite clear. As, however, he says he was successful, we must leave it at that and assume that the swarms of banditti who ravaged the whole intervening country were bluffed into letting this simulated grass-cutter pass unmolested—a marvellous feat of itself.

In Lake's letters and despatches no mention is made of Gardner joining him, though in them we have the names of very many adventurers. The first mention of his name occurs when we find him in the service of Jeypur, who, consequent on the victories of Assaye and Laswari, had just become the ally of the British.

By now, Holkar had become definitely hostile, and war broke out with the British. The prelude to this had been the murder of the whole of his British, or British half-caste, officers—for most were of this last category. In accordance with the custom of this savage, their heads were stuck on pikes and paraded round the camp.

Lake advanced with the Grand Army from the north and Holkar fell back before him. The hot season being at hand and Holkar showing no signs of doing much damage at that juncture, Lake determined to watch him with a detachment and bring the main army back to cantonments, for his white troops were suffering greatly from the heat.

The detachment was commanded by a singularly brave, but most astoundingly incompetent officer, Colonel Monson, of the 76th Foot, and comprised, besides the Company's regular sepoy, sundry bodies of irregular horse, some in the Company's pay, others in the pay of native chiefs.

Among the latter was a corps commanded by Gardner.

Co-operating with Gardner was another British officer, also in command of some irregular horse, one Lucan by name, and one of the most valiant of all this valiant band of free-lances. Lucan had come into Lake's camp from the Mahratta service the evening before the storm of Aligarh the previous year. Thanks to his advice and guidance, in very large measure, the fall of the fortress was brought about, and first and foremost among the stormers was to be seen this indomitable man. Such was his gallantry on this occasion that Lake gave him a commission in the 74th Foot ; to grant a commission in the King's service, as distinct from that of the Honourable Company, was an honour indeed. It will be recalled that the great Gahagan performed marvels at this storm. Gardner, having been thrown into close association with Lucan, would have heard the details first hand—and we have heard of folk having their brains picked.

The two officers combined, and “ bit on Holkar's tail ” ; in other words they succeeded in inducing two battalions and eleven guns to surrender. The “ fight ” was extremely bloodless and, between the lines, it looked very much as though the enemy was only too glad to have done with war, for pay in Holkar's service was non-existent and the country had been so thoroughly ravaged by constant war that no plunder was obtainable. Whatever the circumstances, there is no doubt but that both Gardner and Lucan did good work. It is amusing to note that, when an account of this operation was given in the official gazette, some cynic, writing to the Calcutta Journal, cast doubts on the whole affair—possibly Gardner's fame had already spread. Writing from Saugor in 1820, that is sixteen years after, Gardner states “ Have you seen Major Thorn's Lake's War ? I got hold of it this morning—lame enough, and in many instances incorrect, but I found an Account of my cutting up Holkar's rear, and taking two battalions and eleven guns (he says three battalions) and otherwise mangles it, but calls it a well managed business. 'Twas this that some fellow doubted in the Calcutta Journal, but as it was on public record I did not think it worth while contradicting.”

At the time this action took place, Lake's army was well on its march back to cantonments and both Gardner and Lucan

were away by themselves. Faking despatches under such circumstances is not unknown, though there is no reason to suppose that it was done in this case.

In mid-July, 1804, Holkar suddenly advanced on Monson. This officer, one of the bravest of the brave in battle, was one of those who, when faced with responsibility in isolated situations becomes timid and pusillanimous. In lieu of offering battle as his very able subordinates and as both Lake and Wellesley deemed he should have, he decided to fall back, to his ultimate ruin. Where Gardner was at this juncture is not known. His name does not appear in either the official reports or in the journal of Colonel Don, an officer who was now to become prominent for ability and drive. James Skinner, then in command of his famous "Yellow Boys" under Lake—the regiment now known as the First Bengal Lancers—evidently disliked Gardner, and the dislike was mutual. He imputes that Gardner kept out of the earlier fighting and left Monson in the lurch. Whatever the case, Lucan with his irregular horse, together with certain horse sent by the Rajput chiefs friendly to the British, were overwhelmed in the first encounter, and poor Lucan was foully done to death by Holkar at Kotah.

Monson, falling back through country completely inundated with the monsoon rains, lost half his force through hardship and exposure, but expected help from the Jeypore raja when he reached a fort called Rampura, now known as Aligarh, and Gardner's name is mentioned in this connection in Don's journal. It was stated therein that Gardner was within a few miles of Rampura, though this may have been merely a guess.

The Jeypore raja, by now, was thoroughly overawed by Holkar's advance and, doubtless for this reason, no help, in so far as military assistance was concerned, reached the British commander. Gardner's explanation of events was given, in March 1805, to a young officer of the 15th Native Infantry who had just been wounded at the Third Assault at Bhurtpore. He was then in command of a body of irregulars in the Company's service at Agra. The explanation capped all previous records of marvellous adventure and, though believed by the young officer at the time, for it was given in a most serious manner, would appear to

have got about the army in general. The yarn went that when Holkar first fell on Monson, Gardner found himself cut off, a very probable explanation. The only recourse was to order his men to disperse and find their own way back as best they could. With irregular horse this usually meant that the corps would disperse towards, and remain with, the enemy, who were all of the same race, until the moment seemed propitious for rejoining what they deemed was the winning side. Gardner, with a few men appears to have got back to Jeypore in safety, but what he did when Monson was at Rampura is not known, although the latter was there for three weeks. Anyhow, on the approach of Holkar, the Jeypore raja, now in a state of terror, approached the British Resident, a Captain Sturrock, and told him that Holkar had demanded that a certain European should be handed over to him.

For some wonderful reason, the British Resident was not included in Holkar's demand. A few days later Sturrock was approached by a number of Mussulmans, who asked him if he would mind if they buried one of their number in the corner of the enclosure surrounding the mausoleum in which he was then residing—it was a common practice for Europeans to live in such edifices in default of bungalows. Sturrock assented, after much demur, for the ground was known to be consecrated. When the funeral procession arrived, Sturrock was surprised to see that it did not move directly towards the grave, but went to the door where he was standing. The body was covered with a white sheet, ornamented with flowers, as was the Patan fashion. To his astonishment, the dead man arose, and revealed himself as Gardner, almost as pale and emaciated as a corpse. When we recall the marvellous escape as a grass-cutter the complicated arrangements in masquerading as a corpse would appear somewhat overdoing it.

With regard to the tremendous adventures of Gahagan at Futtygarh, there is every ground for supposing that Gardner was really there when Holkar attacked. He would appear to have rejoined the British about September, 1804, after the escape described above. Futtygarh was then full of depots of corps in the field and Gardner was, in all likelihood, in the process of raising the irregular horse which he commanded when the subaltern of the 15th met him in March 1805. Holkar attacked in

November, 1804, hotly pursued by Lake, with the cavalry. We do not know the names of the officers shut up in the fort, together with the beautiful Belinda Bulcher, the Macans and the other fairies confided to the charge of our friend Gahagan, but it is a curious fact that there may, in very truth, have been a Mrs. Macan, with certain Miss Macans, for Futtigarh was the depot station of the 4th Native Cavalry commanded by Macan, one of the finest and ablest of Lake's many excellent officers. This regiment, like the whole of the rest of the Bengal regular cavalry, with the sole exception of the Governor-General's Bodyguard, disappeared in the maelstrom of 1857.

We now come to probably the most important link in our story. When Lake reached Futtigarh he was accompanied by a young Engineer officer, Carmichael Smyth. This officer was surveying the routes and his map can now be seen in the India Office. Smyth was no other than step-father to William Makepeace Thackeray, and a man much beloved of the writer. It is quite on the cards that Smyth and Gardner both met—they were both of a sociable nature—and Gardner's yarns may have excited interest.

That Thackeray drew largely on Smyth's characteristics in depicting the character of the immortal Colonel Newcome is undoubted, and it is to be noted that Gahagan is not in any way regarded in the light of a vicious liar. We can almost picture the old Colonel commenting on him as "a really ridiculous perverter of the truth."

To give a further example of Gardner's capacity to exaggerate we may quote the following. There had been some discussion of equestrian feats and skill at arms displayed by Skinner's corps. Gardner, then staying at Lucknow with the King of Oudh, breaks in with "An old servant of mine is now in Lucknow. He is in the King's service (meaning the King of Oudh). He is the finest horseman in India. I gave that man Rs. 150 a month (in those days the best part of £200 a year) merely for the pleasure of seeing him ride. That man could cut his way through thousands. All men who know anything of native horsemanship know that man."

A tactless individual asked him to produce this paragon, Gardner was apparently somewhat non-plussed, but got out of

the dilemma with the lame explanation "The man has informed me that he would willingly give a display but such is the jealousy with which he is surrounded that he dare not," oblivious to the fact that, in India, there is a golden key which will open the most obstinate of locks. On the conclusion of the Mahratta War of 1803-06, the whole of the irregular corps, with the exception of a portion of Skinner's which became a form of police, were disbanded, Lord Cornwallis making the not altogether unsound observation. "He would rather fight them than pay them." Gardner's corps went with the rest. Gardner's wife, generally known as the Begum, had been adopted by the old Moghul Emperor as a daughter, and Gardner had a property assigned him at Khasganj, in the Doab, held by a firman from the old man. The lady, thanks to her position as a Princess of Cambay, had been successful in escaping from the clutches of Holkar, no mean feat, for this ruffian was no respecter of persons as a general rule and, had she been a lesser personage, would have brought a young and beautiful woman into his zenana, Mussulman though she was. On this property Gardner remained as a farmer for the next three years. In 1809 he was directed to raise another corps of irregular horse, the regiment now known as the 2nd Bengal Lancers. In 1814, possibly by chance, possibly with the intention of seeing the lie of the land in which war seemed imminent, Gardner proceeded on a sporting expedition to Dehra Dun, then held by the Gurkhas. Here he was nearly shot as a spy, and was only rescued through the intervention of a Sikh priest.

In the ensuing war with the Gurkhas the corps did useful work, forming, in the earlier phases, part of the column commanded by General Marley, the extraordinary officer who so lost his nerve at the unexpected resistance that he actually deserted—Fortescue makes the charitable comment that he was probably insane. Gardner's brother-in-law, Hearsey, in these operations carried out a brilliant stroke with a squadron of the regiment—about the only redeeming feature of these abominably mismanaged operations. Another Hearsey, the future Sir John, of Sitabaldi, Chillianwallah and Mutiny fame, also served with the corps at this period and finally took over command when Gardner left the service in 1828. In 1817 the corps was honoured by being incorporated in the Company's army, for its previous status had

been anomalous. Gardner was rewarded by a brevet majority, dated back to September 25th, 1803, two days after Assaye, this being the day he quitted Holkar's service. This appears in the Army List of 1818.

His last campaign was in Arracan, though he was then almost too weak to sit his horse. His high spirit showed itself to such a marked degree that his corps, though irregular, had fewer desertions than any other which took part, for the campaign was abominably conducted and the unfortunate troops died like flies.

We learn much from Lady Fanny Parke of Gardner's domestic life, and this is of great interest. His Begum was a lady of distinction who lived the usual zenana life surrounded by younger ladies, princesses of Delhi and other leading aristocrats. These secluded woman led extremely dull lives, occasionally varied by acute quarrels. She witnessed the wedding of one of the girls to a scion of the Imperial House of Delhi, and she gives an account of the ceremonies, evidently survivals of the old desert life of the Mongols, from whom the Moghuls are sprung. One was that the bridegroom had to come to the house and carry the bride off with a show of force. This was explained by Gardner. "It is the old Tartar custom for the bridegroom to fight for his bride, and carry her away *"vi et armis"*; this is still retained." "The Begum would not omit a Timurian custom for the world." The other singularity—at first sight not very intelligible—was that the husband, after getting his wife and carrying her home, bade her put her foot through the litter, and touched her toe with the blood of a goat which he slaughtered for the purpose. The practice is said to be peculiar to the House of Timurlane, the Tartar.

The wife of his youth continued to be dear to the advancing years of the old adventurer, with one singular result, that all his offspring were married to natives of India, and have adopted the native life. It is not a case of their being members of the Eurasian community. One of Gardner's sons married a granddaughter of the old Moghul, Shah Alam, and his descendants had what was probably the most remarkable genealogical tree in the British Empire, for one, although a native of India in every respect, inherited the title of Lord Gardner from the Irish peer of 1800.

The last Lord Gardner was his grandson ; and of this nobleman Debrett gives us the following description :—

Alan Hyde, born July 1st, 1836 ; sometime in the native police force ; described in marriage certificate as “ A trader ” ; married March 12th, 1879 by a Methodist Minister in the house of his father to Jane daughter of Angam Shekoh, and has issue living, Alan Legge born October 25th, 1881. Residence, Village of Munowta, Nadri, Etah, N.-W. Provinces, India.”

This Lady Gardner was the grandchild of the last King of Delhi, in whom terminated the line of Timurlane the Tartar, known as the “ Great Moghul.”

Gardner died in 1835, followed in less than a month by his faithful and broken-hearted Begum. He was buried in a very handsome marble mausoleum at Khasganj, Thus ended the career of an adventurer whose descendants are connected with the English peerage, the house of Timur, the kings of Oudh and the Begs of Cambay.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

MOBILITY.

SIR,

I trust that I shall not over-tax the patience of your readers if I add a few remarks on the above subject, "*à propos* of the interesting letter of P. B. I contained in your April 1932 number.

This letter states that "as a general rule, Officers serving with the Irregular Forces on the Frontier, look upon Regulars as ponderous and immobile, and unsuited at ordinary times to mountain warfare, against the agile and wily Pathan."

This statement is rather astounding, and especially so if one considers recent Frontier History. A study of this will show that of recent years heavy fighting on the Frontier has only occurred in 1897, 1901, 1908 (Mohmund) and 1919/20. Now, in dealing with Tribesmen, when once operations start, it is only by hard fighting, involving considerable casualties on both sides, that any permanent effect is gained. The expeditions mentioned, were carried to a successful issue entirely by the "ponderous and unsuitable" Regulars.

The heavy fighting in Waziristan in 1919/20 had an enormous influence over the Mahsuds which they have never forgotten; it killed off all their young fighting stock. In 1930, the heavy losses inflicted on the Mahsuds by a concentration of modern machine gun fire such as they had never before experienced, was the decisive factor in causing them immediately to come to terms.

From the writer's recent experiences of Regulars and Irregulars in the Field, he is convinced that the Regular Infantry of to-day is every bit as well suited to tackle the wily Pathan as he was in the past, provided the situation is duly appreciated. The Khajuri Plain operations in 1931 proved this. They are the same troops, only better trained, as those who fought so magnificently in the Great War. Experience will prove whether their present armament is suitable for mountain warfare: it may be necessary at times to modify this locally, to suit the situation. Similarly it is generally agreed that the new organisation is not so well suited to the individual work of mountain warfare as was the former. But we must make the best of this: each tiny corner of the Empire cannot have its own specialised organisation and troops.

There is always a danger in India of thinking only in terms of the N.-W. Frontier and of peace time patrol work and police duties on it. There is also a tendency during a prolonged peace to overlook the necessity of Fighting Power and to sacrifice everything to Mobility. It is certainly a platitude but one nevertheless apt to be forgotten, that the object for which Regulars are organised and trained is "To Fight". No amount of running over the hills, no amount of "gushls" will win a campaign. Police work is often the unpleasant task of the Army in India but it is not its proper rôle.

When considering the reduction of arms, equipment and transport with a view to gaining more mobility, it is suggested that Fighting Power should always be the governing factor. Fifty rounds of ammunition go nowhere in a real fight. The heavy casualties sustained at Ahnai Tangi in Waziristan in 1919 were largely due to the fact that ammunition ran out and some of the troops had to fight with stones—a horrible situation.

By all means however let us give every thought to the ability to move and to move fast and far. In the writer's opinion, the main and paramount factor towards securing Mobility is the Will to Move.

This is ensured mainly by the Training of the Troops, and by the Leadership of all Commanders.

Yours faithfully,

3rd June 1932.

"Light Infantry."

THE BURMESE REBELLION, 1931.

SIR,

As an officer of the Burma Military Police, I would be very grateful if you could publish corrections to a number of inaccuracies which appeared in an article "The Burmese Rebellion, 1931" published in your April Number.

The first occurs in the section dealing with the course of the rebellion, in which it is stated that available armed civil forces were two

battalions of Military Police. This the entirely wrong, as there were no battalions as such at the disposal of the Civil authorities.

In December 1930, the Military Police consisted of six frontier battalions, two garrison battalions, and a reserve battalion. The rebellion broke out in the area garrisoned by the Rangoon Battalion, but that battalion could scarcely be considered as available for rebellion duty, as it furnished the men in posts stretching from Mergui in the south to Paletwa on the Chittagong border, a distance of approximately 800 miles. The only men available from the Military Police, were detachments found by reducing the Headquarters strengths of all battalions in the force.

It is also added that by June 1931 five new battalions of Military Police had been raised and five others were in process of being recruited. This is very greatly exaggerated, for battalions one should read companies.

Your correspondent states that no Military Police were available for Tharrawaddy at the outbreak of the rebellion in December 1930. This is incorrect as Military Police were sent there and were in action on December 25th. before the arrival of the Military, and on January 1st. there were 420 rifles of the force in Tharrawaddy.

There are several geographical errors in the "Sketch map of Burma." Okkan shown on the Mandalay line about 20 miles North of Nyaunglebin, is in actual fact on the Prome line, 12 miles South of Tharrawaddy.

Thayetmyo shown as being on the Eastern side of the Pegu Yomas in Toungoo district, is on the right bank of the Irrawaddy about 60 miles West, and is about the spot where Allanmyo has been marked. Allanmyo is on the left bank of the river, and not the right.

I think too that most of those who operated during the rains in Thayetmyo district would have no hesitation whatever in saying that the Southern limit of the dry zone should be moved about 80 miles further North.

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BOWERMAN, CAPTAIN.

Rangoon.

Editor's Note.

The author of the article " The Burmese Rebellion, 1931 " comments on the above letter as follows :—

- (a) *Available Military Police.*—The article did not infer that two battalions of Military Police were available " as battalions " ; on the contrary it specifically stated that the two battalions were dispersed " among numerous stations," and that " this dispersion was a serious handicap to the Civil Authorities who experienced great difficulty in concentrating sufficient armed forces in any particular area."
- (b) *Raising of New Companies of Military Police.*—It is very much regretted that by a slip of the pen the word " battalions " was used instead of " companies."
- (c) *Military Police in Tharrawaddy.*—The article did not state that " no Military Police were available for Tharrawaddy at the outbreak of the rebellion." The words used were, " the Rebellion showed signs of getting out of hand. No more Military Police were available." This plainly means that some Military Police were present before the Military were requisitioned.
- (d) *Errors in Map.*—Two of these were due to mistakes in an official map prepared in Burma ; one, to a printers mistake in reproduction. They are regretted.

Finally, the last thing that the author of the article intended was to minimise either the services of the Burma Military Police or the difficulties which confronted them.

A SANATORIUM FOR INDIAN CONSUMPTIVES.

SIR,

I hasten to add my plea to that of Major D. B. Mackenzie in the April number of this journal for a Sanatorium for Indian Troops.

It is pitiable indeed to see these men, who were fine, healthy-looking specimens and in their prime only three months before, stricken down by such diseases as tuberculosis and pleurisy and reduced in an incredibly short time to a miserable travesty of a human being.

“ Five months to live—with luck ” was the verdict on the last case to be boarded out in my own Battalion—a former long-distance runner whose times for the “ three miles ” and the “ ten miles ” still, I believe, stand as Punjab records. Could there be a more pitiable ending for a fine athlete to face than this galloping death awaiting him in his village, when expert treatment amongst healthy surroundings might result in years of extra life and health ?

“ Five months to live ” was the verdict again in another case last week—that of a young Khattak, under 19 years of age, the picture of health only four months ago.

Have we any right to wash our hands of cases such as these and callously allow them to creep away to their homes to die ?

The malady takes them young or old when vitality and powers of resistance to disease are sapped by the hardships to which they have been exposed in the service of the “ Sirkar.” There is not a whisper of complaint that Government treats them anything but liberally. Oriental fatalism steps in and saves the situation.

“ The fate of man is writ upon his forehead at birth ; that he cannot escape. Moreover, Sahib, is not twenty-two rupees a generous monthly pension for man with only two and a half years service, who can be of no further use to the Sirkar ? ” was the remark of his platoon commander.

Is it possible to agree with this opinion when one sees these piteous hulks being assisted by their sick attendants into the second class compartment in which they are allowed to make their last journey homewards—again by the generosity of the Government ? No one can cavil at the liberality of this treatment, but even so the germ of an insidious doubt is born in one’s mind. One begins to wonder whether, after all, the Sirkar’s responsibility can indeed be rightly considered to have ended with the granting of a liberal pension and a free passage home.

The record of Pulmonary Tuberculosis cases invalidated out of one battalion alone during the last four years is not pleasant reading. A total of 18 wrecks of what, but a short time ago, were fine upstanding specimens of their race have been sent off during that period to die in their homes as quickly as the disease, untreated and neglected, may decree. Is then the responsibility of the Government altogether over when these poor wretches have reached their villages ? Further,

can one honestly say, without a twinge of conscience, that their subsequent fate need be no concern of *ours*? That though it is all very sad nothing can be done to lessen the tragedy, and that anyhow the world is full of "hard cases" which are best pushed out of one's mind—and then perhaps one quickly sidesteps from a painful subject and turns one's thoughts to polo or to that next fishing trip that we are planning for next month.

Again, take the case of that fine young P. M. who is now crawling back to his home in the Salt Range without the hope of seeing another sowing. Did he visualise the possibility of being stricken down in his prime by this malignant disease when the spirit of adventure led him into the service of the Sirkar, ready to take his chance in war but hardly prepared for this sudden death sentence in the piping times of peace. Again that suspicion of a doubt creeps in to disturb one's complacency, a feeling of misgiving that perhaps one's responsibility has *not* entirely ceased with the signing of the pension papers and a muttered "*bara afsos ki bat*" as one takes one's final farewell of him at the hospital. And what of the Government? Does the sanctioning of the pension free it from all further obligations in the matter?

The obvious reply to this embarrassing question is that unfortunately the Government has no funds for any such object as the establishment of a Sanatorium. The matter is, however, too serious for this statement to be accepted as final. Certainly the easy course to take is to brand the idea at once as impossible and to let it die of inertia, banished to some musty file, but the raising of funds for a refuge for these human wrecks is, I submit, such a vital matter that it cannot be evaded. The problem has got to be faced—and solved.

Major Mackenzie has made some excellent suggestions regarding the raising of money from private sources. I would go further and urge that, funds or no funds, the State *cannot* be absolved from taking an active part. Let it show the way and set the necessary example with an allotment of money and an appeal for funds; let us then find some influential, philanthropic person to give the lead for private subscriptions, each one of us adding his share in spite of the cut in pay.

This is essentially a matter for the State to contend with first. Once the project has official approval and aid, public interest will be aroused and subscriptions flow in. The suggestion that an extra half lakh be appended to the Budget will doubtless cause no little dismay

in financial circles at a time when every avenue is being explored for further economies. When, however, the true object of this extra-call is properly understood in the Legislative Assembly—when it is realised that the nature of the project is essentially a national one, a charity for brother-Indian and not for the foreigner, is it too much to hope that the House will recognise its responsibility sufficiently for all Parties to sink their differences and pass this new item of expenditure in spite of the “barrenness of the land”?

There is no reason why the Army should be expected to bear the whole of this burden as it by no means holds a monopoly in the disease. The Sanatorium would be intended for patients from all Government Services, civil and military, covenanted and uncovenanted alike, and once it is established the aim should be to expand and enlarge it sufficiently to take in for treatment cases from every walk in life.

There is a pressing need for something more tangible than public charity to see it through, and the necessity of early action by the State is emphasised. May we look to it therefore to give a lead in establishing a charitable Institution which is as necessary in its way as the Leper Asylums which have existed for so many years? The first gesture must come from the top. The movement requires the Government's official approval and support before there can be any hope of fulfilment.

This letter is written in the hope that it will catch the eye of some prominent member of Government, military or civil. Now that the matter has been aired it cannot and must not be allowed to drop back into that limbo of forgetfulness, the office pigeon-hole. That would be the convenient course to take—soothing to one's disturbed complacency, an anodyne for troublesome thoughts. Let us make certain that we do not follow it.

Yours faithfully,

O. D. BENNETT, LT.-COL.,
2/15th Punjab Regiment.

MINGALADON.
8th June 1932.

“MORE OR LESS OF A MESS.”

SIR,

A mess is not necessarily expensive. Much depends on the C. O. and the Mess President. I believe that Officers of the Indian Police have died because they could not afford to take leave, and that this

was largely due to their being much on tour, when an Officer has to have a cook and other servants to himself, instead of, as in the Army, one to the whole Battalion.

As to dress, does "Economist" suggest that Officers should dine as guests with British units in ordinary evening clothes? Or, if Field Officers of the week, turn out guards in that attire?

I do not know when Messes were started in Indian Regiments. Sir Thomas Seaton, who was commissioned as Ensign 4th February 1823, writes of that year, in "From Cadet to Colonel," Ch. I:—

At that time there were no messes in native regiments. Officers generally lived two or three in a bungalow, according to circumstances, and chummed together. Frequently six or more living in contiguous houses would for the time being form a little mess, and if one of the number happened to be an old officer, and a tolerable manager, it was a very agreeable and economical plan. Each officer kept his own wines and beer, and the table expenses were in common. If one of the party wished to invite a guest, timely notice was given to the manager, and a small extra charge was made. Each member of the mess sent his servant to assist in cooking the dinner, and each sent his chair, glasses, plates, knives and forks, and napkin. This was called "camp fashion." A small subscription provided dishes, cooking-vessels, and other requisites, and all the accounts were settled on pay-day.

This system had the great advantage that it did not lead to such extravagance as regimental messes undoubtedly do; the officer could live as economically as he pleased, there were no public nights with their following heavy bills for wine, no mess balls and parties with their attendant extravagance, and no member of the little mess was called upon for any expense beyond that of his daily food. If any member was economising to pay for a gun or horse, some member of the mess would be sure to share with him his bottle of beer or modicum of wine, and he knew exactly what his expenses would be. Regimental messes, as managed in England, are very pleasant for young men with abundant means. I can say little else in their favour.

I quite agree that Indianisation spells the death of the Regimental Mess in India. I also agree that there is "an enormous amount of

extra work to already overworked Officers." Also I think the Mess President gets no chance. When Mess President, I was often with my Double Company on the rifle range as early as one could see to shoot, and breakfasted there, or at the Orderly Room when I got there about one o'clock. After my Double Company work I got to my bungalow about three. The Mess was three quarters of a mile further on. What chance did I get?

Chummeries have their disadvantages. So have Clubs. I remember a British Regiment who, as their landlord would not make the Mess bungalow habitable, closed it and lived at the Club. There, they had their own table and dined as a Regiment—but there were about four cases of enteric among the subalterns, one of whom died. That, I fear, would be one result of chummeries. And chummeries would soon degenerate into dining in pyjamas.

In another station, many oddments, who had no Mess, lived at the Club. It was a very rowdy place and the ex-sergeant who was Steward ran about with a note-book trying to keep account of who broke what.

But a Station Mess is an abomination. Thirty years ago, as a Double Company Commander I lived in a combined Indian Infantry Mess. The Regiments quarrelled; the place was a pot-shop; everybody's attitude was "Thank God, it's not my Regimental Mess." I gathered that preceding Regiments had been the same, with the addition that the C. O. of the one occasionally put the Officers of the other under arrest. Twenty years ago, as a C. O. I had to live in another combined Mess. Same thing—a pot-shop, and occasionally a gambling hell. I go to bed early, but at breakfast next morning cannot help hearing young Officers of the other Regiments laughing about some appalling gambling game that was played overnight.

Chummeries have their disadvantages, but Station Messes are (to my mind) far worse.

Oxford.

Yours faithfully,
C. A. B. P.

MILITARY NOTES.

AFGHANISTAN.

Internal Affairs.

“ The fundamental rules of the Afghan Government,” framed by the National Council, and signed by the King on 31st October, 1931, have now been published. They include several interesting features such as the composition and duties of the Upper House (Majlis-i-Aiyan), and its relation to the National Assembly ; the election of the National Assembly every three years ; its duty regarding the examination and approval of the budget, which will include an allotment for the King's expenses ; and the abolition of forced labour, except in war time. The succession to the throne is declared to be confined to the family of Nadir Shah.

AUSTRIA.

Army Estimates for 1932.

The Austrian Army Estimates, amounting to about £2,370,000 at par, show a decrease of some 25 per cent. on the 1931 Budget total. The total returns to approximately the same level as that of 1927 and brings the gradual increase, which had become a hardy annual since 1923, to an abrupt termination. The Estimates have been accepted by the Austrian Parliament in special debate in Finance and Budget Committee. It is unlikely that the figures will be subjected in the future to more than minor alterations. The total will be slightly reduced by small items of income from army shops and farms, various leased properties, swimming baths, &c.

BELGIUM.

Linguistic Law.

An interesting point has arisen which touches on the linguistic question in this country. All members of the *gendarmérie* are required to know French and Flemish. In those parts of the country far removed from Flanders, such as Luxemburg, naturally only those of

Flemish birth know that language. Thus in the really Walloon country this law has the anomalous effect of excluding any except Flemings from the *gendarmérie*.

Inventor of Mills Grenades.

During the month the British papers reported the death of Sir William Mills, who is referred to as the inventor of the Mills grenade. The Belgian press took up this point and pointed out it was an error to think that the grenade had been invented by Mills. It was stated that the bomb was actually invented by a Belgian, a Major Roland of Liège. The invention was first offered to the French and was refused by them. It was subsequently accepted by the War Office on the condition that it should be manufactured in England and Sir William, then Mr., Mills of Birmingham, was selected to manufacture it.

General Galet's Book.

During the earlier part of December a good deal of space in the press continued to be devoted to criticism of the book recently published by General Galet, the Belgian C.G.S. One effect of its publication has been that General Lantonnois van Rode has taken an action against General Galet for defamation of character. General Lantonnois van Rode was commanding the group formed by the 4th and 6th Divisions at the beginning of the War and considers that his conduct has been unjustly criticised by General Galet. He demanded a public apology and is apparently not satisfied with General Galet's reply to his demand, which was to the effect that he had misread the passages of which he complained.

Voluntary enlistment in the Belgian Army.

Owing to the large numbers of volunteers who have entered the army during recent months on a semi-permanent engagement, an order has been published forbidding any further enlistment of this sort.

This influx of volunteers is a result of the present economic crisis.

Standard of education in the Army.

Official figures of the percentage of illiterates in the army were published towards the end of January. In the year 1930, of 39,497 miliciens, 3 per cent. of the Flemings were illiterate and 1 per cent. of

the Walloons. Of the other 96 per cent., the standard of education was divided up as follows :—

Able to read only	1 per cent.
Able to read and write only	..	8	„
Able to read, write and calculate	..	75	„
Possessing a higher standard of education	12	„	

Most of the illiterates are taught to read and write during their period of service.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

The Czechoslovak Army.

Military obligations and periods of service.

The Defence Law of Czechoslovakia lays down that in principle the armed forces of the Republic will be restricted to a militia, but until that object can be attained the army is based on conscription.

Under the law of 19th March, 1920, military service is compulsory and general for all male citizens between 20 and 50 years of age. The period of service with the colours is at present 18 months, beginning on 1st October in the year in which the youth reaches the age of 20.

By the law of February, 1927, the annual quota of conscripts actually to be called on to serve for 18 months was fixed at 70,000. All remaining fit men in the annual contingent are enrolled in an Ersatz-Reserve, and only a portion of them are called up for a shortened period of 12 weeks' training ; subsequently they are called up for 4 weeks' " special training " and are then transferred to the ordinary reserve, and are liable to the same reservist training as the 18-months conscripts.

Reservists are liable to 4 weeks' training in each of the 3rd and 5th years of their reserve service and 3 weeks in each of the 7th and 9th years. At present, however, for reasons of economy, reservist training is being restricted to 3 weeks in all cases, and only 3 classes instead of 4 are to be called up each year.

Compulsory physical training.

A Bill has recently been introduced which makes physical training obligatory for all male citizens between the ages of 6 and 24 and for all females between 6 and 21. The training will be in charge of the military administration working through the schools and authorized institutions for physical development, and the programme will be worked out by the Ministries of Health, Education and National Defence.

Recruitment of officers and long-service other ranks.

(a) *Officers*.—These fall into two main categories, namely those with war service and post-war entries.

Post-war officers practically all come into the army through the Military Academy at Hranice ; a small percentage for the services are recruited from reserve officers of their respective service.

Reserve officers at present consist mainly of ex-Austro-Hungarian reserve officers. The future replenishment of the Reserve Officers' Corps is effected as follows : Conscripts with a secondary school education are sent, shortly after the commencement of their 18 months' service, to a reserve officers' school ; on passing out, successful candidates may be nominated to commissions as reserve sub-lieutenants before the conclusion of their 18 months' service. Reserve officers are liable to 4 weeks' training in each of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th and 10th years after their transfer to the reserve.

(b) *Warrant officers*.—These are recruited from long-service non-commissioned officers, from other personnel serving with the colours, or from reservists in the first 2 years of their reserve service, and must not be more than 25 years old. After a special preparatory course they are nominated to the rank of warrant officer and must serve for at least a further 4 years.

(c) *Long-service non-commissioned officers*.—These consist of men who, after their 18 months' conscript service, voluntarily take on for further periods of 1 year (or sometimes 6 months) at a time.

Strength of the army.

The approximate total strength of the Czechoslovak army is as follows :—

(a) *With the colours.*

Officers	..	10,070
Warrant officers	..	8,800
Long-service non-commissioned officers	..	4,630
18 months' conscripts—		
October—March, 140,000	} average..	105,000
April—September 70,000		
12 weeks' conscripts	..	6,500
Total	..	<u>135,000</u>

(b) Trained reserves.

Under age 40	.. 850,000
Ages 40 to 49	.. 520,000
	<hr/>
Total	.. 1,370,000 including about <hr/> 43,000 officers.

*Army organization.**(a) Higher command, administration and organization.*

(i) *The President of the Republic* is the supreme military commander, but delegates most of his powers to the Chief of the General Staff on the one hand and to the Minister of National Defence on the other. Each of these individuals has the right of personal access to the President.

(ii) *The Military Secretariat of the President* constitutes the means by which the President maintains contact with the army and performs certain acts which are not delegated to the Chief of the General Staff or to the Defence Minister.

(iii) *The Chief of the General Staff*, as the actual commander-in-chief of the army, is directly responsible to the President for the training and military efficiency of the forces. In all else he is subordinate to the Minister of National Defence. The General Staff is the executive organ of command within the army.

(iv) *The Minister of National Defence* has the power of the purse and through the Ministry of National Defence directs the administration of the army. As a member of the Cabinet he is responsible both to the President and to Parliament.

(v) *The Army Committee of Parliament* consists of two sub-committees, one from each house, representation on which is proportionate to the strength of the parties in Parliament. This committee forms the channel of complaint from Parliament to the Minister of Defence and all measures concerning the army are submitted by the Minister to the Committee, where they are examined and, if necessary, modified before being presented to Parliament.

(vi) *The Inspector-General of the Army* is appointed by the President and is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence.

(vii) *The French Military Mission*.—In 1919 a mission of over 100 French officers was sent to train and organize the Czechoslovak

Army. Its strength has been gradually reduced and it now consists of only eight officers, under the leadership of General Faucher.

(viii) *Territorial organization*.—Czechoslovakia is divided into four military areas, each under a command headquarters (Prague, Brno, Bratislava and Kosice), and each sub-divided into divisional districts. The country is also divided into 48 recruiting districts, which correspond generally to the civil administrative districts.

(b) *Divisional troops*.

There are 12 divisions, each comprising :—

2 infantry brigades, each of 2 regiments of 3 battalions each.

Each regiment also has 1 reserve battalion. Battalions consist of 3 rifle companies and 1 machine gun company.

1 artillery brigade consisting of :—

1 mountain artillery group of two 7·5-cm. gun batteries and one 10-cm. howitzer battery.

1 field artillery regiment of 2 groups each of three 8-cm. gun batteries, and 1 group of three 10-cm. howitzer batteries

1 medium artillery regiment of 2 groups each of two 15-cm. howitzer batteries and one 10-cm. gun battery.

The field and medium regiments each have a reserve battery in addition. All batteries are 4-gun, but some are on reduced establishments in peace.

1 reconnaissance group of 1 cavalry squadron and 1 section of armoured cars.

1 engineer battalion.

1 signal company of 3 cable platoons and 1 W/T platoon.

1 M.T. company.

1 divisional train (H.T.).

1 supply depot, with bakery and slaughter-house.

1 field hospital.

1 motor ambulance column.

1 mobile dentistry.

1 disinfection column.

Note.—A number of units exist *en cadre* only in peace.

(c) *Air service*.

This forms an integral part, and the most efficient part, of the army.

FRANCE.

Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.

The *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* consists of the marshals of France and 12 to 14 senior generals, with the Minister for War as President. The Vice-President is the Commander-in-Chief designate for war and most other members are commanders designate of armies or groups of armies. Each member has a senior officer as his chief staff officer and one or more other staff officers. These form the nucleus of his staff for war.

Members who are appointed as inspectors of arms, &c., report to the Vice-President and not to the Council as a whole.

The Vice-President receives his orders as to the country's policy from the Government, and under his instructions the General Staff draw up appreciations, plans, &c. He is solely responsible for the plan adopted; he may discuss it with the Council, but they have no collective responsibility for it.

If plans involve the co-operation of other services, they would probably be discussed unofficially through the staffs of the services concerned, but there is no existing machinery for such consultations. The ministers, each backed by his senior service representative, for the army the Vice-President of the Council, would then meet to discuss the plan officially. Should they fail to come to agreement, the matter would be referred to the *Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale*, which is practically the Cabinet, certain minor ministers being omitted.

When an important overseas operation is contemplated *ad hoc* committees to ensure co-operation between the services might be appointed.

In the case of a war or an expedition based on one of the colonies, the plan would in the first instance be drawn up by the local commander-in-chief and submitted to the Minister of the Colonies. The latter has a military section in his ministry, and touch with the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* is maintained through the member of that body who is appointed Inspector of Colonial Troops (at present General Claudel). If such a war took on a really serious nature, the Inspector of Colonial Troops might possibly be appointed as Commander-in-Chief, and eventually the control and administration of the war might be

handed over from the Ministry of Colonies to that of War. This had to be done in 1925-26 when the Ministry of War took over from the local administration the direct control of the Riff campaign in Morocco.

GERMANY.

Changes in organization and drill movements.

1. The German rifle company has been organized until recently in 3 platoons, each platoon consisting of 3 rifle and 2 light automatic groups (only 6 light machine guns to each company were allowed by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany).

Amendments to German Infantry Training show that the rifle company is in future to consist of 3 platoons; each platoon will have 3 homogeneous groups (*Einheits Gruppen*) each consisting of a light automatic section (1 *M.G. Trupp*) and a rifle section (*Schutzzentrupp*). The strength of the *Einheits Gruppe* is 1 group leader, 4 men in the light automatic section, and 8 to 10 men, including an assistant group leader, in the rifle section.

2. In column of route the infantry now march in threes, each of the 3 groups in the platoon being in single file behind its leader, with the light automatic section in front of the rifle section.

This system facilitates the deployment of the company or platoon into columns of groups in single file.

The light automatic section normally comes into action first, followed by the rifle section at 50 paces distance.

IRAQ

Iraq and the League of Nations.

On 28th January the Council of the League adopted the following resolution in regard to the emancipation of Iraq from the mandate :—

“ The Council having to consider the special case of the termination of the mandate for Iraq :—

- (1) Notes the opinion formulated at its request by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposal of the British Government.

- (2) Considers that the information available is sufficient to show that Iraq satisfies, generally speaking, the *de facto* conditions enumerated in the Annex to the Council resolution of 4th September, 1931.
- (3) Declares itself prepared in principle to pronounce the termination of the mandatory regime in Iraq when that State shall have entered into an undertaking before the Council in conformity with the suggestions contained in the Report of Permanent Mandates Commission, it being understood that the right to apply to the Permanent Court of International Justice may only be exercised by members of the League represented on the Council.
- (4) Accordingly requests its rapporteurs for minorities questions of International Law and mandates and the representative of Great Britain on the Council to prepare in consultation with the representatives of the Iraqi Government, and if necessary with a representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and to submit that to the Council at its next Session.
- (5) Decides that, should the Council after examining the undertakings which would be entered into by the Iraqi Government, pronounce the termination of the mandatory regime over that territory, such decision will become effective only as from the date on which Iraq has been admitted to the League of Nations."

ITALY.

Libya.

Marshal Badoglio, Governor of Libya, marked the anniversary of the capture of Kufra by the publication of a manifesto in which he declares that the rebellion in Cyrenaica is now "completely and definitely crushed" and that "for the first time since Italian troops disembarked on these shores twenty years ago the two Colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are completely occupied and pacified."

He concludes by stating that this is not only cause for the legitimate satisfaction of all Italy but "serves as a new point of departure for a more vigorous impulse in the civil progress of the two colonies."

In recent years there have been several premature announcements of the successful conclusion of the campaign in Libya, but on this occasion the Italian claim appears to be justified following as it does on a series of well-executed minor operations during the past twelve months which have resulted in the capture of the more important rebel chiefs and the seizure of their strongholds.

The pacification of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which together form the colony of Libya, will enable the Italian authorities to make further progress with the work of civil development. Much has already been accomplished in the coastal regions. Olives and barley are being successfully cultivated, date-palms flourish and the afforestation of the sand dunes is progressing steadily. These achievements have been almost entirely due to State action. The Italian Government supplies the greater part of the necessary capital, supervises the undertakings of the colonists and is at any time prepared to confiscate and re-allot land which is not being efficiently exploited. Unfortunately Libya is singularly barren by nature. It has no rivers worthy of the name and no rainfall comparable with that of the northern sections of Morocco and Algiers. The Italian authorities are thus confronted with a task of enormous difficulty in developing the country and it seems unlikely that it will ever be able to absorb as colonists any considerable proportion of Italy's surplus population.

MOROCCO.

French Zone.

Atlas operations.

Since the last report the operations in the Todra and Gheris valleys have apparently ceased, and the construction of posts to consolidate the area occupied is being carried out. The northern flank guard has now been withdrawn to Mzizel. The force sent down the Draa has reached Amzrou and is constructing a post at that point.

On 15th January, 1932, the French occupied the very important oasis of Tafilalet which has been the refuge of dissidents from the mountainous regions and of the raiding bands from the Sahara. Large

forces of regular troops were concentrated on three sides of the oasis and bodies of auxiliary troops were pushed in. There was apparently not much fighting except around the citadel of Bel-Kacem N'Agid, the principal chief, who finally escaped westwards with a small party. He was pursued by cavalry and his chief lieutenant and a number of his rearguard were killed, and all his lieutenants have since been captured. A road is now being pushed through the oasis from north to south and is to link up Erfoud with Risani and will doubtless eventually join the existing track to Taouz. No opposition has been offered by the tribes now in the occupied area and the leaders have given assurance of their loyal co-operation with the Maghzen and to France.

The *Bataillon d'Afrique* (penal unit) has been disbanded, what remains of its personnel being sent to Tunis.

Of the new railway line from Algeria to Morocco the press reports that the section Oudjda to Guercif has been opened to traffic and will be open for normal use in 3 months.

Tafilalet Area.

The occupation of the Tafilalet continues to bring about the submission of large numbers of families. Bel-Kacem N'Agid is now reported at Zegdou, 200 kilometres east by south of Tafilalet, and 70 kilometres east of the Draa. Towards the end of January, Monsieur Lucien Saint, the French Resident-General in Morocco, travelling by car through Itzer, Midelt and Erfoud, visited the advanced posts in the Gheris and Ferkla valleys and held a review of troops, including the Foreign Legion, French artillery and armoured cars and native auxiliaries, in the oasis of Tafilalet. The establishment of posts along and on the flanks of the new line from Imiter to Erfoud is being continued, not without opposition. The post of Mecissi, 50 kilometres west of Tafilalet, was unsuccessfully attacked on 20th February, and a force moving from Ifech, on the north of the Ferkla plain, to establish a post at Bou Tarart was attacked by tribesmen from the north; these were driven off after hand to hand fighting, the French losses being 14 men killed, 2 officers and 8 men wounded. An officer with some auxiliaries was ambushed and killed at Touroug, near the junction of the Gheris and Ferkla valleys.

These operations will result in clearing the last obstacle to the suggested road and railway from Agadir by the Souss, Dades, and Ferkla valleys through Erfoud and Bou Denib to Algiers.

A working party on the new road to Akka, one of the passes through the Bani Mountains, 200 kilometres south-east of Agadir, was attacked on 26th January by raiders who, after being driven off by the covering party, were pursued southward across the desert by aircraft.

Spanish Zone.

A Decree dated 29th December 1931, provides for further changes in the administration of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco. This Decree confirms the duties of the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief, and defines the relationship between the military and civil powers, at the same time emphasizing the subordination of the latter. The main interest attaching to the Decree is the provision made in it for the creation of both civil and military political districts, and the reorganization of the political service generally. The political officer in a civil district exercises no military command; in a military district the political officer commands all native troops within its geographical limit and is a serving officer of the army.

ROUMANIA.

Military Estimates.

The military estimates for 1932 are for a total of approximately 7,914,000,000 lei (equal to about £9,700,000 at par) of which 4,357,000,000 lei appear in the ordinary, and 3,556,000,000 in the extraordinary budget. The total state budget is approximately 25 milliards of lei ordinary expenditure and 11 milliards extraordinary so that the military expenditure for all the fighting services represents 23 per cent. of the whole, as against 29 per cent. in 1931.

Considerable reductions have been effected from the level of last year's estimates, and for purposes of comparison a table of the two years' estimates is appended.

The policy has been to confine the ordinary estimates strictly to those items absolutely necessary to the bare maintenance of the services, all others being transferred to the extraordinary, which are liable to cancellation in case revenue fails to reach the level estimated.

Since the Finance Minister in introducing his budget stated that receipts were not expected to exceed 25 milliards of lei—a forecast which is considered if anything to err on the side of optimism—it is not plain whence funds will come to cover the extraordinary estimates, of which more than half is accounted for by debts incurred on the 1930 and 1931 budgets. All payments earmarked for contracts already entered upon have been included in the extraordinary budget.

Provision is made for the following establishment of officers and other ranks—

Officers (including Navy and Air Force)	..	15,765
Re-engaged M.C.Os. (including Navy and Air Force)	13,737
Civilian officials (including Navy and Air Force)		4,319
Conscripts (including Navy and Air Force)	..	118,924
Total (including Navy and Air Force)	..	<u>152,745</u>

U. S. A.

Department of National Defence.

In view of the fact that the new French Government includes a Minister of Defence, it is interesting to note that a Bill for the creation of a Department of National Defence is now being examined by a Committee of Congress.

The subject has been discussed at various times since 1923 and numerous bills have been introduced to Congress without success. However, the present sponsors of the Bill claim that it will effect large economies, an argument which carries great weight in these times of economic depression.

The proposed Department of National Defence would be in charge of a Secretary, under him there would be three Assistant Secretaries in charge of the Army, Navy and Air Forces. The present Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments have given evidence before the Committee of Congress which is examining the Bill ; both are opposed to it on the grounds that the present organization of the War and Navy Departments is the most suitable for carrying out the tasks required. The consolidation of the Army Air Corps and the Naval Air Service

under a single assistant secretary, instead of being under the War Department and Navy Department as at present, is strongly opposed by the Secretary of the Navy. On the other hand, the Chief of the Army Air Corps contends that consolidation would be beneficial, but that a thorough investigation must first be carried out as to how it should be done.

The Bill has got a considerable political backing and there is a possibility that it may fare better than its predecessors.

NOTES ON MILITARY REVIEWS.

“ BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES.”

Published by Imp. Typo. de l'Institut Cartographique Militaire,
Brussels.

Price, 1.50 Belga.

December, 1931.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War 1914—18.*

The chief interest in this article lies in the correspondence between Marshal Foch and the Belgian G.Q.G., which brings out once more the Belgian contention that their army always maintained its complete independence and was in no sense under Foch.

2. *Pages of the History of the Belgian Army in the Great War.* By Major-General Deschacht.

Quite an interesting account, particularly to those who have no knowledge or experience of these Belgian forts.

But one is left wondering whether troops properly entrenched in the open would not have achieved as much.

3. *The Citadels or Permanent Fortification of Antiquity.* By Major F. Delvaux.

A continuation of the series of articles on this subject which was commenced in the October number. It is well written and of distinct interest to those who make a study of ancient fortifications.

4. *French Provisional Field Service Regulations.* By J. V.

A continuation of the review of the new French Provisional Field Service Regulations which commenced in the November number.

5. *An "aide-mémoire" for Group and Section Commanders.*
By Captain Collin.

This article is an effort to simplify the tactical instruction of Group and Section Commanders. It seems a little complicated.

January, 1932.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War, 1914—18.*

An interesting account of the fighting on the Belgian front, north of Ypres on 17th April, 1918.

The German attack met at first with a certain success, penetrating to a maximum depth of 1,200 metres on a front of 2 kilometres. Here it was definitely checked and a well-staged counter-attack delivered the same day restored the Belgian position practically in its entirety.

2. *Pages of the History of the Belgian Army in the Great War.*
By Major B. E. M. Boutra.

Quite a well-told story of an affair of outposts on the Belgian front.

3. *The Battle of Kemmel, April, 1918.* By Captain Deruer.

An account of the French intervention in 1918 on the front of the British Second Army in Flanders. The author, Captain Deruer, a graduate of the French Staff College and at present employed at the Belgian Ecole de Guerre, was serving at the time in the French 28th Division, the first infantry division to be sent to General Plumer's assistance.

4. *The H. Q. of an Infantry Division at work preparatory to the occupation of a defensive position.* By Lieut.-Colonel B. E. M. Derousseaux.

An infantry division is detraining in the area of operations with a view to occupying a defensive position.

This is a detailed study of the necessary preliminary work of the H. Q. staff which has proceeded in advance of the bulk of the troops.

The article is very carefully thought out and has undoubtedly a certain instructional value, but it cannot of course take into account the innumerable unexpected happenings which contribute to the interest and instruction of an exercise of this sort in practice.

5. *The Citadels or permanent fortifications of antiquity.* By Major F. Delvaux.

This is the third of the series of these very interesting descriptions.

February 1932.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War 1914—18.*

A continuation of the series of articles on this subject, and deals with the events of the late spring of 1918 so far as these affected the Belgian front.

2. *The Battle of Kemmel, April, 1918.* (Captain Deruer).

Continues the account commenced in the January number. This article deals with the German attack and capture of Kemmel on 25th April, 1918, and is of considerable interest. The writer emphasises the mistaken policy of the French command in ordering offensive action by the divisions in the line in order "to give Kemmel some more air," even though they knew that a German offensive on a great scale was to be launched in a few days. These partial attacks by the French achieved no results, caused numerous casualties and great fatigue to the troops, and disorganized their defensive positions, and probably contributed in no small degree to the rapidity of the German success on the 25th.

The writer stresses the futility of the counter attacks (ordered by the 2nd British Army) of the 39th French and 25th British Divisions on the morning of the 26th, with no proper reconnaissance and no artillery support possible, but it is open to discussion whether these counter attacks did not justify themselves by achieving the disorganization of the further German attack planned for 8 a.m. on the same day. But when all is said, it was probably the German High Command who had lost their confidence in victory, who were quite as much responsible for the eventual failure of their offensive as the defensive measures of the Allies.

3. *The Man of Destiny.* (Lieut.-Colonel B. E. M. Van Overstraeten).

A review of Liddell Hart's "Foch, the 'Man of Orleans.'"

4. *Disarmament Conference.* (Major B. E. M. Diepenrykx.)

A short article explaining the armaments truce which preceded the present Disarmament Conference, together with the text of the French and British memoranda on disarmament addressed to the

League of Nations and an appendix containing a statement of the terms of service obtaining in the armed forces of the various powers. The author is well qualified to write on this subject since he is a member of the Belgian delegation to Geneva.

“ REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE.”

Published by Berger Levrault. Price, 5.50 francs.

December, 1931.

1. *The effort to reach a decision.* (Part IV.) By General Faugeron.

The difficulties of effecting a break through between 1914 and 1917 are fully dealt with. Owing to the length of the front it was never possible to fix the enemy reserves, and as no attack was staged on a front longer than 50 kilometres he was always able to bring up sufficient troops to block any gap. Only artillery could break down his wire and other defences and the extent of preparatory fire required gave sure warning of the front threatened.

2. *The Government and National Defence.* (Part III.) By Chef de bataillon Guigues.

Deals with the training and administration of the national armies.

3. *The 10th Russian Army and the Disaster of Augustovo.* (Part III.) By Colonel Aublet.

A pathetic story of the retreat of the army when both its flanks had been turned, with an amazing incident when the army commander refused a request of a corps to withdraw in a southerly direction as it would block the retreat of other corps, while at the same moment the Chief of Staff of the army was telegraphing a direct order for this withdrawal southward.

4. *The 1st Corps from Belgium to the Marne.* (Part V.) By Lieut.-Colonel Larcher.

Describes a night attack in massed formation by a brigade some three to four thousand strong on a misty night, which was entirely routed by a sudden outbreak of machine gun fire in some cases at 15 yards range; the disengaging attack by the 33rd Regiment, and the unmolested withdrawal of the whole corps on the 30th is well described. It is interesting to note that one artillery brigade, whose batteries had fired 900 rounds on the 29th, succeeded in completely

refilling their limbers and wagons by the morning of the 30th. The total losses of the corps were 3,500, including almost all the 2nd. Lieutenants of the latest batch from Saint Cyr, who had made the united vow to go into action wearing their plumes and white gloves. The troops felt they had gained a victory and the value of this victory was very quickly magnified in popular legend.

January, 1932.

1. *The effort to reach a decision.* (Part V.) By General Faugeron.

This instalment deals almost entirely with Ludendorff, tracing his career from the bold effort that resulted in the penetration of Liège, through his collaboration with Hindenburg on the eastern front, to his period of virtual supreme command of all the German forces from September 1916 up to the armistice. His successes in Russia, where twice he brought off his strategy of double envelopment led him strongly to criticise Falkenhayn's policy on the west, and not until taking over a supreme command did he fully appreciate the difference between fighting Russians and opposing British and French troops. A suggestion is made that by treachery Ludendorff was always aware of the Russian plans, but these were more probably obtained from the Russian wireless which was grossly misused (*c.f.* article in "Revue Militaire Française" of August, 1931), Ludendorff came in 1917 to rely on the submarine campaign and the defeatist propaganda rather than on his troops to obtain a decision. In 1918 when the collapse of Russia gave him numerical superiority on the western front, the author feels that his tactical successes led him away from his real strategic objective (*c.f.* article in "Revue Militaire Française" of July, 1931).

2. *The Government of National Defence.* (Conclusion.) By Chef de bataillon Guigues.

Describing further the immense difficulties of organization of the National Armies, and the drastic disciplinary laws which were passed but were of little avail owing to their not being enforced. There was the greatest difficulty in producing maps, for although the plates of the 1 : 80,000 survey of France had been sent from Paris to Brest, the Government at Tours was not informed and they were never used. The author draws the lesson that improvisation is more dangerous and only sound organisation can ensure security.

3. *The 1st Corps from Belgium to the Marne.* (Conclusion.)
By Lieut.-Colonel Larcher.

Follows the continued retreat from Guise to the Marne which was successfully covered by a weak cavalry rearguard. The author sums up by saying that this corps had covered 350 kilometres, had fought three battles in a month, and had met nothing but success. It is of interest to note that in July, 1914, Marshal Franchet d'Espérey had told his officers that the war which was then imminent would be bitter and costly and would last several years.

4. *The 10th Russian Army and the Disaster of Augustovo.*
(Conclusion.) By Colonel Aublet.

Follows the movements of the 20th Corps up to its being completely surrounded on 21st February. The losses of this corps were some 75 per cent. of its effectives in killed, wounded and prisoners.

5. *Organization of defence on the wing of an army.* (Part I.)
By General Chauvineau.

The writer, who is at present Commandant of the Engineering School at Versailles, and was formerly Chief Instructor in Engineering at the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*, considers in detail the tactical and technical questions of the preparation of defensive lines against a threat of flank attack. The problem of defending river lines is carefully argued, the decision being in favour of an outpost line along the obstacle with a main line of resistance drawn back so that the attackers have to deploy after crossing the river; the position should, however, be sufficiently near for the defending artillery to be able to fire on the river crossings and in front of the main line of resistance without changing position. The distribution of technical personnel and of working parties is fully gone into, and detail of the work to be executed will be dealt with in later articles.

REVIEWS.

"The Soldier and the Empire." By Captain F. P. Roe, F.R.G.S., A.E.C.
(*Gale and Polden, Ltd.*) 5/- nett.

Captain Roe has been inspired by the new syllabus in "Educational Training" (1931) which lays down that the soldier shall have a knowledge of the Empire as it is to-day, the part played by the Army in acquiring it in the past, and the Army's share in maintaining and protecting it. Particular attention must also be paid to Regimental History. This is a very wide field for one publication, and in compressing it into a book of 271 pages the author of necessity has had to guard against too much detailed description. The result is therefore an outline only and instructors will have to turn to other sources if they wish to give a thorough grounding in the subject. The style is simple and easy to read but the thread is often broken by accounts of how units acquired Battle Honours. On page 123 the Sikh Wars are dismissed in four lines and the paragraph ends by saying "Eight British Regiments of the line and three Cavalry Regiments carry this name (Sobraon) on their colours." One can imagine that this subject of Battle Honours presented many difficulties. In most cases they are not stressed to such an extent as to occupy valuable space, but an exception is an account of how the Twenty-eighth Foot acquired the privilege of wearing the "back badge" in 1801, and how this badge was increased in size by the gallant behaviour of a battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment in the Great War. As the Author remarks it is an extraordinary example of the maintenance of tradition in a Regiment, but its description rather breaks into the narrative of "The Acquisition and Consolidation of the Empire." Imperial Geography is touched on and the chapters dealing with Canada, Australia and New Zealand contain notes on immigration.

Besides a general index there are useful indices to battle honours and regiments and the book contains a number of interesting illustrations in monochrome and colour. Captain Roe has provided a text book which will be of help to instructors who have to teach the new syllabus, but a bibliography would be a valuable addition.

J. E. H.

Armaments Year Book (Special Edition).

(LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA). 7/6.

This is a special edition of the Armaments Year Book prepared for the use of the delegates to the Disarmament Conference. It gives the organization and composition of the various armies in a more condensed form than the usual edition which makes it a much better reference book for students. The paragraphs in the various monographs on the "Main characteristics of the Armed Forces" and "The organs of military Command Administration" are the most interesting and give the ideal potted reviews required by staff college candidates.

The Budget figures, however, lose much of their interest in that there is no means of comparing the percentage of the total Budget devoted to defence by the various powers.

As a standard reference work this special edition of the Armaments Year Book should be in all Libraries.

H. S.

Historical Record of the 4th Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment.

(PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION).

This is a well-produced battalion history. The Bhopal Battalion has existed, under various names and with one small break in continuity, for well over a hundred years; and it was high time that some of its actions and traditions were put on record. To my mind this book (about 175 pages, crown octavo) is just about the appropriate size for the history of an Indian battalion; and the subject also has been treated in an appropriate manner.

On a few points the book requires some supplementing and correcting. Doubt is expressed (p. 3) whether Captain James Johnstone (whose name is wrongly spelt) was the first British officer commanding. He *was*, however, Commandant from 1825 to 1828 *vide* Major V. C. P. Hodson's *List of Officers of the Bengal Army*, Vol. II, p. 563. The name of Captain Cawthorn is correctly spelt at p. 160; but wrongly given at p. 141; and is omitted from the index.

Indeed, the index has not come well out of the few tests to which I have put it. The Colours of the Bhopal Contingent Infantry, which are stated to have disappeared in 1886 and not to have been traced, are now in the Royal United Service Museum in Whitehall, where I have myself seen them.

There are some useful and clear sketch maps ; but no illustrations. As regards the early part of the history, which was compiled over twenty-five years ago and is an admirable outline, insufficient revision would appear to have been carried out in the light of subsequent works, such as Col. C. E. Luard's *Bhopal State Gazetteer* (1908) and Major Hodson's monumental book already quoted. But these are small blemishes on a record which is well above the average of Indian regimental histories in the quality of its presentation.

H. B.

Note.—Copies are obtainable from the Adjutant, 4/16th Punjab Regiment, Droah, Chitral, at Rs. 15-10-0 each and from Messrs. Gale & Polden, Aldershot, at s. 21/6.



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
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
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CONTENTS.

Secretary's Notes.

Editorial.

1. The Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1932, by Lieut. R. G. Thurburn.
2. Pre-war, by "Mouse."
3. Dardistan, by Colonel H. L. Haughton, C.I.E., C.B.F.
4. The Present International Economic Crisis and the Gold Standard, by J. B. Taylor, Esq., I.C.S.
5. Shooting in the Central Provinces, by A Forest Officer.
6. The Battles of the Masurian Lakes, by Lt.-General N. Golovine.
7. A Spasm, by Phoenix.
8. A Hold-up in Anatolia, by Captain F. R. Greer.
9. The Burma Military Police and the Rebellion in Tharrawaddy, by Captain J. F. Bowerman.
10. The Travels of Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan, II.
11. The American Civil War 1861-62, by Longtimber.

Letters to the Editor.

Military Notes.

Reviews.

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7. In order to assist members studying for Military Promotion or Staff College Entrance Examinations, the Institution has obtained a number of Tactical Schemes with Solutions, and a series of Precis of important Lectures. These Schemes and Precis are issued to members on payment of a small charge. Lists of Schemes and Precis with their prices are given in the Secretary's Notes.

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
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OCTOBER 1932.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Editorial	427
1. The Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1932	439
2. Pre-War	451
3. Dardistan	459
4. The Present International Economic Crisis and the Gold Standard	469
5. Shooting in the Central Provinces	489
6. The Battles of the Masurian Lakes	493
7. A Spasm	510
8. A Hold-up in Anatolia	522
9. The Burma Military Police and the Rebellion of Tharrawaddy	538
10. The Travels of Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan, II	543
11. The American Civil War, 1861-62	554
Letters to the Editor	572
Military Notes	578
REVIEWS.	
1. The Desert Column	587
2. The Indian Ocean	587
3. Indian Infantry Colours	588
4. Passing it On	589

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 Colonel F. Dickins.
 Colonel P. W. L. Broke-Smith, D.S.O., O.B.E.
 Lt.-Col. S. R. Wason, M.C.
 Major R. T. O. Cary, M.B.E.
 Major J. J. M. Soutar, O.B.E.
 Major H. S. Woods.
 Captain T. I. Bate.
 Captain A. G. Bennett.
 Captain P. C. Bullock.
 Captain N. Burgan.
 Captain J. H. C. Currie.
 Captain S. G. Gardiner.
 Captain E. R. Greer.
 Captain N. O. Hill.
 Captain J. E. Hirst.
 Captain R. T. W. Macleod.
 Captain E. J. Montgomery.
 Captain J. R. Morris.
 Captain J. Y. E. Myrtle.
 Captain S. F. H. Williams.
 Lieut. G. E. R. Bastin.
 Lieut. A. Boyce.
 Lieut. H. G. Fowler.
 Lieut. C. I. V. Jones.
 Lieut. N. H. Kindersley.
 Lieut. N. M. W. Kyle.
 Lieut. H. L. Lendrum.
 Lieut. E. McDonald.
 2/Lieut. J. C. E. Bowen.
 2/Lieut. P. E. H. Latham

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9. A. M., until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 plus postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
The Historical Record of the 4th Bn. 16th Punjab Regiment	.. 1931 ..	
Indian Infantry Colours	.. 1931 ..	Capt. H. Bullock.
The Handbook for the Indian Army	1932 ..	Lt.-Col. W. B. Cunningham.
Dogras.		
Administrative Schemes with Solutions	.. 1932 ..	S. W. Kirby and C. A. P. Murison.
The Elements of Rifle Shooting	.. 1932 ..	J. A. Barlow.
The Desert Column	.. 1932 ..	I. L. Idriess.
Lectures on F. S. R. III Operations between Mechanized Forces.	1932 ..	Maj.-Genl. J. F. C. Fuller.
Passing it On Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the N. W. Frontier of India.	1932 ..	Genl. Sir Andrew Skeen.
Military Report on Ceylon	.. 1932 ..	Official.
Military Report on Malaya	.. 1932 ..	„
A Short History of British Expansion, Part I.	1931 ..	James A. Williamson.
British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898—1914, Vol. VII.	1932 ..	G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley.
India and the British	.. 1932 ..	Patricia Kendall.
The Statesman's Year-Book	.. 1932	
Marlborough	.. 1932 ..	Sir John Fortescue.

- The History of the Russian Revolution, 1932 .. Leon Trotsky.
Vol. I.
- Honest Doubt—Or the Price of Modern 1932 .. Ernest J. P. Benn.
Politics.
- The Strength of England .. 1926 .. George W. F. Bow-
les.
- Military Law, 18th edn. .. 1932 .. Lt.-Col. S. T. Bann-
ing.
- Military Organization and Administra- 1932 .. Col. W. G. Lind-
tion, 12th edn. sell.
- Survey of International Affairs .. 1931 .. Arnold and Toyn-
bee.
- Strange Intelligence-Memoirs of Naval 1931 .. H. C. Bywater and
Secret Service. H. C. Ferraby.
- Ludendorff—The Tragedy of a Specialist 1932 .. Karl Tschuppik.
- The Game of Politics .. 1932 .. Phillip G. Cambray.
- The Caste System of Northern India .. 1931 .. E. A. H. Blunt.
- The Recovery—The Second Effort .. 1932 .. Sir Arthur Salter.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

- Fear and be Slain Seeley.
- Last Days of the German Fleet Freiwald.
- Life of Lord Carson, Vol. I. Marjoribanks.

**VI.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examina-
tion Students.**

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below, there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list, he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—The Great War, General History.

- Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).
The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).
The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).
At G. H. Q. (Charteris).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

The Empire at War (4 Vols.) (Lucas).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

The First World War 1914—1918 (Repington).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Fifth Army (Gough).

The last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

With the Turks in Palestine (Aaronsohn).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman—Manifold).

How Jerusalem was Won (Massy).

The Desert Mounted Corps (Preston).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

Naval and Military Despatches . . A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.

Report of the Dardanelles Commission. Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I, Vol. II (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) . .
Dardanelles Campaign (Nevinson)
The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (Wester Wemyss).

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—OTHER BOOKS.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917 (Staff College).
The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).
Notes on the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Kearsey).
A Chapter of Misfortunes.
My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).
Mesopotamia, 1917—20, Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).
Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).
Story of Waterloo (Hutchinson).
Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).
With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).
Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).
Waterloo (Ropes).
Campaign of 1915, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).
Waterloo Campaign (Maguire).
Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).
Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).
Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.
Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).
A Study of the Waterloo Campaign ("Tacticus").

7. *Marlborough's Campaigns.*

- History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).
 Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).
 The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).
 John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).
 Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).
 A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).
 The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).
 Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—09 (A. Kearsey).
 Marlborough : The Portrait of a Conqueror (Chidsey).
 Marlborough (Fortescue).
 Six British Battles (Belloc).
 England under Queen Anne (Trevelyan).

8. *The American Civil War.*

- Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).
 History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).
 History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).
 A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861—62 (A. Kearsey).
 The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).
 History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).
 Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).
 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).
 Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).
 Sherman (Liddell Hart).
 The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

9. *The East Prussian Campaign.*

- Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).
 Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).
 My War Memories (Ludendorff).
 Tannenberg (Kearsey).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account : The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military),
3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

A Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Hamilton).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the
Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10
maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

Short Account of the Russo-Japanese War ("Footslogger").

11. *Napoleon's Italian Campaign, 1796-97.*

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12. *Organization of the Army.*

A.—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SINCE 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-
General Sir W. H. Anderson.

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Empire and the Army (Fortescue).

B.—FORCES OF THE EMPIRE.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective
Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies,
Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

C.—FOREIGN ARMIES.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

- The Strength of England (Bowles).
- Splendid Adventure (Hughes).
- Empire Government (Nathan).
- New Imperial Ideals (Stokes).
- How Britain is Governed (Ramsay).
- Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).
- The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).
- The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).
- The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).
- Cambridge History of the British Empire (Vols. 1—6).
- Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).
- Rise of the British Empire (Moncrieff).
- The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
- The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
- The Origin and Growth of the British Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
- The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
- England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—BOOKS ON SPECIAL PORTIONS OF THE EMPIRE OR WORLD.

- The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).
- General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
- India in 1929-30.
- India in 1930-31.
- Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
- Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
- The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
- Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
- The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
- History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
- The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
- International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
- What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
- Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

- Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
- Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
- Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
- Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).
- Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).
- Imperial Military Geography (Lee).
- Military Geography of the British Commonwealth (Salt).

TACTICS.

15—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, 1st and 2nd Series (Kirby and Kennedy).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh).

Lectures on F. S. R. III, 1931 (Fuller).

VII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College Examination by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1932 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering members are requested to give the subject of the schemes required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

Continuous Exercise No. 1 "Message Writing,"	
with solution	Re. 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 2 "Order Writing,"	
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 3 "Advance Guards,"	
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 4 "Appreciation,"	
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 5 "Attack Orders,"	
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 6 "Defence," with	
solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 7 "Defence," with	
solution	„ 1/-
(NOTE.—A copy of the map, which is same for all the above Exercises, can be had on payment of Rs. 2/- extra).	
Strategy and Tactics No. 1, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Strategy and Tactics No. 2, with map and solutions	„ 3/8 (Rs. 1/8 without map which is the same as for S. & T. paper No. 1).

Strategy and Tactics No. 3, with map and solutions ..	Rs. 3 8
Cavalry Exercise, with map and solutions ..	3/8
Tactical Exercise—Night withdrawals, with map and solutions ..	3/8
Mountain Warfare, without map and solutions ..	1/-

VIII.—Precis of Lectures, etc.

Military History.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) ..	1/8
The Third Afghan War (1931) ..	1/8
The Palestine Campaign, I (1920) ..	1/8
The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) ..	1/8
American Civil War (1920) ..	1/-
The History and Organization of the Empire (1932) ..	-/12

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the Influence of Modern Inventions on Warfare (1932) ..	-/12
Tactical Lessons of the Great War (1932) ..	1/8
Cavalry, I (1932) ..	-/8
Cavalry, II (1932) ..	-/8
The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930) ..	-/8
Artillery, I (1932) ..	-/4
Artillery, II (1932) ..	-/4
Engineers, I & II (1932) ..	-/12
Tactical Employment of Tanks (1932) ..	-/12
Armoured Cars (1930) ..	-/8
Chemical Warfare (1932) ..	-/8
Night Operations (1932) ..	2/-
Frontier Warfare (1932) ..	1/8
Air Co-operation (1932) ..	-/12

Military Law.

Military Law, I (1932) ..	-/4
Military Law, II (1932) ..	-/4
Military Law, III (1932) ..	-/4
Military Law, IV (1932) ..	-/4
Specimen Military Law Paper (1932) ..	1/-

Organization, Administration and Transportation.

Mobilization (1932) ..	-/4
Reinforcements in War (1932) ..	-/4
Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—Specimen Examination Paper with notes (1932) ..	1/8
Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—Specimen Examination Paper (1932) ..	1/-
“ Q ” Services in Peace (1932) ..	1/8
Movements (1932) ..	1/8

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	Rs. 1/-
Supply of a Division in War (1932)	1/8
Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	1/-

General.

Notes on Military Writing (1932)	-/4
Essay—Specimen Paper (1932)	1/-
Hints on Working for Examinations (1930)	-/8

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:—

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—*concl'd.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk, will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award).

- 1889 .. BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).
- 1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
- 1891 .. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFOLD, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N. W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH, THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013 Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALLY, Maj. H., R.E.
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
- 1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concl'd.*).

- 1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
- 1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
- 1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
- 1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
- 1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
- 1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
- 1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
- 1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
- 1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
- 1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
- 1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
- 1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
- 1926 .. DENNYs, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
- 1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
- 1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
- 1929 .. DENNYs, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
- 1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
- 1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).

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EDITORIAL.

In his pay bill for the month of November 1931 every officer in the employ of the Government of India found himself
The Cut in Pay. confronted for the first time by that unwelcome item, "Deduction on account of temporary ten per cent. cut in pay." He was told that the condition of Indian finances was such that this sacrifice was demanded of him as much by patriotism as by necessity, and he accepted it on those grounds, comforting himself with the assurance that it *was* temporary. He has now had ten months' experience of this reduction in his income, and he would be more than human if, as the year draws to its close, he were not wondering whether these reasons of patriotism and necessity still hold, or whether the time is approaching when it might wisely and safely be demonstrated that the cut was indeed temporary.

The truth is that the officer, especially the junior married one, whether civil or military, has found the effects of the cut much more serious than was anticipated. A good deal of nonsense has been talked, usually by those whose experience is limited, about the high standard of living amongst European officials in India, but no one who had any first-hand knowledge of conditions in the ordinary station believed that the average married couple wasted much of their substance in riotous living. Nevertheless when the cut fell upon them, the official and his wife started off optimistically enough to "reduce their standard of living." It was then that they discovered there

really was not so very much that they could reduce. They could not move into a smaller house—there were no smaller houses and the hotels of India are as expensive as they are bad. Servants were already reduced to the minimum unavoidable in a country where one domestic is permitted to do only a quarter of a man's work. The expenses of a hot weather separation could neither be avoided nor substantially reduced. Something could be saved by cutting out the short drink before dinner and by strict rationing at other times, by giving up the occasional dinner party to their friends, by passing on a fraction of the cut to their servants, and by bitter wrangles with the *khansamah*. But the sum total of their efforts—and they did make real, honest efforts—was grievously small; few of the larger items of the family budget could be seriously touched. Rent, servants' wages, regimental subscriptions, income-tax, family pension funds, clothing, stores bills, education and insurances, all were as before; any slight reduction in one was counterbalanced by increases in others. Indeed with increased customs duties and higher income-tax, the cut was in practice found to be fifteen per cent rather than ten.

After doing their best to reduce expenses to the utmost practical limit in a tropical country, it is safe to say that there are no junior, and few even comparatively senior Government officers, with families and without private means, who do not find it desperately difficult to provide for their children's education. Either the children are at Home—and there has been no cut in school fees—or they are still in this country and, if they are to have any hope of future schooling, money must be found for their educational insurance. The amount that could be spared for such educational and for life insurance was calculated before pay was cut, but the same premia must still be paid from the reduced pay. This has been one of the main factors in upsetting the family budget, and it is not often realized in how many cases the insurance policy has had to be pawned to cover either an overdraft at the bank or its own premium. On the surface things may not seem so very changed—less entertaining, families that stay longer in the plains, a greater keenness to get any job with a little extra pay; beyond this all is much as it was. But underneath is a growing anxiety as to what will happen if the overdrafts go on increasing, month after month, year after year. *The cut may be temporary, but if it continues much longer, its effects will be permanent.* For most married British officers of every Service in India the alternatives are a

gradually increasing indebtedness with all that this entails in anxiety, ill-health, discontent and loss of efficiency, or a restoration of the cut in some form.

It is not only because of the increasingly serious position of the individual officer, but because of its adverse effects on the contentment and efficiency of the Services as a whole that every possible avenue of alternative economy should be explored in order that the cut may be restored. Above all things it is essential that, before legislation to prolong the cut over another year is brought forward, it should be conclusively shown that its retention is necessary for the financial stability of India. Compared with a year ago the financial position of India has vastly improved. Civil disobedience with all its cost in disturbance and delay in collecting revenue is practically dead; agricultural prospects are on the whole good; drastic economies made in expenditure should produce a balanced budget. Unless there is some unexpected deterioration in the political or commercial situation the restoration of the cut ought not unduly to strain India's resources in 1933.

As far as the Fighting Services alone are concerned, there are good grounds for the belief that, in spite of the immense reductions in defence expenditure of recent years, ways could be found, even within the present reduced budget, to restore the cuts. If this for political or other reasons is not considered feasible it is to be hoped that, in the interests of efficiency, the temporary grant of some form of Children's Allowance will be considered. In England, not only is the cut actually less as it does not include allowances which form a large proportion of the Home pay, but married men with families receive substantial remissions in income-tax which have no counterpart in India. Failing the restoration of the cut, the grant of a Children's Allowance to British Officers and Officials in India would do something towards brightening a domestic financial outlook which grows more and more gloomy.

* * * * *

Mr. Gandhi was steadily becoming an example of the proverb, "Out of sight, out of mind," when, in masterly fashion, he regained the centre of the stage by his dramatic fast. In the spate of press articles dealing with his action there has been more than a tendency to overlook one very important thing. Mr. Gandhi had announced that he would die a hundred

The Untouchables' Bargain.

deaths to remove the cruel and degrading disabilities that his fellow Hindus inflict on the Untouchables. If, then, he had decided to starve himself to death unless these disabilities were removed he would have had strong claims to sympathy, certainly to the sympathy of all Englishmen. But, however, much he might express concern for the Depressed, the fact remains that he was not fasting until their ghastly social and religious oppression was removed, but until they were deprived of separate electorates. This was the essence of the whole matter. Mr. Gandhi might want, as he said he did, the social degradation of the Untouchables relieved, but he did not want this to anything like the extent that he passionately desired them to be deprived of separate political representation. For the first he would preach ; for the second he would die. It almost seems as if the Politician had got the better of the Saint.

At any rate, the direct result of Mr. Gandhi's intervention has been the settlement of the dispute between the Untouchables and the Caste Hindus on the subject of representation in the Legislatures. At first sight the agreement reached might be hailed as a complete victory for the oppressed. Some English newspapers have even gone so far as to declare that it marks the end of Untouchability and the beginning of the break-up of the Hindu caste system. A study of the terms of the agreement would have shown them how false this view was. It is a political compromise, not a charter of social reform. At the beginning of the negotiations the Depressed Classes' leaders stood out for the grant, not so much of political safeguards, as of social concessions. Suddenly, for reasons best known to themselves, the social and more important side of the question was allowed to drop and the discussions fell to the level of mere political adjustment. Under the threat of Mr. Gandhi's suicide the Depressed Classes have given up their separate electorates, and in return have received an increase in the number of their members in Provincial Councils from some 71 to 148. On the face of it this should greatly strengthen their representation, but in practice the advantage is doubtful. In London Mr. Gandhi opposed the reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes just as he opposed their separate electorates. Now, while still prepared to die if separate electorates are allowed, he has changed his mind and accepted the reservation of seats. It is permissible to wonder why. Possibly an answer may be found in the method by

which the Depressed Classes' members are to be chosen. The Depressed Classes will first hold a preliminary election amongst themselves at which they will choose four candidates for each of the seats allotted to them. These candidates will then submit themselves to the joint electorate of Caste Hindus and Untouchables. This is where the danger lies. Of the four chosen candidates it is unlikely that the Caste Hindus, with their immense social, religious, and economic hold over the Depressed Classes, would fail to ensure that at least one was pliant to their wishes. At the final election they will be in a majority and can invariably elect this candidate. The result will be that, while actually of the Depressed Classes, the elected member will too often be the nominee and tool of the Caste Hindus. In ten years even the poor safeguard of the preliminary election is to vanish, and it will then be impossible for a Depressed Classes' member to secure election unless he obtains the Caste Hindu vote, and he will not obtain that if he presses too strongly the social claims of his own people. There can be little doubt that the Depressed classes would have secured better and more real representation under the Government award, even with its fewer seats, than under the present arrangement.

While they have thus in reality done little to strengthen their political position, the Depressed Classes have obtained no social or religious concessions by this Agreement. There were at one time hopes that they would wring a guarantee from the Caste Hindus of such elementary rights as freedom to enter temples, permission to draw water at public wells, equality in schools, and the like. There is no mention of these in the Agreement; it deals purely with political matters. It expresses the pious intention that there should be no disabilities against the Depressed Classes for election to local bodies or public services and that every endeavour should be made to secure them "fair representation in these respects subject to educational qualifications." In practice this will mean exactly nothing. The only item of the Agreement which is not purely political is the last which lays down that in each Province from the total grant for Education an adequate sum shall be allotted to the Depressed Classes. It is safe to say that if these sums ever materialize they will be used to segregate the Outcastes in separate schools, and thus to perpetuate their social inferiority.

The Untouchables would do well to examine the bargain they have made. Mr. Gandhi may honestly believe that, in return for the

questionable concession of more seats in the Legislatures, they can safely entrust their future to the brotherly love, so newly awakened, of the Caste Hindu, but others will have their doubts. It may be that by his vociferous professions of love for the Untouchables and horror at the wrongs inflicted on them, the Mahatma has antagonized the strictly orthodox Brahmanical section of the Hindu community, but the practical effects of his sympathy do not seem to have gone far. However that may be, Mr. Gandhi is in an agreeable position. To the Hindus he can claim to have saved their political supremacy at the cost of little or no social or religious concession ; to the Untouchables he can pose as the sympathetic friend who has obtained for them increased political representation at the expense of the Caste Hindus.

* * * * * *

While the rest of India has shown a most satisfactory return to more normal conditions, in Bengal outrage has followed outrage. At first most of these Terrorist crimes had as their object the theft of arms or money ; then to an increasing degree the murder of British and Indian officials became their aim ; now the avowed intention is the indiscriminate slaughter of all British, Anglo-Indians and loyal Indians, irrespective of age, sex or occupation. The Terrorist Party has announced in its leaflets that it is as anxious to murder European children as it is foully to do to death their parents. It has adopted the methods and ethics of the mad dog—and there is only one treatment for mad dogs.

The trouble is of course to apply the treatment. The number of active Terrorists, as distinct from mere conspirators, is small, but they are drawn from a very large class and outwardly of course are indistinguishable from the mass of young middle class Bengali Hindus. Having committed his crime all that the Terrorist has to do is to sink back into the crowd and to leave the Police to try and pick him out from the thousands of apparently identical young men. Considering the immense difficulty of this task and the handicaps under which they have laboured, the wonder is, not that the Police have achieved so little, but that they have done so much in their campaigns against Terrorism. For it must be remembered that this is not the first attempt in Bengal to paralyse Government by organized assassination. From 1908 Terrorist activities, culminating in political dacoities and murders, increased to such an extent that in 1916 Government was compelled to make full use of the powers of the war-time Defence of

India Act. Armed with these, in two years the Police broke up the organisation, and, by 1919, Terrorist crime had practically ceased. In that year the Defence of India Act lapsed and the Terrorists gradually resumed their underground activities, until in 1923 there was another outbreak of political murder, which left the British Labour Government with no alternative but to approve the issue of the Bengal Ordinance of 1924. This Ordinance was incorporated in the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act 1925, and, while not nearly as powerful a weapon as the Defence of India Act, did confer on the Police powers which enabled them by 1927 to master the Terrorists. There were no assassinations in that year or in 1928. The Act, however, lapsed in 1930, the Police lost their powers, and Terrorism once more broke out with the Chittagong Armoury raid. Terrorist activity thus clearly follows a definite cycle. First, the stage of underground conspiracy; next the sudden outbreak of violent political crimes, with which, under the ordinary law, the authorities are unable to cope; then the grant of special powers to the Police and a hard struggle, lasting usually about two years, until the Terrorist organization is smashed and assassinations cease. After this the special powers of the Police are withdrawn or allowed to lapse, interned Terrorists are released to rebuild their organizations, and the whole wretched cycle repeats itself.

Depressing as this review of Terrorist activity and Government counter-action is, it might be anticipated from it that the present outbreak should be overcome by about 1933, but it must be confessed that this time the struggle promises to be more prolonged. The reasons for this are plain. The Civil Disobedience movement, although crushed, has left behind it a legacy of disrespect for the law, increased to contempt by the dilatory and undignified proceedings of the conspiracy trials. Added to this has been the virulent, mendacious and in Bengal almost universal press campaign of racial hatred, conducted by Congress and rendered possible by the repeal of the Press Act in 1922. This propaganda, unchecked for nine years, has resulted amongst a wide section of Bengal Hindus in a mentality which regards political assassination with sympathy or at least with apathy. Congress bodies, like the Calcutta Corporation, while paying lip service to non-violence, have not ceased in practice to condone and excuse, and thus to encourage, the cold blooded murder of officials. It is this almost complete lack of a healthy public opinion amongst middle

class Bengal Hindus which makes the stamping out of Terrorism so much more difficult to-day than formerly, and the first task must be to induce a sounder attitude towards crime in the ordinary population.

In this Government should have the active help of every Indian politician, but it is evident that in many of them the necessary physical and moral courage is wanting. All the more honour and encouragement is therefore due to those who realize that to combat Terrorism is the best service any Indian can now render his country. In addition to the organization of public opinion, it is evident that a thorough overhauling of the Bengal educational system is needed, even though the full effects of this might not be left for some years. Finally, while anything in the nature of indiscriminate reprisals is to be whole heartedly condemned, it is time that the inexplicable leniency that the courts have shown to those convicted of murderous crimes should cease. There is much to be said, too, for the enforcement of some form of collective responsibility. The sins of the children might with justice and effect be visited on the fathers, who, especially in the Hindu family system, cannot divest themselves of responsibility. So much for the guilty and their sympathisers ; there remains the vast number of inoffensive citizens who would willingly see an end to this murder campaign but who, fearing the Terrorists' vengeance, refrain from any action. Steps must be taken to convince these people that the resources of Government are not at an end and that they will not suffer in the future if they now refuse to countenance assassinations.

One of the main objects in the recent despatch of troops to Bengal is to inspire this confidence. In many parts of Bengal it is decades since a soldier has been seen ; no wonder many believe that, beyond the Police, Government has no means of enforcing its authority. The sight of troops will correct this. They are not being sent to occupy a hostile country but to restore confidence amongst the general public. They will in addition, of course, especially assist in the protection of Europeans, and, by relieving the over-worked police of many duties of a semi-military nature, will liberate them for their proper tasks of tracing and arresting criminals. Few duties are more distasteful to the soldier than those that fall to his lot when called to act in aid of the Civil Power, and the inconvenience and expense entailed by the move to Bengal are considerable. But all these will be accepted

cheerfully in the knowledge that the Army is doing something to safeguard Europeans, women and children, and to support those British and Indian officials and Police whose conduct and courage in the face of constant danger and difficulty have been the admiration of the Fighting Services.

* * * * *

Recently there passed almost unnoticed an event which will have more effect on India's future than many a political crisis that has filled the newspaper headlines—on 1st October 1932 the Indian Military Academy was opened.

The Army was fortunate in finding in the Railway Staff College at Dehra Dun a building, that with some alteration was well suited for its purpose, in a locality which enjoys a good all the year climate and offers ample training facilities. In March last preparations to receive the first batch of Gentlemen Cadets commenced, and it can be imagined that to start such an undertaking from the very beginning is no light task. Any doubts as to whether enough suitable cadets would be forthcoming were set at rest by the applications to sit for the first competitive examination in July 1932. There were only fifteen competitive vacancies, but 430 candidates offered themselves, and this in spite of the fact that the local civil officials carefully considered each applicant before submitting his name. A preliminary Admission Board selected 104, who in turn were reduced to 68 by the Interview and Record Board. The fortunate 68 then competed in the written examination and 61 of them qualified. Of these the first obtained 68 per cent. of marks in the whole examination and the fifteenth 57 per cent.—results which compare favourably with the scale of marks obtained by former Indian candidates for Sandhurst. It is interesting to note the communities from which the first fifteen cadets were drawn :—

Mahomedan	6
Hindu	4
Sikh	2
Parsi	1
Indian Christian	1
Anglo-Indian	1

To these fifteen have been added another fifteen cadets selected from well-educated and young non-commissioned and Indian officers of the Indian Army, and ten more nominated by Indian States. The Academy, therefore, opens with forty cadets.

For the first year cadets will be organized into two companies ; for subsequent years as numbers increase into four companies. The course is to be one of four terms (2 years) for Indian Army Cadets, and of six terms (3 years) for other entrants. This shortened course for a proportion of the cadets introduces a considerable complication into training and it remains to be seen whether the military experience of the Indian Army cadets will compensate for a year less study. The new Academy has to train for all arms of the Service and is thus confronted with the difficulty—and a very real one—of combining in the same syllabus instruction given separately at Woolwich and Sandhurst.

But these, and a hundred other difficulties unavoidable in such an undertaking, cannot fail to be surmounted by a team composed of the Commandant and his Staff, all picked officers from the Army in India, and the Gentlemen Cadets, young men whom a rigorous selection has ensured are representative of all that is best in India.

NOTICE.

As the Institution has enjoyed a particularly successful year financially the Council has decided to assist officers suffering from the cut in pay by temporarily suspending the Entrance Fee. Officers may now become full members on payment of the annual subscription of Rs. 10 only. As a further concession those joining now will not be charged any further annual subscription until January 1934.

Members are earnestly asked to bring these advantageous terms to the notice of non-members.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1933.

The Council has chosen the following alternative subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1933 :—

(i) **“With the tendency of modern Military Organization towards Mechanisation, the increasing complexity of modern weapons and the dependence of troops on their maintenance services, it is asserted by many that Regular troops are losing the degree of mobility necessary for the successful performance of their role on the North-West Frontier.**

Discuss how this difficulty can be overcome so that freedom of action and tactical mobility are assured in the Army in India.

or

(ii) **“Discuss the tactical employment of Light Tanks,**

(a) with Cavalry

(b) with Infantry

in both the plains of India and in the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier ; particular reference should be made to the problems of Maintenance and Supply.”

(NOTE.—For the purpose of this essay the following may be assumed :—

Organization—Light Tank Company of 3 sections each of 7 tanks ;
1 Company Commander's tank and 3 reserve tanks.
Total 25 tanks.

Crew of Vehicle—2.

Armament—One ‘303”. Vickers gun (Special tank pattern).

Ammunition—3,000 rounds ‘303”.

Armour—Capable of resisting ordinary ‘303” ammunition, ‘303”
A. P. and shrapnel.

Speed average—Across country. 4—12 m. p. h. Road and track
20—25 m. p. h. Reduced to 15 in convoy.

Crossing power—Trench 5 feet. Water 2 feet 6 inches.

Climbing power—Slope—1 in 2½. Perpendicular obstacle—2 feet.

Circuit of Action—Road approximately 100 miles.

Petrol fill—20 gallons.

The following are the conditions of the Competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and Auxiliary Forces.
- (2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1933.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has offered a Special Prize of Rs. 150/- for the best essay submitted on subject (ii). This prize is in addition to any awarded by the Council.
- (8) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1933.
- (9) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (10) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1932.

The judges appointed for the 1932 Competition, viz., Lieut.-General Sir Walter S. Leslie, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., Sir David Petrie, Kt., C.I.E., C.V.O., C.B.E., M.A., and Mr. G. R. F. Tottenham, C.I.E., I.C.S., have given first place to the essay submitted by Lieutenant R. G. Thurburn, 2nd Battn., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles). The Council of the United Service Institution of India has, accordingly, awarded a gold medal and Rs. 150/- to Lieut. Thurburn.

The essay submitted by Captain M. C. T. Gompertz, Indian Army Service Corps, was placed second in order of merit.

SUBJECT :

“ Disarmament, and its effect on the foreign policy of the British Empire.”

BY LIEUT. R. G. THURBURN, 2ND BN. THE CAMERONIANS
(SCOTTISH RIFLES).

I.—The Foreign Policy of the Empire.

Political tradition in Great Britain has long placed the conduct of foreign affairs outside the arena of party politics. The resultant continuity of policy which has ensued in our relations with foreign powers has consequently been a cause of envy by those peoples pursuing less stable courses. Any international arrangement or agreement which is likely to cause a departure from our settled policy becomes, therefore, a matter of considerable concern to the Empire in general and to such bodies as, for instance, the Committee of Imperial Defence in particular, whose business it is in the last resort to implement our foreign policy by recourse to armed force.

Prior to the twentieth century the foreign policy of Great Britain, could be summed up, in Lord Salisbury's phrase, as one of “ splendid isolation.” The Victorian era had witnessed a gradual but steady consolidation of the Imperial power, and at the same time a commercial expansion not previously imagined. Contemporary events in Europe and outside of it—the American Civil War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-German War, the Italian risings, and the Russo-Turkish War—had not inclined the people of Great Britain to view any closer contact with foreign nations as either desirable or necessary. ‘ John Bull ’ was the acknowledged strong man : his influence could be felt

without the necessity for intimate partisanship. But with the new century a new situation forced statesmen everywhere to reconsider the position. Commercial rivalry and nationalistic cravings for expression became stronger with each passing year.

The currents of world politics forced the Great Powers into the two groups which struggled for mastery during 1914—18. It was during this period that the Dominions of the British Empire came of age, a fact which was definitely recognised in the opinion of the world by the separate representation allotted at the League of Nations. Any question affecting the foreign policy of the British Empire to-day is one, therefore, which affects not only Great Britain, but the entire group of nations and dependencies which comprise that Empire. The Statute of Westminster has further elaborated their independence in this respect, nor does any provision apparently exist as yet for co-ordinated action in an emergency other than by the tedious and clumsy methods of general consultation.

The position is further complicated by the fact that Great Britain is a signatory to treaties guaranteeing armed action in Europe on the side of one State attacked by another, treaties to which the Dominions are not necessarily parties, and that should the necessity for British intervention arise, such action might be undertaken by Great Britain alone, or with the partial adherence of the Dominions. Such a situation arose in Chanak in 1922, when conflict with Turkey appeared likely, and yet all Dominions were not prepared to co-operate.

The tendency of late years has been for the British Empire to draw its component parts closer together, and to act in greater concert as a force for world peace, but while such treaties exist as require military action by Great Britain the possibility of isolated action on her part must be considered.

Europe apart, situations arise from time to time necessitating armed action by Great Britain. Such action may or may not be carried out with the concurrence of the self-governing Dominions, and in the first instance is bound to be done without their military assistance. Such situations have arisen since the German War; in Afghanistan (1919), Iraq (1920), S. Kurdistan (1922—20), Shanghai (1927), and recently in Palestine and Cyprus. Any one of these situations might have developed to a greater extent than it did and have thereby necessitated the employment of larger forces.

A very brief consideration of the diversity of races in the Empire and the varying standards of their development will suffice to indicate the nature of present and future difficulties. In addition, the peculiar nature of Imperial communications, maintained almost entirely by sea and air, renders our supremacy in these directions a matter of vital concern to us. Russia and the United States of America, the States nearest approaching the British Empire in territorial size, are compact and almost self-contained. They do not lie under the necessity of safeguarding many thousands of miles of shipping routes, canals, naval bases, aerodromes, cables, and the host of means whereby the safety of the British Empire is secured in time of war.

It will be seen, therefore, that the problem of the Empire, in considering the armed forces which are to be maintained in peace to deal with unforeseen emergencies such as the above, is world-wide and therefore not comparable with that of any other nation.

The position in 1932 may, then, be summarised thus : the first requirement of Imperial policy is peace. The expansion of trade, the exploitation of the vast undeveloped areas and resources within the Empire, the capture of the world's commercial markets, are present aims only to be secured by an unmolested period of peace. But obligations undertaken to safeguard existing treaties may not always allow of unfettered and independent action. On the other hand, to secure peace the Empire is prepared to act in unison on the side of any movement or nation working to that end. Difficulties are bound to arise : *e.g.*, the Sino-Japanese conflict divided the Empire in that Canada and Australia were both anti-Japanese in virtue of their geographical position, while Great Britain was pro-Japanese because of her old and well-tried alliance with that people.

It must be remembered, too, that in foreign eyes the British Empire is still one unit, and that isolated action by Great Britain or by a Dominion is not to be contemplated. Similarly, hostile action against any one Dominion, whatever the Statute of Westminster may proclaim, is still war against the King, and must involve the whole Empire.

It has been shown, then, that the question of the foreign policy of the British Empire must be treated as a special case in world politics, involving as it does considerations not applicable to any other country, and having aims as dissimilar.

II.—International Cross Currents.

It has been said above that the main interest of the British Empire lies in the furtherance of peace. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Empire is in the fortunate position of being the richest and strongest power in the world. We possess one quarter of the earth's surface; untold wealth lies in areas undeveloped as yet, in many cases barely populated; while the dominant position of our commerce and shipping is the labour of centuries. We, therefore, have much to lose and little to gain by embarking on any policy of military or territorial aggrandisement.

Such, however, is not the case with a great many of the nations of the world. In Europe alone the aftermath of the German War has left a wreckage of thwarted ambitions, strangled trade, fettered economic systems, and struggling populations for which no territorial outlet exists. Germany has lost her colonies, her rich provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, Polish Silesia and the Corridor; Austria is having the breath crushed out of her by a ring of hostile states; Italy is gravely perturbed to find an outlet for the overflow of her population, and does not find that France is an easy neighbour in the Mediterranean and in Africa; the Balkans, always the powder magazine of Europe, require only the spark of financial assistance to be at each other's throats again. The United States of America, for long the dumping ground of surplus Europeans, has by a rigorous curtailment of immigration reduced her degree of usefulness in this respect to a negligible proportion.

Asia has recently provided an object-lesson in the effects of trade and population on foreign policy. Japan has admitted that her territorial limits cannot hold her increasing millions; furthermore her economic position prior to the recent conflict with China was being seriously prejudiced by anti-Japanese propaganda. What the issue may be in Manchuria cannot at the moment be accurately forecast. The U. S. A. and Australia are barred to her; her friendship with Great Britain and America has hitherto precluded any risk of open hostilities with these nations, but no student of history would venture to rule out the possibility. Russia, in the event of the failure of her Five Year Plan, may find herself forced into war to bolster up the credit of her communistic system, if war is not entered upon to further her commercial interests. The smaller states of Afghanistan, Persia, Iraq

and the Hedjaz may with increasing modernisation and contact with Western methods find themselves involved in armed competition in the struggle for existence.

Nor must the possibility be excluded of some new Napoleon or Jenghiz Khan arising, aflame with ambition to raise his country to a level of power hitherto unattained, or to display his own talents to an astonished world. The history of nations is the history of individuals, and the development of civilisation can be measured by the cycles of appearance of some human meteor who has raised or retarded the progress of humanity for a space of time. We cannot assume that the standardising influence of modern civilisation can be extended to the standardisation of a human type.

It must not be too readily assumed that such possibilities as are given above are the products of an imagination too easily stimulated. An age which has evolved the submarine and the aeroplane, wireless telegraphy and broadcasting, may well produce many other human developments equally astonishing, which could affect the march of history.

It will be agreed that the prospects for world peace, when candidly reviewed, present many disquieting features. International rivalries when urged by economic factors have always been the gravest source of danger. Financial exhaustion or depression at present precludes active hostility to most nations. But nations sometimes have no option in these matters, and are forced to embark on a line of action by causes beyond their control. We in the British Empire, which finished so well in the race for colonial possessions and which is now in the comfortable position of the successful business man regarding the plight of less fortunate competitors from the security of a well-furnished home, must not forget that we are the object of envy and strenuous competition on the part of many nations. To these we represent a giant guarding the entrance to the Promised Land—and perhaps, in some eyes, a giant of straw.

III. Disarmament Proposals.

Many attempts have been made throughout history to introduce a period, if not of permanent peace, at any rate of minimised opportunity for war. An example, induced as much by economic motives as by undue optimism, has always been given by Great Britain. After the wars of Marlborough the army was reduced and, under the

chloroform of a lengthy period of peace, so neglected that when next called upon to exercise its influence in a theatre of war it was quite unable to do so. The financially and morally wasteful system of hiring mercenaries had to be resorted to once again. Such disarmament as this proved, therefore, an expensive and useless procedure, which was certainly not justified.

The Napoleonic Wars found the army once more in a pitiful state. National lack of interest in the services combined with miserly financial administration had shamefully bruised if they could not break the spirit of the soldier. After 1818 when the last troops returned from the occupation of France the usual process was carried out of cutting down establishments to the minimum. Not many years passed before men began to say that the age of universal peace had arrived. They conveniently closed their eyes to such minor disturbances as the wars in India, the French conquest of Morocco, the Piedmontese struggles, and many other pacific indications. The great Peace Exhibition was held in Hyde Park in 1851. Three years later Great Britain was engaged in one of its bloodiest struggles in the Crimea. The people paid full measure for the neglect and decay into which the army had been allowed to fall, and the bitter lesson of the casualty lists, largely due to preventable causes, amply discounted the measure of disarmament adopted after Waterloo.

Longsighted men, towards the end of the nineteenth century, foresaw the inevitability of the German War, and in 1914, for the first time in her history, Great Britain entered upon hostilities with an army, too small, no doubt, but fully prepared and efficient. The previous lessons of experience show that it is impossible to pursue a line of policy without the ability to back it up by force of arms if need be. This country has always had the determination which has enabled it to carry through its policy, but it was not always a certainty that it would be carried through. Financial strength alone permitted it.

Experts may question whether the Sumerian or Babylonian civilisations were not greater and more advanced than ours: yet the eventual result was the extinction of each by force of arms. The utmost refinement in manners and culture, the height of science and education, the acme of mechanical and biological progress, are all of no avail against the sudden attack of a hostile power, determined to achieve a greater position in the world. Qualities such as those

instanced above may assist in staving off the blow for a brief period, but lack of preparation against a possible evil cannot be remedied every time after hostilities have begun.

It will be admitted, then, that what is chiefly desirable is disarmament of the spirit of aggression rather than a demobilisation of men or the "scrapping" of ships and weapons. But in view of the imperfect nature of humanity in general, it is perhaps advisable to begin with tangible propositions.

The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 inaugurated the League of Nations, which is not yet, however, a league of all the nations. The United States and Russia are the most notable absentees from its councils. The Disarmament Conference embraces a wider scope, since the delegates include representatives from States which are not members of the League. The chief difficulty in the execution of any international agreement made at the Conference and ratified by the respective Governments appears to lie in the lack of any guarantee that the measures decided upon will be carried out by every country. As far as the League of Nations is concerned, pressure may be brought, as is known, upon members to fulfil their obligations; such action, however, cannot be undertaken with regard to non-members.

This matter is one of very real difficulty; for the whole question of disarmament may be summed up in the word 'Security,' and any nation might feel disinclined lightly to discard its powers of effective defence when such action is not general and simultaneous.

The Treaty of Versailles, while reducing the Central Powers to a condition of military impotence, did nothing to impede the victors from maintaining or developing their armed forces as they wished. The signatories to the Treaty, however, subscribed to the principle of a reduction of armaments, a reduction which it was to be "one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

Since 1919 little has been done except as regards naval disarmament. In this respect a marked advance was made in international relationships by the demilitarisation of a zone in the Pacific Ocean and Far East, within which no further fortifications may be constructed, and by the proportional regulation of the size of the fleets and warships of the Great Powers. As regards land and air forces, in most cases an increase rather than a reduction has taken place. But the Preparatory

Commission for the Disarmament Conference which concluded in December, 1931, produced a Draft Convention upon which the Conference which assembled in February, 1932, would be enabled to base its work.

In addition, the Conference in session has had before it a number of proposals, made by different countries, which vary considerably in principle and plan. Although these proposals are fluid, being the subject of discussion during the summer, the relationship of Disarmament to Imperial foreign policy must vary according to the degree and nature of the former. Before we can consider the effect of one upon the other, we must briefly summarise these proposals.

Naval.

1. Extension of scope of Washington and London agreements.
2. Abolition of submarines.
3. Reduction in size of warships and naval guns.
4. Abolition of capital ships and aircraft carriers.

Military.

1. Abolition of chemical warfare.
2. Limitation of effectives by most practicable course, not necessarily ruling out conscription.
3. Abolition of heavy guns above a certain calibre.
4. Abolition of tanks.

Air.

1. Protection of civilians against } aerial bombardment.
Abolition of }
2. Abolition of military aircraft.
3. Internationalisation of civil aviation.

General.

1. An international Police Force, or League Army, with the control of heavy bombing aircraft, long range artillery, large warships and heavy submarines.
2. Total disarmament.

Such, in outline, have been the principal proposals put forward, some of which, if carried into effect, may very vitally influence the well-being and safety of the Empire. The variations of this aspect of the situation must now be considered.

IV. The Proposals and the Empire.

Naval. It has been continuously pointed out, that the warship most suited to our needs is the cruiser. As was shown above, our communications, under which our trade routes are included, are world-wide and therefore unlike those of any other nation. Our ability to reinforce any part of the Empire, no less than the route by which our food supplies reach Great Britain, must be secure. With the ability to despatch troops to any part of the world in safety, there is the means of striking a rapid blow in the maintenance of our foreign policy. Examples of this have already been given.

The necessity for fast cruisers on our part is, therefore, obvious. The day of the heavily armed capital ship has passed, if indeed a case for its necessity could ever be claimed in the light of our war experience. Nor do we require submarines, which, in the hands of a determined enemy, are a grave menace, to our trade routes and convoys. But conflicting interests are likely to cause these weapons to be retained.

We may say, then, that the naval proposals for disarmament, provided our cruiser strength or tonnage be not further restricted, will not affect our policy.

Military. There is a considerable danger here, that the Conference, in seeking to render war less horrible and more difficult to begin, will have made it cheaper and at the same time rendered it more difficult to reach a decision on either side. The proposed abolition of so many effective weapons spells another deadlock such as was witnessed in France from 1914 to 1918. The abolition of chemical warfare, almost universally subscribed to, deprives every nation of the disposal of a humane weapon, properly used. The abolition of tanks deprives an army of the only method by which it could, in modern war, compete with hostile fire power and gain a decision. It is futile to class tanks and heavy guns, as weapons of offence and so to deprive both attackers and attacked of their most effective weapons. The defenders will then be at the complete mercy of any attacking state which has devised a new weapon, which history shows as the answer in such situations.

As regards Great Britain, the instrument for the execution of her foreign policy, should such be required at any time, becomes immeasurably weakened. We have not a large army, and therefore it must be all the more mobile. To deprive the Army of tanks, apart from the increased casualties which would result in war,—(this aspect does not

appear to have been considered at Geneva)—is to increase its difficulties. Firearms and weapons generally are becoming increasingly efficient and armoured mobility as a protection as well as a means of avoiding utter stalemate has become a complete necessity in modern war.

There are other aspects attached to the abolition of tanks and heavy guns, but it would be irrelevant to discuss them in this essay.

As regards limitation of personnel, a reduction below present establishments would place the British Empire in the position of inability to honour her treaty obligations should the necessity arise, and is referred to later.

Air. Whatever decision is reached by the Conference in regard to military aircraft, the fact remains that the aeroplane has proved itself a necessity not only as a link of Imperial communications, but as a cheap and useful means of warfare. Iraq and the North-West Frontier of India have shown what effect aircraft can have in controlling large areas, in reinforcing threatened points, in supplying troops with food and stores, in the evacuation of personnel, including wounded and women, apart from their uses as a means of aggression, such as an aerial bombardment. The effects of the latter are often not as violent as perhaps is claimed. While there can be little objection to placing the bombardment of open towns or the civil population as beyond the bounds of civilised warfare, the aeroplane must remain a weapon of war without which we, with our special conditions, cannot guarantee the peaceful maintenance of our policy. It must not be forgotten that the moral influence of an air squadron, like a warship, can be of incalculable value in the prevention of hostilities before a dangerous situation becomes definitely beyond control.

In regard to aircraft generally, it must be remembered that the lead in civil aviation established by Great Britain is due to its control by a Service Ministry, and that it is through military aviation that the notable advance in flying reliability has taken place.

General. Theoretically speaking, an International Police Force, made up of proportionate contingents from all the Powers, and having at its disposal the only heavy bombing aircraft and long range artillery in existence, backed up by the only large warships and submarines, the whole controlled by a League Council, must be able at any time to crush resistance and punish any offender against the peace of the world. When coldly examined, however, the practical difficulties are seen to be incalculable in their effect. How will a Council make

rapid and clear decisions? How enforce them when made? How are international jealousies to be curbed, international sympathies and prejudices suppressed, so that the League army will work as one? It is possible to visualize a hundred difficulties. If the plan were workable, then its effect, so far as the British Empire is concerned, would be beneficent, for the main interest of the Empire, as already stressed, is peace.

That Total Disarmament lies within the range of practical politics at this stage in the world's development is an idle dream, and need not be discussed.

V. The Future of our Foreign Policy.

The two issues before the world to-day are those of War and Peace. As emphasized more than once already, the foreign policy of the Empire is based on the maintenance of peace. Any form of disarmament which conduces to a continuance of peace and the unhindered development of modern civilization is welcome to us. But it has been seen that some forms of disarmament would weaken the Empire and by so weakening it would render it less of a force for peace than it is to-day. Just as the law is generally respected because of the police which are maintained to enforce it when necessary, so it is essential that our position in the world, our policy and our aims, should be respected because maintained by a force not only strong enough but capable of executing its function when called upon to do so.

Again, the proposals that have been made at the Disarmament Conference are based upon the establishments and weapons which are known to be in existence to-day. But the greatest weapon of war—surprise—cannot be dealt with. It is possible to remove so-called aggressive weapons from the permitted list for armies: but a state intending to attack its neighbour may, and probably will, devise a new aggressive weapon, and the last stage of the disarmed nation will be worse than the first. One cannot disarm Surprise, or Necessity, well known as the Mother of Invention. This is a point which we cannot afford to overlook.

Situations may arise in the future for which the forces of the Empire, as regulated by the Disarmament Conference, may not be of sufficient strength. The close and constant co-operation of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Foreign Office is required, that time may not be lost by the necessity of referring matters to an International Board of Arbitration which would possibly not deal with them in sufficient time to be of use.

History shows that disarmament in the past has not availed to prevent us from going to war when the necessities of our policies required us to do so. We cannot to-day rule out the possibility of war, although the Locarno and Paris Pacts have immeasurably strengthened the cause of peace. Moreover, in the last hundred years we have, as a nation, generally avoided alliances or entanglements binding us irrevocably to intervention in the disputes of other nations; to-day, on the other hand, we have obligations which might quite easily lead to our participation in a conflict not immediately concerning us. In this connection one should bear in mind the gradual formation of two camps in Europe, which has been in progress since the German War. On the one side stand France, Poland and the Little Entente, pledged to the maintenance of the existing Peace Treaties. On the other side are Germany, Hungary, Italy and those countries whose claims to a revision of the Peace Treaties have been by many admitted as just.

Great Britain, it must be recognised, holds the Balance of Power. She is pledged with her late Allies to uphold treaties. Her sympathies and influence might bring about the peaceful revision of the latter. Meanwhile, her foreign policy must be based on the dual requirements of peace, and friendship with all nations. Should her armed forces fall below the strength requisite to an influential voice in the councils of the world, her policy cannot be supported and disarmament to this extent would spell impotence, with the consequence of disaster.

Contemporary history shows the dangers (as much as the advantages) of immediate disarmament, unless carried out faithfully by all nations of the world. But how is this to be ensured? Those nations which have lost the most in the last war may well feel that another appeal to arms cannot produce more intolerable conditions than those under which they now live. They may regard disarmament by the major powers as a Heaven-sent opportunity to improve their present circumstances. Nor can we yet say that all wars are necessarily evil. They have been fought, may yet be fought, for great ideals. Nor do the feelings of humanity invariably coincide with the dictates of policy.

We may conclude, then, that disarmament for the British Empire beyond the present scale is not a justifiable action, in that the Empire, which is to-day the greatest force for peace in the world, might not then be in a position to exert its authority in the maintenance of that peace.

PRE-WAR.

BY "MOUSE."

(" In the days before the war, my boy, the regiment was a wonder ; we wore full-dress and the officers knew sword drill ; we played polo, we entertained Lord Curzon, who gave me these cuff-links ; we spoke the vernacular of our men—(Ho ! Khitmagar. Bring some more whisky-soda and jaldi lao, tum.)—I used to know Pushtoo and Punjabi. We didn't waste our time and money going to dances and buying motor-cars. When we did dance we used to take four collars and another shirt. We shot tigers ; we stuck pig ; we never drank cock-tails—(Ho ! Khitmagar. Kis waste the whisky-soda not bringing ?)—those were the days, my boy, those were the days. Bungo ! " Extract from the conversation of a pre-war officer bent on the improvement of my mind after dinner.)

This is not going to be one of my serious, uplifting articles. I am for the nonce going to take sides with the junior officer and try to express some of his feelings ; those feelings, beliefs and impulses which antagonise his seniors and which often lead to misunderstanding between them. I may be extravagant, I may be unfair, but I will try to be truthful, and if I succeed in making some senior officers laugh at themselves and thereby flex their heads to a more tolerant view of their juniors I shall have accomplished my object. Years of service have taught me that there is nothing really wrong with our seniors, except their age.

There is a thing called " The Pre-war Tradition " that gets my goat. It is a mixture of Victorianism and perverted snobbishness born and bred in those spacious days when the Army was at the peak of its social and political importance. Those days are no more, but the tradition still lingers. Mark you, I am not decrying the traditions which make the Army what it is. I grant whole-heartedly that the magnificent histories of the British and Indian Armies must be preserved with the most religious and rigorous fanaticism ; I grant that those armies can now afford to cock snoots in respect of training and discipline at any other forces in the world ; I grant that we are all devilish fine chaps, but.....My grievance is far less important and yet looms daily on the mental horizon. I don't like being button-holed by some elderly military officer who

was at Sandhurst at or even before the date that witnessed my birth, and being told by him that : " We never did *that* before the war, my boy." By " that " he by no chance ever means a purely military evolution or a question of tactical training. No, it is always something far more hideous. Like drinking a vermouth before dinner, or riding a motor bicycle or wearing a white waistcoat with a dinner jacket. The more one listens to senior officers the more one realises what amazingly fine fellows they must have been when young, and what low little worms we all are. Although I am aware from my researches into psychology that this superior attitude is a normal result of advancing years and that I too, in fifteen or twenty years, will succumb to the same ailment, nevertheless I feel that the present generation, who grew middle-aged in the maelstrom of the war, deserve consideration from their elders and begetters.

Our seniors were damned lucky. They lived their soldier's life in that halcyon period between the Boer wars and 1914. The profession of arms for seventy-five per cent. of its devotees was a pleasant diversion between shooting goals off horses and tigers off elephants. England experienced unexampled prosperity and prestige throughout the world. Her Government did not always appreciate the growing menace of Germany, but fortunately there were forces working in the background to forge her small army into a perfect instrument. The handling of that instrument in the initial stages prior to its embarkation from England might have been better done—(unhappily Mr. Churchill was at the Admiralty and I was at school at the time,)—but its wonderful development and its sheer indestructibility are now the greatest marvels in English history. I can never make out, even from our official Historians, how much this was due to the brilliance of our Generals, the statesmanship of the British Government, Mr. Lloyd George, or the British soldier. Personally I think they were all very lucky, and privately I think they all owe a lot to the obscure platoon commander.

The final results of the Great War, disregarding the results which might have been if we had lost, are :—

- (1) An impossible debt to America.
- (2) The alienation of the Irish Free State, Egypt and India.
- (3) The growth of the hideous thing, Democracy.
- (4) The reduction of the British Navy.
- (5) And now, a ten per cent. cut in my pay.

Indeed, the only sound thing that the war seems to have produced is the Manhattan cocktail. And yet, in spite of this dismal reckoning you find pre-war officers going about boasting of the good old days which engendered these lamentable results for their sons and daughters. I do not for one single split second wish to blame soldiers for these pathetic results. I have read far too many of those nauseating debates in Parliament not to understand that the average senior general has a devilish hard roe to chew. (The House of Commons ought to have two hard-bitten soldier permanent members—one a Gunner and the other a Cavalryman, for these arms have a greater exuberance of language—whose job ought to be deliberate interference in service debates.)

But what I do wish to say most respectfully is, why do pre-war soldiers assume infallibility? They do not intrude this attitude militarily, for they now realise that such puritanism has only one decoration—a bowler hat—but they do insist on it socially and almost regimentally. Surely this is an absurd anachronism. I do not profess to have complete faith in my arguments and I am writing them mostly for my own amusement, but there are so many *jadoos* in Indian regiments particularly, so many religious rites and so many minor tyrannies imposed by the pre-war generation that I think it is only right to give them expression :—

- (i) Ceremonial Parades.
- (ii) Mess Regulations.
- (iii) Horses.
- (iv) Social Customs.
- (v) Entertainments.
- (vi) Motor Cars.

Ceremonial Parades. *Bang!* Twice a year every Indian infantry regiment undergoes the supreme and futile torture of a Ceremonial Parade. Prior to the auspicious event it suffers the valuable refinement of practice parades. Irrespective of the fact that half its complement may be engaged on the arduous guard duties that fall to the lot of every battalion on either internal security or frontier service; disregarding the different duties performed by an infantry unit in the plains and, say, a Gurkha unit in its quiet hill station; and supremely indifferent to the exigencies of our complicated modern training, what do our pre-war soldiers expect? They invite all their lady friends and give them awnings and car parks and then convey

all the words of command to the harassed infantry by the dipping of a flag over a horse's ears. The wretched soldiery comply with the various requests to the best of their ability and are enraged at their sheer inability to put up a Guardsman performance. It is not their fault. The Guards are not expected to furnish nine guards, three inlying picquets, four fatigue parties and a patrol on their officers' wives with the temperature at 120° in the shade. I do not for one moment say that our pre-war officers insist on Guardsmen's precision, but why are they so huffed when they don't get it? The two annual ceremonial parades are a survival of those old days when soldiers in India could afford to spend their time in carrying out those Victorian evolutions designed to satisfy the multitude and based on the tactics of Inkerman and Waterloo. They now destroy the Christmas holidays of overworked officers, and in the hot weather lead to many men using intemperate language. Why does not somebody with a p. s. c. mind evolve a simple, dignified parade which will show equal precision, equal arms drill and equal discipline without the present hurting of every modern soldier's feelings?

Mess Regulations.—"An officer's real home is his mess," a senior officer once said to me, and then, when I dropped a trick at Bridge, asked me in exceedingly Victorian language why the hell I had trumped his ace. I replied that I had been thinking about the Staff College, and then had to spend the next two months going about like an archangel so as to obtain a satisfactory confidential report. Mess life in India is not homely. The paucity of officers, the large overhead expenditure, the extra pettifogging given to the officers on the mess committee, the parade dinner with all its attendant courtesies and Elizabethian refinements—it is no more like home than a Y. W. C. A. social. No wonder that the Indian Army is given to early marriage. The average pre-war officer thinks that if he gives a mess concession to his juniors—such as dining in a dinner jacket or allowing him to leave the table before the decayed wine has been circulated nine times,—the whole discipline of the regiment will collapse. I don't know why this apprehension exists unless it is that the pre-war officer was accustomed to drink more red wine than we young fellows can afford. Ordinarily in mess there is far too much formality, often too much "shop" and generally too much obsequiousness. For Guest Nights certainly bring up all your blood-stained history, your historical formalities, your regimental customs and your ruby

wines—but for the love of modern democracy let your ordinary meals be family parties where Second Lieutenant Snooks can dispute a point as easily and as courteously with his Commanding Officer as he would with his own father.

Horses.—The spring and genius of our army are in the English countryside and English sport of half a century ago. And the Golden Calf worshipped by our High Priests—mostly cavalry—(one of these days I am going to write about the Cult of Cavalry, or the Worship of Mammals and then there will be stars in my firmament and hoof marks on my fundament)—as I say, the Golden Calf worshipped by every aspirant of military glory and every sycophant of military nepotism is that ornamental but expensive locomotive, the horse. I don't want to be low, or hide-bound, or horizontally confined, but I would like to know why every soldier who wants to get on has, first of all, to get on a horse. The number of chaps at the Staff College who spend two miserable years being horsey so as to satisfy the Moloch of all the Mammals has got to be counted to be believed. (They know of course that it is a well invested penance, for the remainder of their service will be spent in upholstered limousines).

Judging from these bitter remarks the reader may think that I am in the Royal Air Force or the Royal Tank Corps, services whose contempt for mammals or camels is well-known. If I were an airman (the only difference between an Airman and a Cavalryman is that one of them has a good market for part-worn plugs)—I also would spit on horses. I would say thus to myself; “Here I am up in the air with a range of vision, manœuvre, and power of offensiveness unrivalled by any land-bound forces. I can go across country, jump fences, and achieve spectacularity; I can do everything the Cavalry do except pin butterflies or the enemy to his ground. With me up in the air, with my enhanced visibility, my bombs, my cameras and my roaring engines I can ensure and demand victory so long as the infantry forces protect my base. The Cavalry—Pooh!”

If I were a Tank officer—(the only difference between a Tank and a horse is that one needs elaborate seduction and the other a gentle tickle)—I would also distend my exhaust upon all quadrupeds. I would cock my beret over one eye and say: “To blazes with the prehistoric fauna of Marlburian days. These fox-hunting squires, these gaitered yeomen, these be-spurred generals, and these polo-playing exotics—why should they impose their antique whims and pre-

ferences upon the organisation which in this age of mechanisation is the only logical, the only necessary, and the only perfect instrument of war? The airy way these cavalry conservatives talk gives me prickly heat; thank heavens for Fuller's Earth. The Cavalry—Bah!"

Thus and thus would I talk if I held rank in either of these arms, even as they do. Unfortunately I belong to the lowest type of military life—the Infantry. I am an untouchable; nobody dare touch me for a fiver, and I dare not, alas, touch anybody either. I spend my life walking on legs too short for cavalry and on feet too big for clutches and accelerators. Yet, in spite of my grotesque appearance, my aversion to horses expressed in my written and signed preference for infantry as a cadet and my strained circumstances, I find that one of the greatest essentials to the advancement of my military career is horsemanship. All my military life it has been impressed upon me that to be an efficient officer one must have a horse. I have always had a horse, but it has struck me as extraordinary that the authorities who insist on these principles and these conceptions of soldiering insist with equal forcibility that an infantry officer is not entitled to a horse until he is a company commander. When one is thirty-six years of age or older it is not the time to gallop into Olympia and make one's equestrian bow. If a horse is a necessity for an infantry officer—which I fully grant it is—he ought to have one from his first infantile pip. The cavalry officer gets every encouragement to improve and extend his horsemanship; line ponies, orderlies, polo tournaments, the bliss of three months at Saugor, and the balm of Gilead or Girth gall, but what of his foot-slogging brother? He gets an indifferent remount or buys a perambulating screw; he tries to hunt on an untrained charger or to play polo on a couple of pensioned bazaar tats, and, just because he falls off on a New Year parade in front of the grand-stand, his regiment is for ever blasted by the General who comments—"The officers need more training in horsemanship."

The dice are loaded against the infantry officer; he has got to be able to march, to direct artillery fire, to co-operate with tanks, to observe from aeroplanes and to sit on a horse and be veterinary surgeon to mules. He has also got to win the war and sit on it when it is won, and after all this standing and sitting he invariably collects a raspberry from some senior officer because the tails of the mules of his Machine Gun Company are trailing below their hocks. It's a bit hard.

After all this tomfoolery I would like to say that I do like horses for their own sake. I have a few, none of which I am entitled to and none of which, *cela va sans dire*, I can afford. But we are like that in the infantry - dashing. The Cavalry - pish !

Social Customs.—An officer gets no married allowance until he is thirty ; a private soldier until, mark you, he is twenty-six. Why ? I am sufficiently conservative not to get socialistic at this proletarian decision regarding the respective amateness of the classes, but upon my Sam, I don't see why the pre-war tradition regarding the Age of Consent for officers should be enforced in the present enlightened age. The pre-war feeling is against early marriages because wives and families add burdens to administrative arrangements. The fact that such sentimental liaisons are normal biological phenomena common to all strata of humanity is lost upon the Victorian hierarchy who rule us, and who were brought up to believe that such connections should be arranged by Mama, Papa and God, all in their own good time. I admit that if I were a commanding officer I would prefer that all my officers were bachelors because then I would probably have them always on the tips of their toes for service and hard-work, but if ever I did command such a unique collection in India I would not be surprised to hear that they were all eunuchs. Some psychologist ought to examine the causes for so many young officers in the Indian Army being married. An inhospitable country, home-sickness, mess-sickness : and, as the Prayer Book says, " a remedy against sin." I do not profess to know, but I do think that the pre-war soldier who damns so fiercely and so volubly the present matrimonial tendency might well dig into his own conscience. I would hate to examine the *debris*.

Entertainments.—In the pre-war days they entertained. They exercised the human faculties for giving and receiving pleasure to and from their guests. They dined them and wined them. They gave them champagne, chartreuse, marsala and all those other drinks with which I am not acquainted. They gave them buggy rides. They gave them tremors, fits and spasms. They gave them fun and fashion.

We are too poor to do that. Instead of the ten course banquets, the truffles, the *pate de foie gras* and the tinned asparagus we give them sausages and eggs and bacon. We cannot afford the rich sherries, and so we tempt them with cheap continental vermouths disguised with lemon and bitters to hide the taste and decrease the cost. (We call them cocktails). We give them honest whiskies and sodas and achieve the same results. We kiss the girls too, but our amours rarely

lead to scandal. And we don't wear long moustaches and we don't pretend to be archangels.

Motor Cars.—Nothing enrages my official fathers so much as the sight of a motor car containing me. "In my day," they say, blowing up their chests in a vain attempt to deflate their diaphragms, "we never had motor-cars. We were content with a horse, a buggy, a brake, a railway train or an ox-wagon." And then they look at me as if I were a Maharajah expending all the tribute of my subjects in a fleet of Rolls-Royces. Actually, I may be giving a lift to our Second-in-Command who has got four children at school and wants to teach me my profession by way of a T. E. W. T. ten miles from cantonments. Being a bachelor I can afford a Ford and am only too glad to save my brother officers unnecessary fatigue. This pre-war hostility towards motors is really rather ridiculous. A car is not a luxury now; in India it is an economical necessity. From the professional point of view, an officer living in Army Mansions (because he cannot afford to compete with the growing class of Indian which is invading the security of cantonments) must have a car. He is separated from his barracks by three, five, seven miles. He has to appear on morning parades, and then at office, and quite frequently again in the afternoons. According to the pre-war conceptions of locomotion he ought to walk, ride, bicycle or use a tonga. Being modern he buys a dud car, and spends the remainder of his service lying awake wondering if the thing will start; and Generals call it a limousine. I have done the walking, the riding and bicycling (I could not afford the tonga) and I know how very seriously my efficiency was impaired. I used to sleep for hours and hours in office. The modern junior officer is worked far harder than his seniors were. He has not the time to idle about cantonments on a slow horse; he cannot afford the luxury of a tonga and he likes the fun of driving a car or riding a motor-bicycle. If he abuses the privileges offered to him by the conveniences of modern methods of transport by occasionally using his vehicle to take a pretty girl for a ride—well, point me out the general in the whole British Army who is not sorry he had only a tonga, or a bullock wagon, or a tandem or a hansom for exactly the same purpose.

In conclusion I would like to state that I notice a great deterioration in the class of young officers now being produced by our military colleges compared with what they were in my day.

DARDISTAN.

BY COLONEL H. L. HAUGHTON, C.I.E., C.B.E.

After an interval of nearly forty years another attempt has been made, this time by a German party, to reach the unconquered summit of Nangaparbat, that magnificent peak of nearly 27,000 feet, the western buttress of the Himalayas, round which the Indus sweeps to make its final turn southwards. The distant view of Nangaparbat is well known to many in Northern India, for it so dominates the mountains around it that it is possible to see it, not only from comparatively short distances such as from Gulmarg, but also on clear days from certain vantage points near Murree, Nathiagali and even from the Peshawar Valley. Not a few also know well the country lying this side of the great mountain and the approaches to it; but it has been suggested that readers of the Journal may be interested to hear something more concerning the country in the immediate vicinity, and of the people who dwell there.

The best known line of approach to the Gilgit Agency, in which Nangaparbat is situated, is from the Kashmir side over the Tragbal or Rajdhiangan Pass down into the Gurais Valley, and up again over either the Burzil or the Kamri Pass to Astor, and thence down into the Indus Valley beyond. Nangaparbat may also be approached from the Khagan side and the lower Kishenganga Valley by the Babusar Pass, which leads one to Chilas. There is another, but little used, route over the Mazeno Pass leading into the Indus Valley at Buner, between Bunji and Chilas; but this latter pass is so little used that further reference to it may be omitted. There are of course other routes leading into the Gilgit Agency which may be briefly mentioned—that from Chitral *via* Shandur Pass through Yasin to Gilgit itself, and the Central Asian route from the North-east *via* the Killik or the Mintaka Pass through Gujal to Hunza and thence down the valley of the Kanjut stream to Gilgit.

The route *via* the Gurais Valley and the Burzil is the best known and is the one which has been in general use from the earliest days, when the forces of the Sikh and Dogra rulers of Kashmir were endeavouring to keep a precarious hold upon part of that country which now forms the Gilgit Agency. The road is good, and in summer there

is no difficulty in crossing either the Burzil or the Kamri Pass, but this has not always been the case and men in Kashmir may still be found to speak of the horrors of the Burzil and the Gilgit road in early days, when the Kashmir troops depended upon forced cooly labour for all their supplies. On the Hattu Pir, round which the old road, if road it could be called, passed down to the Indus Valley at Ramghat, hundreds of those wretched coolies, ill-clothed, ill-fed and over laden, met their deaths from starvation and disease, until the place became a perfect Golgotha. In these more enlightened times, supplies for the Gilgit garrison are carried up yearly by hundreds of ponies, which are collected at Bandipur. As soon as the passes open, all ponies are carefully inspected by the transport officer in charge, and all weak or sore-backed animals are discarded so that the minimum suffering is entailed.

The Burzil and Kamri Passes are both between 13,500 and 14,000 feet altitude, but the Burzil generally opens earlier than the Kamri, as it seems to hold less snow. Given fine weather, there is little difficulty in crossing either of these passes, and a single man or parties of a few men lightly laden might cross during any month of the year. All the same the Burzil is reckoned to be a pass of ill-repute, and from time to time has been responsible for a considerable loss of life. In 1891 a party of Gurkhas proceeding to Gilgit was caught by bad weather on the pass and suffered many cases of frost-bite, and in the spring of 1907, the coolies, who were accompanying two officers on a shikar expedition, were caught by an avalanche and twenty-two of them were buried alive.

From Bandipur to the Burzil, the country is as beautiful as any to be found even in Kashmir. Magnificent forests of spruce and silver fir clothe the slopes on the mountains leading up to the Tragbal. The Tragbal Pass itself is perhaps unrivalled for the profusion of wild flowers to be found at certain times of the year. In the Gurais Valley at an altitude of about 8,000 feet grassy slopes and dense forests, broken by towering precipices on either side of the rushing Kishenganga lend an air of prosperous fertility; but actually the people of the valley lead a hard life, as the ripening of their crops at such an altitude is a matter of great uncertainty—in fact only certain hardy crops will ripen at all.

It is interesting to note that these people of the Gurais Valley are not Kashmiris but are Dards speaking the Shina language, of whom

more anon. Once the Burzil is crossed, the country changes. It cannot be said to be actually treeless, as it is practically true to say of the north side of the Zojila, for small stretches of forests do exist ; but generally speaking, on crossing from the south side to the north side of the range, one passes from a forest country into one of bare open hills.

The Gilgit Agency, in which Nangaparbat is situated, comprises a large part of the country often spoken of by the general name of Dardistan, and which includes many small States such as Gilgit, Astor, Hunza, Nagar, Puniyal and Yasin. It is a country which can perhaps best be described as stupendous. To some people it is very beautiful, with a hard almost awe-inspiring beauty of its own ; to others it is forbidding. The passes close behind them like vast doors cutting them off from civilization and all the normal amenities of life ; the vast mountains oppress and hem them in like prisoners in the narrow valleys ; to them the very grandeur and vastness of nature become terrifying. One can quite imagine that something such as this must have been the feelings of the unfortunate beings, who in early days were sent to penal servitude from Kashmir, and pushed across the Indus to fend for themselves. Many of these wretched Kashmiris were seized upon by Chilasis or people from Hunza and Nagar, and were sold into slavery in Chinese Turkistan ; but some managed to settle down, inter-married with low class people of the country, and their descendants may be found in Gilgit to-day. They are now hardly to be distinguished from the true natives of the country, and one man to whom I talked seemed to bear no ill-will on account of the punishment which had been meted out to his grandfather. I enquired what was the crime for which he had been transported, thinking that it might have been for killing a cow in Kashmir ; but I discovered that the culprit had been a butcher in Srinagar who had been caught out selling dog meat and calling it goat ! His grandson seemed to regard it as quite a good joke.

Perhaps the most curious convict that ever came to Gilgit was a cat. This cat, when rambling over the roofs of Srinagar, dislodged a tile or a piece of wood which fell upon a child's head and killed it. The cat was caught, tried and on being sentenced to transportation for life was taken up to Gilgit and pushed across the Indus. The delightful old Dogra General, who commanded the Kashmir troops in Gilgit when

I was there, told me the story and assured me that the cat, which must have been a lady, had many descendants still living amongst the cat population of Gilgit.

One more word only regarding the scenery. I have already described it as stupendous, even awe-inspiring, and this appears to be the impression it made upon the old Chinese travellers, who passed that way upon their pilgrimage to the Buddhist shrines in India. For it is of this country that Fah Hian writing in about 400 A. D. says "steep crags and precipices constantly intercept the way. These mountains are like walls of rock, standing up 10,000 feet in height. On looking over the edge, the sight becomes confused and then, on advancing, the foot loses its hold and you are lost." Another pilgrim, Sung Yun, writes "for over a thousand *li* there are overhanging crags 10,000 fathoms high, towering up to the heavens."

It is indeed a land of mighty peaks and deep, dark gorges, and it is said that within a radius of sixty-five miles from Gilgit, there are to be found, among a mass of innumerable smaller peaks, eleven of from 18,000 to 20,000 feet, seven from 20,000 to 22,000 feet, six from 22,000 to 24,000 feet, and eight from 24,000 to 26,600 feet. Everything is upon a vast scale. At times perhaps, standing upon some lofty spur, one's eye lifts from the sombre depths of the narrow gorges beneath to the sparkling snow-clad peaks above, silhouetted clear, sharp and silent against a deep blue cloudless sky. On some other day one may have the misfortune to crouch behind a rock for such poor shelter as it gives, whilst lightning flashes and thunder rumbles around one, a biting, wind-driven rain lashes the face, the roar of avalanches of snow, rocks and earth crashing down the mountain side rivals that of the thunder itself, and the clouds and mist whirl and writhe in a frenzied dance to the whistling of the tearing, shrieking wind. Then indeed does civilised man feel that he is but a puny creature and understand the superstitions of the untutored hillman who dwells in such surroundings and "sees god in the clouds and hears him in the wind."

Now let us turn to a consideration of Dardistan, and see if we can define what is meant by this term. Who are the Dards? Over what area do they extend? These questions, though they appear simple, are not by any means easy to answer. Dardistan, as we now understand the term, comprises the whole of Chitral, Yasin, Puniyal, Gilgit,

Hunza and Nagar, Astor, and the Indus Valley from Harmosh to Batera, the upper reaches of the Panjkora river and the Kohistan of Swat. The Indus Valley section may again be divided into two main portions—the upper portion being called Shinkari, or the country of the Shins, including Gor, Chilas, Darel and Tangir, and the lower portion generally known as the “Kohistan.”*

It is probable that in early times the Dards covered a very much more extensive area than they do at present, for they appear to have been sufficiently well known to be classed as an important tribe by ancient writers. They are mentioned in the Vishnu Purana and also by Arrian, who speaks of the Dardai, “who inhabited the mountains towards the eastern borders.” Ptolomey also speaks of them as living “at the sources of Indus,” and Pliny, referring to the gold still to be found in some quantities throughout the upper Indus Valley, writes “*Fertilissimi sunt auri Dardoe.*”

It will be noticed that Chitral has been included in Dardistan. The mass of the people there are Kho, speaking a language called Khowar, but the ruling families are Ronus, who are still the most honoured caste amongst the Dards. It is justifiable to think that Kho people themselves were at one time more widely distributed than at present if, that is to say, there is any connection to be traced between their name and approximately the same syllable which is to be found in the ancient names of rivers, such as the Khophen, the Kunar and the Khoaspes.

The Dard people in the Gilgit Agency may, broadly speaking, be said to be divided into three castes. After the ruling caste of the Ronus, already mentioned, come the Shins, and below them the Yeshkuns, and lastly a collection of low castes, such as Kamins, Doms, etc., who provide the millers, potters and musicians of the community. It is interesting to note that in marriage the Shins will give their daughters to Ronus and the Yeshkuns to Shins; but a lawful daughter is never given to a man of lower caste. This, and the whole caste system, seems to denote a close connection with Brahminical Hinduism.

It is impossible to deal in any detail with this difficult matter in a paper of this sort, but there are reasons for thinking that whilst the

* There are still one or two small colonies of Dards tucked away in the most remote valleys of Baltistan where they have maintained until this day their own language and customs in the midst of the Tartar population which has swamped them out of most of the country.

Kho people of Chitral may fairly be considered very early if not the actual original inhabitants of the country, the other Dards swept up from the direction of the Punjab in later times either completely submerging the aborigines, or driving them and the remains of previous waves of invasion into the inmost recesses of the hills. The first of these waves appears to have been Yeshkun and the second, Shin.

It is said that there are no less than eleven different dialects spoken in Dardistan, and their distribution appears to confirm the above view of the waves of Dard invasion. In Chitral, Khowar is the language generally spoken, and it is to be noted that there are no Shins or Yeshkuns to be found there; their respective invasions having presumably spent themselves before they crossed the Shandur Pass. In Hunza, Nagar and Yasin, the Yeshkun language, known as Burishashki, is spoken, whilst Shina, the language of the Shins, is spoken throughout Gilgit, Astor, Puniyal and Gizar—the most accessible valleys in which the Shins established themselves when they forced the Yeshkuns back into the inaccessible fastnesses of Hunza, Nagar and Yasin. It has been suggested that the Yeshkuns may be descendants of the original Yuechi, those Scythian tribes who conquered Gandhara about the first century and ousted the last of the Greek rulers—Hermaeus—from Bactria.

All these people are now Mussalmans of sorts, Sunnis, Maulais and Shias, all being found within the limits of Dardistan. Apart from the historical records of the Chinese, there is still plenty of evidence within the country to-day to show that the prevailing religion must at one time have been the gentle faith of Buddha; for in numerous places the remains of stupas and Buddhist carvings upon the rocks bear silent witness to the faith now vanished and forgotten.

Curiously enough the name by which their neighbours, the Kashmiris, always refer to the Dard people is "Bhota" or "Bhota-log." The present inhabitants of the country appear to have forgotten entirely their connection with the Buddhist faith for they have no knowledge of it and take no interest in such Buddhist remains as still exist. The rudely carved figure to be seen on a rock face at the mouth of the Kirgah nullah, some three miles above Gilgit, they call "Yathini" who, they say, was a female demon who devoured human beings, but was turned into stone and fixed upon the rock by a holy man whom she endeavoured to seize,

In this legend, twisted round to suit Mussalman ideas, there may be some connection with the "Hariti" of Buddhist lore who, it may be remembered, was a similar female demon and devoured the children of others, though she is said to have had five hundred of her own. She was converted by Buddha who stole her youngest child and hid him under his begging bowl. The distracted mother nearly went mad with grief at the loss of her child, which gave the gentle teacher the opportunity he sought of making her realise the sorrow that she had inflicted upon others so that she came to be regarded as the lover and protector of children, the goddess of mercy and of fertility. The other form in which she has come down to us is as the goddess of small-pox—a destroyer of children—which title she evidently derives from the evil practices of her earlier years before her meeting with Buddha.

It is probable that the Buddhist faith gradually disappeared from the country with the coming of the Shins who certainly introduced some form of Brahminism. It is to be noted that all the Dard peoples other than the Shins apply to the latter the term "Dangarik" or "the cow people." This appears to be fairly strong evidence of their connection with Hinduism, though curiously enough the feeling for the cow seems to have become perverted in these days, for no Shin will milk a cow or keep chickens, the latter being a practice which is shared with them by most Hindus.

The existence of caste has already been mentioned and it may be added that the ruler of the Shins was always called the Ra. Again the burning of the dead was in vogue until comparatively recent times, concerning which Drew writes :—"One or two old men have told me that they could remember hearing it mentioned, as not an uncommon occurrence, in their youth, but none could recollect having witnessed any actual instance. So lately as in 1877, a very old man in Darel scandalised his neighbours by calling his sons to him on his death bed, and after having his arms and valuables brought to him, desiring to be burnt with them when dead. His wish, however, was not carried out. He and a man of Gor, who died twenty years ago, are known to have always refused to be circumcised or to call themselves Mahomedans. They were probably the very last Hindus in Dangaristan."

Behind these relics of Hinduism and in spite of the introduction of Mahomedanism, which gains strength yearly as education spreads, there are to be found many signs of still earlier idolatrous beliefs and

customs in the legends and festivals of the country. It is impossible to enter into a discussion of these in detail, but, as instances, may be noted the festival of Taleni which seems to be based upon some original form of sun or fire worship, and the general feeling of reverence for and frequent employment in ceremonials of the *Chili* tree, perhaps indicating the existence at one time of some kind of tree worship. Behind this again is to be found in the folklore of the people a wealth of stories showing how strong must have been the belief in demons, spirits and fairies, good and bad.

In this connection one cannot help wondering whether some of the difficulties experienced by the party which tried to climb Nangaparat should not be attributed to such beliefs amongst the local coolies, who still undoubtedly entertain such sentiments though they would be reluctant to confess them. There is little doubt that about seventy-five per cent. of the local people firmly believe that Mummery and the two Gurkhas who accompanied him upon his last fatal climb were killed or carried away by fairies. That this would be the fate of anyone trying to climb the mountain was foretold, before the expedition started, by an old witch in Goona, a village towards Chilas; and the avalanche which swept away Mummery and his two companions confirmed that belief in the eyes of the people at large.

There are few if any witches left in these days and I know not whether any of them have prophesied ill concerning the fairies' attitude towards the present expedition; but it must not be forgotten that to the people of Gilgit "Dyarmir," as they call Nangaparat, is the home of the fairies and on its summit is "Bathelo," the fort, the innermost sanctuary of these fairy folk, who would surely be unlikely to allow any mere man to enter it!

The failure of the present expedition in spite of pluck and perseverance will perhaps still further strengthen the popular belief that avenging avalanche, falling rock, baffling cloud and biting wind have come to the assistance of the fairies of Dyarmir and have once again rendered their fastness impregnable to the attacks of human beings.

A whole volume might indeed be written about these interesting Dard folk, their customs and beliefs, their mode of life and social organisation, their festivals, sports and pastimes; but this paper has already grown too long.

However, at the risk of hearing somebody say " Yes, insufferably long ", it is felt that it would be almost indecent to bring the paper to a close without saying something of what may be called the national game of the country — polo.

Gilgit indeed shares with Manipur the honour of being regarded as the home of polo, but, although the game has been played there for more generations than any one can remember, it is probably not indigenous but was introduced into the country from outside. Nevertheless it was from Gilgit and Manipur that we borrowed the game, naming it from the *Pulu* which, strictly speaking, is the name of the ball with which the game is played.

The game itself is generally called *Char'gan* and the ground upon which it is played the *Shawaran*. Whence the Dards introduced the game cannot be said with any accuracy, but probably from Persia from which country it spread East and West in very early days. Does not Omar Khayyam use the word *Chaugan* in his quatrain which begins—

" The ball no question makes of ayes and noes,"

" But right and left, as strikes the player, goes."

How early the game was played in Persia I know not, but Constantine Porphyrogenitos, writing about the 8th century, speaks of its being played in Byzantium and uses for the polo ground the word *Zeuganisterion* which must be derived directly from the Persian "*Chaugan*." That great leader of the Muslim hosts, who made circles round our brave but heavy crusaders and was known to us through our school histories as Saladin, was an expert polo player. Who knows but that his prowess at the game may have helped him to overcome his more cumbersome and slow moving adversaries? As far as India is concerned the game must have reached this country well before the 13th century for was not Sultan Kutb-ud-din Aibak, the builder of the Kutb Minar near Delhi, killed whilst playing polo at Lahore about A. D. 1210!

To describe the game as played in the Hindukush to-day would be a long business and it has been done before, so it must suffice to say that the ground is any flat piece of land that can be found and usually has a rough stone wall along either side, upon which the spectators and musicians sit. There are no fixed measurements, for in a mountain country one must take what one can get, even though it be the village street!

In important matches nowadays, the players are generally six aside, but in friendly games there is no limit and anyone who likes may "chip in," so that there may be ten or a dozen aside, all playing "on the ball!" There are no *chukkers*, but the side that scores nine goals first wins and hard fought games have been known to go on without pause for two hours! The best ponies are Badakhshanis and stand about fourteen hands.

The traveller Vigne was, though probably not the first European to see the game, about the first to leave a record of having seen it and was much impressed by what he saw. Travelling between 1830 and 1840 he saw the game played at Shigar in Baltistan and writes of it as follows:—

"At Shigar I first saw the game of the *Chaugan* which was played the day after our arrival on the *Mydan* laid out expressly for the purpose. It is in fact hockey on horse back. The ball, which is larger than a cricket ball, is only a globe made of a knot of willow wood and is called in Tibeti *Pulu*. I can conceive that the *Chaugan* requires only to be seen to be played. It is the fit sport of an equestrian nation and would be, I should think, an excellent exercise for cavalry.... and I should strongly recommend it to be tried on the Hippodrome at Bayswater."

It seems to have been some time before Vigne's advice was taken either at Bayswater or anywhere else, for polo was not introduced into India until about 1860 and took longer to reach England. It is not until 1871, that we read of a great match—eight aside—being played between the 9th Lancers and the 10th Hussars.

THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE GOLD STANDARD.

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A lecture delivered to Members of the United Service Institution of India.

It is a curious fact that, though there is nothing about which the average man is so intimately concerned as money, there is nothing about which he knows so little. The problems of money and particularly of international finance are generally supposed to be a matter for the expert, to be left to the trained handling of bankers and their like. This is all very well so long as things are going smoothly, but when they begin to go wrong it is a different matter. To all appearance, the experts have made a mess of their job, and the layman has a right to ask why, because there is no question, except that of social health, which is of more importance to the man in the street. A pestilence like the Black Death may sweep a country and decimate the inhabitants, but disorders of the monetary system may create almost equal suffering, in fact even greater suffering in scientifically organised and highly developed modern communities. The numbers of the unemployed have increased by tens of millions. People's life's savings, even when invested with prudence, have practically disappeared. International debts have climbed up to a figure where they are clearly beyond the capacity of any debtor to pay. In a desperate effort to make ends meet, Governments have screwed up taxation, cut down expenditure, reduced the pay of their staffs or retrenched them altogether, and, what is worse, there appears at present to be no real sign of a favourable outcome.

What is it that has happened? Prices have collapsed to one half of what they were six years ago and a third of what they were just after the war. This may sound exaggerated. You may reply, "My clothes, my house rent, my bearer's wages are certainly not half of what they were in 1926, and if they were, it would not be a bad thing." The tragedy is that this fall in prices is a fact. If the price of wheat or wool or cotton rises, up jumps the price of the loaf or of a suit of clothes within the week—if wheat falls it is a much more difficult

job to persuade the baker to put down the price of bread. He has a thousand excuses, he has his wages to pay, his rent is the same and so on. The fact is that people like having their pay put up and hate having it put down, so if there is a heavy fall in the wholesale prices of such things as food grains, metals and other raw materials, the retail prices will not come down nearly so quickly and the balance of things is upset. The latest statistical statement of the Bank of England bears this out. It shows that whereas wholesale prices in pounds sterling have now fallen to the 1913 level, the retail price of foodstuffs is still 25 per cent. above it and the general cost of living still nearly fifty per cent. above it. A heavy fall in wholesale prices is therefore a calamity and this is what the world is suffering from. But why should wholesale prices fall? That is the problem which we have to examine this evening.

I have already pointed out the similarity of this crisis with some great pestilence and the analogy is close. It knows no national frontiers. There were countries like the United States of America which hoped that they could avoid the common plague, by drawing their skirts around them, by raising their tariffs so as to keep out the lower priced produce of other countries. They now find that they are suffering worse than the others. Again, as in the case of a pestilence, those countries are suffering less which are leading the more simple life, those which economically speaking are closer to the ground. India, for instance, has suffered very severely, but it has not been nearly so heavily hit as the United States, although it would be foolish to minimise the loss caused by the falling off in the price of India's staple exports such as cotton, jute, rice and tea. The gross money value of the export of Indian merchandise in the twelve months which ended last March fell to 156 crores as compared with 220 crores in the previous year. India's average annual exports for the previous ten years were worth 315 crores. In other words, the money which India gets from foreign countries for her produce is now about 160 crores a year less than it was a few years ago. When you remember that our whole national budget is only about 130 crores you will realise what a blow has been given to our finances by the collapse in the world's demand for our goods, and how impossible it is for the Government to maintain its previous standard of expenditure when the taxpayers' capacity has been so terribly reduced.

At the same time, the actual population of India because of its simpler standard of living has probably suffered less than the population of Western countries. The price of foodstuffs has fallen as rapidly as, if not more rapidly than, that of other commodities, so that the ryot has enough to eat. The people who are suffering, and suffering as badly as in any Western country, are the commercial and business communities, but they form a smaller proportion of the whole than in more highly industrialised countries.

Though we may derive a little miserable consolation from the fact that there are others who are worse hit than we are, that does not answer the question what is hitting us, and is there a remedy for it? It is sometimes said that this is a disease which must burn itself out and that it is no use trying to do anything. Any remedy which is a mere palliative may make the ultimate position worse. It is of course a truism that nature will find its own remedy. The turn must come sooner or later. This, however, is merely a counsel of despair. If this crisis is allowed to burn itself out, it may destroy in the process practically everything that is precious in our civilization and leave us to build up laboriously again from the bottom, as happened when the Roman Empire destroyed itself. What we are now suffering from is usually described as an economic blizzard. I do not like the description. It suggests a visitation of nature which is entirely outside our explanation or control, like a volcano or an earthquake. I would prefer to describe it as a world-wide epidemic, because the monetary systems of the world are factors which can be controlled, even though we may not yet have discovered how to control them. The present crisis is like a disease, the cure for which has not yet been discovered, rather than some blind phenomenon of nature. I am convinced that sooner or later the cause of this wide monetary disturbance will be recognised and isolated, and with its isolation the remedy will follow.

I do not mean by this that there may not be contributing factors, as disease is fostered by unhealthy habits of life. We have all been inclined, governments and private individuals alike, to live beyond our income. After a world-wide war, in which men and material were destroyed on a scale never before known, we had the mad illusion that we were emerging wealthier than we went in, that we could live better and work less. All this may be true, but common sense argues that there

must be a root cause for this undoubtedly extraordinary phenomenon, and though there is disagreement among experts as to that cause, I think that most of them now agree that this catastrophic fall in wholesale prices is due to the inadequacy of the world's gold reserves, as at present managed, to support the present volume of the world's trade and commerce. In other words, there is not enough gold to go round. Expressed in this bald form it is a platitude. Everybody knows it. In order to find a remedy, we must examine the problem more closely to try to find out why, and by how much, the world's gold stocks are inadequate, and whether anything can be done either to stretch them out so as to meet our requirements, or whether we can bring in anything else either to serve instead of gold or to help it out. On these, which are the really practical and important points, there is still much doubt and disagreement.

This brings me to the lines on which a scientific investigation of the problem should proceed, and here I am afraid that I must slur over the various details of a somewhat complicated theory in order to put the broad results before you. What is money? In a modern State money, from the point of view of the man in the street, is the common standard for measuring the value of commodities authorised by the State. In other words, the first essential of money is that it is the legal tender of the country, the kind of coin you have to do business in if you are in a particular country. The State, except on very rare occasions, does not fix the actual price of any particular commodity. It leaves that to individual negotiation, but it says that the price when fixed must be expressed in terms of its money. It would appear to follow from this that the State could declare anything which it chose as money, so long as the quantity of the thing was limited by nature, or so long as the State could limit the quantity itself. For instance, it would be useless to call pebbles or sea-shells money in a country where anybody could pick up handfuls of them, though they have both actually served as money in places where they are rare. Also, if a State made its paper notes money, and printed them as fast as the printing press could turn them out, their value would sink to nothing, like the rouble or the mark.

This, however, is not the whole problem because foreign trade has to be considered. The foreigner is under no compulsion when he sells his merchandise to a particular country to accept the legal tender of that country. He wants something which he can convert

into the legal tender of his own country. In order to facilitate international trade, therefore, something is required which will be universally acceptable, and gold, because of its rarity and durability, has fulfilled this function of an international medium of exchange from time immemorial, at first in companionship with silver and latterly to a continually greater extent alone. From this you will see that there is no necessarily indissoluble connection between the internal currency of a particular country and the price of gold in that legal tender. Since last September, for instance, the price of an ounce of gold in pounds and in rupees has varied considerably according to the fluctuations of the exchange with America and France, where the price of gold, in dollars and francs, respectively, is still fixed by law and remains the same. In order to facilitate international trade, however, it was soon realised, primarily by Great Britain, which has been the world's leading merchant country for the last three hundred years, that foreign trade would be enormously encouraged if a country could maintain a definite parity between the internal and external values of its currency, that is to say, that the international commodity—gold—would always have a fixed price in pounds, shillings and pence. Such a fixed parity clearly lessens the risk to a foreign trader of finding that the price in his own money which he eventually gets is less than what he originally anticipated. Equally also it makes it tempting for him to leave his spare funds in such a country because he realises that he can draw them out when he likes on the same basis on which he put them in.

So far, the argument is simple enough. The next conception, that of credit, is more complicated and it is the misunderstanding about the nature and the limitations of credit which is the primary source of the present trouble. I shall endeavour, however, to make the explanation as simple as I can. In its baldest form the proposition which I have just stated would mean that if a country wished its money to have the maximum possible stability in relation to the outside world, all its money would be gold and nothing but gold. This, however, would clearly be impossible in practice, but you must realise that every single step forward from this position brings in the conception of credit, that is to say, of one man trusting another.

For instance, there are large payments which would involve the physical transport of impossibly large masses of gold if they had to be paid in specie, and the mercantile community to avoid such remittances

introduced such expedients as payment by cheque or bills of exchange or bank notes, that is to say, promises to pay the amount of gold specified in the document if called upon to do so. At first these documents were issued by private individuals or banks on their own credit, and if you accepted a note you definitely knew whom you were trusting to cash it. It was soon found that there was a certain amount of bank notes in the case of each country which would never in practice be cashed because they were much more convenient than cash for large transactions. The amount would naturally rise and fall according to the state of business, but there would be a minimum below which it would not fall though it might be difficult to decide what exactly that minimum was. Once banks realised this, they also grasped the logical consequence, that they need not keep a sovereign for every pound note they issued, but could lend out a proportion of them in full confidence that they would never be called upon to cash every note. At this stage Governments saw that there was money in the business, and began to issue notes, either themselves or through State banks which had to pay for the privilege. The profit, as I have said, was derived from the fact that a certain amount of the notes were not backed by gold. In England before the war this uncovered amount was fixed at £18½ millions. In other words, the Bank of England was allowed to issue as many notes as it liked. These notes were declared by the Government to be legal tender money up to any amount, and anybody could present them in any quantity at the Bank of England and receive gold sovereigns in exchange. For any notes issued over £18½ millions the Bank of England had to retain a reserve of one sovereign for each pound of notes issued as a reserve against encashment. It is obvious that if any particular country either through misjudging the situation or through the desire to make profit out of the issue of its notes did not keep an adequate reserve in gold, it would have to put difficulties in the way of the conversion of its notes into gold, or even in the extreme refuse encashment altogether. In such cases it is equally obvious that the notes would circulate at a discount in relation to gold. It was to prevent this that the reserves of the Bank of England were framed on the most cautious lines, so that in practice before the war London was the freest market in the world.

I have discussed these comparatively simple developments in monetary credit in considerable detail, because the effects of further developments of credit on money, though apparently more complicated,

are really governed by the same principles. The ways in which one individual may trust another in matters involving money payments are innumerable. They also vary in degree from time to time. For instance, when prices are rising manufacturers are eager to sell their output so as to bring in fresh raw material and increase their trade. They are, therefore, prepared to give liberal credit to shopkeepers who, in turn, are eager to borrow to lay in large stocks because they see a quick turnover. Business booms in consequence ; there is plenty of employment at good wages and lots of money about. Investors and speculators see that business is making good profits and that the shares of the companies concerned are rising. They are, therefore, eager to trust them with their money by buying their shares, and so the improvement goes on.

It might appear that there is no reason why such a process should stop of itself or why anybody should want to stop it. I have already told you how disastrous a sudden fall in wholesale prices is, so it might seem that the contrary, a rise in wholesale prices, would be equally beneficial. The only people who suffer from a rise in prices are those on fixed incomes or those who have invested in Government securities or debentures with a fixed rate of interest. As prices rise, since they merely get the same amount of money, that money is able to purchase less. On the other hand, though they do not benefit so quickly as the merchants, they get their benefit in time. People on fixed rates of wages can stand out for higher rates of pay which will generally be conceded because there is plenty of money about, and the investor in Government securities will benefit, because the Government will be deriving more money from customs duties on the increased volume of trade and income-tax on the increased incomes of the trading community. It will, therefore, be in a position to lower the income-tax on fixed securities.

Though it might look as if it was to everybody's interest that this delightful progress should continue indefinitely, there are factors which will come into operation to stop it. The first of these is the increased demand for legal tender money, either bank notes or cash. Though the original impetus has been given by people trusting each other more, there are numerous transactions in respect of which trust is not given, and cash has to be paid—servants' wages, railway and taxi fares, purchases in shops and the numerous demands on peoples' petty cash ; and as prices rise, obviously more cash will be required.

There will, therefore, be a demand on the Government of the country to create more legal tender money, both token coin such as shillings and pence, and bank notes.

It may be asked, and it has been asked on many occasions, why a Government should not meet such demands? Why should it refuse to expand the currency and thus put a stop to this highly desirable process which would seem to benefit them as well as the public? The usual answer is that if they do so, they will weaken their gold reserves. As all this increase is due to the growth of credit and not to any increase in the actual legal backing, that is to say gold, it follows that if a Government is to increase its currency notes to meet the demand of the country, that increase must decrease the proportion of gold in its reserves. Also if, as a result of this trade boom, prices have risen in that particular country higher than elsewhere, then foreigners will cease to buy the products of that country which are standing at a higher price than similar articles manufactured by themselves. On the other hand, they will be eager to take advantage of the higher prices prevailing in that country to unload their own produce in it. The balance of trade will therefore be against the country. As it will not be able to export its own highly priced goods, it will have to export gold to maintain its exchange and thus weaken its reserves even further.

This was the orthodox argument of the political economist before the war, but it has been hotly disputed in many quarters since. It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between inflation due to Government extravagance and a rise in prices due to an increase in trade. It is generally admitted that it is wrong for a Government not to balance its budget but to meet the deficit by churning out notes from the printing press. That can only end in a collapse, and that currency will share the fate of the rouble and the mark. But, they say, it is quite different if the currency is demanded by trade, and if traders are prepared to borrow the extra currency from Government against the security of their goods.

The exponents of that theory, and they are many, say that in the latter case, the increase in trade activity will have started in one country not because of some phenomenon peculiar to that country alone, but because of some world-wide development. In other words, a rise or fall in prices in a particular country will not be a purely national

phenomenon but an international one. If, then, the stage is set for a rise in prices all over the world, all that is required, they argue, is a reasonably liberal policy of co-operation between the authorities responsible for money in the various countries to prevent prices in any one country materially outrunning another and so creating a dangerous flow in the precious metals.

There is, however, one definite and final answer to all these arguments. Reasoning on these lines is based on the same fallacy as many schemes for disarmament. They would work quite well if every nation was prepared to play the game, but they suffer from the fatal defect that any nation which does not play the game will find itself in an overwhelmingly strong position should co-operation collapse. In the event of war breaking out with its inevitably disastrous results on international trade and credit, those countries which have piled up an enormous edifice of credit on slender gold reserves will find themselves in a hopeless position as compared with those which have retained a larger reserve in gold. No individual country can carry on modern war for any length of time on its own resources. It must borrow abroad, and the foreign creditor, before lending, will want to know that its gold reserves are reasonably adequate. We could effect marvellous reforms if there was no more war, if there was one world State. An international currency policy would be one of them, but so long as politics are run on national lines, currency policy must be governed by practical national considerations, and among these considerations, the possibility of war must always be at the back of the mind of every prudent statesman. There must be practical moderation in all things. A nation which arms itself to the teeth is a nuisance to its neighbours, by compelling them to increase their expenditure on armaments. So a nation which, for a similar motive, grabs all the gold it can, lowers the economic standard not only of itself, but of all its neighbours. But it is equally foolish to fly to the other extreme by either disarming completely or by following a credit policy which puts us financially at the mercy of other countries.

All this boils down to the axiom, that, though in theory credit might go on expanding indefinitely on a given basis of gold, in practice there are limits, and that over a long series of years prices must depend on the actual quantity of gold in use as money or reserve for money and not on the credit edifice which it may be possible from time to

time to construct on a given quantity of gold when men are feeling particularly benevolent or optimistic. I hope that I have made this point clear because it constitutes the whole basis of what is known as the quantity theory of money. I shall put it in another way. Though mutual co-operation between bankers and what may be called "sunshine" talk to encourage people to lend money to each other and to buy freely may temporarily increase the amount of credit on any given amount of gold and may consequently keep prices steady, or even make them rise for the time being, the equilibrium so created is essentially unstable. Sooner or later something will turn up to prick the bubble, and down prices will crash to a level which bears a truer relationship to the gold which forms the foundation of the whole fabric.

The broad view of the history of prices in the world bears this out. They have always moved in relation to the quantity of gold and silver available. For instance, we know that the discovery of the New World by Columbus and of the untold riches of Mexico and Peru liberated vast quantities of gold and silver. These spread through Europe and, as a result, prices practically doubled between 1500 and 1600 A. D. After the Napoleonic wars our information becomes much more complete and we can trace the relationship more closely. The world's gold output* was, roughly, worth about five million pounds sterling a year. This was inadequate for the rapid growth of population and industrial development which followed exploration, colonisation and the development of railway and steamship traffic. The result was a serious fall in prices between 1839 and 1851; the general average taking 1850 prices as the basis at 100 falling from 133 to 97, a drop of more than a third. This led to labour agitation and revolutionary troubles in practically every country in the world—1848 being a year famous for its revolutions in France, Germany, Austria and Italy, while we had our own Chartist troubles. In the immediately following years, however, the large gold areas in the west of America and in Australia were opened up with the result that the world's gold output rose rapidly from five million pounds a year to twenty millions. This eased the situation, and prices rose to 132 by 1855. The world's gold production, which was now varying between 20 and 30 million pounds a year, was sufficient to maintain this level of prices until the Franco-Prussian War.

*See chart at page 488.

In 1873, after the conclusion of that war, which was marked by the payment of a large indemnity by France to Germany, a new and very interesting development occurred. Up to that time, with the exception of England, practically every country was either on a wholly silver basis or on a basis of bimetallism, that is to say, it had a silver currency as well as gold, and maintained the price of silver in a fixed relation to gold. The ratio was roughly one to fifteen, that is to say, the silver rupee was worth one-tenth of a sovereign, or two shillings. Germany had long been envious of the position acquired by England, and the indemnity which Germany extracted from France put it in a position, as it thought, to adopt what it considered one of the main causes of England's mercantile supremacy, namely, a standard based on gold alone. It therefore melted down its silver marks and dumped the silver bullion on the market, along with the silver extracted from France, and used the proceeds to buy gold. The action was well timed. The United States of America were just recovering from the Civil War, and there was a large party there which favoured the abolition of the bimetallic standard based on silver circulating with gold and the adoption of a purely gold currency like England. The large quantities of silver thrown on the market caused considerable difficulties to the silver using countries. The rupee exchange, for instance, was driven down from two shillings to one shilling and six pence. France and the Latin countries were compelled to abandon the free purchase of silver, and the United States eventually followed their example. The abolition of silver clearly narrowed the metallic basis of currency by casting an additional burden on gold, which it was not able to stand. Prices, which had risen to 144 in 1873, fell steadily to 79 in 1895, with the usual results of narrowing trade and socialist and labour agitation, particularly in England. The fall again was arrested by fresh discoveries of gold. The Rand mines in South Africa began to produce in the early nineties. The gold output of the world which was worth about 30 million pounds was doubled within a few years, and then rose steadily to its record of 96 millions in 1915, prices rising correspondingly from 79 in 1895 to 110 in 1913.

When the world war broke out, the credit structures based on gold were quite unable to stand the strain, with the result that every country engaged in the war, had to issue paper money which could not

be exchanged for gold. To prevent the foreign exchanges collapsing, large credits were arranged between the various allied countries, and the expenditure, for instance, of England in France to pay the troops and of France in England to buy munitions were set off against each other and the balance lent by the country in which the balance was incurred. Until the United States entered the war, the purchases of the Allies there were similarly financed by loans to the United Kingdom. In this way the exchanges were pegged. If the French Government, for instance, had to spend more money in England than England was spending in France ordinarily, the French Government would have had to purchase large amounts of sterling with the result that the quotation for francs, which was 25 to the pound at the beginning of the war, would have fallen away possibly to a very large extent. The British Government undertook to peg the franc round about 40 or 50 to the pound by giving the French sterling at that rate and lending them the balance which they could not purchase in the open market. This is obviously a fairly simple matter between countries both of which have inconvertible paper currencies, but it might be asked how could a country which still agreed to exchange its notes for gold, like the United States, peg the exchange of a country like France which did not? The explanation is that just before the war the United States had introduced a new banking system called the Federal Reserve System which enabled the Reserve Bank to issue additional notes which were not completely covered by gold as in the pre-war Bank of England system, but of which a proportion only was covered by gold, and the rest by trade bills, that is to say, lent to traders who promised to pay when they sold their produce. In other words, for every dollar of gold they could issue, let us say, two dollar notes, one covered by gold, the other by an I. O. U. As the Allies were tumbling over each other to buy munitions, there was any amount of trade bills, and so notes poured out and prices soared. The important point is that this meant that whereas in previous wars there were countries which were still on a gold standard, in the last war, there really were none, because though United States notes could still be changed to gold, in practice the structure of gold which the States had built up on their gold basis, was so excessive that in normal times no prudent banker as a business proposition would have allowed it. As a result prices soared to 248 in 1919, a higher level than they ever reached in the Napoleonic wars.

After the war came the settling up. The fundamental mistake then made was to assume that because these debts were expressed in dollars and because dollars were in the inflated circumstances of the time exchangeable for gold these were real gold debts. They were nothing of the kind. The amount of commodities which they would have purchased was less than half of what a similar amount of gold would have purchased in markets which were operating under ordinary economic law. The farce was carried a stage further when the whole debt balance was dumped on Germany. On top of this was the disquieting fact that the gold supplies of the Rand had been dwindling since 1915, and that there did not seem to be any parts of the world left unexplored where new gold deposits on a sufficient scale could be discovered. The world's output of gold which was worth 96 million pounds in 1915 had fallen to 65 by 1922. It was obvious that if the world meant to go back to the old proportion of gold to notes, the most appalling fall in prices was inevitable.

The Bank of England made a desperate attempt to keep things going by international co-operation and by lending money to other countries. It hoped that the central banking institutions of the more important countries in the world would also voluntarily restrict their gold holdings and maintain the credit edifice on them in such a way as to keep prices up. Theoretically in an ideal world it might have been possible, but in practice, the whole project collapsed because of the reason which I have already mentioned, and the pound was forced off gold in the forlorn hope. Why? Because there was one country which put what it considered the necessities of her own national security before the common prosperity of the world. This is not blaming France. Remembering how often and how terribly she had been invaded in the past, no one can blame her if she felt that the international pledges for her security were insufficient, and determined to follow her own way with ruthless realism. She thought that by piling up gold she could compel the nations of the world to recognise her political claims. But she did not get the gold for nothing. She had to pay for it. A certain amount of it was derived from reparations receipts, but the bulk of it was the outcome of her own hard work and her thrift. By lowering the exchange of the franc from 25 to the pound to 123, she destroyed four-fifths of the value of every investment in the country, but she made France a cheap country for the foreigner to buy things from, and a cheap country for the tourist

to travel in. By these means she acquired large amounts of the money of other countries, which she could compel them, when the time came, to turn into gold. Between 1925 and 1929 she more than doubled her gold reserve, raising it from 164 million pounds to 336, while America's holding remained more or less stable at 800 millions and England's at 145.

The bubble was pricked in 1929. The banking authorities in America, in taking steps to stop a stock exchange boom, started a crisis of unprecedented magnitude of which we cannot yet see the end. Within these three years the gold held by France has risen to 640 millions, a rise of 300 since 1929, while the gold in the States has fallen by 260 to 540, England's holding is 130, a drop of 15. The prices of all important commodities have meanwhile fallen to roughly 76, thirty per cent. below the prices of 1914, lower even than they ever were in the last century, and they are still falling. It is a preposterous situation. What is to be done about it?

In the first place, as a practical proposition, war debts and reparations must be cleared out of the way. That is the British case, and there can be no doubt that without the removal of those enormous international liabilities, no progress is possible. It is not a question of ethics; whether one Ally should pay another for services rendered in a common war. On that question there are obviously two sides. This is a simple business proposition. These loans, as I have shown, were floated at a time when, owing to artificial conditions, they purchased just about half and in many cases, a third of what they would now purchase. The debtor countries have not got the gold or the capital to repay them; and, even if payment was allowed in goods (and goods are held back by high tariffs), their export would be on such a scale as to ruin the industries of a country which took payment in them. The world, instead of recognising the impossible, kept fiddling round with impossible promises to pay thousands of millions, terrifying the wits out of every business man and every investor. It is just as if you were to punish criminals by inoculating them with small-pox germs. It might be unpleasant for them, but it would be equally unpleasant for the ordinary peaceful citizen, who would almost certainly be infected too. America in the last three years must have lost far more than the whole value of its foreign debt though that is about three thousand three hundred million pounds at the present rate of exchange. The value of some 15 to 20 representative premier

American railway securities has fallen since 1929 from 3,500 million dollars to 280 million—a clean loss of nearly £900 million—four-fifths of the whole of our debt to her. When one remembers that the falls in their Motor Car Shares, Bank Shares and Land Values have been on a similar scale, there can be no doubt that it would have paid America over and over again to wipe out the entire debt years ago if by so doing it could have retained the level of prices of a few years back. It may be argued that it is not fair to let Germany off everything because she is the ultimate debtor, and then if she is let off, the taxpayers of the various countries will still have to pay to make up the interest which she has surrendered. That is true and it is obvious that Germany must pay something. What is even more obvious is that if the negotiations are unduly prolonged, the world and the taxpayers of the creditor countries are losing more than they could possibly hope to get in the final settlement.

Even when this problem is removed, however, the main problem will remain unsolved, though it will not be so serious. As I have shown, the world's production of gold has been falling steadily since 1915, while the world's population as a whole, has been increasing. In 1915, it touched 96 million pounds, it is now about 80. It also seems unlikely that any new gold mines will be discovered on a sufficiently extensive scale to make up the deficiency. Experts have calculated that, even if there had been no war, prices would have fallen about 10 per cent. below the pre-war level by last year, and that they may fall in future at the rate of about 1 per cent. a year. This, of course, is nothing like the fall which has actually occurred, but though the world could stand such a reduction, it would not be a healthy position. With prices continually falling, trade would be continually depressed and enterprise stifled. It therefore appears that, unless more gold is discovered, the world will have to revise its attitude to it. Possibly the solution may be to take in some other metal, such as silver or platinum, into the currency reserves as a supplement to gold. It is more likely that world currency systems will develop on the lines inaugurated by the Bank of England when it went off the gold standard last September, that is to say, that the authority responsible for issuing legal tender will issue it in such a way as to maintain a reasonable stability of prices in the country itself without too much regard to the actual price of gold in the terms of its own money.

This means in practice that foreign exchanges, instead of staying put, will constantly be moving up and down as the dollar and franc do now. A reasonable quantity of gold will be held in the reserves because gold will still remain the most expeditious method of settling foreign payments, even though foreign countries also may have unfixed the price of gold so that it will have to be accepted as a result of individual bargain. This, as you will see, is a totally different matter from reducing the proportion of gold to notes in your reserve, while still offering freely to change gold for notes at a fixed price. International co-operation on these lines has often been suggested as the way out; it would certainly enable Governments to print more notes, but as I hope that I have already shown you, it is essentially unsound because it plays into the hands of any country which does not play the game according to the rules. What the Bank of England has done is much more drastic and courageous; it is making the value of its notes in the world at large depend not on their gold backing but on the credit of England, the world's belief in its honesty—that it will not turn on the printing press to meet its requirements, but will balance its budget by economy and taxation however severe. There are obviously grave defects in such a development, which must be described as retrograde, and only to be justified by the direct necessity. It is clearly to the advantage of traders and investors that they should have certainty as to the price which one currency will command in terms of another. This, however, is not an insuperable difficulty, and the ruin of the financial fabric of a country is too high a price to pay for it. There is the far greater danger of a Government or a Currency Authority being inefficient or corrupt and using the printing press to meet its budget deficits. To such a course there can be only one end; that of the rouble and the mark. All the same, retrograde though the step may be, it appears inevitable; we have gone too far forward in the internationalisation of finance as compared with the internationalisation of politics. Financial disarmament has outrun political and we must retrace our steps. The British Empire, however, in the long run would seem to have little to fear from such a development. There is no institution in the world so highly trusted as the Bank of England for its impartiality and incorruptibility. If other countries are not prepared to co-operate by lowering their gold reserves, they may find in time that they are left sitting on useless heaps of gold which nobody will buy at the fancy monopoly

value they have put on it, and that the place of gold has been taken as an international currency medium by the pound sterling.

What will be the effect of all this on prices ? As I have already shown, the greatest immediate cause of all the trouble from which the world is suffering is the catastrophic fall in prices in the last two or three years which, coming on the top of the big fall immediately after the war, has made it almost impossible for business men and Governments to carry on.

Is there any hope of any immediate rise ? Here it is impossible to predict. There are currency enthusiasts who, intoxicated with the discovery that it is the lack of gold which is the cause of all trouble and the consequent fact that if we can make our paper money worth less in gold we can put up internal prices, imagine that all they have to do is to turn on the printing press and issue fresh notes until things come right. The problem, as I hope I have made clear to you, is by no means so simple as that. Even those theorists who consider that paper money should be increased, are generally cautious enough to hold that it should only be increased when there is an actual demand from the business and trading community for such money ; in other words that merchants are prepared to pledge their stock as security against the loan of the newly created money from Government. This panacea has been tried time and time again by making the borrowing rates of the central currency authorities as cheap as possible. The bank rates in London and New York are lower than they have been for nearly 40 years, so that any trader who wishes to launch out can get his accommodation fairly cheaply. The difficulty is that they are afraid to do so because they see no hope of selling their produce. Other currency enthusiasts go further. They point out that if a new gold mine is discovered, the adventurers who join in the gold rush, obtain gold with its actual purchasing power which they can dispose of as they like without having to borrow anything from anybody. The new theory has been stated in its crudest form in the United States where, recently, a large number of ex-soldiers marched on Washington to claim a bonus for their war services. The idea was that these men should be paid in paper notes printed up for the purpose. This would give them purchasing power, they would use the money to buy commodities and have a good time generally in exactly the same way as Bret Harte's gold rush heroes, and the large scale demand for commodities thus created would stimulate trade generally.

It sounds very plausible, but there is a definite distinction between the two. In the case of discoverers of a gold mine, the common sense of the world based on thousands of years of experience has realised that the amount of purchasing power so created will be limited. Nobody outside the Arabian Nights or a bucket shop has ever discovered a solid mountain of gold nor is anybody likely to. That is a risk which the world is quite prepared to meet when it comes. The difficulty about printing paper is that there is no limit, and, what is more important, the ordinary business man and investor would realise clearly that there was no limit. If a Government begin by giving a bonus to their ex-soldiers, there is no reason why they should not go on to give a much larger bonus to themselves. Why balance the budget by such unpopular methods as ten per cent. cuts and screwing up the income-tax? Why not print paper to make up the deficit? Why tax at all? If a Government tried that game, it is perfectly obvious that every man with any common sense would do what they did in Germany when marks were being churned out of the Government Printing Press. They would rush to buy goods, furniture, property, anything, so long as the money had any sort of value, in the certain knowledge that however little it might be worth to-day, it would be worth a good deal less to-morrow.


It might be answered that this may be all very well about the rouble and mark, but that a common sense government would, in practice, limit the creation of such purchasing power. That, however, is not the point. Once the purchasing power has been so created and prices begin to go up, producers see that they can turn out their goods at a profit and are eager to borrow freshly created notes against the security of their stocks because they realise that the more they can expand their business the more profits they will make. The Government will, therefore, be confronted with the difficulty of refusing to lend money against perfectly legitimate demands. It has started the snow-ball rolling and cannot stop it. If it simply flatly refuses to issue any more money, it will precipitate a crash. The Banks will have to close their doors.

It is possible that later on the world may evolve methods of making prices rise by monetary action, but I doubt whether it knows enough to try it now. The first step which the Bank of England has taken into the untrodden land of monetary theory is quite sufficient to go along with; that is to say to try to keep internal

prices more and more stable. If the Bank of England continues to do this, other countries will realise that it is suicidal for them to cling to their present currency systems if they mean a continuous fall in prices. They will then work round to something like the same system though of course conducted on national independent lines. When the internal prices of the more important countries of the world have been roughly stabilised in this way, it is obvious that the exchange fluctuations between one and the other will also dwindle, and if, at the same time, they have common sense enough to keep their tariffs down and do their utmost to foster internal trade, abandon the childish delusion that they can sell things to people without buying from them, traders will gradually pluck up courage with expanding markets, and prices will begin to move up. In any case, like all crises, this fall in prices, even on the most rigid monetary theory, has overreached itself, so that, even on the old orthodox gold theory, we are due sooner or later for a rise in prices of some 15 per cent. on their present level.

When that upward movement occurs—as occur it certainly will—the various currency authorities of the world will be confronted with a very difficult problem. It will be disastrous to stifle the movement at birth; on the other hand, they must be careful to prevent it degenerating into wild speculation, or prices may bound up too far with a corresponding set-back later. It is impossible to say when this rise will occur. It may be soon, it may be delayed. It may be rapid, it may be gradual, but come it will. In the meantime, we have to eschew fancy theories, keep our heads and wait, sticking it as best we can. We, India equally with England, depend for our livelihood on international trade. We cannot be prosperous while the rest of the world is not. We cannot expect any real revival of our prosperity until international trade also revives and prospers. At the same time, however dark the immediate outlook may appear, we, in the British Empire at any rate, have the consolation that we have now discovered the source of the trouble, so that things for us cannot become appreciably worse, and that later when the rest of the world sees sense, there must be a very general and large improvement.

DIAGRAM OF WHOLESALE WORLD GOLD
PRICES FROM 1800 to 1932 (See page 478).
(BASIS 100 FOR 1850 AND 1910).



SHOOTING IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

BY A FOREST OFFICER.

In the Journal for July I tried to give some hints on the preliminary arrangements for a shoot in the Central Provinces. Proceeding still on the assumption that the reader really has no experience to fall back upon, it is possible I may be able to save him from some of the mistakes which it is so easy to make.

People do such queer things. Darya, Gond, *shikari* of Dudalpani (there must have been chalk in that water) came to me obviously fed up. I had told him to help the Colonel Sahib and now asked how things were going. The tenor of his reply was, "Rotten, the Sahib never walks a yard if he can help it and never carries his own rifle; once he had a shot at a bear and insisted on resting his rifle on my shoulder. Does he think I am a tripod and want my eardrum burst? Worst of all, I and my son have to sleep by his bed at night." "I expect" I said, "he wants to visit the kills before it is light." "Visit the kills! The last thing he wants is to see a tiger while he is on the ground; no, he puts a black box under his bed and keeps us there to guard his money. Does he think Gonds are dacoits, and that I am a chowkidar?"

That Colonel wrote and told me he had a very disappointing shoot and thought the junglies a poor lot. He would not have understood if I had told him that aboriginals don't steal from sahibs and only want to be treated as man to man.

Then as regards weapons, more than one man has found on arrival that he could not close the breech; cartridges right bore, but wrong shape. *Ruat coelum!* Try that rifle and those cartridges before you start. Buy your cartridges in sealed tins; if they have been in stock through a monsoon in cardboard packets, beware. One man, hard up too, arrived with 250 H. V. cartridges, just 200 too many, and a rupee a piece; another, from England, had 2,000 shot gun cartridges, he took back 1,800; another, this time from America, had six rifles for himself and two for his wife, and in the only emergency he ignored his D. B. .450 and used a small bore Mauser on the tiger; yet another, worst of all, in a jungle fowl beat, gave a boar a charge of No. 6 in the backside. "Just to tickle him up," he said. I could have done the same to him.

One more instance of queer things men can do. They had had their Christmas camp, all as happy as the day is long, a tiger, no contretemps and many thanks. A month later I was out for an evening stalk in that area with my old friend Budaung, Korku, of Tötley Doh by Pinkapāthar, (say that again, is there no music in that address?), and at a certain spot he kicked the earth and laughed to himself. "What's the joke?" I asked. He told me it was here the *burra* sahib had buried the cheetal head. I said the sahib had shown no cheetal shot when he returned his permit, nor had the Forest Guard. "No" he said "it was only a *baccha* in velvet and the sahib told me to cut off the head and bury it there. "How much did he give you!" "He gave me Rs. 5, but I heard afterwards he gave the Forest Guard Rs. 10 and the Forester Rs. 20."

What a pity to disturb the harmony of our correspondence! But you cannot take less than Rs. 50 from a man who tampers with subordinates. Confession, and explanation of the circumstances, might have cost him nothing; the wider your experience, the better you appreciate how easily mistakes occur.

But who am I to talk of the queer things others do. Was it is not on the sandy shore of the Wainganga that the panther and I gazed into one another's eyes, and was there not, for one fleeting second, a thought, why should you die, you graceful creature? Begone the thought, now for the *coup de grâce*. But, alas, to appropriate a happy verse from "*The Field*,"

"Until age leaves me withered and one eyed
At the ultimate end of my road
I shall hear the click, click of the gun I'd
Forgotten to load."

The panther skipped up the bank—and down below, the river rustled to and fro over the shingle, and a peacock screeched to mock me.

A few remarks about kills and machans may be useful.

Kills are generally young buffaloes, though goats serve the purpose for a panther. Tact is required to obtain them. It is not the thing to sell your stock for sacrifice in cold blood. If possible, leave the transaction to a local official. In any case if negotiations appear inexplicably protracted, try to keep your temper; the best solvents for problems in the jungle are patience and a sense of humour.

If it is a panther you are after, the *boda* should be small. If you are going to sit up and you don't want the kill taken away the rope should be strong. If it is likely to be difficult to see the animal's track, clear a small area round the kill so that you can see whether a tiger, panther, hyæna or wild dog has done the deed. A tiger feeds clean, a panther often makes a filthy mess of his dinner.

Screen a *machan* for sitting up as much as possible. In a beat an animal is hustled and his thoughts are occupied with the enemy on the ground, but coming on to a kill is a different matter. Generally an animal circles round for some time and approaches this unnatural meal with extreme caution. He will spot any movement; when you are stalking yourself notice how it is movement which attracts your eyes, a trembling blade of grass, a leaf falling fifty yards away. So it is with the cats, only more so, as it is on their eye-sight they depend for their daily bread. If you shoot from your right shoulder, and if you have a companion in your *machan*, always have him on your left; sit on a rug, eat soft food, not biscuits, and don't smoke. I don't feel competent to go into the subject of torch devices, but this is worth mentioning. A friend of mine was mauled, sitting on the ground, because the first barrel of his .450 H. V., in addition to hitting the tiger, broke the bulb of his torch; biter bit with a vengeance, his position indubitably marked by the flash of the torch, himself blinded and a wounded tiger with all the cards to play.

When you have a beat take the trouble to inspect the army, dismiss the halt and the maimed and children too small to look after themselves. Satisfy yourself that every individual there knows the meaning of the whistle which you blow. The second they hear that, it is every man for himself, up trees and stay there. Otherwise, it doesn't matter how many shots are fired, how fierce the *gul mul*, the line is to come steadily on; if there is any danger to any man you will blow the whistle. Always have a shot gun in your *machan*,—you may want to search spots hidden from view, if you are not quite certain how the land lies, before you take up your task of finishing off a wounded animal.

And now for three short tales, all true and each with the moral sticking out a mile.

April is the month of "manna," by which I mean that then all creatures, human, wild and domestic, wait for the fleshy flowers of

the *mohwa* tree to drop to earth and provide both bread and wine. The early bird catches the worm. Twice have I known the keen *shikari*, thirsting for the blood of a bear, sally forth alone before the dawn to do the round of *mohwa* trees. See, there in the morning mist she crouches, shuffling from side to side on her hunkers as she gathers in the flowers. Bang! up she rears, with that almost human scream of the wounded bear,—bang again—she's down!

One fellow has never pressed a trigger since, that's thirty years ago. Old women must rise early when all the world wants *mohwa*.

A young man's first beat, early in the year, the undergrowth still green and very thick along the river bank. Movement behind that clump of *lantana*, a speck or two of fawn, surely a cheetal's back, anyhow I'm going to let fly. By Jove, it's down! Up comes the beat hook behind that bush, I've shot a deer. Cries and angry shouts,—his own *shikari* in a khaki coat, dead for his folly in acting as a stop on the ground away on the wing.

A tiger beat. Away there on the left, he slinks like a wraith through the rocks, halts a second and listens to get the direction of the beat. *Crack!* He speaks to the shot. *Crack*, again! He's out of sight. A shout to Bill, "He's hit, finish him off;" again, "For God's sake, fire." Why won't he answer? Curse this din the beaters make. Oh, hell, ought I to blow the whistle. "Bill, is he dead?"

The beat is over there lies the tiger, dead, and there in his *machan* sits Bill all huddled up—a *ricochet*.

THE BATTLES OF THE MASURIAN LAKES.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. GOLOVINE, LATE RUSSIAN
GENERAL STAFF.

Lieutenant-General Golovine is the author of numerous works on tactics and military history which have gained for him a European reputation. His "Problem of the Pacific" is probably his work best known to English readers.

During the Great War, General Golovine held several high appointments on the General Staff of the Russian Army, which gave him exceptional opportunities for actual experience and for observation. Later, in 1918, while recuperating at Odessa, he succeeded in collecting and documenting a vast quantity of the army archives that had been jettisoned during the debacle. The valuable material thus obtained, added to his own knowledge and supplemented by information received from colleagues of the Russian General Staff, placed General Golovine in a position to write a really authoritative history. The result is his "The Campaign of 1914 on the Russian Front," which is recognised as one of the really important contributions to the history of the War.

This work has not as yet appeared in English, though the late Marshal Foch wrote an enthusiastic preface for a French edition. The Journal is thus fortunate in being able to give much information from Russian sources which has not hitherto been available to English readers.

The length of the original volume prevents its being reproduced in full in the Journal and what follows is a series of necessarily incomplete excerpts from an authorized translation of the Russian edition.

General Golovine's book deals first with conditions in Russia preceding 1914 and with the original Russian War Plan. He then describes mobilization, followed by the advance of the Russian First Army under General Rennenkampf into East Prussia—a successful but precipitant offensive which culminated in the victory of Gumbinnen. The extracts which follow are taken from succeeding chapters, and give an account of the Battles of the Lakes and of the ill-fated offensive of General Samsonov's Second Army.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY.

Unpreparedness of the Second Army for a Rapid Offensive.

We have seen how seriously "precipitancy" in the invasion of Eastern Prussia had affected the operations of the First Army, but this "precipitancy" had yet more harmful results in the Second Army. Even the very persons responsible for the Plan of War had begun to recognise the difficulty of fulfilling the obligations therein undertaken for the first days of the war. In his memoirs Paléologue, the French Ambassador, states that it had reached the ears of Sazonov, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, that General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and General Jilinsky, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, were of opinion that a hasty offensive into Eastern Prussia must inevitably break down "as our troops were still too much dispersed and the transport problem involved many difficulties." "But," added our Minister for Foreign Affairs in this conversation, "as we have no right to leave our Ally in peril, despite the undeniable risk in the operation which has been undertaken, it is our duty to attack immediately, even as the Grand Duke has ordered" This was the answer to the words of M. Paléologue: "Remember what a critical time this is for France."

The work of the Russian G. H. Q. was carried on under the influence of this ideal—the urgent necessity for coming to the rescue of France at the earliest possible moment. On the 20th.¹ August, the day of the battle of Gumbinnen, a telegram had been received from our Military Attaché in Paris stating that the French War Minister "believed in all seriousness that it was possible for us to invade Germany and march upon Berlin from the direction of Warsaw." Such an idea could only have arisen from a loss of mental equilibrium in this crisis. It was evident from the expression of this desire that even the expedient of accelerating our offensive into Eastern Prussia was considered inadequate. In the memoirs of Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, it is noted: "On the Belgian front our operations have taken a bad turn. I have received orders to urge the Imperial Government to hasten as far as possible the commencement of the offensive of the Russian armies."

Finally, on the 26th. August M. Paléologue received a telegram from Paris, in which it was stated: "We have received information

¹. Throughout the dates given are according to the usual European calendar, not the Russian "Old Style" which was thirteen days earlier.

from a most reliable source that two army corps, at first facing the Russian army, are in course of transfer to the French frontier, being relieved on the Eastern frontier of Germany by Landwehr units. The war plans of the German Great General Staff are too clear for it to be necessary to insist on the need for a determined offensive on the part of the Russian armies advancing on Berlin. Convey this urgently to the Russian Government and insist upon this."

Incidentally, owing to the effect of the battle of Gumbinnen, exactly the opposite had actually taken place—*two army corps were being moved from France*. This fact shows the extent to which "nerves" influenced the demands of our Allies upon us. The appeal could not fail to give the Emperor and our Supreme Commander-in-Chief the idea that France was at her last gasp. During these days the rôle of Commander-in-Chief, not of the Russian army alone, but of all the Allied armies, was imposed upon the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, and therefore his decisions were dictated not by the interests of Russia alone, but by those of the Allies as a whole. This point of view must always be borne in mind in studying the campaign of 1914.

On the 12th. August, *i.e.*, on the 13th. day of mobilization, in his telegram No. 513 the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group informed the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that "although the orders (issued to the Second Army) to assume the offensive refer to their execution *with the utmost speed*, and although the units of the army have been moved to their starting-points for crossing the frontier, this crossing can hardly be expected to be carried out by the cavalry, supported by infantry, earlier than the 16th day (the 15th August), and by the main forces of the army earlier than the 19th.-20th. day (18th. 19th. August)." It should be recalled in this connection that General Yanushkevich's letter (No. 345) had ordered the offensive to commence on the 14th. day (13th. August), *i.e.*, 4 or 5 days earlier.

The haste with which the Second Army was embodied had dire effects upon it. The army consisted of three corps of its "own" military district, the Warsaw, together with one corps (the IInd.) of the Vilno Military District, and one corps (the XIIIth.) of the Moscow Military District. Unquestionably this of itself was an obstacle to the "Speeding-up" of the commencement of the offensive. The result proved to be even more unfortunate than in the First Army.

General Samsonov's army, like that of General Rennenkampf, took the field with its rear not properly organised, but the degree of this disorganisation in General Samsonov's army amounted to absolute confusion. Not only had the army failed to reach its proper establishment in field bakeries and in corps and army transport, but there were divisions, for example, the 2nd. Infantry (belonging to the XXIIIrd. Corps), without even their divisional trains: the Howitzer Group of the same corps had no transport park, and the ammunition was loaded on country carts, the ingenious gunners wrapping the shells in plaited straw. Consequently the XXIIIrd. Corps units were a heavy burden to the neighbouring corps, which for the time being became responsible for their supply, and were thus upset in their own calculations. As might be expected, the supply situation was eased to a certain extent by the circumstance that the corps of Samsonov's army, as was also the case in General Rennenkampf's army, took the field short of their establishment of infantry units: for example, instead of the 32 battalions laid down, the VIth. Corps had a total of $24\frac{1}{2}$; the XVth. Corps had 28, and the XIIIth. 31.

In the descriptions which individuals who had actually been present gave at the inquiry into the reasons for the catastrophe to Samsonov's army, one reads again and again how the commanders of fighting units begged for an "unhurried offensive," and how the divisions of the XIIIth. Corps on the march were not like fighting units at all, but reminded one more of a "Pilgrimage." This latter fact was a direct consequence of the circumstance that the XIIIth. Corps did not maintain an extra strong peace time cadre, as was the case with certain of the frontier corps, and therefore the units of this corps required a certain period for the "digestion" of reservists reporting upon mobilization.

It is stated in General Klyuev's ¹ notes that upon his arrival in Byelostok to assume command of the XIIIth. Corps, he was suddenly faced with the picture of the total unreadiness for immediate action of units, 60 per cent. of which consisted of newly reported reservists. As we had no territorial system of bringing units up to strength, these two-thirds of the rank and file were complete strangers to their officers. In this state units were straightway entrained, transported to Byelostok and embarked upon a forced campaign. "The men in the ranks had honest Russian faces, but they were only peasants in disguise, whom

¹ The Commander of the XIIIth. Army Corps.

it was necessary to train." Having formed this opinion of the corps placed under his orders, General Klyuev visited the Second Army Commander to acquaint him personally with it, and to report that the only way to make these units militarily efficient was to exercise deliberation in the offensive, which would at the same time permit of the proper organisation of the supply system.

The incomplete organisation of the rear had its effect even upon a service so purely concerned with operations as the Signal Service. The XXIIIrd. Corps had not yet received all the technical signal material laid down by schedule. Even in a corps where this material was complete, it was insufficient to establish the communications necessary under the conditions of the manœuvre to be executed.

The following example will serve to show how real was the lack of organisation of the Signal Service of the army. An officer in charge of the Signal Service of the newly formed Ninth Army, visited the central telegraph station at Warsaw on business concerned with the equipment of the Army Signals. To his horror he saw that a whole stack of telegrams addressed to the staff of the Second Army was lying untouched in the central telegraph office of the town. These telegrams had not been sent on owing to the fact that direct telegraph communication had not been established with the Second Army, and that the subsidiary lines were completely blocked. This officer carried off the whole pack of telegrams and at once took them personally by car to the staff of the Second Army.

What must the situation have become when the Second Army entered the territory of Eastern Prussia, where the whole population was in arms, and where telegraph communications were cut upon our invasion, the apparatus being destroyed and the personnel taking to flight! The immediate consequence was that corps, having exhausted all their signal resources to get into communication with their divisions, were unable to extend their lines to Army Headquarters and to their neighbours, and A.H. Q. could not aid them with its own resources. A further result was that even by the 23rd. August line communication had not been established between certain of the corps and the Staff of the Army was forced to have recourse to wireless telegraphy as a means of transmitting messages. But here in the employment of this new device of science the disorganisation resulting from the haste with which the army had taken the field was especially

in evidence. For instance, it was discovered that the XIIIth. Corps was not in possession of the key for deciphering telegrams sent out by stations of the VIth. Corps. For this reason or for some other reason equally due to the disorganisation of the Army Signal Service, Army Headquarters sent important operations orders *en clair*. The despatch of messages in this way must of course also have been due to complete lack of training of the staff itself, but this very unpreparedness still further emphasises the impossibility of an efficient accomplishment of that speeding up of the commencement of operations which was demanded of the Army.

The confusion in the staff work of the Army had its effect upon all the lower staffs. Most of the Corps Commanders complained that Army Headquarters had not acquainted them with the objectives given to corps for their operations. A perusal of the so-called "*directives*" for the Army is sufficient to determine the justice of this accusation. These documents in no way differ from commonplace orders and correspond little with what should be understood by the word "*directive*." The Staff of the Army likewise kept corps but poorly informed of the situation. The confusion in the staff work of the army seriously affected the troops. "The corps staff used to receive orders only late at night," testifies General Klyuev. "This became such a custom that the staff officer on duty was ordered always to despatch at 1 a.m. the following telegram: 'Orders for to-morrow not received: am waiting.' Sometimes also at the moment a march was commencing orders would be received from the staff of the Army changing the direction of the march. The units had then to be halted, new advance guards sent forward and those already put out withdrawn, the troops generally shifted about and the march order destroyed."

The unpreparedness of our higher staffs was felt more acutely in the Staff of the Second Army than in that of the First. The latter was formed entirely from the staff of the Vilno Military District, but the Staff of the Second Army came from that of the Warsaw Military District, which had also to provide the staff of the North-Western Army Group. This latter, with the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District at its head, had taken all the best officers. The Staff of the Second Army filled up its General Staff personnel from other districts and therefore was essentially a composite of great and little. Owing to the lack of thought given to our mobilisation, the Army

staffs had not assembled in peace time for their members to become acquainted with one another at war games and staff rides, as was the case in Germany and France. Moreover, his very appointment was kept secret from an officer, thus making it impossible for him to prepare himself for his allotted rôle. The chaos which reigned in many of the higher staffs at the commencement of the war was the natural result of this state of affairs.

To complete the tale of the infirmities of the Second Army yet one more must be added—one of which General Rennenkampf's army was also the victim. Army corps found themselves deprived of divisional cavalry, properly so called. In most corps second and third grade Cossack units, untrained at the commencement of the war, had been detailed to fulfil this rôle. Owing to delay in their arrival, measures were taken in the Second Army for the temporary attachment of units in their place. But what happened in actual fact? General Martos, commanding the XVth. Corps, requested that one of the regiments of the cavalry divisions which in peace time were part of the establishment of the XVth. Corps should be left temporarily in that corps in the rôle of corps cavalry, "as had been arranged, in the provisional tables for the employment of units in case of war—the 6th. Glukhovsky Dragoon Regiment being detailed therein for the XVth. Corps." This was changed and he was given the Orenburg Cossack Regiment from the 13th. Cavalry Division. Corps Cavalry should know the corps they are serving, and the corps commander should train them and have confidence in them, but instead he knew that the Orenburg Regiment was only accustomed to police service in Warsaw, and knew nothing of service in the field. But this request of General Martos was "categorically" refused. "As a result," he continues "the corps was left without cavalry reconnaissance on the march and in action. The Cossacks also turned out to be untrained and to be chary of running into danger."

The situation in the XIIIth. Corps was no better. "The cavalry reconnaissance," writes General Klyuev, its commander, "was carried out by four sotnias of the Frontier Guard, attached to the corps. In peace time the Frontier Guard, while executing its arduous duties, received its cavalry training in units no larger than a troop, or, rarely, a sotnia. It was therefore completely untrained for carrying out distant reconnaissance, and it fulfilled its duties in near reconnaissance just as any N. C. O. of the Transport would have done."

The Approach of the Army to the Battle-field.

The situation created in the French theatre by the criminally thoughtless Plan of War had a serious influence upon the strategy of the Russian theatre. There was also the influence of the general politico-strategical situation, which is evidenced in G. H. Q. orders dated 8th. August for the concentration of the Guards' and the Ist. Army Corps in Warsaw. The idea of immediate pressure upon Germany by the shortest line of operations upon Berlin is still more forcibly expressed in the memorandum dated the 26th. August, drawn up by the Operations Branch of G. H. Q. under the direct influence of the impression of General Rennenkampf's victory at Gumbinnen and of the alarming news received from France. According to this memorandum it was proposed to "expedite the occupation of the Lower Vistula," and with this object to develop an offensive from Warsaw along the left bank of the Vistula; "to expedite the clearance of enemy forces from Eastern Prussia," and for this purpose to transfer General Rennenkampf's army, to the strength of 4 or 5 corps, by rail to the left bank of the Vistula. General Samsonov's army was to remain on the right bank of the Vistula. Of this force one first line corps and 2 or 3 second line divisions would guard Königsberg, 1 or 2 first line corps, with 2 to 4 second line divisions in strongly fortified positions in the area Preussisch Holland—Saalfeld—Deutsch-Eylau, and two first line corps echeloned in rear at Soldau would guard the front Marienburg-Graudenz. On the left bank of the Vistula the Ninth, First and Tenth Armies, to a strength of, say, 15 corps, would be deployed in order to develop operations into the interior of Germany. In case of the evacuation of the Lower Vistula by the Germans, General Samsonov's army also would be transferred to the left bank of the river, on the right flank; the Armies would then be deployed in the following order—the Second, Ninth, First and Tenth.

The actual course of operations necessitated the expenditure of corps "under orders for the offensive into the interior of Germany" to reinforce the North-Western Army Group (the Ist. Corps) and the South Western Army Group (the Guards' Corps). Moreover, the hasty strategy of concentrating troops to carry out operations directed against Poznań led to the violation of one of the basic principles of military science—the concentration of force in the decisive place at the decisive time. The present Second Army operations were now to

decide the fate of our first manoeuvres against Germany, and the battle impending before the Army was the decisive moment. One is reminded perforce of the words of the great Suvorov : " Go into battle, assemble your troops, drain the lines of communications. . . . "

In consequence of this, the desire of General Jilinsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, to use the corps which had been concentrated in the Warsaw area to aid in the operations of the Second Army, was entirely justifiable. He included the Guards' and the First Army Corps in the establishment of General Samsonov's army.

But on the 9th. August General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, warned General Jilinsky by telegram that one of these corps—the Guards' or the Ist.—was to serve as an " active-operations-reserve " (?) in the hands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and, in view of the move by General Jilinsky of the Ist. Corps to Plonsk, " under no circumstances was the Guards' Corps to be moved out of the Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk area. "

The epithet " active-operations " could not alter the hard facts of the case : as events turned out during the days that were critical for Samsonov, the Guards' Corps was astray in the area of the left bank of the Vistula.

On the 21st. August General Jilinsky enquired of G. H. Q. : " Can the Ist. Corps take part at Soldau ? " The reply was returned, under the signature of General Yanushkevich, that " the chief rôle of the Ist. Corps is to secure the offensive operations of the Second Army on the Thorn flank. If it is certain that there is no danger to the left flank of the Second Army from the direction of Thorn, it is permissible for the Ist. Corps to take part in the fighting on the army front. " The evasive tone of this reply limited the co-operation of the Ist. Corps in the Second Army Operations to the Soldau area.

The battle of Gumbinnen had caused General Jilinsky to ponder upon the risks involved in the task which had been imposed on General Rennenkampf's army. By his orders of the 22nd. August he had taken the IInd. Corps off the establishment of the Second Army and had transferred it to Rennenkampf's army. Thus General Samsonov's army was weakened by yet another corps, and the IInd. Corps, which had taken no part in the battle of Gumbinnen, was now left out of the

Second Army battle—yet another corps gone “astray.” Finally, the departure of the IInd. Corps from the Grodno area forced General Jilinsky to leave the 3rd. Guards’ Infantry Division (of the XXIIIrd. Corps) in this area.

In the final analysis, instead of seven corps (the Guards’, the Ist, IInd, VIth, XIIIth, XVth, and XXIIIrd.), with a strength of 15 Infantry divisions, being placed at the one time at General Samsonov’s disposal, he was given only 9 infantry divisions (the Ist, VIth, XIIIth. and XVth. Corps and half the XXIIIrd). Moreover, of these 9 divisions, two (the Ist. Corps) by the instructions given above were fettered to a specified area (Mlava-Soldau). It should be remembered here that the fire strength of 9 Russian infantry divisions was less than that of 6 German.

We will now examine in detail the operation task imposed upon General Samsonov’s army, weak as it was.

The original proposals of General Jilinsky for the operations of the Second Army are set forth in his telegram to G. H. Q. dated the 10th. August. It was stated therein that General Samsonov’s army would attack with two corps (the IInd. and VIth.) on the front Lyck-Johannisburg, and with the two other corps (the XIIIth. and XVth.) on the front Rudschanny-Ortelsburg, and later on the front Rastenburg-Rothfließ. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group left General Samsonov’s army upon the centre line of operations, the line leading from the Graevo “rail approach” to Eastern Prussia. It was also in accord with the Plan of War that the Second Army should be deployed upon this line. But when the *directive* (letter No. 345) of the same date, the 10th. August, arrived from G. H. Q., the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group altered his original proposals.

Letter No. 345 demanded the speedier exertion of pressure upon Germany, with which object it was proposed to extend the objectives of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, the actual suggestion being that the Second Army should attack “turning the line of the Masurian Lakes from the West with the object of shattering the German Corps which had deployed between the Vistula and the Masurian Lakes, and thereby preventing a German withdrawal behind the Vistula.”

The operation about to be carried out by a part of the corps of the Second Army, to turn the Masurian Lakes from the south, was not sufficient to fulfil this task, and General Jilinsky decided to alter the line of operations of the Second Army to one to the west of the Masurian Lakes, leaving one corps (the IIInd.) covering the Lyck flank. He reported this decision to G. H. Q. on the 12th. August, and sent General Samsonov *Directive No. 2*, dated 13th. August. According to this directive the main forces of the Second Army were to be deployed upon the frontier between Mishinets and Khorjele, to attack the front Rudschanny-Passenheim, and subsequently to attack northward in flank and rear of the line of the Lakes.¹

The Army Commander, having received this directive from the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, on the 14th August issued Army Order No. 1 for the deployment of the army before crossing the frontier, and on the 16th. August sent out to Corps Commanders his *Directive No. 1*. It will be seen from these operation orders that General Samsonov had shifted the line of deployment of his Army still further to the left, linking the left flank of the XVth. Corps to the Ist. Corps right flank, which was operating on the Mlava-Soldau line. In his telegram No. 1012, dated the 17th. August, General Jilinsky objected to this change of the front of deployment (of the XVth, XIIIth. and VIth. Corps) still further westwards. In this telegram he said: "On the basis of my proposals, approved by the Grand Duke and set forth in *Directive No. 2*, the front specified for the attack of the Second Army to the west of the Masurian Lakes was from the line Mishinets—Khorjele to Rudschanny—Passenheim. You have extended your left flank to Jaboklik, and consequently the front of the three corps of the Second Army during the march to the frontier will cover 60 versts, which I consider excessive. In view of the fact that the 1st. Corps, being part of the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, has been placed at your disposal to support your forces, I consider it better to put the 2nd. Infantry Division into the front line."

General Samsonov's army had in fact been "pulled" westwards. We use the word "pull" with intent. Factors relating to the basing of armies have acquired far greater importance in modern warfare than was the case in earlier periods. A modern army cannot fight a battle unless continuously served by transport of all sorts. The Second Army, which had commenced its offensive before the formation

¹ See Diagram No. 1.

and organization of its lines-of-communication and subsidiary services had been completed, was fatally bound to the Russian railway lines. We emphasise the word "Russian," as owing to the difference in gauge, technical work on a large scale would be required before the German railway lines could have been used. At the commencement of the invasion by the Second Army this work was still more incomplete than in the case of the First Army. The railway line Novogorod-Mlava naturally acted as a powerful magnet.

Modern strategy does not complete its task in the theatre of war merely by concentrating large forces on the field of battle; it is confronted by another problem of equal importance—that of organising the lines of communication of the fighting troops. This aspect of command in the field was completely overlooked in planning the first operations on the North-Western Front, just as at the Kiev war game conducted in April 1914 by General Sukhumlinov for members of the higher command. The very first contact with the realities of the situation caused the plan, by which the Second Army was to circumambulate the Masurian Lakes to a distance of more than a hundred versts, to burst and disappear like a pricked bubble.

A careful study of the East Prussian network of railways will show us how "fantastic" in another regard also were the projected operations of the Second Army: the front of the River Alle, continued by the belt of lakes extending between Allenstein, Gilgenburg and Lautenburg, had been so well equipped by the Germans with railway communications, that twelve lines served it from the west, of which three were double. It would be difficult to admit the supposition that the Germans, should they decide to defend Eastern Prussia, would permit General Samsonov's army to march peacefully northwards between the chain of the principal Masurian Lakes and the River Alle. In this case a German flank attack from the front Allenstein—Lautenburg, which was served from the west by seven lines of railway, would unquestionably have ensued, and under these conditions it would follow that the further General Samsonov's army proceeded, the more dangerous its situation would become; it would literally fall into a strategic trap.

In "A Brief Strategic Outline of the War of 1914—1918," published by "Voennoe Delo," appears the statement that General Samsonov on the 11th. August addressed a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Army Group, in which he insisted on the necessi-

ty for disposing his army further to the West. In order to obtain an explanation of General Samsonov's point of view, which did not coincide with that of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, we requested General Postovsky, the late Chief of Staff of the Second Army, to enlighten us upon this historically important question. Its great interest induces us to reproduce in full the reply received.¹

"In 1911 or 1912, I cannot recall which, the Staff of the Warsaw Military District² succeeded in obtaining through agents an account of the War game of the German General Staff, the subject of which was a similar offensive.³ One of the armies on the Russian side was attacking on the line upon which General Samsonov's army subsequently came to attack, and the German forces ordered to operate against it were concentrated in the Western part of Eastern Prussia, in the area of Deutsch Eylau and Osterode. Having turned the left flank and rear of the Russian army, which had penetrated far into Eastern Prussia to the West of the Masurian Lakes, they annihilated it.

"This German plan of operations at the war game answered exactly the peculiar conditions of the East Prussian theatre. In fact, the offensive of an army from the Warsaw district northwards, as it developed, enabled the Germans—equally those concentrated in the Western part of Eastern Prussia, and those arriving by rail from the more central districts of Germany—to take the attacker in flank and rear by means of a simple frontal movement.

"Those responsible for working out the plans for the offensive therefore considered it essential to take as axis the railway line Novogeorgievsk-Mlava, but strictly on condition that part of the army be disposed westward of this line, and moreover, that the flank of the offensive be made secure by marching the left flank units of the army in echelon. It was essential to leave the railway line Novogeorgievsk-Mlava covered by the flank of the army, because this was the sole line of supply in a country full of swamps and quicksands, where transport was a matter of great difficulty.

"If the attacking army was not strong enough to occupy the whole front from the Masurian Lakes to Mlava and considerably further westward, it appeared better to remove it from the belt of lakes and lead it westward thereof. Communication between the First

¹ "The Offensive of General Samsonov's Army in Eastern Prussia" by General Postovsky; manuscript in the possession of the author.

² General Postovsky was at this time Quartermaster-General on the Staff of the Warsaw Military District.

³ An invasion by a Russian army, similar to the offensive of General Samsonov's army. (Author's note).

and Second Armies was in any case impracticable of attainment. Therefore it was better not to attempt it, and to operate against the area Deutsch Eylau—Osterode.”

These considerations were conveyed to General Samsonov after his arrival in Warsaw on the third day of mobilisation, and were approved by him. Unfortunately, when the decision was taken to embark on an immediate offensive of the army into Eastern Prussia, General Samsonov was not given any sort of choice as to the means by which the task imposed upon his army was to be carried out. The offensive was regulated by the *directives* of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, and these laid down with exactitude the trace of the Army front and even the lines of advance. Therefore, to keep within the limits of the *directives* which he had received, it only remained to General Samsonov to try to extend his front westward as far as possible, and to have strong echelons in rear of his left flank. The first of these echelons was the Ist. Corps, and the second, the Guards which up to the commencement of operations had been included in the establishment of the Army. The Commander of the Second Army attached special importance to the tasks allotted to this corps. To General Samsonov's extreme chagrin, at the time ordered for the commencement of the march of this corps, the corps commander received from the staff of the Front direct orders for the removal of the corps from the establishment of the Second Army. He did not immediately report the orders he had received, so that only after the lapse of twenty-four hours, when the offensive had already been developed, did General Samsonov learn of the removal from the Second Army of the more important of the corps in echelon. Subsequently the Commander-in-Chief of the Front also limited the rights of the Second Army to issue orders affecting the Ist. Corps.

On the 19th. August the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group despatched the following telegram to General Samsonov: “The delay in the Second Army offensive is placing the First Army, which has already been fighting for two days at Stallupönen, in a difficult position. Therefore expedite the offensive of the Second Army and develop operations as energetically as possible, bringing the Ist. Corps into action if necessary for this purpose.”

Such efforts were indeed necessary, owing to the strategic situation created by the hurried advance into Prussia of General Rennenkampf's weakened army, but they were beyond the demands that

could practicably be made upon the troops of the Second Army. The strategic conception of the operations planned for this front was based upon an overestimate of the capacity even of the best troops in the world. General Samsonov could only reply: "The army has been advancing without a pause since the receipt of your orders, traversing daily more than 20 versts of sands, and consequently further acceleration is impossible."

An eye-witness thus describes the march of the Second Army: "The surface of most of the roads was soft and sandy, which made transport movement extremely difficult. I myself saw a convoy being moved forward thus: from one half of the vehicles the horses would be removed and harnessed to the remainder, which would then be moved forward a verst; then all the horses would be taken back to the vehicles left behind, and so on throughout the entire march. The troops never saw their supply trains. A day's halt was never given. In this way the XIIIth. Corps, having completed nine marches without its transport and without bread, became especially disorganised. The reservists unused to marching were worn out."

Thus exerting themselves to the limit of their strength, the corps of the Second Army on the 21st. August had reached the line Friedrichsfelde-Mlava. In advance of the right flank of the army marched the 4th. Cavalry Division, in advance of the centre, the 15th,¹ and in advance of the left flank, the 6th; the 5th. Cavalry Division remained on the left bank of the Vistula.

Information obtained from reconnaissance gave it to be supposed that Divisions of the German XXth. Army Corps, reinforced by Landwehr units from the garrison of the Vistula forts, were opposite the Second Army. This was the case. The following were the German forces opposite the Second Army:—

	Battalions.	Batteries.	Squadrons.
The XXth. Army Corps consisting of the 37th. and 41st. Infantry Divisions. ..	25	29	6
The 70th. Landwehr Brigade. ..	6	2	4
General Unger's Division (the 20th. Landwehr Brigade and General Zemmern's Brigade). ..	12	6	4
Total ..	43	37	14

¹. When the fronts neared one another the 25th. Cavalry Division was transferred to the left flank.

During the 20th. August reports were received that the enemy was hastily retreating before our troops, and an air scout stated that he had seen two long columns leaving Mlava for the north. But at the same time cavalry patrols reported that they had come across numerous barbed-wire entanglements, sited in good defensive positions, in sectors of the frontier belt at Ortelsburg, Neidenburg, and to the west of the latter. The outskirts of villages and the ditches draining the swamps were everywhere heavily wired. Upon the declaration of mobilization trenches had been dug behind this wire, and the outskirts of most villages had been turned into strong points.


This caused General Samsonov to decide on a cautious approach to those areas which would probably be fortified, and on the endeavour to capture them by the use of enveloping and flanking tactics. His *Directive No. 3* issued by him on the 21st. August and containing operations orders for the 22nd. August, was based on this idea. This directive provided for the staging by the VIth. Corps of an operation to obtain possession of the Ortelsburg area, and of one by the Ist. and XVth. Corps, to obtain possession of the line Neidenburg-Soldau; the XIIIth. Corps was to remain in the Kutzburg-Kannwiesen area and to be ready to turn the Ortelsburg or Neidenburg position; the 2nd. Division was to march on Mlava.

General Samsonov's superiority in strength was not sufficient to enable him, in planning his operations, to calculate on taking the German positions at one blow, even taking into account the exaggerated intelligence concerning the "German defeat at Gumbinnen," which had been communicated to Samsonov by the Staff of the North-Western Army Group.

General Jilinsky remained extremely dissatisfied with General Samsonov's *Directive No. 3*. On the 22nd. August he telegraphed (in his No. 1145) as follows: ".....I consider the dispositions for the 22nd. show a great lack of resolution and I demand immediate and resolute operations." In his telegram No. 6295 in reply General Samsonov pointed out the extreme exhaustion of the troops, the impossibility of bringing up the 2nd. Division, which had been left behind, the disorganisation of the lines of communication, and the fact that units, especially in the XXIIIrd. Corps, were not at full establishment.

DIAGRAM N°1
ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY
(Illustrating the Plans
of Generals
Jilinski and Samsonov)

Scale of Kilometres
0 20 40



S.D.O. No. 6991, 9-32.

The "Civil and Military Gazette" Press, Lahore.

Ortelsburg, Neidenburg and Soldau were occupied by our troops on the evening of the 22nd. August. At the same time it was discovered that the Germans were closing in westward in the Gilgenburg area.

On the evening of the 22nd. August, when reporting the occupation of Ortelsburg, Neidenburg and Soldau to Army Group Headquarters, General Samsonov considered it necessary to remind them of the complete disorganization of the lines of communication. "It is essential to organize the lines of communication, which has not yet been done," he stated in his telegram. "The country is devastated. The horses have long been without oats. There is no bread. Transport from Ostrolenko is impossible."

(To be continued.)

A SPASM.

(Due to Internal Unrest).

BY PHOENIX.

There are, I believe, supermen who can sit down and read such works as Field Service Regulations, the Army Act, and so on.

(i) Without going to sleep.

(ii) With some benefit to themselves.

The ordinary kind of man has to have some incentive in order—

(i) To avoid going to sleep.

(ii) To grasp what it is all about.

Incentives include, for instance, a promotion examination or one's last shot for the Staff College, the fact that one has to speak at a Tactical Discussion or find a sound reason for an unsound action which has been censured by the C. O.

There is, however, one other stimulant to interest and understanding and that is Experience. It is so easy for a senior officer, all plastered with war medals. He opens his F. S. R. and reads:—

“— will depend on—

(i) The nature of the country.

(ii) The strength of the enemy.

(iii) The weather.

(iv) The plan of the higher commander—”

and so on. His eyes gleam with interest! Why? Because it all reminds him of the Somme in '18, or Ypres in '17, or Shaikh Sa'ad in '16, or Tanga in '15 or Crecy in something or other.

“How true! How true!” he murmurs. He neither goes to sleep nor does he fail to get a kick out of it.

Now answer me this. How many of us really have any experience of Aid to the Civil Power? D——, I mean, very few. All right. That being so, how can you expect to read intelligently all the instructions, rules, laws and things on the subject? I'll tell you—by reading the following experiences of my young friend Bobby B.

II.

Bobby was desperately keen and enthusiastic. Enthusiasm is his father and temerity his mother as one might say. So, when he came out to India a full-blooded 2nd. Lieutenant, he was quite decided in his mind to do everything a soldier should do. He had read several (abridged) lives of great men, and very rightly considered that what was good enough for Marlborough, Wellington and Stonewall Jackson would do nicely for Bobby B. Anyway he intended to take his profession seriously and get all the experience he could by fighting Pathans, Nagas, Kashmiris and what not.

It was therefore a terrible blow to his martial ardour when he joined his regiment in Bombalpur, shall we say, and found that in a year it was due to move to Lucknabad, so to speak. The blow was the more bitter when he discovered that in both places his regiment was allotted to Internal Security and not to the Field Army.

He soon found that there were compensations for his enthusiastic mind. He had not been a month in Bombalpur before a friend in the Indian Police, who had been at his public school, said to him,

“There are going to be doings in the city during the Muharram. I expect you fellows will be called out in aid.”

Now, this was a new one on Bobby who had so far spent his time on the barrack square relearning his drill, which the Adjutant seemed to think he had forgotten during the two months since he left Sandhurst, and doing musketry and things. Tactical training and so on had not yet been meted out to him. So Bobby was completely mystified by the Policeman's remark and replied

“Oh ! Really ! You mean—? ”

The policeman who had been out in the country for two years (and had also been captain of the school rugger fifteen) looked pityingly at him, nodded, and walked away.

Bobby felt shamed and worried. Next morning he asked his Platoon Sergeant, quite casually of course, whether he had been out in aid of the Muharram at all. The Platoon Sergeant, who was lately out from the Home battalion, had not ; but naturally he did not say so.

“That will be quite all right, sir,” said he, “You don't need to worry about that, sir. I was in Ireland you see, sir.”

So Bobby stifled any qualms he may have had. After all there couldn't be much in it. The majority of natives he had observed in Bombalpur were a measly looking lot, and the very sight of Bobby at the head of his platoon would doubtless put them to flight. Nevertheless Bobby was keen, as I said, and after lunch he had a look through F. S. R. I. and II. and also Infantry Training Vol. II. He was on the point of opening his Manual of Military Law when he fell asleep. This was bad luck because he was getting 'warm' in his investigations as one might say. Not that the Manual of Military Law would have been the slightest use to him because the Indian Penal Code and extracts from the Code of Criminal Procedure, which tell one something about these things, happened to be in the Manual of *Indian Military Law* which as a self-respecting British Service officer Bobby very naturally did not possess.

A few days later he found himself with his platoon, paraded in front of a line of lorries all ready to move off in aid of the Civil Power—whatever that might be. The Adjutant was giving a lot of, to Bobby, completely incomprehensible instructions and ended up by saying,

"Whatever you do, remember—Minimum Force, or else we'll all get into the devil of a row."

This remark gave Bobby much food for thought as they rattled along the street into the bowels of Bombalpur city, which was completely strange to him.

Suddenly, on reaching a place where several roads met the two lorries containing his platoon stopped and he observed the Company Commander (who was always very rude to Bobby) talking to a police officer.

"This will be your piquet position, B.," he said? "You are to watch all roads coming into this square. Get busy with it. I'll be back when I've fixed up the other platoons."

Bobby's mind worked quickly.

"Am I to make barricades, sir?" he asked.

"Don't be a damned fool. These are communal riots, not the lines of Torres Vedras. Oh! by the way, there's your magistrate. Take your orders from him."

Bobby gazed upon his magistrate. He had always had a vague idea that a magistrate was an elderly kind of bloke with a wig,

spectacles and a gown. This one was an anaemic, emaciated and very nervous individual who bore a marked resemblance to one of the Mess khidmatgars. Bobby didn't feel at all like taking any orders from him.

There were six roads leading into the hot and dusty square. Bobby put a double sentry on each and collected the remainder of the platoon beside a kind of disused fountain near the centre of the square. The sentries were given orders to report at once any movements of the enemy—as you were—suspicious looking Indians. So far, so good, but Bobby knew a lot about war and was not going to remain inactive. Two patrols, of a corporal and three men each were detailed to reconnoitre the roads round the post. He couldn't explain much to them because the Company Commander had the only map of the city available and none of his N. C. O.'s had ever been in this part before. His reserve was now reduced to twelve men which, as the Platoon Sergeant pointed out, was not enough for reliefs for the sentries.

It was at this point that Bobby remembered the card, I.A.F.D.-908 which had been issued to him the previous day from the regimental office. He sat down to read it.

“Act in closest possible communication with the Civil Authorities throughout.” Bobby glanced up. The magistrate was about three yards away. He didn't want him any closer than that!

“Maintain inter-communication if possible by telephone.” If that meant inter-communication with the Civil Authority a telephone was not necessary; he could talk direct. If it meant inter-communication with the rest of the Company—well, he hadn't the faintest idea as yet where it was, and anyway he had no telephone. He told the Platoon Sergeant to look round for a Telephone Office or Box in the neighbourhood. The magistrate here spoke up.

“There is telephone in shop of Ramatool Friendshipwala, wine merchant.” This was some two hundred yards from the piquet but was something, and he could talk to the regimental Orderly Room. It was not till later that he discovered that Mr. Friendshipwala had closed and barricaded his shop, and access to the telephone was not possible.

“Avoid using small parties as far as possible and never use single men.” That was all right so far as the sentries were concerned. He had posted them in pairs; but those patrols!! He hoped they would be back before the Company Commander returned.

"*The military are not to be used as Civil Police.*" Now, what the——did that mean? It said already that single men were not to be used, and Civil Police always so far as he knew walked about singly. Why repeat the caution? He was puzzling over this point when the sentries on opposite sides of the square spoke simultaneously.

"Lot of suspicious looking Indians at the end of the road, sir."

"Kind of procession like, approaching the piquet from the west, sir."

"Load" roared Bobby, who as I said, was a quick thinker.

"Sir, you must not fire without my order." The magistrate had become extremely agitated.

The Lewis Gun section commanded the road now occupied by the suspicious looking Indians. The remainder of the Platoon some ten rifles in all, were drawn up across the other road blocking the approach of the procession.

Suddenly Bobby remembered the Adjutant's final warning anent Minimum Force. He had not yet quite grasped the meaning of this. It seemed to him that his platoon was already a minimum force for the job in hand and they were scattered all over the place. Orders were orders however (and besides the Company Commander might arrive at any moment!), so he withdrew two men of the party of ten, into reserve as it were. Surely, he thought to himself, eight rifles is about a minimum force for blocking a road.

The procession, which seemed to be several hundreds in number, had stopped on seeing the military across the road ahead of it. A tall, thin man, to whom Bobby took an immediate dislike was haranguing the crowd.

On Bobby's enquiry the magistrate said, "Sir, the man is telling them that this is a public thoroughfare and that they are a peaceful procession and that no one has the right to stop them."

"Tell them to go another way and that they can't come along here." Bobby was firm.

The magistrate went forward a few paces and shouted to the crowd whereupon the tall, thin individual approached, followed by the procession. He addressed Bobby in English.

"Your Honour has not right to prevent us using this public right of way. We are peaceful group of persons pursuing peaceful avocations. We are doing no harm to any person or thing. We are not therefore unlawful assembly."

Bobby was puzzled. He had been told to watch the roads leading into the square and to take orders from the magistrate.

"Well, magistrate, what about it?" he asked.

"Sir, this is legal point. I am uncertain."

The Corporal standing next to Bobby spoke, "Beg pardon, sir, but perhaps if I gave the chatty bloke a clip over the head with my butt it might help him to choose another road."

At this moment several things began to happen simultaneously. The suspicious looking Indians on the other side having caught sight of the procession across the way became much excited and their numbers increased rapidly.

"Can I fire on this lot, sir? It is looking a bit dangerous over here." The N. C. O. commanding the Lewis Gun section had an anxious look.

"No. You can't. Wait for orders." Bobby was getting cross. The procession had stopped but the noise was increasing and there were shouts of defiance. The Platoon Sergeant's voice at the head of another side street could now be heard.

"No You can't come this way. So back you go. *Footsack! No bon! Mafeesh!*" The sergeant appeared to be a linguist.

An angry voice replied to him. "You cannot prevent me. I am M.L.A., Bombalpur Legislature, and I claim protection of military. My car is smashed by Mohamedan rioters and I wish to go to my house."

As Bobby turned to investigate this new complication a stone struck him on the helmet and another hit the ground near by. The Corporal looked towards him expectantly. The magistrate was registering an agony of indecision. A broken soda-water bottle hit one of the men full in the face opening his forehead and cheek which poured with blood.

Out of a side street now appeared the Company Commander, in a car, accompanied by a Police Officer and two armed constables. The former took in the situation at a glance and turned to the magistrate.

"I am going to disperse this crowd. Do you agree?" The magistrate nodded. "Into them with the bayonet, B."

At this moment, in the distance, two shots rang out. The suspicious looking crowd in the street facing the Lewis Gun section melted away as if by magic. The procession too was in full retreat leaving two on the ground who had been unable, owing to pressure from the crowd behind them, to avoid the steadily advancing line of bayonets. The Police Officer examined the fallen men and a smile of satisfaction spread over his face.

"Good," he said. "This is a man we have wanted for a long time." It was the tall, thin individual.

No one would accuse Bobby of being too calm and collected. This was exactly the kind of stuff he wanted and he was scarlet with excitement and satisfaction. Here was his platoon attacked from three sides. On one, a riotous procession; on the other, a threatening crowd and on the third, a voluble M. L. A.; and they had all been repulsed. Good work.

He had failed to see the danger approaching from the fourth side.

"And now, young fellow, will you explain to me what you have done with your rose coloured platoon?" There was a kind of suppressed look in the Company Commander's eye which made Bobby go suddenly cold.

He explained his dispositions, slurring over to some extent the matter of the two weak patrols.

"Exactly! Weak everywhere and strong nowhere." The Company Commander looked grim. "Just come out of earshot of the men. I have a few remarks to make to you," he said.

"The first responsibility of a commander, Mr. B.," he went on, "is the safety of his men. I arrive here and find your platoon scattered about in small packets, any or all of which could have been rushed and swamped by a determined crowd. Luckily for you the Indian in this part of the world is a comparatively weak-kneed individual. Farther up north you would have been for it. You allowed a threatening crowd not only to come close to your men, but you actually permitted them to stone you and badly damage one of them. That man Thompson will probably lose the sight of his eye, poor chap."

Bobby was indignant.

"How could I do anything without the magistrate's order? You told me——"

"When your men are in danger there is no question of waiting for a magistrate's order." He let this sink in for a moment. "And now, can you tell me where your two patrols are?"

"No, but I told them not to go far."

"Exactly. You let them loose in this maze of an Indian city and expect them not to lose themselves. I'll tell you about one of your patrols. There it comes."

Bobby noticed that one man had his arm bound up and that the Corporal was going lame.

"That bright patrol of yours lost itself. When it turned into the main market street it found itself hemmed in by an excited crowd of Mahomedans. The Corporal did his best to get clear but had to use his butts to do it. This attracted some Pathan *badmashes* who closed with them and got away with one man's rifle. Fortunately the Pathan ran straight into a police patrol and we have got the rifle back. Perhaps that will show you the danger of using weak patrols on these occasions."

The Police Officer now came up.

"We have patched up those two bayonet wounds, and I'll take them off to hospital. I had better take your man too? By the way, have you discovered who fired those two shots. They must have been responsible for clearing the Mahomedan crowd away on that side."

Bobby had an uneasy feeling that his second patrol might have got mixed up in a scrap. He was saved the trouble of further investigation by its appearance at the far end of the street. The Corporal made his report.

"I sent O'Leary and Jones ahead as scouts, sir," he said, "about fifty yards ahead of me and Simpson. We reconnoitred the roads on this side. I have made a rough sketch of them, sir. Most of the roads were deserted, sir, but as we turned back in this direction we came across a few natives walking along. They seemed to be quite peaceful. When we turned into the main street back over there, two Indians with beards ran out of a house and stabbed two others who

were passing. I shouted to O'Leary to stop them, but they were too quick and ran up a side street. O'Leary and Jones each fired a shot at them, sir, but missed. The wounded Indians were taken into a house by some others. I then brought my patrol back here, sir."

"Don't split up your patrol like that again in this kind of work. Keep together. And I don't like that firing" The Company Commander looked distinctly puzzled and this surprised Bobby.

"Surely that was all right" he said, "They had to do something about it."

"I'm not too sure. A N. C. O. can take action only in protection of his men or property in his charge. Even an officer unaccompanied by a magistrate, can only disperse an unlawful assembly, and I don't think you can class two cut-throats as an unlawful assembly. I'll go into that later and let you know."

"And now, my lad, I want you to realise that you have made about as big a mess of this show as you could—"

At the end of half an hour Bobby had been reduced to a proper sense of his complete uselessness as an officer and leader of men; but, as I said before, he was full of enthusiasm and soon recovered. Before his platoon had been dismissed late that night his active mind had formed several conclusions. These he wrote down in his note book. Right or wrong they may be of interest. He showed them to the Company Commander, and for convenience sake the latter's remarks are given in their appropriate place.

"Aid to the Civil Power is no job for the soldier. He is armed with fighting weapons and is not allowed to use them."

(Company Commander :—Quite so! but the army in India has no other job in peace, and, in war, a large proportion of it is reserved for Internal Security purposes alone).

"The safety of the men is my chief responsibility. Since they cannot, in the ranks, take action to protect themselves, I have to take it for them."

(C. C. : Quite right. In other words, do not let a crowd get so close to them that they cannot fire, or so near that they can close with the troops hand to hand. It may be difficult to do this. You must use your ingenuity. I once got the magistrate to warn a crowd that any man crossing a certain line would be fired on. I did not have to fire!

If a crowd stones or attacks your men, fire at once. Always fire for effect, at the actual offender if you can. One shot will generally be enough if you act soon enough.

(C. C. :—Oh ! yes, I know I told you to go in with the bayonet yesterday. That was because you had let things go too far and there was'nt time to issue controlled fire orders. I took a risk I know. Hand to hand work is to be avoided if the crowd shows any fight).

“ Do not send out small patrols—never less than a section of eight men.”

(C. C. :—Yes. Stick to military units, that is sections or platoons. If people are hostile to the troops you take a great risk in patrolling with less than a platoon. In communal disturbances you can probably use sections, but remember they can do nothing except self-protection unless accompanied by a magistrate or policemen in whose aid they can act).

“ Find out the meaning of ‘ The military are not to be used as Civil Police.’ ”

(C. C. :—That is difficult to explain. I will try, but remember that these are only my private opinions.

Troops are only allowed to use the weapons with which they are armed. Since they are so strongly armed it is necessary to protect the public from them. They are therefore not given the same protection by the law as policemen are. That is one of the reasons why soldiers cannot use police methods in these cases.

There are times when troops will have to do certain police duties, for instance when the police are insufficient in numbers, or tired out or fully engaged in another place. Of course, the duties we may have to do are those definitely due to and connected with the riots or disturbances. We cannot be asked to do normal or routine police duties.

The crux of it all is that whatever we do *we must not use police methods*. We are not trained or armed to use police methods.

The police employ actual contact with the people. They mingle with and accompany crowds. They attempt to divert, stop and control crowds by physical contact and pressure. They allow single constables and small parties to be scattered about an area. Experience has shewn that these methods are suitable for men armed as policemen

and trained to the work, and, I may add, permitted by law to take action which we soldiers are not allowed to take. The police methods are suitable for normal conditions and, up to a certain point, in abnormal times. They definitely cannot be used by forces armed as we are and who are brought in to act at the stage of disturbances when it is necessary for troops to take action.

All this accounts for the warning in our instructions and the fact that the military commander is made responsible for the action the troops take. Were it not so, police officers would, of course, attempt to use soldiers in the manner of police, with fatal results. I imply no slur on the Police. They, very naturally employ methods which they understand and to which they have been trained.)

"Troops cannot legally take action against individual murderers only against unlawful assemblies of five or more persons."

(C. C. :—That is not correct. There is the right of private defence which entitles any man to protect himself or any other person or thing. You will find it clearly put down in sections 96 to 102 of the Indian Penal Code in the Manual of Indian Military Law.

O'Leary and Jones did wrong in firing at those two men yesterday. Under the Right of Private Defence they could, strictly speaking, only take action while the fear of danger lasted. In that case yesterday the danger had already ceased. Therefore, in my opinion, they could not act under the right of private defence.

As private citizens, however, they had the right and duty of effecting the arrest of men who had committed a non-bailable offence. Look up the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 59. Even then, in my judgment, they had no right to fire, since they were not requested to do so by a policeman or magistrate. You must warn your men not to do so in future, except, of course, in the right of private defence.

If, therefore, you want to send out military patrols to enforce an order such as a curfew order or to prevent crime, you must see that they are accompanied by a magistrate or policeman in whose aid they will act."

"I see", said Bobby B.

But when he came to think it over he found that visibility was still not too good. He wondered how much more there was for him to learn by experience.

Anyway he decided to have a dive at these mysterious books on law. To his astonishment he found them almost sane and intelligible. It must have been quite half an hour before he fell asleep.

EDITOR : *This article is based on an absurd assumption. No officer as ignorant as Bobby B. would have been allowed to go out in aid of the Civil Power.*

PHOENIX : *Of course not. That's why I enclosed a stamped envelope.*

A HOLD UP IN ANATOLIA.

BY CAPTAIN E. R. GREER.

I.

The opportunity of a journey by car through Anatolia is not one that falls to the lot of many Englishmen, even in these days of universal motoring, and it was therefore with alacrity that I accepted the invitation of Major H., the military attaché to the British Embassy in Stamboul to accompany him on a tour of the Anatolian Provinces of Asia Minor. Being myself in Stamboul on language study from my regiment in India at the time (1929), the prospect of a three weeks' motor tour was a welcome change from grappling with the intricacies of the Turkish language. Further, having motored a good deal in such countries as Persia and Baluchistan where some of the roads, if indeed they can be called roads, are indescribably bad, I imagined that I knew fairly well what we were in for. I was destined to be disillusioned on that score before the end of our trip.

Preparations for a motor tour in an undeveloped country naturally require a good deal of forethought. Petrol, we knew, could be obtained at various towns on our proposed route, but food and lodging were not so easily to be found. Major H., in whose car we were to travel, settled the latter problem, fixing up an ingenious arrangement by which the front seat of the car was made to tip backwards and join up with the back seat, thereby forming a not uncomfortable, if slightly cramped bed for two. He also fitted a mosquito net to be let down from the roof for use when necessary. We were thus independent of *serais* and rest-houses with the accompanying breeds of insects, crawling and flying, which infest roadside hostleries all over the East. We were obliged to take a quantity of tinned food with us, but we determined to keep it as a reserve, and to live on the country as much as possible.

Our proposed route lay through Brusa, Eskishehir and Afium Kara Hissar to Konia. From there we intended going through the *Vilayets* (Provinces) of Kayseri, Sivas, Tokat and Amasiya, to Angora, returning to Stamboul by a northern route. This itinerary which was to cover some 1,500 miles was planned subject to the state of the

roads and the conditions of the country, about both of which we possessed only the most meagre information.

One fine morning in June, we shipped the car from Stamboul across the Sea of Marmora to Mudania, the scene of the Armistice between General Sir Charles Harington and the Turks in 1922, and from there started for Brusa. The first one hundred miles or so being fairly well populated, we found the roads good and no difficulties whatever were encountered. The country near the sea coast is of striking beauty. Ranges of mountains covered with pines and cypress trees and neat well-kept villages leave a pleasing impression, and the snowy peaks of Mount Olympus tower above the landscape. As we got further into the interior the country underwent a complete change. Thinly populated and barren, with occasional bleak hills dotted like islands on a bare plain, one can travel for hours without seeing a sign of life. The soil is poor and only in the vicinity of the few streams are any signs of cultivation to be seen. Extremes of heat and cold in summer and winter add to the difficulties of life, and breed a hardy race in the Anatolian Turk.

The Turks have an ambitious road programme in hand, and we certainly came across a good deal of what might be called "road activity." Our principle concern, however, naturally lay in the state of the roads as we found them at the time, and they were in a sorry condition. In the proximity of towns they were generally good, but beyond that they petered out into cross-country tracks overgrown with grass and completely neglected.

Such maps of the country as are available are very inaccurate. The direction of the roads changes continually. Diversions, sometimes of several miles, are frequently made by cars finding the "main road" impassable. The result is often confusing, and roads and tracks radiating in all directions are very bewildering to the traveller. We often lost our way and had to go back on our tracks for several miles to get on to the right road again.

The small amount of motor traffic in the interior was very noticeable, and in view of the great development of motor transport in Eastern Countries generally during the past few years, this is all the more remarkable. In Persia and India one passes on a day's journey numbers of the ubiquitous "Chev" or "Dodge" lorries and cars laden to the roof with passengers and goods, and one

never ceases to wonder how they ever get anywhere without the vehicle falling to pieces on the road. In the country districts of Anatolia we did not see a single lorry and only one or two cars.

The Anatolian Turk is a very different type from his brother of the town. The new European modes and customs have not yet penetrated into the interior and we found the Turk there just as he must have been fifty years ago. The comparison was in favour of the country peasant. In Stamboul and other large towns the picturesque baggy trousers and turban have almost disappeared and the modern Turk wears the felt hat and lounge suit of Europe. He has no option in the matter, it is the law, and however he may dislike having to discard his ancient dress, he is forced to do so. Once in the interior we felt that we were back in the Turkey of the ancient Sultans. The people are all peasants and eke out a precarious existence on the barren soil. Poverty appears to be rampant and the standard of living low. In spite of this, the old traditions of Eastern hospitality still flourish. We had frequent experience of this when halted near villages during our tour. The headman invariably came out to greet us and insisted on our partaking of a meal before we proceeded on our way.

On one occasion when we had taken the wrong track out of some village and had lost the road, we picked up a peasant at a small hamlet who offered to accompany us to the next large town, one hundred miles away. He informed us that we would have great difficulty in finding the way without assistance, as there was no road for miles, and he said he would pilot us to our destination and return to his home on foot. On asking him what he wanted for his services as guide he said he would be very happy with four *liras* (eight shillings), but would take less if we thought that excessive! We took him along and eventually dropped him at our destination with a liberal tip and a couple of tins of fruit. He thereupon started off on his one hundred miles trek home singing and dancing down the road we had just come by. He told us on parting that it was years since he had possessed such wealth as was now reposing in his belt.

On the third day after leaving Stamboul we reached Afium Kara Hissar, an important railway junction on the Turkish—Iraq Railway and one of the largest towns in Anatolia. During the Great War Afium was the site of a large British prisoners of war camp and there

are doubtless many British soldiers who have lively recollections of the place. Later, in the Greeco-Turkish War (1919—22), Afium was the scene of much fighting when it was captured by the Greeks in 1921 and finally re-taken by the Turks a year later. It is an interesting place, typically Turkish, with its rows of tall wooden houses and ancient mosques and minarets, while jutting up in the middle of the town towers a great black rock several hundred feet high, from which the place takes its name of **Kara Hissar** or **Black Castle**.

Major H. paid an official call on the Commander of the troops at Afium and was received with much courtesy. On our departure a Staff Officer accompanied us for some miles out of the town to put us on the right road.

The following day we reached Konia where we spent a night at the local hotel—a course which we had cause to regret before next morning. Sleep was out of the question and we spent the night in repelling with a tin of “Keatings” the attacks of innumerable bugs of varying shapes and sizes which appeared from every corner of the room as soon as the lights were put out.

II.

It was beyond Konia that our real adventures started and we ran into tragedy in the lonely Anatolian country-side.

We had reached the small town of Karaman where we heard reports of flooded and impassable roads due to heavy local rains. Nevertheless we decided to push on about fifty miles to Eregli which we hoped to reach in one day. The roads were vile, and soon after leaving Karaman we saw that the reports of floods were not exaggerated. The country here is very low-lying and we found the road little better than a swamp in many places. Major H., who was a very fine driver indeed, did his best, and we shot through great pools of water and skidded through quagmires in our endeavours to get on, but it was a hopeless business. We soon got bogged in a sea of mud a few miles out of Karaman, and stuck there for three hours while we endeavoured to round up men from the nearest village to pull us out. This accomplished, we went through the same performance another few miles further on, and by nightfall we had only covered some fifteen miles. By this time we were hungry, tired and covered with mud from head to foot, and we therefore decided to spend the night in

the car outside a small hamlet and hope for better things next morning. Meanwhile we found ourselves the centre of interest of a small crowd from the wayside hamlet and soon got into conversation with the inhabitants. When we told them our next destination, two of them pushed their way forward through the crowd and offered their services as guides. They were a curiously contrasted pair, one dressed in old-fashioned European clothes with a battered felt hat pulled down over a villainous-looking face. The other a respectable-looking old man wearing the turban and baggy pantaloons of the Anatolian Turk. The latter told us in course of conversation that his name was Mustafa and that he was the proud father of sixteen children. Seeing a heaven-sent opportunity of earning *bakhsheesh* for the support of his large progeny he expressed an earnest desire to act as our guide, saying that he knew of a route over high ground which was not under water, and swearing by Allah to bring us safely to the town which was our next stopping place. Although it was by this time dark we decided to push on the thirty or forty miles in the hope of finding a hot meal and a bath. We therefore yielded to Mustafa's assurances, put him in the back of the car, and started off. This arrangement was strongly disapproved of by the other would-be guide who jumped on the running board of the car volubly declaring his intention of accompanying us. We told him that one guide was quite sufficient but he refused to listen to reason and I was obliged to push him gently but firmly off the running board. We left him standing on the road on the outskirts of the village glaring and cursing after us.

We had not gone far on our journey before it was apparent that our newly found guide was taking us a long way off the direct route. After a lot of gesticulating and a torrent of Turkish we gathered that he was obliged to take us a wide detour of some fifteen or twenty miles to avoid the flooded area and that we would join the direct route at a point about six miles from the village which we had just left. We would then be on the so-called main road again which was clear of floods from there on. A twenty mile detour to get to a point only six miles away in a straight line seemed a round-about business, but feeling too tired and bored to argue the question at any length, we accepted the inevitable and hoped for the best. The track we were on could scarcely be called a track at all and we were actually driving across country most of the time. However, our headlights were good

and our guide seemed to know every inch of the country, so we began to hope that we would reach our destination by midnight.

I was sitting in the front of the car beside Major H. with Mustafa in the back, now quite at home and smoking numbers of our cigarettes. The night was dark and silent and I had settled back comfortably in my seat preparing to doze when I was suddenly and unpleasantly brought to my senses by the crash of a rifle bullet at close range. It smashed through the windows of the car, covering us with splinters of broken glass. Almost before we had time to realise what had happened another shot followed. I saw the flash of the explosion not twenty yards way. With a groan our guide fell back in his seat. Major H. involuntarily stamped on the brake and pulled up and we both sprang out. I dodged round the front of the car and found myself presenting an excellent target in the full glare of the headlights before realizing that they had been left on. We instinctively stood away from the car, an obvious target for further bullets. We were unarmed, it being deemed inadvisable by the Powers that Be for us to be in possession of arms when travelling in Anatolia. So we were helpless. We could do nothing but peer into the darkness and wonder what was going to happen next.

A minute passed and no one appeared. Then two more minutes and still no sound except for the moaning of the unfortunate Mustafa who was lying on the floor of the car. It was apparent that the poor fellow had been badly wounded. When another minute or so had passed without anyone showing himself we discussed our next action in low tones. It was indeed a case of "What does A do now"? Should we go back or forward? It was obvious that our guide could guide no longer and we had no hope whatever of finding our way to our destination across-country in the dark without his help. Therefore to go forward was ruled out; but to go back seemed almost as hopeless as we had nothing to guide us, the road being, as I have explained, almost non-existent. The only hope was that we might pick up the tracks our car had made, but the darkness of the night would make this a difficult business. It was obviously our first duty to obtain medical assistance for Mustafa as soon as possible so we determined to return the way we had come and try to get back to the village we had left an hour or so before. Once there Mustafa would be with his own people again. This settled, Major H. walked over to the car and took his seat at the wheel. It was a ticklish moment

as for all we knew there might be rifles trained on the car waiting for us to return to it. But the enemy, wherever he was, gave no sign. Major H., pressed the starter, swung the car round and we were off back the way we had come.

I stood on the running-board and tried to pick up our old track, but I could see nothing, and we had not gone half a mile before we were completely lost. We stopped and got out of the car and judging ourselves to be out of the enemy's field of fire examined Mustafa's wound by the aid of a pocket torch. He had been hit just where the arm joins the shoulder. It was a horrible wound and it was apparent that the bullet was a dum-dum as his arm was nearly severed from his shoulder. We bandaged it up with our handkerchiefs, applied a rough tourniquet and forced some brandy from a flask down his throat, but it was little we could do for him with the means at our disposal. We then proceeded to search round for some signs of our previous tracks. Eventually we found the marks of tyres, but it was not long before they completely disappeared on a hard piece of ground and we were again obliged to stop the car and make a further search round. The night was cloudy, so we could get no help from the stars. It is a most unpleasant sensation to feel oneself completely lost, as we were, and I have no wish to repeat the experience.

It is unnecessary to go into details about the three hours which followed. Sufficient to say that we picked up our old tracks a dozen times and lost them again as often. Mustafa had relapsed into complete unconsciousness in the back of the car and we gave up all hope of getting help in time to save his life. We had almost decided to sit down and wait for daylight when we found ourselves on an ancient broken-down culvert which we immediately recognised as having crossed shortly after setting out from Mustafa's village. From that point onwards all was well. The track was clearly defined and in the very short time we found ourselves on the outskirts of the village. Here a fresh problem presented itself. How were we to account for our return with Mustafa lying desperately wounded in the back of the car? Could we explain in our very indifferent Turkish what had happened and what was more to the point, would we be believed? What would the villagers' attitude be towards a couple of "ferengis" who had descended out of the blue a few hours previously, picked up one of their pals, and were now returning with him

unconscious and dying in the back of the car? The outlook was not too bright, for these were wild and primitive people. However, we had no choice but to go through with it, so we drove into the sleeping village blowing the horn and shouting to the inhabitants to turn out.

In a few moments we were surrounded by a crowd. A lantern was brought and its light showed Mustafa lying in a pool of blood in the back of the car. For a few moments things looked unpleasant. The villagers seemed to make up their minds at once that we were responsible and closed round us with threatening attitudes and scowling looks. We were vainly trying to explain what had happened when by a great stroke of fortune, Mustafa, who was being lifted from the car by his friends, recovered consciousness for a few seconds. He gasped out a few words and almost at once lapsed again into insensibility. But it was sufficient to turn the villagers from enemies into friends and their threatening attitude immediately changed to one of helpful friendliness. We at once offered to drive the car back to Karaman where the nearest doctor lived and fetch him back to the village. We thought it wiser to leave Mustafa behind, partly because we judged him too far gone to stand any more jolting in a car and partly because we did not know what fresh troubles lay on the flooded road to Karaman which had delayed us so much the previous afternoon. The villagers, who were now our firm friends, agreed.

It was by this time about midnight and taking one of the villagers with us we started back on the fifteen mile journey to Karaman. Major H., had been driving for hours under vile conditions and practically without a break, but he was indefatigable and it was due to his skill at the wheel that we got through without difficulty and arrived at Karaman about an hour later, where we went at once to the local police station. Here we met with interminable delays. The Captain of Gendarmes, who was summoned from his bed and appeared after some delay, insisted on recording our statements before he would do anything else. It was in vain that we protested that our statements could wait and that we had come to fetch a doctor for a dying man. It appeared to us that it made no difference if the whole population of Anatolia was in its death agonies; official routine demanded first and foremost a statement in writing. Seeing it hopeless to argue we told him as briefly as possible, using French and Turkish

indiscriminately, what had happened. He took down our statements with maddening deliberation and an hour went by before he expressed himself satisfied with what he had written. In the meanwhile a doctor had been found, and putting him in the car together with the Captain of Gendarmes and a couple of his men, we started back for Mustafa's village. On the way we passed several parties of mounted gendarmes riding hard for the same destination, so it was apparent that our friend in command had taken some action.

Dawn came on the way and we reached the village in broad daylight. There we found more mounted gendarmes and we were informed that still more parties were out scouring the country-side in the direction where the shooting had occurred. The doctor carried out his examination of our wounded guide and expressed his opinion that, though very weak from loss of blood, he would probably live. This information naturally cheered us considerably.

In the meantime the villagers, with the unfailing hospitality of the Anatolian peasant, insisted on preparing a meal for us which we were more than ready for, having had no food for over twelve hours. Just as we had finished we heard a great hullabaloo outside the village and a party of gendarmes appeared dragging along at the end of a rope an unpleasant-looking individual in dirty European clothes with a battered felt hat pulled down over his eyes. It was the same man we had pushed off the running-board of the car not twelve hours before!

Much investigation and cross-questioning followed and our Captain of Gendarmes eventually told us he had got the whole story. According to his account a feud over a woman had been in existence for some time between the villainous-looking gentleman in European clothes and Mustafa. For months the former had been waiting his opportunity to put Mustafa out of the way and finally thought he saw his chance when we picked on Mustafa as our guide. He did his best to accompany us hoping apparently to find some opportunity of settling accounts with Mustafa when they had left us at our destination and would be returning to their village together on foot. This plan having failed when he was pushed off the car, he at once determined to cover the six miles or so along the main road on foot, knowing that he could reach the same point where we would arrive, after our twenty mile detour, before we could get there. He rushed to his house,

seized his rifle, got to his position with a few minutes to spare, and fired into the car from a distance of about 15 yards as we passed him. This, the Captain informed us, was the true account of the incident and he went on to express the deepest regret at the inconvenience to which we had been put and the unfortunate chance which led us into unwittingly getting mixed up in a private vendetta. He added his personal assurances that the unpleasant-looking individual in question would soon be swinging at the end of a rope.

We pointed out that if this account of the incident were really true, then all we could say was that Mustafa's enemy had gone about getting rid of his rival in a curious way. To fire into a car travelling, at fifteen or twenty miles an hour in the dark and hope to hit the person intended, struck us as being a bit optimistic, not to say dangerous for the other passengers. Our friend assured us that such a target would present no difficulties whatever to men with the high standard of marksmanship of the Anatolian Turk!

We could see that our gendarme friend wanted to convince us that the crime was the outcome of a personal vendetta. He foresaw that awkward complications might ensue should he be unable to produce a satisfactory account of an incident in which two British officers, one of them the Military Attaché, driving in a car with a British Embassy number, were fired at and held up on the road. The Turkish authorities prided themselves that under the new regime Anatolia was safe for the traveller and had publicly declared on several occasions that the bands of brigands and robbers which had for some years infested the interior had now been completely stamped out and that travellers could go where they wished with perfect safety. Unless, therefore, some good reason could be put forward for the adventure which had befallen us the British Embassy at Stamboul might make the incident the subject of an official protest. This, we guessed, was in our gendarme Captain's mind.

Our opinion of the affair was that we had been held up by some wandering thieves or brigands who saw the lights of our car in the distance and lay up on the roadside for us. They were probably under the impression that the car contained some local merchant from whom loot might be reasonably expected. Having fired into the car they heard our voices, and realizing that we were foreigners,

became frightened of the consequences to themselves and beat a hasty retreat.

However, we were obviously not in a position to prove the truth or otherwise of the story we had been told. Being strangers traveling in a foreign country we were naturally unable to dispute the opinions of the police, whatever we might ourselves think of them. We therefore made our adieux to our gendarme friend, having assured him that we would take official steps to have our thanks expressed to him for the trouble he had taken on our behalf.

The Anatolian Gendarmerie impressed us as a very efficient force. Almost every village had its gendarmerie post and the whole country is systematically patrolled by mounted gendarmes. All villages of any size have a telephone and in an emergency the gendarmes of the area concerned can be warned and quickly got on the move. The officers and men are recruited from the pick of the army. We met with nothing but courtesy and kindness at the hands of the various Gendarmerie officers with whom we came in contact during our tour. The insistence of the officer at Karaman on getting our written statements before he would move from his Headquarters was annoying, but is probably not uncommon in the police forces of even more highly organized countries. Certainly there is no question that the state of the interior of Anatolia has improved very considerably during the last few years. Previous to that bands of brigands roamed the country-side and travel in the interior was a hazardous undertaking.

III.

Having left the little village which had been the starting point of our adventurous night we had to decide on our next step. Our gendarme friend had told us that the whole country-side ahead of us was under water and that road communications were almost completely cut in the direction in which we wanted to go. We therefore decided to cut short our itinerary, return on our tracks to Konia and go from there to Angora, the capital. We reached Konia the same evening, stopping on the way for a couple of hours sleep and a bathe and shave in a wayside stream. With the recollections of insect life in the local hotel at Konia fresh in our memories, we determined to drive a few miles out of the town and spend the night in the car by the road-side. While at dinner in the hotel we received a message from the *Vali* (Governor of the Province) to the effect that he hoped

to see us before we left Konia. We therefore went round to his office after dinner where he presently joined us full of apologies for the adventure which had befallen us. He had been informed by telephone of the details of the incident and repeated the same story as that given us by the Captain of gendarmes. He added that the unfortunate Mustafa had died shortly after our departure from his village, but before dying had made a statement corroborating the story of the feud. We were naturally distressed to hear the news of the old man's death but the *Vali* assured us that the Government would compensate the family for the loss of the head of the house. We found in the *Vali* a very courteous Turkish gentleman. He insisted on sending his own car to accompany us to Angora, some 170 miles away. The road, he explained, was very difficult to find and his driver would guide us there by the best and quickest route. He would take no refusal. On informing him that we proposed to spend the night in our car outside the town and start for Angora at dawn the next morning, he expressed great surprise at our not availing ourselves of the amenities offered by the local hotel; however, he personally accompanied us to a spot where there was a well of good water about three miles out of the town. There he insisted on posting over us two sentries whom he had brought along with him, to prevent our being disturbed by passers-by. He then left us with fresh protestations of his regret at the affair in which we had been involved.

Next morning at dawn, having dismissed the sentries, we started for Angora, with the *Vali's* car as pilot; but after fifty miles or so finding the road to be fairly well-defined we sent the pilot car back to Konia renewing our thanks to the *Vali* by the driver, and proceeded on our way alone. The route was uninteresting, consisting of long stretches over barren and dusty country varied by an occasional climb over low hills, the whole very sparsely inhabited with small cultivated areas in the vicinity of villages. We reached Angora the same evening without further incident.

Angora, the seat of Government and the heart of Mustafa Kemal's regime, is full of interest. Formerly an unknown town in the middle of Anatolia, it has sprung up, mushroom-like, almost overnight, into a modern and scientifically planned city. It was in Angora that Mustafa Kemal, driven from Stamboul after the armistice, gathered a few kindred spirits round him and planned the coup which

led to the revolution in Turkey, the defeat of the Greek Army in Anatolia, the overthrow of the Sultanate and the establishment of the new Republic. This accomplished, Mustafa Kemal chose Angora as his new Capital. He was suspicious of Stamboul with its undercurrent of political intrigue, and, determined to cut adrift from these influences, set up his seat of Government far away in Angora, the place so closely associated with the origin and accomplishment of his great ideals. Whether this decision was a wise one or not time alone will show. Certainly it has resulted in the decay of the ancient capital of Stamboul, which has sunk to the level of a neglected and second-rate Levantine port. Most of the Foreign Embassies have transferred to Angora, now the first city of the Turkish Republic. Large modern granite buildings stand in well ordered rows and the services of the most expert town-planners and architects have been secured for the lay-out of the new capital. The result gave me the impression, as we drove into the town, of some modern American city miraculously set down in the heart of an Eastern country.

Having reported at our Embassy we drove to the Angora Palace Hotel. It was an astounding contrast with the accommodation we had had up to date. Only recently completed, it is the equal of any first class hotel in London or Paris. Loud speakers provided the latest jazz music during the dinner hour. The cuisine was perfect and the service of the Swiss waiters highly efficient. Here we spent a couple of days, Major H. having business with the Embassy.

IV.

The route by which we decided to return to Stamboul lay through the *Vilayets* of Bolu and Ismet. This route which runs through Northern Anatolia is little used by ordinary traffic, the most direct road being *via* Eskişehir and Brusa. We knew that our proposed route crossed several high ranges of mountains, but we could obtain no information in Angora as to the state of the road. Nevertheless we started out full of hope refreshed by our two days' stay in the luxurious surroundings of the Angora Palace Hotel.

Shortly after leaving Angora we entered mountainous and picturesque country. The road was good and we made excellent progress, spending the night in the car by the road-side some one hundred miles from Angora. Continuing our journey early the next morning we soon found ourselves in difficult country. The road become more

and more neglected and it was apparent that it was little used by motor traffic. Numbers of ravines crossed our route all spanned by rickety wooden bridges made from the trunks of pine trees and ill-suited to the passage of anything more than a light cart. Fir trees began to appear on the rugged hills surrounding us and frequent waterfalls and streams came leaping down the mountain sides. We were not, however, destined to make much further progress that day. It was still early in the morning and we were crossing a more than usually rickety bridge which began to sway and creak in an alarming manner just as we reached the middle of it. Major H. accelerated a little to get off the bridge as quickly as possible. We reached the far end of the swaying structure and saw two yards in front of us where the bridge ended, a drop of a couple of feet on to the road. It was too late to do anything. With a horrid crash the car bounded off the bridge on to the road below and came to an immediate standstill.

We found that serious damage had been done. The gear box and clutch were smashed beyond hope of repair except in a garage. We were stranded nearly one hundred miles from the nearest railway with no immediately apparent means of getting there or anywhere else.

The first thing to be done obviously was to find some signs of human habitation, and after a short search round we found a track leading up a valley at right angles from the road. I followed this, leaving Major H. wrestling with the car in the faint hope of being able to effect some temporary repairs. After following the track for a mile or so I came upon a small hamlet built of wooden houses tucked against the mountain-side. I explained the situation to the headman and asked him if he could provide us with transport of any sort. This, he said, was impossible, but he explained that he was connected by telephone with a large village some ten miles away which was in its turn in touch with the town of Bolu, forty miles away, where he thought a motor vehicle of some sort might be obtained. It was curious to find a telephone in an out-of-the-way hamlet like this. It was, as has been said, part of the system of telephone lines which cover the interior for use by the gendarmerie in their maintenance of law and order. I asked the village headman to put a message through whereupon he explained that the only person who knew the working of the machine was the local *hoja* (priest) and that no one except him was allowed to use it. After a short delay the *hoja* turned up. When we had explained

the situation to him he started to telephone. The instrument was a primitive one and a considerable time elapsed before anything happened. Finally however, the *hoja* managed to deliver his message to be passed on to Bolu. After that there was nothing to do but wait. I returned to the car, which Major H. had found to be beyond repair and we sat down by the road-side and proceeded to pass the time as best we could.

By evening, about nine hours later, we were still waiting, further telephone calls through our friend the *hoja* having elicited no satisfactory answers. Just before dusk, as we were making up our minds to spend the night by the roadside, we spied, a party of travellers coming down the road. They were some five or six in number headed by a person apparently of some importance and mounted on a good-looking horse. On seeing us and our car by the side of the road he stopped and courteously enquired whether he could be of any assistance. We explained the situation to him, whereupon he informed us that his house was some twenty miles further on and was at our entire disposal if we could only find some means of transport to get there. He was, we gathered, a farmer on a large scale, the owner of a lot of property and a person of considerable local importance. As we were discussing ways and means over a friendly cigarette a lorry suddenly appeared round a bend in the road. It was the answer to the *hoja's* efforts on the telephone, so our luck was in once more. Our newly-found friend insisted on removing our kit into the lorry in which he said he would himself accompany us to his house where we were to be his guests for the night. The problem of Major H's car, however, remained. If we left it stranded one hundred miles from the railway what chance had he of ever seeing it again? This problem was soon settled by our newly-found host who informed us that he would arrange for a pair of bullocks to drag the car to the railway, whence its transport to Stamboul would be a simple matter. We therefore packed ourselves and our kit into the lorry accompanied by our friend who handed his horse over to one of his retinue.

The journey which followed was distinctly unpleasant. It was by this time dark and the road had become very precipitous. Numbers of precarious-looking wooden bridges and hair-pin bends followed each other in rapid succession. The lorry driver was a most indifferent performer, the head lights were extremely bad, and we rocked and swayed over the mountain road in the most alarming fashion.

Time after time while crossing a bridge the whole structure groaned and swayed, and a crash into the ravine below seemed inevitable.

Several times we were obliged to descend and examine bridges about the safety of which our host was particularly doubtful, before the lorry could proceed gingerly across in bottom gear. He informed us that the road was practically never used by motor traffic and he was therefore unable to guarantee the bridges for such modern inventions !

Eventually, about midnight, we reached our friend's house, a large building on the outskirts of a village situated on the mountain side. Here we were treated with extreme kindness. The servants were quickly roused and the guest-room made ready. We were given most excellent Turkish dinner of *pilaf*, stewed fruit, curds and coffee, our host himself waiting on us.

Early the next morning, having thanked our host very heartily for his hospitality, we resumed our journey in the lorry, our objective being the railway station of Geyve. We had crossed the steepest ranges of hills the day before and the remainder of the journey was comparatively easy. In due course we reached the railway where we had not long to wait for a train to Stamboul. Before departing we made arrangements with the Station-master at Geyve, for the carriage of the car to Stamboul and he promised to send it on as soon as it arrived.

That same evening we reached Haider Pasha terminus on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and crossed its sparkling blue waters to Stamboul in one of the excellent ferry boats that ply between Europe and Asia.

Three weeks later the car followed. Dragged by bullocks over some hundred miles of one of the worst roads in Anatolia, its condition can better be imagined than described. It was a battered wreck, almost unrecognisable from the smart-looking car in which we had set out from Stamboul a fortnight before ; while inside the seats were covered with a large and ominous brown stain, a reminder of how the ill-fated Mustafa had met his end while travelling in our company.

I have often wondered what became of the villainous looking individual who was accused of Mustafa's murder. I suspect that as soon as we had left the district he was allowed to go, having served the purpose of scape-goat for which the Police required him. It would be interesting to revisit that little village near Karaman one day and try to find out the true story of our hold-up in Anatolia.

THE BURMA MILITARY POLICE AND THE REBELLION IN THARRAWADDY.

BY CAPTAIN J. F. BOWERMAN, 10TH. BALUCH REGIMENT.

"As regards the Military Police I need say no more than that if there had been sufficient reserve of strength in the force, and if they had had enough officers, they could have dealt with the rebellion themselves"—
Extract from speech by W. Booth-Gravely, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S., Special Commissioner, Rebellion, at the Burma Dinner in London on June 3rd, 1932.

Tharrawaddy was the only district in the rebellion area in which it was possible to collect anything like an adequate number of men of the Burma Military Police to deal with the situation. In all other parts of Lower Burma small parties of men wore themselves to shadows trying to prevent the rebellion from spreading, and in attempting to cope with a situation which became increasingly difficult from day to day.

The strength of the Burma Military Police prior to the rebellion was six frontier battalions, two garrison battalions and one reserve battalion; since the rebellion one other garrison battalion has been raised. The frontier battalion garrison posts on the frontier, and have small reserves at their headquarters to provide the columns which are sent out every cold weather. The garrison battalions have detachments all over Lower Burma whose duties are mainly to find treasury guards at district headquarters, and escorts for prisoners and treasure; at battalion headquarters they have small reserves which are allotted tasks in the local defence schemes of Rangoon and Mandalay. The reserve battalion, approximately eight hundred rifles, is the reserve for the force, and in the cold weather it supplies detachments to different frontier battalions, whose numbers have been depleted through column duties.

It can thus be seen that the end of December while well chosen to commence a rebellion from the rebel point of view, was the worst possible time, as far as the Military Police were concerned, as most of their cold weather columns had started and could not be recalled. The outbreak which occurred in Tharrawaddy District on December 24th, spread with alarming rapidity, and as the post of seventy rifles at

Tharrawaddy itself was quite unable to cope with it, additional help was demanded. A company of regular troops was sent from Mingaladon, and additional Military Police were rushed out as rapidly as possible.

As the Military Police arrived, they were split up into small parties and sent out in all directions, generally with no rations or bedding, and with no instructions except to try to restore order. No accurate information was obtainable, the wildest rumours were afloat, and the whole country-side appeared to be rising. The Military Police parties wandered about until they bumped something, fortunately in all cases with considerable losses to the people who were bumped. The heaviest casualties inflicted on the rebels were at Pashwegyaw on December 30th, where a combined force of 2/15th Punjabis and Military Police was attacked by a large body of rebels, which was only saved from almost complete annihilation by the coming of darkness. As a rule, however, the strength of the Military Police parties rarely exceeded, twenty-five rifles under an Indian Officer, they had no automatic weapons and were on a number of occasions attacked by rebel gatherings of strengths varying between one and five hundred. At that time, too, the rebels considered themselves invulnerable and came on with a fine disregard of their own safety. The fact that they merely adopted mob tactics undoubtedly saved many a small party of Military Police.

By January 1st, 1931, four hundred and twenty Military Police of all classes had been collected in Tharrawaddy district, and two hundred mules of the Eastern Battalion had arrived from Myitkyina, but very few British Officers were available for duty in the area. However, those who could be released were sent down, and others from regular units at Mingaladon were attached to the Military Police, and it now became possible to work out a scheme to try to cope with the situation. It was apparent that it was courting disaster to send small parties of men into the blue with no definite tasks, so the policy was adopted of basing small columns on Okkan and Tharrawaddy, while a larger one of eighty rifles was given a roving commission in the villages and forest reserves bordering on the Yomas. By this time, however, the rebels had discovered that they were not invulnerable and, as it had become almost impossible to get into touch with them, a change of plan became necessary.

The new plan was based on locating detachments of regular troops in different parts of the district, with the task of patrolling

by day and night in the vicinity of their posts. The Military Police were employed in working through reserve forests and areas where it was thought that rebels might be hiding, with the idea of driving them out into the open to be dealt with by the regulars. This plan, however, proved to be a failure, as the area of country to be beaten proved very much too large to be effectively combed by the small force of Military Police, and the rebels continued to be as elusive as ever.

The method now decided on was known as the Sub-Area Scheme, and formed the basis on which operations were planned in most districts after the Military authorities took over control in July. Under this scheme all Military Police in the district were put under the command of a British Officer, the whole district was divided up into areas with boundaries allotted and these were again divided into sub-areas. Area Commanders were appointed and were made responsible for establishing posts, seeing that systematic patrolling was carried out, and that posts co-operated with those in areas outside their own. At the time of the introduction of this scheme, February 14th, it was not possible to find sufficient men to establish all the required posts, but these were gradually occupied by men from frontier battalions, who were sent down directly their columns returned to battalion headquarters.

Within five days of the commencement of this scheme a detachment of thirty rifles under a Subedar, which had reached a village named Zaingthwe, was attacked by a party of two hundred rebels. In this action the rebels made excellent use of ground and cover in their attempts to get to close quarters, but all attacks were beaten off, and on the morning following the attack, thirty-five dead bodies were found round the post; the only Military Police casualty was the Subedar who was severely wounded in the thigh.

By the end of March sufficient men had been drafted into the district to allow of all posts being occupied, and although there were only one or two minor actions, the general situation had become appreciably better; it was impossible, however, to get any reliable information about rebel movements.

Throughout April the same systematic patrolling was continued and there were a number of small encounters, two of which are worthy of mention. In the first, a patrol of nine rifles under a Lance-Naik

was ambushed by a small party of rebels, who fired one burst and then ran; one sepoy was killed and two wounded. The Lance-Naik sent back his wounded with a message to his post commander that he was following up the party which had ambushed him, and that re-inforcements should be sent out. The post commander led a party of twenty-five rifles to the scene of the ambush, and then found that the Lance-Naik was fighting a retiring action against nearly three hundred rebels whose camp he had attacked with his five men. On seeing re-inforcements arrive the rebels fled and their camp, stores and rations were destroyed.


In the second, a Naik and six sepoys encountered a party of seventy-five rebels armed with eighteen guns. The sound of firing was heard by the post commander who sent out additional men to assist the Naik. In this action too the rebels bolted on seeing re-inforcements arriving, but left eleven dead and one severely wounded man on the field; eight guns were also picked up.

During May patrolling became even more intensive, and small parties of rebels were again roughly handled on several occasions. The most important engagement during this month was an attack on a camp occupied by Boh San Htu and his gang, which was carried out by twenty-three rifles under an Indian Officer. This camp was hidden in dense jungle which afforded wonderful cover for the defenders, but the attacking party captured the position with a loss of only two men wounded. The rebels lost four killed and ten wounded, eleven unwounded prisoners were taken, while the camp and all stores were destroyed.

By the end of May, although the morale of the rebels had been very considerably shaken, and the large gangs had had their numbers very much reduced by casualties and desertions, the situation was still far from normal. With the near approach of the rains, however, it was necessary once again to review the situation, as many of the Military Police posts were very isolated and it would be impossible to ration them once the rains had broken. A large proportion of the men too were badly in need of rest, as the strenuous time they had gone through had left its mark. It was, therefore, decided to reduce the numbers of Military Police from 750 rifles to approximately 300, and to hold a smaller number of posts, which for the most part were off the main road and railway line, while the regular troops were split up in small detachments at stations on the line itself.

The Military Police rains posts each consisted of a post commander and twenty rifles, and were ordered to send out patrols three times a week, to assist the Civil Police as much as possible, and to follow up any information they might obtain. As the rains drew on, this task became increasingly difficult as a considerable area of country became completely under water, but the men stuck to their work well and, considering the scanty medical supplies which were available, there was very little sickness.

By the end of the rains the situation was very much better, and the rebellion was considered to be practically over as far as this district was concerned. An out-break at Zigon was quickly nipped in the bud, and by the middle of February it was found possible to reduce the numbers of regulars and Military Police. Since then conditions have steadily improved, and everything now appears to be normal again, but small detachments of men are still stationed in different parts of the district to show that the rebellion has not been entirely forgotten.



THE TRAVELS OF RISALDAR SHAHZAD MIR KHAN.

PART II.

In August 1888, I attended the " Guides Class " at the College at Roorkee. This college is the very home of promotion and advancement. There can be few who have not benefitted from instruction there. One is taught surveying, the work of an overseer, engineering, etc. Baldev Pershad, the head instructor, was a first class teacher and took no end of trouble with us, but I only passed somewhere half way down the list, for we Pathans are a thick-headed lot.

MY JOURNEY WITH CAPTAIN WELLBY SAHIB BAHADUR THROUGH CHANG TANG AND GREATER CHINA IN 1895-96.*

(See Map at end).

My fourth journey was with the famous traveller Captain Wellby Sahib *Bahadur* (Captain Montagu S. Wellby, 18th Hussars) through Chang Tang and Greater China to Peking and Tientsin.

In April 1895, I went home on two months' leave from the regiment at Nowshera. One day a camel sowar of the regiment came and couched his camel at the door of my house and told me to report myself to the Colonel at once. I mounted the camel behind him and in due course was brought up to the Commanding Officer who told me that there was a certain Captain Wellby Sahib going to China and that I was to go with him. I left Nowshera with Lieutenant Malcolm Sahib of the 93rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and went to Kashmir where I met Captain Wellby. In Kashmir we bought clothes and other necessities for the journey and off we went to Laddakh. In Laddakh we bought camels, mules, ponies as transport to the value of about nine thousand rupees.

We started off along the Indus river for Shoshal which is a hill on the southern bank of the Indus ten marches to the east of Laddakh. Here we loaded up our seventy camels, mules and ponies with flour, grain and bhoosa and our journey started in real earnest.

* All the statements in this narrative have been confirmed from Captain Wellby's Book " Through Unknown Tibet, 1898 ".

From Shoshal village, I started sketching. We took no guide with us and relied entirely on the compass to find our way.

Chang Tang is a great plain which no one had ever thoroughly explored up to that time. The few travellers who had attempted to cross it had either died on the road or merely ventured into a corner and then come straight back. We, on the other hand, were to go right through the middle of it and were to find out all about the resources of the country, and to see if there were anything that might be of use to the Sarkar. Notwithstanding the great care we took in making preparations for the journey, we met with all sorts of difficulties from the very start and very soon the local inhabitants tried to prevent our further progress. This happened as follows :—

At the twelfth stage from Shoshal we camped by the side of the river east of Bandolah Dawan. Here we saw some savages of a tribe called the “ Changpa ” (people of Rudore and Rudok. Trans :), the number of whom gradually increased till there were about forty or fifty of them, and more and more came till by nightfall they had surrounded our camp.

They told us that their Chief Lama would not allow foreigners into his country. We of course paid no attention. They then threatened us with their rifles and swords, and actually threw stones at us. We got ready for a fight, but Wellby Sahib *Bahadur* said we had not come out to fight but to travel. Next morning we went back the way we had come. One of the Changpa went with us, but we gave him no fire to warm himself nor water to drink, so he soon got fed up and returned. We then gave up hope of travelling by that road and chose one more to the North over the Lanak La which they told us eventually led to the East. It was a dreary lonely track, and for seven months we saw no signs of human habitation.

A Shooting Accident.

One day Captain Wellby Sahib had gone out shooting small game. On his return he gave his gun, which he thought was empty, to his servant to carry. One barrel, however, was still loaded. One of our servants called Lassu tried to snatch it away from Esho (a Laddakhi servant) on whose left a mule driver, Sadiq by name, (called Sulloo in Captain Wellby's book) was walking. Esho whilst struggling with the gun cocked it, pressed the trigger, and let it off; and the whole charge of shot hit Sadiq in the face and smashed his lower jaw. He collapsed

on the ground groaning. We had no appliances on the spot—not even any tea to give him—nothing. So I put him on my mule and we took him along like that. In camp we fed him on bread sopped in tea. The situation was serious for he was in too great pain to move and implored to be left where he was to die. Captain Wellby pointed out that supplies were running short, and it was impossible to tell how long the journey was going to take, and that the whole party could not be held up for Sadiq. We left one man and one pony with him and went on. The first night—a long time after we had got into camp, the pony led by its driver, and carrying its huddled burden straggled into camp. We never saw them again—though for many evenings we strained our eyes to catch sight of them. They must have died for there was no sign of human habitation within at least four months' journey of where we left them.

Now our troubles began, for the road was deep in snow and the mules could get nothing to eat. After a week or so of such conditions one of the ponies died. The Sahib then decided to feed the animals on bread. As a result of this our own rations came to an end in a very short time. We then had to rely on our guns for food.

*Wild Horses.**

We saw great herds of wild horses, which career about in long lines and look like a Brigade of Cavalry drilling. They are small and chestnut coloured. They had never seen a man before, and would come right up close to look at us, and then run away for a mile or so and come up again.

One evening on getting into camp we shot one of these horses for food, but its meat was very unwholesome. It gave me the most dreadful stomach ache. The Captain Sahib gave me some medicine, but it did me no good and I could not keep up on the march next day. At nightfall there was a heavy fall of snow, and in a short while the whole country was covered as with a white sheet. I made myself vomit, after which I felt a little better. I then fell head over heels into a snow drift and lay there unable to move. When dawn broke I staggered on, but the snow had obliterated all signs of the road. How-

* The Kyang or wild ass of Tibet and Laddakh usually stands about 14 hands; he is of a light brown colour, with white throat, belly and legs; rather heavy in neck and shoulders, he is nevertheless a graceful mover and there are few prettier sights than a herd of them scampering over the wide plain. (Through Unknown Tibet--Wellby.)

ever I started off in the general direction of our journey and soon met some men the sahib had sent to look for me. They helped me into camp. They gave me some hot soup of sorts which was all we had. After the meal we started off again.

Yags.

We now got to a part of the country where the Yaq, which is a sort of snow ox, abounds. The Yaq has long hair reaching nearly to the ground. I have never seen any other wild herbiferous animal so fat. There must be quite 30 lbs. of meat in one haunch.

One day a couple of these animals, a male and female, were going along in front of us, when all of a sudden the male turned and charged us. I could not shoot it as my rifle was in its canvas case, but I brandished it at the animal and he shied off and ran away.

The Servants Desert Us.

When the followers saw that our rations had come to an end they refused to obey orders, and objected, they said, to eating the flesh of wild animals. Twelve of our mules died and we had to leave the least important loads by the road side.

The experience I gained from this journey was that so long as you have even one Sahib with you, you will never die of hunger. For they have with them all the necessary implements for shikar ; double barrel guns, fishing rods, tackle, etc., etc.

When we could not get game, we used to eat wild onions which we found by the side of the road and collected in the spare nose bags of the animals that had died. Firewood was practically unobtainable.

One day, when a servant called Juma was watering his mule, he let it down into some filthy water which it proceeded to drink. The Sahib asked him if he was mad to let the mule drink such filthy stuff. Whereupon all the followers began to insult the Sahib and to shout at him. The Sahib Bahadur then kicked Juma hard, after which all the followers, including the Sahib's personal servants, packed up their belongings, and taking the Sahib's pistol which was in their keeping, left us and ran away back the way we had come.

The Sahib managed to persuade Lassu and Esho to stay with us. The other ten wandered about for several days, but as they found nothing to eat they came back and followed in our tracks for two or three days.

They obviously intended to murder us and take our stuff, so we took all possible precautions by day and night. One day they came up very close and shouted out that they were ready to obey our orders. We decided to take back one of them—Shukar Ali, and sent the others away. They were a constant source of danger to us for they were so many and we were so few.

One day our camp was by the side of a nullah to the east of which was a small hill. From the west we saw the mutinous servants coming along the nullah towards us. Wellby Sahib told me to have a shot at them with my rifle. Instead of this I drew out my long knife and went up the nullah towards them. The two Sahibs followed me up in support. As soon as the servants saw us they retreated precipitately. I tried hard to catch them up, but they got away in the jungle and right out of sight. We never saw them again, and heaven only knows what happened to them. They probably died, as there was no sort of human habitation within hundreds of miles.

The Mules Die.

We continued our march through country, the average height of which was 16,000 feet above sea level and where for several days our twelve mules got nothing to eat whatsoever. At length we came to a patch of vegetation at the foot of a hill and there we camped.

The unfortunate mules grazed till night fall. Then we rounded them up and picketed them, and went off to sleep. At about ten o'clock I saw the mules lying down as if they were dead and reported the matter to the Sahib. He came along with me to the mule lines and caught hold of a mule's head and I of its tail, and we tried to lift it on to its feet; but it collapsed on the ground again. To cut a long story short, eight of them died that night; one was dreadfully ill and died shortly afterwards. Of all our transport animals, only three mules remained. Before this, we had thrown away some of the loads, but that day we had to drop eighteen loads of clothes, uniforms, etc., and to leave the tents standing where they were. We left some very fine coats, poshtins, etc., including all the Sahibs' writing materials. It seems that Europeans find it very uncomfortable to sit down without a chair; for the Sahib threw away everything that he had, but carried his camp chair on his shoulder. I cut up the tripod of my plane-table for fire-wood. I took with me one blanket and the suit of clothes and Kashmiri sandals that I stood up in. The Arabs say that

"Travelling is Hell," and verily it is so. Wellby Sahib now said that from the theodolite it appeared that China was quite close, but the theodolite turned out to be wrong.

At last our clothes got completely worn out and threadbare. From continually wading through water, the skin of my feet had chapped and cracked and they were black with dirt, for we had no soap. We only had snow water to wash in, and after our journey it took us nearly a year to get clean for the dirt had eaten right into our skin.

Signs of Life.

We now began to see some signs of human habitation. After six months' march, one day we saw some sort of Buddhist inscription on a stone. Some ten days after this, we found some broken pieces of china tea cups and saucers by the edge of a pool, and this cheered us up tremendously. One morning after a heavy snow fall we had marched about four miles when Esho, the bearer, drew our attention to something black at the foot of the hill in front. The Sahib looked at it through his field glasses and said it was a black camel-hair tent. Esho went forward to investigate and came back and told us that it belonged to a merchant from Lhasa who was taking a thousand yags to China. We decided to go with him and caught him up next day. From him we found that China was more to the north and that if we had not met him we would have had yet another six months' journey in the desert; for we had been making for the sea, due east.

I had suffered a great deal from hunger, and now saw a chance of eating my fill. The merchant, however, refused to sell us food except at famine prices and the Sahib decided that the best thing we could do was to leave him and to push on ahead.

We bought a pony off him to supplement our three worn out mules. When we told him of our intention to push ahead, he warned us that we would lose the way and would again have to eat the flesh of dead animals in the wilderness. However, we managed to find out all about the road from the drivers in his caravan, and then we left him. Eventually our supplies came to an end, and the merchant's words came true.

One day Wellby Sahib shot a black bear which was very fat. We had a lot of difficulty in cooking it, as we had thrown away our cooking pots and the followers only had one each. I did not like the idea

of eating bear, but there was nothing for it, so we washed the flesh as well as we could and roasted it. From the very beginning I had told the Sahib that I was ready to eat anything that he thought was all right, but I did draw the line at big fat rats and bears.

We had been travelling at 16,000 feet when we suddenly had to come down to 8,000 feet. Here Captain Wellby Sahib found some black-berries and called out to us, "Hurrah ! here is the fruit of China !

We were delighted.

A little further on we saw some houses, and later, when we saw more signs of life, the Captain Sahib told me to go ahead and reconnoitre. I went as far as I could, but saw no one and came back. That evening the Sahibs themselves went out and discovered that the local inhabitants were shepherds. We met some of them next day and they gave us some mutton to eat. We were now sure that we had really reached a civilized country where we should be able to get food and transport to relieve our exhausted mules.

On the 14th October we got to the city of Tonkar where we met a Swedish missionary, Mr. Rijnhart, by name. He had lived there for many years with his wife. He borrowed 250 dollars for us from the local Chinese officials. Thirty miles further on we came to Sining where we found a Doctor Ridley Sahib, who managed to procure a buggy for us.

The Hinterland of China.

The people look on all foreigners with the greatest contempt, and, as they all wear clothes of exactly the same pattern and colour, any foreigner is immediately recognisable. Even the Muhammadans wear little caps on their heads and pigtailed down to their heels. The Buddhists and Christians wear long coats and trousers and sandals on their feet. The Chinese never cut their nails, which grow to an enormous length.

The currency consists of brass coins with holes in them which they thread on a string. About 250 of such coins go to a rupee. They also have a silver coin which they call a "Yambu" which is commonly used for exchange. Japanese dollars are also current, and Japanese matches and goods are sold everywhere.

One day I gave two men a rupee, telling them to take half each. One of them drew his sword and cut the rupee in half. I asked him why he had spoilt the coin. "Oh we always do that" he replied.

There are caravansarais at every stage, and everyone one meets in these, is just like the Persians rotten from drink and opium.

All Chinese women are lame and they are only able to limp for a short distance. When a girl is born, her feet are tightly bandaged up, so that even when she is full grown her feet remain like those of a baby. If a woman's feet are not so deformed, she is not considered fit to be married. I have seen the dhoolies in which they take the bride along to her wedding. She is seated in a sort of chair and is veiled, but any passer-by may ask the bearers to let him see the bride's face and they will put the dhooly down and she will unveil !

When a Chinaman dies, he is buried in the fields and all trace of his grave is soon lost in the cultivation.

On the 4th November 1896, we got to Chang Wei on the river Hoang Ho, where we embarked on a ship, and sailed for the city of Shabtiz, where one can see the Great Wall of China on a hill to the East. This wall is 1,600 miles long. For 450 miles between Shabtiz and Butan we followed the line of the wall. The wall is wide enough for a field gun to go along it.

The country is densely populated ; the villages are about a mile apart and every five or six miles you will find a town of considerable size. The road we followed ran through these settlements.

You can take it from me that all the idol worshippers in the world are concentrated in Tibet and China. In each and every street and lane in a Chinese town, there is an idol temple. Some of the idols are of gold, some of silver and others of brass. They are all placed in a row. At the gate of the temple there is usually a stone lion or some such thing. There are no metalled roads in China and carts merely follow each others tracks. Carts usually have two horses which are driven tandem. There were six of us and we hired three carts, in one of which Captain Wellby and I sat. One night we started at 10 o'clock and I asked the Sahib to let me walk for a little. We soon came to a stream which delayed me for some time, but the cart went on. It was pitch dark and I soon got lost. The road ahead split into two and I took the one to the left. At dawn, I came to a large hill on the side of which I saw a Chinaman. I had picked up enough Chinese to ask for what I wanted and to find the way, so I called out to him, "*Talu Pekin ?*" which means, "Where is the road to Pekin ?" He pointed to the other side of the hill and said, "Down there." I found

that I had come a long way out of my way and could see nothing of the Sahibs. On I went. I was wearing a torn old fur cap, my breeches and coat were in tatters and my Kashmiri sandals in ribbons. I could not get rid of the people I met who followed along behind thinking I was a mad faqir. They jeered and hooted at me.

I met one good fellow who gave me an egg and a cup of tea. He refused to take any payment. On the morning of the third day I met the Sahibs in a caravansarai, but I felt very aggrieved that they had neither taken the trouble to wait for me nor had made any effort to search for me.

Pekin.

To the west of Pekin runs the same Great Wall, and here the road crosses the wall. At such points there are towers and the road splits up into three alley-ways and passes under the towers through tunnels. The road joins up again on the other side. There is a bridge to the west of Pekin which is built of stones of amazing length.

The road we had followed from Laddakh to Pekin was about 3,000 miles.

Pekin is a fine city which we entered by the Western Gate. We saw in front of us a fort, which we entered to find another fort, and inside that yet another and so on, the gates being all opposite one another. It is a very large and beautiful city, the shops are splendid and are decorated with coloured boards outside. One day I saw some Chinese soldiers in the bazar with banners in their hands marching along both sides of the road, and I heard that the King's daughter was coming along in a dhooly. A band was playing, but I must say that Chinese music did not appeal to me. It sounded like a lot of donkeys braying. I believe that the Chinese army has now improved a lot, but in those days their uniform was all in tatters and looked just like a faqir's blanket! Their rifles were mostly Russian single-loaders. There was nothing like discipline. When soldiers were walking along the street, they would often practise shooting at a stone. Officers were recognisable by a feather in their caps. No one pays any attention to the King's orders. The people do just what they damn well like and nothing else. There was a British Agent in Pekin, who did all he could to help us.

It is 100 miles from Pekin to Tientsin. In those days there were eighteen Sikh sepoy in Tientsin who acted as military police. They


got 18 dollars a month with rations, uniform, etc. In Tientsin, one finds ships from every country in the world. I saw a Japanese man-of-war in the harbour. The sailors seemed a very fine lot. Here we embarked in a ship and went to Hong Kong which we reached in seven days. Hong Kong is a lovely city and is built on a small island.

In seven days' time we reached Singapore. As I had no clothes fit to wear, I bought myself here a suit of clothes and some bedding. I then tied my old stuff into a bundle and threw it over board. Some onlookers asked me what I was doing and I replied "Thus have I destroyed the stronghold of the lice!" In due course we reached Calcutta *via* Penang and the Andamans.

Here I bade farewell to Captain Wellby. The Sahib *bahadur* went to Lucknow, and I rejoined the regiment in Nowshera. Some time after he sent me two hundred rupees and recommended me to the Quarter Master General in India for the MacGregor Medal which I was given with a reward of Rs. 150/-.

(To be continued.)

THE ROAD THROUGH CHANGTANG TO TIENTSIN.



SCALE 500 MILES TO 1 INCH.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-62.

BY LONGTIMBER.

Some Short Notes on the Shenandoah Valley Campaign.

Policy and Strategy.—A Government has a right of control over its servants but Lincoln did much to ruin McClellan's plan, his action was ill-advised and defeated its own ends.

In framing a plan of campaign the commander must consider the susceptibilities of his Government. McClellan's plan to move by sea to Fort Munroe would have compelled the *Confederates* to conform and concentrate for the defence of Richmond, but he did not take the trouble to convince his Government of this; he also miscalculated the time required. Lincoln, however, realised this.

The battle of *Kernstown* (March 23rd '62) realised Lincoln's fears and upset McClellan's plan. Once political fears are roused, Governments will exercise their right of control.

Government control was just as severe on the *Confederate* side. But Lee acknowledged this right of control and was loyal to it.

Lee's policy was to let the enemy advance into difficult country where they could not profit by their numbers.

Each side had three ideas :—

1. To take the enemy's Capital.
2. To defend its own Capital.
3. To defeat the enemy forces.

Note the abnormal value attached to Capitals.

Strategy was disregarded because Public opinion :—

1. Does not understand concentration but only dispersion.
2. Fails to grasp time and space conditions.
3. Favours detachments.

At the commencement of hostilities tactics were Crimean in nature but soon altered to suit new conditions.

Topography.—Roads in Virginia few and bad. Natural obstacles very great. Eastern Virginia thickly wooded. Rivers very large, bridges few and far between, a few fords. The use of rivers by the *Federals* contributed largely to their ultimate success.

The *Shenandoah Valley* 20 to 25 miles across and 140 miles long, well cultivated with few fences. The valley of the *South Fork* narrower and more wooded than that of the *North Fork*. A number of vitally important gaps existed in the *Blue Ridge*. Note the salient frontier of the *Confederate* country.

1861 *War*.—In April 1861, the attack on *Fort Sumter* opened the war. Little of importance occurred, however, till the battle of *Bull Run* on 21st July 1861.

Dispositions. McDowell (F), 50,000 about Washington.

Beauregard (C), 20,000 at Manassas Junction.

Near Harpers Ferry, Patterson (F) with 14,000 was confronted by J. E. Johnston (C). with 11,000.

The *Confederates* succeed in debouching from the Valley. Afterwards, however, Jackson would have liked to advance, but halts at Winchester.

The *Federals* awake at last to their difficulties. McClellan assumed command, he held the confidence of the troops under him.

Jackson wished to take the offensive after *Bull Run* but Jefferson Davis would not weaken certain places in the south in order to provide the necessary troops. Abandoning territory a constant fear.

McClellan wanted time to organise his forces and undoubtedly got it as the *Confederates* made no move. By refusing to advance McClellan forfeited the confidence of his Government with disastrous future results.

Jackson on the other hand, always considered how his movement would assist Lee and hamper McClellan.

The Federals had three main lines of advance against Richmond.

(a) Via the *Shenandoah Valley*.

(b) Via Alexandria-Manassas Junction—Culpepper and Gordonsville.

(c) Via Aquia Creek—Fredericksburg and Hanover Court House.

Outline of events up to the commencement of 1862.

1. Battle of *Bull Run* 21st July 1861.
2. McClellan re-organises the *Federal* troops.
3. *Confederate* leaders anxious to assume the offensive.
4. Jackson in command in the Valley.
5. The expedition to Romney 13th January 1862.

Situation, February 1862.

Federals.

200,000 round Washington under McClellan.

20,000 in the Alleghanies under Fremont ($\frac{1}{2}$ at Petersburg near Moorfield and $\frac{1}{2}$ 100 miles west of Staunton).

38,000 under Banks north of Winchester.

Fort Munroe was held by the *Federals*.

In all approximately 260,000 men.

Confederates.

32,000 at Centreville under J. E. Johnston with a detachment at Leesburg.

4,600 under Jackson at Winchester.

A force under Magruder near Yorktown.

A force holding Norfolk.

McClellan's plan of campaign.

The people of the North favoured a direct advance upon Richmond which would cover Washington and lead to a decisive battle.

McClellan, however, overestimated the *Confederate* strength, was deterred by the natural obstacles presented by rivers, forests and bad roads and also by the difficulties of supply up to Fredericksburg.

He proposed to overcome these difficulties by turning the *Confederate* right and using the York and James rivers to feed his men.

He calculated that the *Confederates* would hurry down to Richmond. Time and space were against him.

Jackson, from his position at Winchester, threatened western Virginia and Maryland and cut the communications by the Baltimore and Ohio railway and could menace Washington. In addition he could reinforce troops at Centreville.

Jackson's reputation was beginning to cause alarm in the breasts of the *Federal* leaders.

Both Lee and Jackson early recognised how vulnerable Washington was politically and as a junction of communications.

McClellan's original plan to land at Urbanna was vetoed by the Government who suggested that he could either (a) go to Fort Munroe or (b) advance overland. He chose (a). He was instructed to leave sufficient force for the defence of Washington. His plan was right in principle but wrong in detail. It required early success and

would be defeated by serious delay. An overseas expedition with untrained troops is more difficult than a direct advance especially when the hostile positions are known. His movement was on exterior lines leaving Washington uncovered. He therefore had to bear at once upon the enemy's main army and never relax.

Diary of events from 7th till 23rd March 1862.

March 7th—9th. Confederates fall back on Richmond. Jackson isolated in the Valley—3,600 Infantry, 600 Cavalry and 27 guns. Jackson's orders were to keep the enemy employed without exposing himself to defeat, in order to prevent them from reinforcing their main army.

7th. Hill retires from Leesburg.

9th. J. E. Johnston retires. This coincides with the *Federal* advance towards Centreville but was not caused by it. Banks ordered to occupy Winchester. His force divided into three Divisions of average strength 12,500.

11th. Confederate "Council of War" resulting in Jackson's retirement from Winchester. This caused McClellan to order Williams to Manassas, Sedgwick to join main army and Shields to remain to look after Jackson.

12th. Banks occupies Winchester and Jackson, Strasburg. Banks estimates Jackson's force at 11,000 men.

18th. Shields is pushed on from Winchester to Strasburg. Jackson falls back to Mount Jackson. His real strength is ascertained by Banks.

20th. Sedgwick, Williams and Banks ordered to move on Manassas. Shields to continue to watch Jackson and protect the Baltimore railway.

21st. Jackson learns that Shields is retiring. He decides to attack.

22nd. Ashby's cavalry get into touch with Shields, south of Winchester.

23rd. Jackson, after two marches of 14 and 21 miles, decides to halt. He finds his camp overlooked by the enemy. Bad staff work. This brought on the battle of *Kernstown*.

To realise the strategic result of this battle the general situation must be borne in mind.

General Situation.

A portion of the main *Federal* army had begun to land at Fort Munroe on 19th March ; but on 23rd March this was unknown to the *Confederates*.

Remainder of *Federal* main force had advanced to Centreville with cavalry on line of the Rapidan. *Confederates* had fallen back.

Banks' force—Williams to join main army *via* Snickers Gap. Shields to Winchester, Sedgwick to the west.

On 23rd March, Ashby's cavalry had a skirmish with the *Federals* and located 4 regiments of infantry, some guns and cavalry.

Jackson on coming up decided, at first, not to attack, then changed, his mind thinking that he had a *rear guard* in front of him and correctly attacked. It was lucky for him that he had not attacked earlier since his movements were all exposed to his enemy.

The *Federals* did not profit by their opportunities. They had a weak holding attack in front and might have got through, but Jackson's boldness imposed on them. Jackson in this battle attacked at the start with 3 regiments ; this did not deceive the *Federals* who had 8 battalions opposed to him and sent away 6 to reinforce the decisive point.

Information.

The importance of early tactical information is brought out in this fight. In this case Jackson thought that he was in front of an inferior force though actually out-numbered by 3 to 1.

Would he have been justified in attacking, if he had been aware of the real facts.

The Battle.

Federals.—Tyler's brigade north of Winchester.

Kimble with 5 battalions behind Pritchards Hill.

Sullivan's brigade supporting Kimble, concealed from Ashby.

Confederates.—Stonewall brigade (Garnett) 5 battalions.

Hookhan's brigade 2 battalions.

Burke's brigade 4 battalions.

Ashby's cavalry and 3 horse-guns (280 men).

At the commencement of the fight 4 out of 5 batteries had been left south of Kernstown.

Jackson quickly saw that the occupation of the " Sandy Ridge " would cause the *Federal* rear guard to fall back to save their communi-

cations with Winchester. In about 20 minutes he had seized the ridge but came under heavy artillery fire from his right flank.

Jackson's containing attack had soon been reduced to a few men under Ashby, one battalion of Burke's brigade and the 48th Virginia Regiment.

On reaching the sandy ridge, Jackson had deployed into two lines and occupied a small stone wall. He had no reserve. His guns could only engage those on Pritchards Hill and were unable to keep down the hostile infantry fire.

By this time Tyler's brigade was attacking Jackson from the Toll Gate and Kimble had not been deceived by the containing attack.

As the situation appeared to be getting desperate, Garnett (without orders) sent back the Stonewall brigade to take up a position to cover the *Confederate* retirement. Jackson quickly realised that there was only just time to get the troops away. The *Confederates* retired to Newtown unmolested; a portion of Ashby's cavalry covered the retirement.

Note the difficulty of pursuit, almost always so in history.

Effect of the Battle.

The effect of this battle upon the *Federal* Government was far-reaching :—

1. Williams' Division (8,000 men) recalled from Manassas to Winchester.
2. Shields' command tied to the Winchester area.
3. Federal Government's attention drawn to Jackson's force and the Upper Potomac.
4. Blenker's Division (9,000 men) withdrawn from McClellan and ordered to Western Virginia.
5. Becoming concerned for the defence of Washington, Lincoln order the 1st Army Corps, 37,000 strong, under McDowell, to remain at Manassas instead of embarking for the Peninsula, thus McClellan's force of 150,000 men for the advance on Richmond was reduced by 46,000.
6. McDowell given an independent command covering the approaches to Washington.
7. Banks also withdrawn from McClellan and ordered to defend the Valley.

McClellan on the eve of his advance upon Richmond thus found himself considerably weakened and embarrassed by Lincoln's action.

Tactical Notes on Kernstown.

Jackson's tactics based on sound principles. His flank movement risky, but he believed his information reliable. His manner of execution was in accord with the principle of co-operation of all arms. He was, however, ultimately unable to use his artillery for the support of his infantry. His cavalry co-operated on both flanks.

If the *Federals* had pushed on they could have rolled up the *Confederate* right flank and compelled Jackson to get away across country.

Jackson did not consider the day lost as long as he had an untouched reserve. But for Garnett's order to retire, Jackson said he would have won the battle. There was confusion as to who was in command of the flank attack; Jackson did not make this point clear. Therefore question for consideration—"the position of a commander in battle?" Very important from point of view of staff, especially now with complicated system of command.

Use of cavalry. In attack or defence, keep the mass of cavalry on one flank, but have some on the other. The *Confederate* cavalry, though few in numbers, was used to protect *both* flanks. Out of 600 *Confederate* cavalry only 280 were actually present in action. It was owing to the action of Ashby and his cavalry that the *Federals* did not pursue Jackson after the battle.

* * * * *

Following on the results of Kernstown, the *Federal* forces were divided into 4 armies under :—

(a) McClellan. (b) McDowell. (c) Banks. (d) Fremont.

All controlled from Washington.

Banks now halted 6 days at Strasburg.

Note the importance of the Massanuttons (50 miles long) as an obstacle, passable only by the road Newmarket—Luray.

Diary.—On April 2nd. Banks at Woodstock with cavalry 5 miles south of Edenburg. Jackson fell back slowly to Rudes Hill, 2½ miles south of Mt. Jackson.

Ashby in touch with *Federals*. Jackson's force increased to 6,000.

April 5th. McClellan advanced up the Peninsula. His 60,000 men checked by 15,000 under Magruder for 5 days.

Ashby with 1 Sec. guns and 1 infantry brigade separated from Jackson in order to check Banks at Edenburg.

He succeeds in holding Banks back for 14 days.

April 10th Confederates commenced to retire.

General Situation on 16th April 1862.

Confederates. Main Army. 50,000 Johnston Yorktown Peninsula.
10,000 Anderson Fredericksburg.

Left Flank. 8,000 Ewell Culpepper.
6,000 Jackson Rudes Hill.
3,000 E. Johnston McDowell.

Federals. 100,000 McClellan Peninsula.
37,000 McDowell Fredericksburg.
20,000 South of Washington.
7,000 Warrenton.
19,000 Banks Woodstock.
20,000 Fremont Moorfield.
9,000 Blenker Harpers Ferry.

The *Confederate* front was 150 miles long, the *Federal* 220 miles.

The *Confederates* were on "Interior" lines with minimum of detachments. The *Federals* were on "Exterior" lines and held the initiative; the *Confederates* could do nothing but wait for a false move.

Jackson's Tasks.

- (1) To contain *Federals*.
- (2) Prevent them occupying the Valley and capturing Staunton.
- (3) To be in a position to move to Richmond at any moment.

April 17th. Jackson at Harrisonburg. The importance of Staunton, *i.e.*, Supply depot—road junction—railway and strategical point.

Jackson prepares an alternative base at Gordonsville.

Courses open to Jackson.

- (1) Wait at Harrisonburg and call up Ewell.
- (2) Remain at Harrisonburg and order Ewell to act on Banks' communications,

- (3) Retire on Staunton, between Fremont and Banks, but Valley south of Harrisonburg open and unsuitable to Jackson's small force.
- (4) Join main army.
- (5) Collect at Fisher's Gap.
- (6) Move to Elk Run Valley, recalling Ewell to him, from here he could cover his own communications and threaten those of Banks better than from Harrisonburg. He was also safe from Fremont in the Alleghanies.

He decides to move to Elk Run Valley.

Consider his strategic position there and his appreciation of the situation.

Banks moves slowly forward towards Staunton with cavalry to Harrisonburg. E. Johnston pushed back to within 7 miles of Staunton.

Blenker sent to join Fremont and *Confederates* learn that McDowell is concentrating at Fredericksburg.

Jackson therefore submits 3 proposals to Lee.

1. Combine with Ewell and move by Luray Gap against Banks.
2. Combine with E. Johnston against Milroy at McDowell, and then deal with Banks.
3. Move via Front Royal against Banks.

Lee leaves the choice to Jackson and he selects the 2nd plan.

Possible ways of moving.

1. By Harrisonburg.
2. By Port—Republic—Cross Keys—Staunton.
3. Up the eastern side of the Shenandoah, across Blue Ridge by Brown's Gap to Mechums River Station.

He chose the third route and 8 days after his march started the *Federals* knew nothing about it.

Situation during May 1862.

May 3rd and 4th. *Confederates* evacuated Yorktown Peninsula.

5th. Rear-guard action at Williamsburg.

Federals occupied West Point.

10th. *Confederates* evacuated Norfolk. Huger burnt his stores and fell back.

11th. Merrimac blown up.

Federals making arrangements to reinforce McDowell with Shields' division.

Anderson (12,000) near Fredericksburg facing McDowell.

Johnston falling back before McClellan.

Fremont strung out all along the Valley.

Banks falling back on Newmarket. Milroy at McDowell.

Fremont between Franklin and Romney. Jackson at Staunton.

E. Johnston at West View 7 miles west of Staunton.

Ewell at Swift Run Gap.

Note the doubt amongst the *Federal* leaders as to Jackson's intentions. Jackson thought that Milroy's force was the smaller and that it should, therefore, be attacked.

Situation in the Valley.

May 6th. E. Johnston moves a short distance and Jackson follows him from Staunton.

8th. E. Johnston halted 8 miles east of McDowell. The road to McDowell crossed Bull Pasture Run, a considerable obstacle but not unfordable.

Note Milroy's position at McDowell.

Jackson decides to hold Sitlington Hill and turn the *Federal* left during the night. But at 3 p.m. Milroy decides to attack to gain time to get away. The Offensive-Defensive.

Note moral effect of Milroy's attack :—

1. Jackson's plans frustrated.
2. Jackson surprised. It was an encounter battle.

The Battle.

May 8th. Five *Federal* battalions attacked.

E. Johnston had 6 battalions on Sitlington Hill, he was afterwards reinforced by the "Stonewall" brigade.

At about 6 p.m., *Federals* began to retire.

Federal guns had no targets—*Confederates* had no guns.

Confederates did not pursue. Was this owing to the difficulty of the country?—or paucity of troops?—or both factors?

The *Federals* drew off towards Franklin.

Point for consideration—Milroy might have occupied Sitlington Hill originally and attacked the head of Jackson's column emerging from the Bull Pasture Mountain defile.

9th & 10th. Jackson follows Milroy.

11th. Milroy at Franklin.

Note Jackson's foresight, after the battle, in sending cavalry to close roads entering the Valley from the west. In one case felling trees across the road on both sides for over a mile. A good after result when Jackson was withdrawing down the Valley.

12th. Jackson decides to return to the Valley as he might be required at Richmond at any moment.

May 17th. Jackson reaches Mount Solon, having separated Fremont from Banks.

Lee's Plan of Campaign.

The offensive-defensive. He decides to attack Lincoln in Washington and *not* McClellan near Richmond.

Lee wished to leave Johnston and Anderson where they were, attack Banks in the Valley and *thus* Lincoln and Washington.

Johnston appreciates the situation. He wished to concentrate at once and attack all forces in his front.

On 1st June *Lee assumes command* of the *Confederate* forces in the field.

* * * * *

Jackson in the Valley.

May 19th. Jackson at Mt. Solon. His force 17,000 men in 2 divisions, consisting of 48 guns, 3 regiments of cavalry, and 13,000 infantry.

He advances against Banks.

Note the position of Banks. It is always dangerous to operate from an insecure base. Note the position of the Massanuttons. His force was divided thus :—

At Strasburg, 3,000 cavalry, 15 guns, 4,000 infantry.

At Buckton, 1,000 infantry and the remainder about Front Royal.

Jackson reaches Newmarket. Ashby's cavalry held the fork of the roads from Luray and Newmarket, thus Banks never knew from which direction to expect attack.

Note Jackson's manoeuvre in the nature of a raid and his method of approach against Front Royal.

He could always fall back by Staunton or Gordonsville.

From Newmarket he crossed the Massanuttons to Luray.

May 23rd. Approaching Front Royal Jackson left the pike about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of that place and moved towards the Front Royal *Federals* by an unwatched rough track. Kenley at Front Royal had no cavalry for reconnaissance.

Action at Front Royal 23rd May 1862.

Remarkable result of charge of 250 *Confederate* cavalry.

Jackson's reasons for attacking Kenley (weaker force) rather than Banks.

Contrary to the method of holding weaker force, Jackson thought that:—

1. He could annihilate Kenley.
2. He would be in a better position to attack from Front Royal than from the south.

Appreciation of the characteristics of the hostile Generals.

Jackson wished his enemies to think that he was moving in force up the North Fork, whereas he sent Ashby that way and slipped off from Newmarket across the Massanuttons.

Note his method of surprise and rapidity. He organised a "Corps of Orderlies." Wellington organised a similar Corps.

It was not till about 4-30 p.m. that Banks heard of the defeat of Kenley and not till 10 a.m. next day (24th) that he realised his danger.

Jackson was in doubt as to Banks' line of retreat from Strasburg. *There were 3 courses of action open to Banks.*

- (a) He could move west towards Fremont's force near Moorfield and Franklin.
- (b) Move east through Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Geary's small force.
- (c) Hold on at Strasburg and wait for reinforcements from Winchester.

Jackson thought that he would adopt course (b), but Banks elected to fall back on Winchester. Had Jackson gone straight for Winchester he could have got there first. But then Banks by adopting (b) could have saved himself.

Action of Jackson.

He sent half Ashby's cavalry by the Front Royal-Strasburg road. Half to Cedarville and Middletown.

Ewell moved to Nineveh with his cavalry to Newtown.

Jackson did not want to let go of Cedarville before he definitely knew Banks' line of march.

At 10 a.m. Banks sent half his baggage to Winchester where it arrived safely, later he sent the second half with an infantry escort, this was captured by Ashby. Note the indiscipline of Ashby's cavalry and looting.

Banks sent one regiment to Middletown which delayed Jackson from Cedarville. Note rear-guard of 2,000 cavalry, and remarkable pursuit by night after battle in front of Winchester.

May 25th. Battle of Winchester.

Note :—1. The danger of detachments.

2. Indiscipline of Ashby's cavalry.

3. Steuart's "Pedantic Folly."

4. Difficulty of co-operation between detachments when attacking.

5. Jackson's expedient for replacing cavalry.

Jackson and Ewell attacked at Winchester, the former opposed by two and the latter by one brigade. There was no mutual support by either but the attacks were simultaneous.

The *Confederates* were double the number of the *Federals*, but when the *Confederate* cavalry was required to pursue it was looting.

The *Federal* cavalry charged to assist the retirement of Banks. Ashby went away to Berryville but Steuart would not take an order except through his immediate superior (Ewell). Jackson, therefore, put his gunners on horseback and sent them in pursuit.

Banks crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, north of Harpers Ferry.

Note the length of the *Confederates* marches.

Lee sends instructions to Jackson to press the enemy to Harper's Ferry and threaten Maryland.

May 29th. Jackson drives in the *Federal* piquets at Harpers Ferry.

Result of Jackson's Operations.

McDowell withdrawn from assisting McClellan and sent back to Washington for the second time.

Every available *Federal* in the west sent to Harper's Ferry. McClellan told that he must either take Richmond at once or return to Washington.

Diary of Events.

May 24th. On 24th May, orders were sent to McDowell to send 29,000 troops *via* Manassas Gap and together with Fremont from Franklin, to cut off and capture Jackson's force.

Note how Jackson's action, in closing the roads after the battle of McDowell, operated on Fremont's march. Note also Jackson's precarious position.

May 29th. Fremont had been ordered to move on Harrisonburg. This was changed on 29th. Fremont with 15,000 men was east of Moorfield. Shields was near Manassas Gap. But Jackson had good roads whilst the *Federals* had bad ones. Moreover the *Federals* had telegraphic communications but *no direct* inter-communication. Jackson had the choice of two routes and was superior to any single *Federate* force.

May 30th. Jackson marched south and reached Strasburg on afternoon of 31st. The 12th Georgia Regiment was overwhelmed at Front Royal. Ashby held off Fremont, who had stupidly taken up a defensive position at Cedar Creek.

June 1st. By night-time Jackson was safe at Woodstock. McDowell should have marched on Staunton and *not* on Winchester as there was no time to go by Manassas Junction.

Jackson with his whole force at Woodstock finds his position untenable.

June 2nd. He falls back to the southern end of the Massanuttons in order to secure his line of retreat to Richmond. He burns the bridges at White House, Conrads Store, Columbia, Luray and elsewhere.

Fremont's force follows up the North Fork and Shields up the South Fork.

Note.—Intercommunication was only possible by the northern end of the Massanuttons. Jackson by retreating south would thus be able to keep his enemies separated and could communicate with Richmond as long as he did not let in Shields on his eastern flank.

The South Fork was unfordable below Port Republic. Jackson also burnt the bridge near Mt. Jackson. And at Harrisonburg he ferried his sick over the river to Staunton.

June 5th. Jackson's main force reaches Cross Keys.

Ashby killed in a rear-guard skirmish. A great blow to the "Army of the Valley."

Had Jackson burnt the bridge at Port Republic he could have attacked Shields, but Fremont's artillery could have assisted Shields in the battle. Besides Shields would have been directly on his communications. Thus Ewell was left at Cross Keys to stop Fremont whilst Jackson dealt with Shields.

Fremont, however, attacked rather earlier than was expected.

June 8th. Situation :—*Federals.* Fremont—15,000 men at Harrisonburg. Shields—13,000 spread out over 25 miles.

<i>Confederates.</i> Ewell—three brigades at	{	About
Cross Keys. Jackson		16,000
at Port Republic.		men.

Note how Jackson adapted his strategy to the configuration of the country.

The Battle. Fremont attacked at Cross Keys and at the same time Shields' cavalry made a raid on Port Republic.

The *Federal* attacks were *not* concerted and Fremont employed only half his force. With superior force he attacked Ewell's right. Ewell reserved his fire till the enemy were within 60 yards. A vigorous counter-

attack by Trimble (on his own initiative) followed, with the result that Fremont at once withdrew his containing attack.

Note:—1. Trimble's initiative, the effect of his counter-stroke, the proper use of reserves.

2. The importance of co-operation in the attack.

3. The effect of running short of ammunition.

June 9th. Action of Port Republic.

Strong *Federal* position, guns on Coal Pit Hill.

At 5 a.m. movement against Shields began. The bridge made over the river was indifferent. Shields was strung out but his advanced troops (4,000) were in a strong position between the river and Coal Pit Hill.

Jackson sends Taylor's brigade to turn the enemy left flank.

Federals counter-attack checked. Pursuit by *Confederates* for 9 miles.

Jackson bivouacs at Brown's Gap, 9 marches from Richmond. McDowell's force at Conrad's Store, 15 marches from McClellan. Fremont at Mt. Jackson.

Lessons:—Effect of strong containing attack.

Effect of weakly improvised bridge.

Loss of way.

Lee realises that if he supports Jackson, McDowell would not be allowed to move on Richmond. Thus McDowell's corps was finally concentrated as a separate command at Manassas.

Lee sends two brigades to reinforce Jackson.

June 14th. Shields at Front Royal. Fremont and Banks at Middletown. McDowell's corps concentrated at Manassas.

June 17th. Jackson withdraws his entire force towards Richmond; reaching Ashland Junction on 25th June.

June 28th. Even on this date Banks thought that Jackson was about to attack him at Middletown. This indicates the excellent use of cavalry by Stuart, who screened the withdrawal of Jackson's troops with great skill and success.

Remarks on the Campaign, from which lessons can possibly be learnt, for future guidance.

Concentration of numbers at the decisive point.

Jackson's skill lay more in his strategical object than in his actual tactics. At Kernstown he failed tactically.

A preponderance in numbers does not always ensure victory.

At Winchester Jackson employed 16,000; about double the enemy's strength.

At Cross Keys Fremont attacked, but used only some 7,000 men whilst Ewell had only 8,000.

At Port Republic Jackson had 6,000 against Shields' 4,500.

Jackson always combined a front with an enveloping attack.

Jackson's eye for country, a new idea at that time.

Development of tactics to suit possibilities of modern conditions.

Employment of cavalry. When Jackson moved from Elk Run, to Staunton, he used his cavalry to screen his movements; and afterwards to seal up the passes south of Moorfield.

Note the personal influence of Jackson and Ashby.

Not only the characteristics of hostile commanders, but the methods of warfare adopted by opponents must be considered.

Effect of a small force on major operations. McClellan's plan was good, but Jackson's detachment deprived him of some 46,000 men.

Had the Federals gone straight ahead with their converging forces they might have succeeded, but the difficulty of doing so was too great for them. For example, Jackson's retirement from Harper's Ferry. In spite of the fact that Fremont and Shields were in telegraphic communication with Washington, they failed.

Jackson would not have taken up a flank position at Elk Run, had he been opposed by a commander of equal calibre. He might easily have been bottled up and Banks left free to march on Staunton.

Note use of the Massanuttons and South Fork of Shenandoah to prevent co-operation of Fremont and Shields.

Use of offensive action to upset adversary's plan; example, Milroy's attack at McDowell which greatly interfered with Jackson's plan.

Value of counter-attack at Bull Run and Kernstown.

Necessity for discipline and training as exemplified in the early stages of the war, the evils of short term enlistments. In this respect compare the enlistment organisation of the North with Lord Kitchener's "three years or the duration" in the Great War; if the North had enlisted for the "duration," it is doubtful whether the South could have held out for any length of time.

Note the evils of "Individualism" in the lower ranks of an army.

Simple plans are most suitable for ill-disciplined troops.

Note the effect of an initial victory in a campaign (Bull Run).

Danger of detachments not uniting in time.

Results of "piecemeal" attacks.

Reserves should not be used merely to guard line of retreat, *e.g.*, Garnett's action at Kernstown. There were, however, several instances of the correct use of reserves in this campaign.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

QUETTA OR CAMBERLEY ?

DEAR SIR,

I am writing to ask whether any of your readers could give me advice in a matter which is rather close to my heart. In the July number of an English Service Journal there is an article on "How to Succeed in the Army" by "The Mother of Four Officers", and in it she states that officers who have been through the Quetta Staff College are not rated quite so highly as those who have gone through Camberley. I have just passed through Quetta and am an eligible bachelor; and the idea that I am slightly below the Camberley standard has rather blighted my hopes, for I have long been aware, when straightening my tie on entering a drawing room, that I am being weighed up by calculating feminine eyes, and I had hoped that in future I should be able to overcome the awkward feeling by knowing that my fingering was drawing attention to the tie's distinctive colours, and by being able to drop a few casual references to "when I was at the Staff College." But the "Mother's" article has brought home the fact to me, rather forcibly, that I may be faced with the question, "Oh, which Staff College were you at?" and that I may find myself stammering confusedly to the girl's parent, "Er-er, Quetta", and trying to tread on the cat's tail in order to create a diversion. For it's this daughter question that is worrying me. My object is the same as it always has been, to observe rigidly the principle of economy of effort, but I am now beginning to feel that I need a secure base to work from, and so I am on the lookout for a really wealthy young woman whom I can fall back on in case I lose my job. The thought that I shall be competing in this with men rated at a higher standard of intellect than mine fills me with gloom, nor can I avoid its happening, because the principles of peace are immutable and the Camberley bachelors are bound to be on the same tack. Could any of your readers give me advice as to how to overcome this handicap of inferiority? I should be truly grateful if they would help me to spend my declining years in comfort and not let me lose my objective to some cupidous Camberley fellow. I am not really so very deficient intellectually, for I have written to my mother, and she says of course not, even though I may take more after father than after her.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

JOHN HOOKER,

WHO WAS THACKERAY'S MAJOR GAHAGAN ?

SIR,

The account of the career of Local Lieut.-Col. William Linnæus Gardner, given in the article " Was Thackeray's Major Gahagan ? " in your July unumber, requires some corrections and additions.

- (a) Gardner's first commission was not in H.M. 89th Foot, as is to be inferred from the article. He was commissioned as ensign, H.M. 63rd Foot, from 20th March 1783 ; and transferred to the 89th on 23rd April following.
- (b) In 1796, as Colonel Maunsell states, Gardner went on half-pay again, as Captain of an Independent Company ; but he resigned from H.M.'s. service in 1798.
- (c) The date of his joining the Raja of Jaipur has so far as I am aware never been ascertained ; but I have the best authority for saying that he was in the Jaipur service, and at Jaipur itself, on 1st Sept. 1803. That is to say, Gardner had left Holkar's service before (and probably some months before) the battles of Assaye, Delhi and Laswari.
- (d) It is incorrect to write of Alan Hyde Gardner as " the last Lord Gardner ". This person was merely a claimant to the English and Irish baronies of Gardner of Uttoxeter and to the baronetcy of Gardner (cr. 9 Sept. 1794) : he never established his right thereto. The position is thus correctly stated in Burke's Peerage : " Since the death of Alan Legge, 3rd Lord Gardner, 2nd Nov. 1883, the right to the baronies of Gardner has not been established, although an heir obviously exists ". The titles are thus dormant, and have been claimed in recent years by representatives of two branches of the family.

I am, etc.,

B.

29th July 1932.

THREE ARMS AND SIX LEGS.

SIR,

"Phoenix" in his article "Three Arms and Six Legs" has attempted to show that the bayonet is an essential weapon for Cavalry in order that it may carry out its duties fully, especially on the Frontier of India.

I do not think that the fact of its desirability will be disputed by many cavalrymen, most of whom have probably served at one time or other on the Frontier. I do not propose to enter into a discussion as to the advisability or otherwise of re-arming Cavalry with bayonets. That is a matter of weighing up the advantages of its re-introduction, against the disadvantages of efficiency lost in time taken in bayonet training, which is at present allotted to training in subjects which are considered more essential.

"Phoenix" (a cavalryman himself) states that "*The real trouble is that cavalry don't want the bayonet now*". He invites his readers to find the reasons for this objection, by reading his article again from the beginning. I have done so.

I will pass no comment on the somewhat irrelevant remarks concerning the cavalryman's possession of seven pairs of shining boots, and the thrill of the lance pennon; except that the lance has now been abolished as a weapon for war for Indian Cavalry, as well as British, and that seven pairs of shining boots are difficult to maintain at present for financial reasons.

His remaining (not entirely relevant) reasons, however are worthy of remark. They may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Equitation and training of horses receive too much consideration.
- (2) Horses are incorrectly trained by the use of unnatural obstacles, and pampered by soft going.
- (3) The cavalryman's objection to getting off his horse, and his apparent desire to sit on one to retain the "Cavalry Spirit."

I propose to comment on these subjects with a view to clearing up a certain amount of misunderstanding which may possibly exist with others as well as "Phoenix",

1. *Equitation and training of Horses receive too much consideration.*

It has been the policy for some years in the training of cavalry to eradicate this fault which existed some years ago. The training of a remount now takes on an average 12 months ; it is doubtful if this can ever be reduced appreciably and economical efficiency retained. Consideration must be given to the fact that if young horses are advanced in their training too rapidly, their legs are liable to not stand the strain, and that they may be prematurely broken down. When a horse has been passed into the ranks, he receives little additional training other than that received on equitation parades.

During the Individual Training Season 1932, the proportion of hours spent on equitation, in one Indian Cavalry Regiment, compared with hours spent on other subjects of training was as 1 is to $4\frac{1}{2}$.

(These are actual figures, taken from detailed records kept of one squadron, and do not include educational training or routine parades such as "stables").

2. (a) *Horses are trained mostly over "Imitations of obstacles found in England and places outside India."*

This statement is incorrect. The obstacles used for the training of this same regiment, and of several others that I have seen, are mostly imitations of (or actual) mud walls, banks, ditches, water cuts, nalas, sunken roads and thorn fences, all of which are met with in India. There are a few timber and brushwood fences to give variety and to accustom horses to unusual obstacles.

(b) *Horses are Pampered by soft going.*

"Given practice over rocky country.....their feet harden and so withstand the jar." The horses (of his regiment) after several years on the frontier had feet of iron.....Few were lame."

I venture to question the soundness of the policy implied by these statements, for the following reasons :—

The regiment, to which I have already referred, during a tour of duty on the frontier, suffered remarkably little from casualties in lameness from the hard going. After leaving the frontier, the trouble started. A phenomenal number of horses showed signs of lameness due to ring bone, side bone and pedal ostitis. They truly had "*feet of iron*", and eventually a considerable number had to be destroyed.

It is neither sound from a training point of view, economical, nor humane, to jump horses on to or train them on hard ground if soft going is available. Horses feet harden up remarkably rapidly as soon as hard and stony going is met with. Practice in this is unnecessary.

Also any soldier worthy of the name is capable of realizing that "*anything rougher and more likely to damage a horse*" than a parade ground or a prepared surface is not "*a thing to be avoided*" when the slightest necessity arises.

(3) *The Cavalryman's objection to getting off his horse, and his apparent desire to sit on one to retain the "cavalry spirit."*

I do not propose to discuss fully the subject of the "cavalry spirit." I will, however, state that it is in no way connected with "*sitting on a horse*" or "*the charge.....carried out haphazard.*"

In the last century very great advances have been made in the power of rifle and artillery fire; automatic weapons and A. F. V's. have been introduced. The principles of war still remain the same, but the method of employment of all arms has changed and is still changing.

By referring "*Phoenix*" to Cavalry Training Vol. II, 1929, Sections 1 and 49, and Manual of Operations on the N.-W. F. of India, Section 10, further comments by me will be unnecessary.

The bayonet is highly desirable for cavalry employed on the frontier. For this reason, a proportion of bayonets is now issued to all British and Indian Cavalry units stationed in that area.

But the reasons for bayonet training being excluded from the cavalry training programme, are in no way connected with shining boots, lance pennons, soft going or sitting on horses.

I have never shared with "*Phoenix*" his "*feeling of compassion for the P. B. I.*", and I hope that the Infantryman in the same way saves himself the trouble of having any feeling of compassion for the

"CAVALRYMAN."

SIR,

I read with much pleasure Cavalryman's critique of my article "*Three Arms and Six Legs*" and am proud that it spurred him to write so spirited a reply.

I will pass no comments on the irrelevant portions of his letter but will confine myself to the matter of bayonets. Here we seem to be almost at one.

He agrees that bayonets are highly desirable for cavalry on the frontier and concedes that most cavalymen will not dispute the desirability of arming the cavalry with bayonets. Nevertheless he doubts the advisability of so arming the cavalry because of the time lost in training in more essential work. If ever it is his fortune to face Pathans at close quarters on a frontier hill he will find that bayonet work ranks quite high among the essentials.

Let him disabuse himself of the idea that bayonet training need take up much time. An average of once a month over the assault course was found to be ample for a cavalry soldier, and (hush! dare I say it?) the time can be taken from that now allotted to anti-aircraft firing, field engineering and even from physical training itself! I nearly suggested cutting out half an hour of Educational Training a month, but that would be rank heresy. One would naturally, when approaching a hill top, prefer to be surrounded by 3rd or even 2nd class Certificates of Education than by men who can use bayonets.

The proportion of bayonets (50 per regiment I believe) now issued to cavalry units on the frontier is inadequate for fighting. Indeed they are only intended for guard duties. Either the regiments who have them do not train their men to use them or, worse still, they waste precious time in so doing.

Yours faithfully,

“PHOENIX.”

MILITARY NOTES.

BELGIUM.

Conscientious objectors.

The Council of Ministers has refused to allow men incarcerated for refusal to carry out their military service to be treated as political prisoners. This decision is generally welcomed by the press.

FRANCE.

Ministry of National Defence.

On the formation of the Tardieu Government in February, the Ministers of the three fighting services were abolished, and their duties assigned to a Minister of National Defence assisted by two Under-Secretaries. The control of the commercial side of civil aviation was transferred to the Minister of Public Works.

This change had been suggested in the past on many occasions and the plan actually adopted had been under study for the past two years, the late M. Maginot, as Minister of War, having had an important part in its development.

The General Staffs of the three services continued as hitherto, as did also their *Conseils Supérieurs*, but for higher strategical purposes there was formed a "Committee of National Defence" composed of the Minister and the three Vice-Presidents of the three *Conseils Supérieurs*.

With the advent to power of the new Government with M. Herriot as Prime Minister, the National Defence Ministry, which was introduced by M. Tardieu, has disappeared and the three separate ministries for the fighting services are revived. The ministers are :—

War M. Paul Boncour.
Marine M. Georges Leygues.
Air M. Paul Painlevé.

A decree was published on 6th June constituting yet another new committee entitled *Haut Comité chargé de coordonner les besoins de la défense nationale*.

This committee will study the questions which affect the employment of the land, sea and air forces, their general organization, the general programmes of armament and the distribution of budgetary credits for this organization and these programmes.

IRAQ.

League of Nations.

As the result of a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held on 19th May, a draft declaration was approved, in which is set out the guarantees required by the Council of the League of Nations on the cessation of the Mandate in Iraq. These guarantees cover :—

- (i) The effective protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities ;
- (ii) The safeguarding of the interests of foreigners in the judicial sphere ;
- (iii) Freedom of conscience and the safeguarding of the activities of religious missions ;
- (iv) Rights acquired and financial obligations contracted by the Mandatory Power before the termination of the Mandate ;
- (v) Respect for international conventions ;
- (vi) The concession to States members of the League under certain conditions of most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to reciprocity ; and
- (vii) The right of the members of the League represented on the Council to lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice any difference of opinion arising out of the interpretation or execution of the undertakings assumed by Iraq before the Council.

The Iraq Government is expected to affix its signature to this declaration and to be formally admitted to the League at the meeting of the Assembly in September.

Oil Concession.

Early in the year negotiations were undertaken between the British Oil Development Company and the Iraq Government for the exploitation of oil concessions on the West bank of the Tigris. The concessions on the East bank, it will be remembered, are held by the Iraq Petroleum Company, who are building the pipe line to Haifa and Tripoli. The negotiations with the new company have now been completed, and the

contract was signed on 20th April. The general terms of the agreement include the following :—

- (i) The lease of the concession shall be for seventy-five years ;
- (ii) The rent shall be £ 100,000 for the first year, rising by £ 25,000 per annum to £ 200,000, which rent shall cease as soon as the transport of oil shall commence ;
- (iii) The royalty payable shall be four shillings per ton ; and
- (iv) The Iraq Government shall receive 20 per cent. of all oil produced, to be sold or disposed of as they may think fit ;
- (v) Though German, Italian and French capital is sunk in the company as well as British, it is an essential part of the contract that the control of the company shall remain in British hands.

ITALY.

Alpine training in the Italian Army.

Exercises in the Alps and especially the training of Alpine troops in the use of skis have been the subject of special attention this winter in the Italian Army.

Ski training is divided into winter training, officers' training and advanced summer exercises.

LATIN AMERICA.

PERU.

Naval Mutiny.

On 7th May the crews of the Peruvian warships " Coronel Bolognesi " and " Almirante Grau, " which were in Callao Harbour, mutinied and imprisoned their officers. A loyal sailor swam ashore and warned the Government authorities, who were thus able to take immediate steps to deal with the mutiny. Troops were brought down from Lima and aeroplanes and submarines made a show of force against the mutineers who promptly surrendered. The Government declared martial law for 15 days. The mutiny was accompanied by disturbances in the streets of Lima, but the Government soon had the situation in hand.

The trouble was communistic in origin and was also said to be connected with plot by the " Aprista " or Labour Party to raise a rebellion in the northern provinces of Peru. Senor de la Torre, the

leader of this party, was arrested on a charge of complicity in the recent attempt on the life of the President, Colonel Sanchez Cerro. Eight of the mutineers were executed.

MOROCCO.

Spanish Zone.

On 29th March, speaking in the Cortes, Senor Azana (Prime Minister and Minister of War) stated that reorganization in Morocco had effected a saving of nearly 25 per cent. on last year's estimates, viz., 174 million pesetas (£4½ millions at 40 p. to the £1.) As soon as the main road from Melilla to Tetuan is completed the garrison can be halved and this saving doubled. (Work on this road appears to be seriously delayed at present owing to lack of funds).

ARMY REORGANIZATION.

Replacement of conscripts by volunteers.

A law published on 15th May enacts that :—

1. In future, as far as funds permit, the effectives of all the corps and units of the Army serving in Morocco shall be recruited voluntarily.

2. All Spaniards and naturalized Spaniards between the ages of 18 and 40 are eligible to enlist as volunteers, if unmarried or widowers without children. They are, however, to be required to produce proofs of identity and of good character, and be passed by a Medical Board as physically fit.

3. Volunteers will enlist for four years and receive a bonus of 500 pesetas. Afterwards they may re-engage for various periods. The rank and file cannot, however, remain with the colours after attaining the age of 45 (serjeants 48).

4. When the requisite numbers for the army in Morocco are not forthcoming, either through shortage of funds or because enough volunteers have not presented themselves, the contingents will be completed by conscripts, selected by ballot.

In the same way corporals and serjeants may be posted compulsorily to the units in Morocco.

FRENCH ZONE.

Tafilalet operations.

As a result of the Tafilalet and Ferkla Valley operations at the beginning of this year, more than 30,000 families have subsequently made their submission. Communication through this area will be improved by a track suitable in most parts for motor vehicles and throughout for motor cycles with a view to joining Agadir on the Atlantic coast *via* the Sous Dades and Ferkla Valleys to Colomb Bechar in Algeria. The only areas of dissidence now remaining are the sparsely cultivated mountainous regions of the Great Atlas and the waterless regions in the extreme south of the Saharan border.

SIAM.

The Political Situation.

A political upheaval occurred in Siam towards the end of June when by a *coup d'état* the newly-formed People's Party, composed principally of members of the Army and Navy, seized control of the capital and arrested as hostages Prince Paribatra, heir to the throne, and various other important personages. King Prajadhipok was absent from Bangkok at Hua Hin, a seaside resort about 140 miles from the capital.

Following the outbreak, a manifesto was issued on 24th June accusing the King of misgovernment and the princes of battenning on the people ; it stated, however, that the King would be invited to retain the throne as a constitutional monarch with an elected assembly, and that failing this a Republic would be established. This invitation was extended to the King by letter, and at the same time it was pointed out that if he refused another prince would be appointed in his place. King Prajadhipok returned to Bangkok during the night 25/26th June, apparently in a warship sent to bring him to the capital, and, after a meeting with representatives of the People's Party, he issued a proclamation accepting the new régime and stating that his views were in accord with those of the Party as to the necessity for a new form of Government which he had for some time recognized as desirable. A proposed Constitution was presented to the King on 26th. This he accepted, with minor alterations, on the following day. According to press reports the new Constitution is partly democratic in character as power is to be invested in the people but exercised for the present by (i) a Monarch, (ii) a People's Senate, (iii) a Committee of the People's Party and (iv) the Law Courts. King Prajadhipok is to be the

Monarch and succession to the Throne is to be in accordance with the existing law. Amnesty has been granted to all concerned in the insurrection.

SPAIN.

Military laws.

A Decree was published on 25th February embodying the following provisions :—

- (1) Authorising placing on the reserve by Government Decree such general officers who for more than six months have been unemployed, provided that during that period appointments have been made for which their rank qualified them.
- (2) Providing that the pensions of 12,000 officers, retired under special conditions on full pay, when the army was re-organized after the fall of the Monarchy may be suspended when an offence is incurred against Article 1 (acts of aggression against the Republic) of the Defence of the Republic Act.
- (3) Prohibiting the publication of military and naval newspapers with the exception of the technical publications of the War and Marine Ministries.

It is also interesting to note that Senor Azana now gives the number of officers who have retired voluntarily as 12,000. The previous figure given was 10,000.

THE ARMY IN 1931.

Terms of service.

In spite of the great changes carried out in the Spanish Army in 1931, there has been no change in the liability to serve or the length of service of the normal recruit.

Peace organization.

Peninsula.

As a result of the Decree of 26th May and subsequent Decrees issued by the Provisional Government, the whole aspect of the army has been changed. The following units have been disbanded :—

- 37 infantry regiments (out of 76).
- 4 mountain battalions (out of 12).
- 9 light infantry battalions (out of 17).
- 17 cavalry regiments (out of 27).
- 1 railway battalion (out of 2).
- 2 engineer battalions.

The infantry divisions have been reduced from 16 to 8. The cavalry division has been maintained. Two mountain brigades, composed of all arms except cavalry, also remain.

The new organization envisages two tank regiments, the formation of a new machine-gun battalion and the provision of essential ancillary troops.

The Regional Commands have been abolished and three Inspectors-General have been appointed to ensure co-ordination and inspection. These in no way inherit the political and social powers enjoyed by General Officers Commanding-in-Chief ("Captains-General") of the regions. Many of the purely military powers of the latter devolve upon the Divisional Commanders, who are now given authority over all troops located within their divisional area. Formerly in practice these only exercised command over the infantry or cavalry regiments of their respective divisions.

Strength of the army in peace.

The advent of the Republic found 22,000 officers in the Army List, of whom some 15,000 were on the active list. The new Government reduced the total number to 8,000 by allowing officers to retire on the full pay of their rank.

According to such figures, as are available, the strength of the army after the 1931 reduction is as under :—

(a) In the Peninsula and Canary Islands—

Officers.	Other ranks.	Total.
6,124	98,114	104,238

(b) In Morocco.

Officers.	Other ranks.	Total.
1,876	45,849	47,725

Infantry reorganization.

Each infantry division will include 2 infantry brigades, each of 2 regiments of 2 battalions. Each battalion will consist of—

4 rifle companies.

1 machine-gun company.

Specialists section.

Cavalry reorganization.

The composition of the cavalry division is as follows :—

Divisional headquarters.

3 cavalry brigades of 2 regiments of 2 groups, each group consisting of 2 sabre squadrons and 1 light automatic squadron.

1 (infantry) cyclist group consisting of 1 rifle company and 1 machine-gun company.

1 group of motorized machine-gun squadrons.

1 horse artillery regiment of 3 brigades of 3 batteries each.

1 field squadron.

1 signal group (horse), consisting of 1 visual and 1 W/T section.

1 aviation (observation) squadron.

1 cavalry ammunition column.

1 supply company (M. T.).

1 medical section (M. T.).

1 mobile veterinary section.

Artillery reorganization.

In consequence of the recent changes, the Peninsular artillery will be as under :—

(a) *Divisional artillery.*—Each infantry division will include 2 field artillery regiments (one of guns and the other of howitzers). Each regiment will consist of 2 brigades of 3 batteries and will hold in reserve guns and equipment for a third brigade.

(b) *Cavalry divisional artillery.*—One horse artillery regiment of 3 brigades, each of 3 batteries.

(c) *Artillery in mountain brigades.*—Each of the 2 mountain brigades will include 1 mountain artillery regiment of 2 howitzer brigades, each of 3 batteries.

TURKEY.

Turkish visit to Moscow.

The Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Pasha, accompanied by Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a large party of Turkish notables, arrived in Moscow on 26th April on an official visit to the Soviet Union.

The visit closed on 8th May after an official announcement that the Soviet Union had granted Turkey credit for 8 million dollars worth of agricultural and textile machinery to be repaid over a period of ten

years in instalments of Turkish produce, and had presented the Turkish Army with ten tractors, five tanks and some other vehicles.

U. S. A.

The Reserve Officers Training Corps.

The objects of the Reserve Officers Training Corps are first to provide officers for the Officers Reserve Corps, and secondly to give such instruction to students who do not complete the full course, as will make them useful in the army in time of emergency or in the National Guard or Organized Reserves in peace time.

The corps is organized in Senior and Junior Divisions. The Senior Division is composed of units at universities, colleges and schools which grant degrees and at certain "military schools" designated by the Secretary of State. Units are formed for practically all arms of the service. The Junior Division is formed of units at other schools. It consists of infantry units only and the training is more elementary than that of the Senior Division.

The following figures for the year 1931 give an indication of the importance of the corps :—

—	Units.	Personnel.
Strength of Senior Division	220	75,000
Strength of Junior Division	106	41,000
Number of camps held	67	
Attendance at camps	6,700	
Number of regular officers employed as instructors.	679 active and	92 retired.
Number of commissions given to graduates during the year	5,150	

REVIEWS.

The Desert Column. BY ION. L. IDRIESS.

(*Messrs. Angus and Robertson, Ltd., Sydney, Australia*). 6/-

This book is based on the diary kept by the author during his service in Gallipoli and in Palestine and in it he has managed to retain the vividness of the feelings which impressed him at the time. The author, who was a trooper in the Australian Light Horse, is at his best in his narrative of the work of the Desert Column from the Suez Canal up to the Gaza battles. Here he deals with open warfare and the many problems which still confront us in that form of fighting. The difficulties of keeping operations fluid ; of avoiding disorganization when troops get closely engaged ; of keeping the offensive spirit under most disheartening circumstances ; of retaining mobility in sandy, waterless country are all exemplified, and the conclusion arising from their examination is that a spirit of individuality such as permeated the Light Horsemen is a necessity if the best results are to be achieved.

It is doubtful whether we in the regular army aspire to this ideal sufficiently and the Desert Column may help to convince some of us that the stereotyped is by no means always the best.

H. R. S.

The Indian Ocean. BY STANLEY ROGERS. Illustrated by the Author.

(*George C. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1932*). 7s./6d.

This is the third of a series of books by Mr. Rogers dealing with the great oceans of the world, the previous two being *The Atlantic* and *The Pacific*. In his Foreword the author remarks—“Histories have been written of peoples, of religions, and of countries, so why not of an ocean ? ” and the result is a book full of interesting facts written in a simple yet fascinating manner. Mr. Rogers himself voyaged all over the world, often in wind-jammers, and when he writes of India, China and Australia clippers and their famous races, one realizes that he is writing from first hand knowledge. “To hell or Melbourne in sixty days” was the

boast of that gallant breed of seamen whose sole object was to make a quick passage irrespective of the weather. This work is intended to be more of an entertainment than a text book, but authenticity has not been sacrificed and the various chapters give an outline of events in the Indian Ocean from the time of the early Portuguese Adventurers to the present day. Many changes have occurred since passengers furnished their own cabins in preparation for a voyage lasting months, and the author hesitates to think what monstrosities will shuttle across to India in 2032. It is difficult to pick out the most interesting features of this romance of the sea, all chapters are equally enthralling, but perhaps the description of the Indian Ocean during the early months of the war 1914—18 will again remind one how vital it is to safeguard our shipping lanes. The exploits of the German raider *Wolf* are apt to be overshadowed by the feats of the cruiser *Emden*, but Mr. Rogers pays a tribute to her resourceful Captain (Karl Neger) in his description of how she evaded capture for fifteen months and took fourteen vessels before successfully returning to Germany. The author has greatly added to the charm of the book by his delightful drawings.

J. E. H.

Indian Infantry Colours. BY CAPTAIN H. BULLOCK, F.R. HIST. S., I.A.

(*Times of India Press*, Bombay, 1931). Rs. 15/-

Any book dealing with such an absorbing question as the colours of regiments of the Indian Army could scarcely fail to be of interest, and Captain Bullock's "Indian Infantry Colours" is no exception to this.

The author's ideas as to the origin of colours in the old East India Company "Nishan" is particularly interesting and deserving of further examination. To trace the present regimental colours back to the East India Company's Bale Mark is ingenious; for the traders "Nishan" of 1658 did, indeed, become the soldiers' "Nishan" of 1805—13.

As symbols embodying the spirit of a unit, corps or company, the true origin of colours must be sought far back in the dim beginnings

of history. Small pieces of stone, which have been unearthed in excavations in India, have confirmed the cult of the standard in the East over 5,000 years ago. We know, also, from the Bible that the people of Israel recognized these symbols, as the following extract from Number II, Chapter 2, shows :—" The people of Israel shall pitch every man by his own standard with the ensign of their fathers house." It is, of course, common knowledge that the Knights and Barons of old had their company standards or colours.

The company " Nishan " is, thus, but a step in the long and interesting history of standards. Captain Bullock traces the change from company to battalion and regimental colours : this change, he points out, having been made in King William III's time in the Regular Army at Home.

The scope of " Indian Infantry Colours " is to trace in narrative form details in connection with these colours from their earliest days down to 1781, when the first known regulations were issued. The second part of the book deals with a summary of their successive development and design. Finally, the author has added certain chapters dealing with colours of various groups of past and present regiments, which are fairly representative of Indian Infantry as a whole.

The book should be of interest, not only to India Infantry units, but also to those British Infantry battalions, who spring from those famous regiments usually known by the collective title as " The Company's Europeans."

The book is well illustrated with several attractive plates in colour.

R. N. G.

" Passing it on." Short talks on Tribal fighting on the North-West Frontier of India.

By General Sir Andrew Skeen, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.M.G.

(Gale and Polden Ltd.). 5/-

In this little book of only 128 pages a great frontier soldier " passes on the wise teaching of his seniors " to the present generation of serving soldiers—and may be to their successors, as frontier fighting, dictated as it is more by the nature of the country than the armament and methods of the enemy, changes slowly.

Although it was by no means his first frontier campaign, it was columns in command of the Tochi and Derajat in the operations against the Waziris and Mahsuds in Waziristan in 1919 that General Skeen made his reputation as a frontier soldier—a reputation which will not easily fade from the pages of Indian frontier history and will certainly remain always very high in the memories of all who took part in those campaigns with him. Coming, as they did, immediately after the Great War, they found India war weary and without troops or officers trained in mountain warfare. The tribesmen, on the other hand, were well-equipped with modern rifles and ammunition, with their ranks full of many ex-regular soldiers and militiamen well-versed in our methods, and flushed with the success of a series of damaging raids into British territory which we had been unable to prevent or to punish. In the resulting operations, in both of which General Skeen commanded the striking forces, the most stern and bitter fighting which has ever occurred on the frontier was experienced. That the Derajat Column eventually, after several severe reverses and heavy casualties, succeeded in turning the tables on the Mahsud and completely subduing him says much for the sticking power of the troops and the determination of their British officers, but only those who were brought into close contact with him from day to day during those strenuous and anxious times know how much was also due to the courage and leadership of the Column Commander himself.

General Skeen's last appointment in India was Chief of the General Staff during which time he brought out the present "Manual of Operations on the N.-W. F." which still remains the official text-book on Mountain Warfare.

To the great regret of his many friends and admirers he was compelled through ill-health to retire from the Army a few years later. There is no one better qualified to speak or to write on the subject of frontier warfare than he is and his book was certain of an eager welcome.

It is addressed "to the junior officer of Infantry, of the British Service in particular, as he is less likely in his wider range of service to be trained for the local problem which all officers in India have to keep in mind. To officers of Infantry, because that is the arm on which falls in chief part the need for adjusting its methods to the circumstances or this special form of war. And to junior officers, because in frontier fighting the junior officers' problems are many and varied, and their

correct solution far more important in immediate results than in any other form of war."

The book covers every form of frontier operation and it visualises each one in considerable detail. It may be considered that some of this detail is unimportant, but success in this form of warfare depends very largely on attention to detail and, if the reader is going to get full value from this book, he must read it with a very alert and concentrated mind. The book would undoubtedly have been improved by explanatory diagrams—the picture which the author sees so clearly in his mind may not be quite so clear to the average reader.

Of particular interest is the emphasis laid on the organization and the care of the transport, both animals and drivers. This was always a point to which General Skeen rightly insisted that the strictest attention should be paid.

The book is full of delightful flashes of humour of which the following are two examples.

"By the way, look out for bees. A certain Highland battalion might still tell you, if decency permitted, of the value the men got from their kilts in saving their faces at the expense of other parts when the bees of Maizar resented the burning of their homes. Another argument, if one were needed, against indiscriminate burning of houses."

"Another hint—do not halt your men on tracks or near conspicuous rocks and so forth. These are always known ranging marks. And your men will not halt near you."

"Officers and white stones"—the old soldier's rule still holds.

General Skeen has indeed "passed on" much that will not only be of value to the junior regimental officer, for whom the book is written, but the junior staff officers to whom a knowledge of the detail and procedure which has to be carried out within the unit is, of course, essential.

J. G. S.



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
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
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CONTENTS.

Secretary's Notes.

Editorial.

1. Military Intelligence in Tribal Warfare on the North-West Frontier of India, by Captain H. L. Davies, M.C.
2. Modern Counter-Battery, by Bt. Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Cherry, M.C.
3. The So-Called Forward Policy, by "Mouse."
4. The Fallacy of the Line, by Lieut.-Colonel O. G. Body D.S.O.
5. The Capture of Khazana Ghund, by "Shiggadar."
6. A First Day's Pig-Sticking, by "New Hand."
7. The Organization of Second and Third Line Transport in India, by Captain A. H. J. Snelling.
8. The Lion of the Punjab, by "Zarif."
9. A Matrimonial Tangle, by "Auspex."
10. Escape from Delhi, 1857, by "Samej."

Letters to the Editor.

Military Notes.

Reviews.



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I.C.S. |
| 3. The Quartermaster-General in India. | 10. The Military Secretary, A. H. Q. |
| 4. The Master-General of the Ordnance
in India. | 11. The Engineer-in-Chief, A. H. Q. |
| 5. The Air Officer Commanding, R. A. F.
in India. | 12. The Director, Medical Services,
A. H. Q. |
| 6. The Director, Royal Indian Marine. | 13. The Director, Military Operations,
A. H. Q. |
| 7. The Secretary, Army Department. | |

Elected Members.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 14. Major-General J. E. S. Brind, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O. | 17. Colonel A. E. Grasett, D.S.O., M.C. |
| 15. Sir David Petrie, Kt., C.I.E., C.V.O.,
C.B.E., M.A. | 18. Lt.-Col. W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E. |
| 16. Brigadier The Viscount Gort, V.C.,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C. | 19. Squadron Leader W. F. Dickson,
D.S.O., A.F.C. |
| | 20. Major A. F. R. Lumby, C.I.E., O.B.E. |

MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1933-34.

Elected Members.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Major-General W. L. O. Twiss, C.B.,
C.B.E., M.C. (President). | 4. Brigadier A. F. Hartley, D.S.O. |
| 2. Sir David Petrie, Kt., C.I.E., C.V.O.,
C.B.E., M.A. | 5. Colonel A. E. Grasett, D.S.O., M.C. |
| 3. Brigadier The Viscount Gort, V.C., C.B.E.,
D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C. | 6. Squadron Leader W. F. Dickson,
D.S.O., A.F.C. |
| | 7. Major A. F. R. Lumby, C.I.E., O.B.E. |

Additional Members.

- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| 8. Ram Chandra, Esq., C.I.E., M.B.E., I.C.S. | 12. Major D. D. Gracey, M.C. |
| 9. H. Williamson, Esq., C.I.E., M.B.E. | 13. Major F. E. Morgan. |
| 10. Colonel C. E. Edward-Collins, C.I.F. | 14. H. C. B. Jollye, Esq. |
| 11. Wing Commander A. R. C. Cooper. | |

Secretary and Editor
Bankers

.. Captain W. E. Maxwell.
.. Lloyd's Bank, Limited (Cox's and King's
Branch), Simla.

PROOF

These excerpts prove the **INDIVIDUAL** nature and **VALUE** of the courses of postal instruction provided by **PITMAN'S** for the **Staff College Entrance and Promotion Examinations.**

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United Service Institution of India.

JULY 1933.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii.
Editorial	279
1. Military Intelligence In Tribal Warfare on the North West Frontier of India	289
2. Modern Counter-Battery	301
3. The So-Called Forward Policy	309
4. The Fallacy of the Line	321
5. The Capture of Khazana Ghund	328
6. A First Day's Pig-Sticking	340
7. The Organization of Second and Third Line Trans- port in India	344
8. The Lion of the Punjab	356
9. A Matrimonial Tangle	367
10. Escape from Delhi, 1857	375
Letters to the Editor	382
Military Notes	386
Reviews	409

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1933 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

The Revd. P. N. F. Young, M.A.	Capt.	W. S. Hushar
J. B. Shearer, Esq., I.C.S.	,,	J. F. S. McLaren.
T. B. Tate, Esq., I.S.E.	,,	H. D. K. Money.
Major-General G. H. Addison, C.B.,	,,	H. L. Ogden.
C.M.G., D.S.O.	,,	J. A. C. O'Hara.
Brigadier D. E. Robertson, C.B.,	,,	J. McI. Robertson, M.C.
D.S.O.	,,	R. G. Sanders.
Lt.-Col. S. G. Simpson	,,	D. R. St. J. Shannon.
Major E. B. de Fonblanque	,,	F. Shearburn.
,, W. P. MacLaughlin, M.C.	,,	A. E. Swann.
,, H. V. McWatters	,,	R. D. C. Taylor.
,, W. H. S. Schofield	,,	T. H. E. Woods.
Capt. F. G. Allen	Lieut.	P. M. Alpin.
,, O. R. Bethune	,,	W. P. Careless.
,, P. T. Clarke	,,	J. G. E. Hickson.
,, A. R. Fallon	,,	P. L. A. Hill.
,, I. M. Goff	,,	S. A. Lowman.
,, R. E. Holloway, M.B.E.	,,	R. A. H. Soames.
,, R. E. Hunt	2/Lieut.	M. Haya-ud-Din.
2/Lieut. V. D. Jayal.		

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication

of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9. A.M., until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books

which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4. A complete up-to-date catalogue is under compilation and will be available for issue towards the end of the current year.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
What Would be the character of a New War ?	.. 1931 ..	Enquiry organised by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre, 2 Vols.	1932 ..	Translated by Col. T. Bentley Mott.
Twenty Years in Tibet	.. 1932 ..	David Macdonald.
Political India, 1832-1932	.. 1932 ..	Sir John Cumming.
The Martial Races of India	.. 1932 ..	Sir George MacMunn.
Red Russia Arms	.. 1932 ..	J. B. White.
Imperial Defence and Capture at Sea in War	.. 1932 ..	Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond.
The Iraq Levies, 1915-1932,	.. 1932 ..	Brigadier J. Gilbert Browne.
The Merchant Venturers of London	.. 1933 ..	Charles Grey.
Planned Money	.. 1933 ..	Sir Basil Blackett.
How Britain is Governed (revised edition)	.. 1933 ..	Ramsay Muir.
Japan—The Mistress of the Pacific ?	.. 1933 ..	Col. P. T. Etherton and H. H. Tiltman.
Jacka's Mob	.. 1933 ..	E. J. Rule.
The History of the Russian Revolution, Vols. II & III	.. 1933 ..	Leon Trotsky.
The Tinder Box of Asia	.. 1933 ..	George E. Sokolsky.
The Future of Infantry	.. 1933 ..	Liddell Hart.
The Wells of Beersheba—A Light Horse Legend	.. 1933 ..	Frank Dalby Davison.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

The Political Handbook of the World, 1933	.. Edited by W. A. Mallory.
War in the Air 1936	.. Major Helder.
The Official History of the Great War, Operations in Macedonia from the beginning of the war to the Spring of 1917, Vol. I	.. Capt. Cyril Falls.
Egypt Since Cromer, 1904-1919, Vol. I	.. Lord Lloyd.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) Campaigns.

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set from October 1933 for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii) and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of the books recommended for the study of each :—

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
October 1933 .. March 1934	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the "History of the Great War—Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I & II.	"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vol. II, Parts I & II" (Cyril Falls).
		"The Palestine Campaign" (Wavell).
March 1934 .. October 1934 March 1935	France and Belgium, 1914 ; up to and including the Aisne.	"Official History of the Great War—Military Operations—France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. I." "40 days in 1914" (Maurice).
October 1934 .. March 1935 October 1935	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	"Official History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I." "Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign" (Evans). "Tigris Gunboats" (Nunn).

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R. A. I., the following books are recommended :—

- “ Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation ” (Harding-Newman).
- “ Military Organization and Administration, ” 1932 (Lindsell).
- “ A. & Q. or Military Administration in War ” (Lindsell).
- “ Military Law, ” 1932 (Banning).
- “ The Defence of Duffers’ Drift, ” 1929 (Swinton).
- “ Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II ” (Kirby and Kennedy).
- “ Imperial Military Geography ” (Cole).
- “ Elements of Imperial Defence ” (Boycott).
- “ Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence ” (Cole).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) Campaigns.

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon’s Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne,

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) The following books are recommended for the above campaigns :—

(i) *The Strategy of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796.*

Rise of General Buonaparte (Spencer Williamson).

Principles of War (Foch).

Vol. XI of 11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(ii) *The Strategy of the Waterloo Campaign, 1815.*

Six British Battles. (Belloc).

Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).

11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(iii) *The Strategy of the Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.*

Short History of the British Army (Sheppard).

Life of Wellington (Fortescue).

(iv) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the American Civil War.*

True History of the Civil War (G. C. Lee).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-65 (W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmunds).

Stonewall Jackson (G. F. R. Henderson).

Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (Maurice).

The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

(v) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan-Robinson).

The Japanese in Manchuria (Cordonnier).

Critical Comments only in the "Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military)."

Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Ian Hamilton).

(vi) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of War.*

Official Histories—Military Operations, France and Belgium
 Vols. I—V. Egypt and
 Palestine Vol. I and
 Vol. II, parts I and II.
 Gallipoli, Vols. I and II.
 Mesopotamia, Vols. I and
 II.

The Great War of 1914-18 (Aston).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign (Evans).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

(vii) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the East Prussian Campaign*, 1914.

Tannenburg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Ironsides).

The World Crisis, Eastern Front, 1931 (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

(viii) *The Strategy and Tactics of the Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War*.

The Official History, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine,
 from June 17th to the end of the War, Vol. II, Parts I and
 II.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

(ix) *The Strategy and Tactics of the action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne*.

The Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium,
 Vol. I.

40 Days in 1914 (Maurice).

Liaison, 1914 (E. L. Spears).

(x) *The Strategy and Tactics of the 3rd Afghan War*, 1919.

The Official Account (General Staff, India, 1926).

(c) In addition to the above, the following books are recommended for the various subjects :—

(i) *Strategy and Tactics*.

Soldiers and Statesmen (F. M. Sir W. Robertson).

Governments and War (Maurice).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Lectures on F. S. R. II (Fuller).

Lectures on F. S. R. III (Fuller).

War and Western Civilization, 1832—1932 (Fuller).

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

Military History for the Staff College Entrance Examination (Sheppard).

In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy).

Passing it on (Genl. Sir A. Skeen).

Report of the Dardanelles Commission.

(ii) *Organization, Administration and Transportation.*

Military Organization and Administration, 1932 (Lindsell).

A. & Q. or Military Administration in War (Lindsell).

Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation (Harding-Newman).

Administrative Schemes with Solutions (Kirby and Murison).

Outline of the Development of the British Army (Hastings-Anderson).

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. S. O.).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

League of Nations : Armaments Year Book, 1932 (Special Edition).

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

Declaration of British Disarmament Policy, 1932.

Commonsense about Disarmament (Lefebure).

(iii) *Military Law.*

Military Law, 1932 (Banning).

(iv) *The History and Organization of the Empire.*

Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).

Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

British Empire (Basil Williams).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32.

Problem of the N. W. F., 1890-1908, with a survey of policy since 1849 (Davies).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt since Cromer, Vol. I. (Lord Lloyd).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakely).

Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott).

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College Examination by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1932 Army Headquarters Staff College Course. Those for 1933 will become available later.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering members are requested to give the subject of the schemes required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

(A)—Tactical Papers.

Continuous Exercise No. 1 "Message Writing,"				
with solution	Re. 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 2 "Order Writing,"				
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 3 "Advance Guards,"				
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 4 "Appreciation,"				
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 5 "Attack Orders,"				
with solution	„ 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 6 "Defence," with				
solution	„ 1/-

Continuous Exercise No. 7 "Defence," with solution	Re. 1/-
(NOTE.—A copy of the map, which is the same for all the above Exercises, can be had on payment of Rs. 2/- extra.)	
Strategy and Tactics No. 1, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Strategy and Tactics No. 2, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8 (Rs. 1/8 without map which is the same as for S. & T. paper No. 1.)
Strategy and Tactics No. 3, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Cavalry Exercise, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Tactical Exercise—Night withdrawals, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Mountain Warfare, without map and solutions	Rs. 1/-

(B)—**Precis of Lectures, etc.**

Military History.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) ..	Rs. 1/8
The Third Afghan War (1931)	Rs. 1/8
American Civil War (1930)	Rs. 1/-
The History and Organization of the Empire (1932)	Rs. -/12

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the Influence of Modern Inventions on Warfare (1932) ..	Rs. -/12
Tactical Lessons of the Great War (1932) ..	Rs. 1/8
Cavalry, I (1932)	Rs. -/8
Cavalry, II (1932)	Rs. -/8
The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930) ..	Rs. -/8
Artillery, I (1932)	Rs. -/4
Artillery, II (1932)	Rs. -/4
Engineers, I & II (1932)	Rs. -/12
Tactical Employment of Tanks (1932)	Rs. -/12
Armoured Cars (1930)	Rs. -/8
Chemical Warfare (1932)	Rs. -/8

Night Operations (1932)	Rs. 2/-
Frontier Warfare (1932)	„ 1/8
Air Co-operation (1932)	„ -/12

Military Law.

Military Law, I (1932)	„ -/4
Military Law, II (1932)	„ -/4
Military Law, III (1932)	„ -/4
Military Law, IV (1932)	„ -/4
Specimen Military Law Paper (1932)	„ 1/-

Organization, Administration and Transportation.

Mobilization (1932)	„ -/4
Reinforcements in War (1932)	„ -/4
Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—Specimen Examination Paper with notes (1932)	„ 1/8
Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	„ 1/-
“ Q ” Services in Peace (1932)	„ 1/8
Movements (1932)	„ 1/8
Movements—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	„ 1/-
Supply of a Division in War (1932)	„ 1/8
Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	„ 1/-

General.

Notes on Military Writing (1932)	„ -/4
Essay—Specimen Paper (1932)	„ 1/-
Hints on Working for Examinations (1930)	„ -/8

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—(contd.).

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk, will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award.)

- 1889 .. BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).
- 1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
- 1891 .. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
- RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

* *N.B.*—The terms " officer " and " soldier " include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS--(contd.).

- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFOLD, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., c.m.g., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., i.a. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., r.e.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F.F.), (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., m.c., r.e.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200).
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., o.b.e., 31st D.C. O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., d.s.o., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
 KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
 SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K.G.O., Bengal Sappers and Miners.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., v.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
 YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.
 CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
 LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
 BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
 1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
 1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
 1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
 ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
 1911 .. MR. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
 1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
 1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
 1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
 NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
 1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
 1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
 1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
 1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
 1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
 1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
 1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
 1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
 1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
 1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
 1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
 1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
 1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
 1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).

NOTICE.

The Council has decided—

- (i) In order to assist Officers suffering from the cut in pay, payment of the Entrance Fee be suspended during 1933.
- (ii) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of \$10/6 per annum.
- (iii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are eligible for membership of the Institution.
- (iv) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.

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EDITORIAL.

For the last fifteen years the world has been trying to restore itself to pre-war conceptions of life and living. All countries have striven desperately and in most cases vainly to bring back the good old days of prosperity, capitalism and the gradual amelioration of the masses' lot. Unfortunately the war was fought on the empty slogan "to make the world safe for democracy" and now since democracy rules its council chambers, the world seems to be more insecure and less stable in every sphere of human activity than it ever has been. Historians will assert that this is the natural reaction to any great upheaval, but the fact cannot be ignored that the armistice of 1918 ushered in the first flood of democracy at a time most disadvantageous to Demos and his ideals. The fantastic debts incurred by the warring nations were so astronomical in their dimensions to the ordinary layman that he was content to leave their reckoning and disbursement to the experts. The latter were able for a long time to camouflage their bankruptcy in technical colours—tariffs, gold standards, treaties, inflation, deflation and the rest—but the day of complete reckoning had to come.

It has now arrived. England, the world's most honest creditor, has made a token payment of her debt to America because she cannot pay in full. This is the climax to a series of international defaults and is definitely a landmark in world history. Heretofore there was a sort of sanctity to international agreements and the breaking of a treaty was often a *casus belli*. Now, with democracy

as ruler, there is not this spirit of honesty or bellicosity, and it is diverting to note that any unsigned measure of agreement made by European statesmen in their efforts to achieve some stability is dubbed "a gentleman's agreement."

It is the current fashion to disregard all formal agreements. Japan has resigned from the League of Nations because she disagreed with the findings of the impartial Lytton Commission which she helped to appoint; Persia renounced her Oil Treaty and has got away with it handsomely; the Irish Free State recognises herself as an independent Republic despite the shilly-shallying pronouncements in the House of Lords; and Germany will have the Treaty of Versailles torn up within five years. The pen continues to be mightier than the sword.

The League of Nations is popularly blamed for this sorry state of world affairs and its record for the thirteenth year of its existence gives facile scope for its many detractors. On its hands the League has three undeclared wars, in none of which it has been capable of any decisive action: Japan and China; Columbia and Peru; Bolivia and Paraguay. Its major project, the Disarmament Conference, has been a kaleidoscopic shifting of ground and formation so incomprehensible that the world has lost interest and enthusiasm. The United States of America and Soviet Russia, two of the greatest nations, are still non-members.

Democracy demanded "open diplomacy" and it got it in the League. Every nation sent its wind-bag to Geneva to expel platitudes and generalised fatuities. The trained diplomat has been ignored, his knowledge of the country to which he has been accredited has been brushed aside, and in his place some junior member of Government with sufficient press-appeal has been aired to Geneva to hold forth on any subject from World Economics to Traffic in Women in the Congo Hinterland. It is all slightly ridiculous, but it may be thankfully observed that recently the pendulum is swinging back to more business-like and ordered methods. Nations are tending to co-operate on mutual ground and on mutual interests. This may not lead to the goal of Internationalism and a world community of interests so cherished by the doctrinaire of the Cecil and Wells school, but it may lead to a period of peace. And even the League of Nations could not take objection to this.

* * * * *

In these sad times of depression and bankruptcy, when statesmen at the World Economic Conference expatiate on the penury of the Indian peasant (of whom there are about three hundred and twenty millions), it seems ironical and unfortunate that a new constitution is being hammered out in London which will only increase the financial strain on the masses. The proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform as laid down in the White Paper visualise many expensive innovations. In the Centre the Lower Chamber will more than double its membership and the Upper Chamber will quadruple its senators. The allocation of revenue by the Centre is proposed on generous lines. The Centre will return about half of the income-tax it receives at present to Provinces, and half of the export duty on jute which it now takes from Bengal will be assigned to that province. In addition heavy subventions will have to be paid by the Centre to the three new provinces—the N.-W. F. P., Sind, and Orissa. In other words, the more expensive Federation of India will have to exist on less money than it does at present—unless a great trade revival or more stern economies take place.

Despite the small signs of economic recovery to be seen in the improved railway returns and the gradual rise in commodity prices which give grounds for hope, the Finance Member has made it clear that there must be a very large revival of trade before India's exports of commodities (other than gold) are sufficient to balance the volume of imports upon which the Customs revenue of the Centre depends.

In the event of a great trade revival not materialising money will have to be found from either increased taxation or drastic economies, and probably both. Before further taxation is imposed we may expect the usual popular cry "Reduce the Army." The Army Budget, in spite of its phenomenal reduction from 54 to 46·6 crores, is to the uninstructed like a red rag to a bull; and it is certain to be the objective of incessant attacks by politicians. Further military economies may or may not be possible, so it will be interesting to see how this question is affected by the Report of the Expert Committee's Enquiry into the strength and composition of the Army in India, and the Capitation Rates Tribunal Report. These reports appear to take a long time for consideration.

* * * * *

The most interesting development in training carried out this year has been the frontier "flag march" carried out by the 1st Cavalry Brigade and a company of Light Tanks. The main object of the exercise was to experiment with the co-operation of Light Tanks and Cavalry in the different phases of battle under Eastern conditions. •

This is the first occasion on which any organised modern mechanised force has been brought into practical co-operation with the Army in India, and the lessons learnt—both from the enthusiastic mistakes and cautious successes in the handling of this sensitive and sensible arm—are numerous. In the first place it is apparent that the Light Tank in India is a delicate instrument, and, for its value to be fully exploited and used with best effect in battle, the Force Commander must employ this arm for some decisive rôle. When we refer to the delicacy of Tanks no disparagement of their mechanical efficiency or the ability of their crew is intended. India, being a non-industrial country, cannot now maintain or equip mechanised units and any serious damage to vehicles will have to be repaired by England; this entails serious delay and points to the necessity of great care and thought on the part of the Force Commander before armoured vehicles are thrown into a battle.

Similarly the conservation of the two-man crew's energy is of paramount importance. When in contact with the enemy the crew have a tremendous task; observation of the ground and enemy; negotiating obstacles, working a machine gun; control of driver or sub-section; maintenance of direction and co-operation with other arms. This is a full-time job when encased in a lurching, roaring shell of steel, and obviously requires consideration before the Light Tanks are employed in a task capable of performance by troops whose physical and mechanical difficulties are not so heavy. It should be remembered, also, that tanks require even more meticulous and detailed grooming after a day's operation than do horses.

These considerations clear the air and help to give us a clue to the most effective employment of Light Tanks in India. And that is offensive. They should not be frittered away in tasks—such as flank guards, reconnaissance, holding of ground pending the arrival of troops, and detachments for subsidiary operations—which can be performed by other troops. The consensus of opinion after their first

experiment in co-operation gives them more responsible rôles. These are briefly as follows :—

In the attack ; as a surprise weapon, concentrated and mobile, to operate on a flank or to overcome the enemy machine guns. In the defence ; again concentrated and ready to co-operate in planned counter-attacks. On the march their economical speed, both for crew and engines, needs careful attention ; being mechanically unsuitable for slow movement—(their average unit road speed is 15 m. p. h.)—in a column of all arms they must move by bounds. Their place, therefore, in a column is dependent on tactical considerations, but in an approach march there seems no reason why they should not accompany the mechanical transport in rear of the column and still arrive at the proper place and time to take an effective part in the battle. This would prevent undue wear and tear on the vehicles and the unnecessary waste of energy of the crews.

At the same time we think it would be wrong at present to stress dogmatism in Light Tank employment in the East ; they are novel weapons the effective employment of which depends on elasticity of temperament and an open mind. The proper utilisation of their mobility, surprise effect and fire power seems to be a more valuable problem for military study than the evanescent concern regarding their maintenance and mechanical fragility. Motor engineering is progressing so fast that one may assume that present imperfections will have disappeared by the time of the next war, and our time consequently might be more valuably devoted to the imaginative belief that our present tanks are perfect, and therefore capable of tasks which we are at present diffident to give them. It is easy to argue that you must employ the tools given you, but every war has produced new tools and, if we anticipate a better tank and train on it, the anticipation will broaden our military imagination and deepen our mechanical foundations. We seem inclined to take our experiments too seriously.

* * * * *

By notification in the *Gazette of India*, No. 565 of 8th October, 1932, the Governor-General in Council formally constituted the Indian Air Force, and appointed the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in India to command the new force. Six months later, 1st April, 1933, the first unit of the I. A. F. came into being when the first flight of No. 1

The Indian Air Force.

Indian Air Force Squadron was formed at Karachi. It is intended to expand this nucleus to a squadron of three flights by gradual stages.

The main difficulty to be surmounted was the question of personnel and this matter has been dealt with successfully and satisfactorily. During 1932 five officers of the General Duties Branch completed their training at Cranwell and one officer trained for the Stores Branch returned from England. In India it was decided that all Indian enrolled personnel serving with the R.A.F. should, for administrative reasons, be brought within the scope of the Indian Air Force Act and should cease to be subject to the Indian Army Act as heretofore. Consequently all the personnel of the Indian Technical and Followers Corps, R. A. F., transferred voluntarily to the Indian Air Force. Thus the Indian Air Force consists of the following personnel in addition to flight cadets under training :—

Officers	6
Combatant Ranks	144
Non-combatant Ranks	332
Followers, Class I	271
<hr/>			
Total, all ranks	753
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The transport link and vital artery which connects India to England is the Suez Canal. Recently there has been some important criticism in imperial and shipping circles regarding the commercial, financial and legal structure of the Suez Canal Company. This deserves our notice, for, disregarding the canal's strategical importance, the questions raised concerning its management affect our pockets in India to a serious extent. The company, officially known as the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*, with its headquarters in Paris, exercises the world's greatest monopoly. The special Canal dues on shipping were reduced in 1931 to six gold francs per ton, gross tonnage, after considerable agitation by the interests concerned, and this is the limit of concession offered. When it is realised that a cargo steamer of 5,540 net tonnage, carrying cargo of 3,872 shipping tons, has to pay Canal dues of £2,181-6-9, it helps one to understand why steamship passages by unsubsidised British liners compare so unfavourably with some continental boats. Taking a

less personal view it is surprising to learn that the average surplus profits on the canal for the four years ending in 1931 were 67·83 *per cent.* On the other hand the average annual receipts of the British Government on their holding of Suez Canal shares in 1926—31 was over one and a half million sterling, about 44 *per cent.* on £3,460,000, the face value of the shares bought in 1875; but this comfortable investment hardly compensates for the damage done to British shipping, and, more important, to British and Indian consumers. French financiers have dominated the policy of the company with an astuteness worthy of their financial recovery after the war, and England seems to be content with her annual *douceur*.

In the statutes of the company it is laid down that the Board of thirty-two members should consist of members "*représentant les principales nationalités intéressées à l'entreprise.*" Actually it consists of a Franco-British *bloc*, (excluding one Netherlands representative), in the proportion of 22 to 10. Taking as a criterion that the interested nationalities are those whose produce and passengers are wholly or mainly sent in either direction through the canal, the following nations would appear to be most interested in the enterprise:—Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, Persia, and the rest nowhere. In 1931 the amount of shipping using the Canal was as follows:—British, 55·46 *per cent*; German, 10·59 *per cent*; Dutch, 8·27 *per cent*; French, 6·60 *per cent*; and Italian, Japanese, Norwegian and American in decreasing percentages.

These are illuminating figures, which become more cogent when compared with the management of the Panama Canal. The Panama cost two and a half times the price of the Suez Canal and the annual upkeep is about the same. Yet the Suez authorities levy dues 44 *per cent.* higher per ton of cargo carried. This powerful monopoly affects India severely and it seems extraordinary that such an unfair commercial handicap should be allowed existence in a world clamouring for fluidity of trade and cheapness of transport. If present canal dues were halved it would give a fillip to British trade, help Indian commodities to gain a western market, and yet give the lucky canal shareholders twice the annual dividend earned by any gilt-edged security.

We have drawn attention to this peculiar state of affairs primarily because its equitable readjustment should reflect advantageously on Indian economics (in which we have all got to be so interested), and secondly because it seems rather ludicrous that the Royal Navy, the British Army and the Royal Air Force protect and keep inviolate the canal which is becoming a barrier rather than a highway to our trade.*

All officers will be glad to see the efforts now being made by
The Bungalow **Army Headquarters** to improve the housing con-
Imbroglio. **ditions** for officers in certain cantonments. Since the war the accommodation in many military stations has been growing steadily worse. In some cases officers have had to live in or share mud-walled, leaking-roofed mausolea on which their landlords expended the minimum of repairs and for which they extracted the maximum of rent. Owing to the increase of officers and the influx into cantonment limits of large numbers of property-owning Indian civilians, there was not sufficient accommodation in many stations and officers were forced to live in expensive hotels and even in tents.

The present situation is really the result of the policy pursued for the last hundred years, by which Government, to save themselves the initial cost of building, gave wide powers to the military authorities to make free grants of the occupancy rights in land in cantonments to persons who were prepared to build for them. The grants were originally made to the officers themselves, but in course of time the bungalows changed hands and by 1929, when the new cantonment legislation was introduced, most of the houses in cantonments were owned by Indian civilians, a fair number were occupied by them and the balance were let to officers at ever-increasing rents. There was some justification for the rise in rents after the war. The houses had changed hands by speculatively-inclined owners, thatched roofs had been replaced by mud ones and there was a sharp rise in material and labour prices during this period. But even allowing for all this the rents charged must have paid over and over again for the few thousand rupees which represented generally the original cost of the bungalows. Even now, when the cost of building and the value of houses have dropped by nearly 40 per cent. all over India, there are cases of rents having increased in the last eight years by 100 per cent.

* The interested reader might study the article, "The Suez Canal," by Sir Arnold Wilson in "The Nineteenth Century," June, 1933.

If Government had only pursued from the beginning a policy of building for themselves or at least charging proper rents for land leased for that purpose, the military estate in cantonments would now be worth crores of rupees. As it is, the evil has grown to such large proportions that no simple remedy is possible. The present policy of resuming a limited number of sites in selected cantonments, complicated though it may be by legal and administrative considerations, is a step in the right direction. It is hoped that the transfer from private to military ownership will be carried out with the least possible friction.

One of the commonest gibes at *p.s.c.*-officers is that once they have graduated at a Staff College the remainder of their service is spent away as much as possible from their units. We do not believe this to be true. We can sympathise with the natural inclination of a trained staff officer to seek employment where his talents and ambition might have more scope, but there are regulations on the subject whereby it is ensured that *p.s.c.* officers alternate their periods of staff employment with spells of regimental duty. The latter periods, due to the annual increase in graduates, tend to grow longer.

This gibe is so hoary that it would not deserve attention, except that, by its frequent repetition, its influence has now invaded circles which appear to accept it as truth. In the discussion following a lecture on "The Training of the Army for War" at the Royal United Service Institution an officer stated: "I think it is no exaggeration to say that, after an officer leaves the Staff College, if he returns to his regiment for a year or eighteen months in the next ten years, that is the most that happens; frequently it is less."* In an article ("Training and Employment of Regimental Officers") in the same Number the author writes: "..... when a good regimental officer becomes a Staff College graduate and does well in his first staff appointment, except for two or three visits of six to nine months' duration—spread over the next ten or fifteen years—his services are virtually lost to his regiment until he becomes a second-in-command or a commanding officer."

These assertions are somewhat surprising, and, while we do not know if they correctly describe *p.s.c.* employment in England, we

* R.U.S.I. Journal, May, 1933.

are sure that they are not accurate concerning the Army in India. An examination of the employment of a batch of officers who left the Staff College over ten years ago—and this during a time when there was a shortage of *p.s.c.* officers—proves that the average period of regimental duty performed by these officers was over four years. One officer, it is true, spent only one-and-a-half years with his unit, but seven spent six years, four spent five, and seven others spent over four. These figures speak for themselves.

Furthermore, it is not generally realised that the majority of *p.s.c.* officers get only one four years' staff appointment between leaving the Staff College and becoming second-in-command. The average leaving age is 35, and when four years' employment, at least one year's regimental duty and leave are added, the officer has completed 19—22 years' service, which brings him into the zone of seconds-in-command. Thereafter he is not eligible for staff employ until he gets command, and his staff training is at the disposal of his unit.

We hold no brief for *p.s.c.* officers, and we are in cordial agreement with the desire that their abilities and knowledge should be utilised more than at present in their own units; but loose statements of the kind quoted above are liable to do more harm than good.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN TRIBAL WARFARE ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

BY CAPTAIN H. L. DAVIES, M. C.

General Considerations.

Although the general principles which govern the activities of the Intelligence Branch in normal warfare against an organised enemy will hold good in tribal warfare, there are certain considerations that affect the application of these principles in campaigns across the North-West Frontier.

These considerations, summarised, are :—

- (a) The existing organization of the covering force Districts.
- (b) The necessity for employing small columns, somewhat isolated from their higher formations.
- (c) The dependence of such columns upon local intelligence sources.
- (d) The nature of the country, and the tactics and psychology of the enemy.

The above points are discussed briefly below.

To maintain the tranquillity of the tribes, "Covering Force" Districts have been formed, *viz.*, Peshawar, Kohat, Waziristan and the Zhob Independent Brigade.

The Brigades within these Districts are situated, either, just behind the border, as in Peshawar and Kohat, or actually in the midst of tribal territory, as in Waziristan.

Operations in tribal country carried out by the Covering Troops may vary from a steady advance, the rapidity of which is controlled by the formation of an organized L. of C. (and possibly the building of an M. T. road) behind the striking force, to mobile operations, on a light scale of kit, carried out by a column based on a fortified camp inside tribal territory.

An example of the first situation was the Waziristan campaign of 1919-20, and of the second situation Waziristan operations in 1930.

In either case it is unlikely that the actual striking force will exceed a Brigade with attached troops, though, if an organized

L. of C. is being established, reserve Brigades may be distributed in depth on this L. of C. Such operations may become necessary in the Tirah or in Mohmand, but in Waziristan, where the control of the country is based on three fortified camps with mobile columns operating from them, the first situation, referred to above, will be almost inevitable.

It follows, therefore, that as the striking force will be normally limited to a Brigade, and that as the collection of information regarding the enemy and the country generally, will be primarily the task of the striking force, the responsibilities of the Brigade Intelligence staff are considerably enhanced in tribal warfare.

The enemy is not organized, that is to say he concentrates suddenly for specific operations and disperses with equal rapidity. Reconnaissance with ground troops is, therefore, of little value, particularly as the country discounts to a large extent the use of cavalry and armoured fighting vehicles. Consequently, until battle is actually joined with an enemy concentration, the striking force must depend for its information regarding the movements and intentions of the tribesmen upon political information, or news obtained from local friendlies and agents.

On the other hand there are few areas in tribal country that have not at one time been the scene of previous campaigns, and the tactics of the enemy are marked by an incorrigible conservatism. They will concentrate for serious opposition at certain definite positions and they will probably occupy these positions in exactly the same way as they did in previous campaigns in that area. For example, in Waziristan the Ahnai Tangi and Barari Tangi, have been the scenes of numerous actions during the campaigns of the past hundred years in that country, while the Mahsud tactics, and the positions they occupied, during the destruction of Makin in 1920 and in 1923 were practically identical.

Consequently, the information obtained by political sources can frequently be reinforced by intelligent forecasting based on a knowledge of previous campaigns. From the above considerations certain deductions can be made :—

- (a) The Intelligence Staff, and particularly the Brigade Intelligence Officer, are of very enhanced importance in tribal warfare. The Brigade Intelligence Officer must be prepared to deal, not only with battle intelligence when contact

with the enemy has been gained, but with political intelligence, and local agents and friendlies, during the advance.

- (b) To assist the Brigade Intelligence Officer in the above duties the attachment of a political advisor to Striking Force (Brigade) Headquarters becomes essential.
- (c) The fullest possible information regarding the country, the inhabitants, the political situation, and previous campaigns in the area concerned, must be placed at the disposal of the Brigade Intelligence Officer before the advance begins and throughout the course of the operations.

Preliminary Arrangements for a column about to operate in Tribal Territory.

In the following paragraphs it is assumed that a Striking Force of one Brigade with attached troops (hereafter referred to as S. F.) is about to advance into tribal territory, forming an organized L. of C. behind it, the Headquarters of the Covering Force District concerned remaining in its peace station.

Bearing in mind the deductions arrived at in the preceding paragraph, certain preliminary arrangements are necessary before the advance begins.

(a) *Distribution of available information.*

At Peshawar exists the Military Intelligence Officer, whose task throughout the year is the collection of information relating to all parts of the North-West Frontier from Chitral to Waziristan. A similar office for the Zhob and Baluchistan exists in Quetta.

The first step, therefore, is to obtain from Peshawar (or Quetta according to the area of operations) the fullest information available regarding the topography, resources, political situation, possible friendly maliks, etc. The compilation of a tribal directory, which includes indexed air photographs of practically all the important valleys and village areas of the North-West Frontier has been proceeding for the past two years. With the completion of the Waziristan directory, now in hand, the whole of the North-West Frontier will be dealt with. These directories will be of enormous assistance in future operations across the border.

The above information will be reinforced by the relevant route books, hand books, and maps which already exist.

(b) *Provision of a qualified Brigade Intelligence Officer.*

Brigade Intelligence Officer is a permanent peace appointment in all Brigades. To deal adequately with the responsibility of his appointment in tribal warfare, a Brigade Intelligence Officer must possess the following qualifications:—

- (i) Be trained in his task.
- (ii) Be able to speak Pushtu and Urdu.
- (iii) Have a good knowledge of the Frontier and of the tactics and psychology of the tribes. In addition, of course, he must have the confidence of his Brigadier.

Prior to the advance he must obtain and read the official accounts of previous campaigns in the area of operations.

(c) *Provision of a Political Advisor.*

The necessary arrangements must be made to obtain a political officer to accompany the column. The selection of this advisor will rest with the political authorities, who may appoint either an officer or a tehsildar, according to the importance of the operations. It is important to remember, however, that the individual selected will join the S. F. staff in the capacity of an advisor and not as an executive Intelligence Officer. All intelligence duties must remain under the control of the General Staff, represented in this case by the Brigade Intelligence Officer.

(d) *Co-operation with the R. A. F.*

In addition to the above arrangements, full consideration must be given to the assistance that can be obtained from the R. A. F. It is probable that the control of aircraft co-operating with the column will be retained by the District Headquarters concerned, who will decide whether it is necessary to embody an Intelligence Liaison Section to work with the co-operating squadrons, and the tasks required. The S. F. Headquarters, however, will be responsible for indicating any particular area of which photographs are required, and for demanding air reconnaissance to confirm reports received from ground sources, or to reinforce the knowledge already available regarding routes, camping grounds, water-supplies, and possible enemy positions, etc.

In important operations a R. A. F. Liaison Officer may accompany S. F. Headquarters in an advisory capacity. Normally, however, shortage of officers will render this difficult.

The Advance into Enemy Country.

During the preliminary advance the S. F. intelligence staff will be occupied principally in the collection of information relating to the intentions of the tribesmen in its immediate vicinity ; also, in the collection of topographical information relating to the country through which it is advancing for addition to, or in amendment of, the relative route books, handbooks and maps.

District Headquarters, in close touch with the Military Intelligence Office, (Peshawar or Quetta) and the Political Authorities, will be watching the repercussions of the operations on neighbouring tribes, and the possibility of their joining in the struggle, either by direct reinforcement, or independent operations in their own areas. This information will, of course, be passed on to the S. F. intelligence staff.

The sources of information at the disposal of the S. F. intelligence staff will be :—

- (a) Local agents and friendlies through the medium of the attached political advisor.
- (b) Any special reconnaissances ordered by the S. F. commander.
(*Note*.—Reconnaissance carried out at any distance must be a reconnaissance in force for which the whole Brigade may be required. Individual reconnaissance, or even the employment of patrols, will seldom be possible in tribal warfare).
- (c) District Headquarters who will forward :—
 - (i) information received through the Military Intelligence Office or Political sources.
 - (ii) information obtained by air reconnaissance.
- (d) L. of C. detachments.

Throughout the operations the responsibility of detachments in regard to local intelligence must be borne in mind. The enemy have no definite "front." They may concentrate in areas on either flank of the L. of C. with the intention of attacking posts on the latter. Consequently, all such posts must provide their own local intelligence arrangements which will include observation of the surrounding country from permanent piquet posts positions, and interrogation of local contractors or friendlies.

Generally speaking the main source of information during the preliminary advance, and before contact has actually been established

with enemy concentrations, will be agents, political and R. A. F. Very little information can be expected from the fighting troops and their "battle intelligence" organizations.

INTELLIGENCE DURING THE BATTLE.

(a) *Factors influencing battle intelligence in tribal warfare.*

These factors are :—

- (i) The imposition upon our own troops of an "all round" front.
 - (ii) The number of small detachments in piquet positions necessitated by this "all round" front.
 - (iii) The tactics of the enemy, who seldom exposes his intentions until some error on the part of our own troops gives him an opportunity to operate in circumstances favourable to himself. Each of these factors deserves special consideration.
- (b) *The "all round" front.*

In normal warfare a Battalion will seldom be deployed upon a front exceeding 1,000 yards. Normally, at least one flank of a Battalion acting in a Brigade operation will be covered by another deployed Battalion. Consequently, the front that must remain under the observation of the Battalion intelligence section will not usually exceed 1,500 yards of moderately level ground. In tribal warfare on the North-West Frontier, a Brigade will usually move up a river bed enclosed by hills. This applied equally to areas such as Waziristan where circular roads have been constructed, for it is unlikely that the tribesmen will select country traversed by these roads for their operations.

With the Brigade moving by a narrow valley, therefore, it will seldom be possible to deploy more than one Battalion during the advance, and this Battalion must protect its flanks by means of piquets. This piquetting is normal in all movements on the North-West Frontier, so a battalion when deployed, during either an advance or a withdrawal, will find itself spread in detachments over an area up to 1,500 yards in depth. That is to say, it will have a front of at least 3,000 yards to watch. There are occasions of course, when a Battalion may be called upon to attack a definite feature on a limited front, with its flanks protected by other portions of the Brigade, but normally,

as all movements in tribal territory is limited by the nature of the country to the river beds, these extended "fronts" will be necessary.

A Battalion intelligence section of six men, or three observation groups, cannot be expected to maintain continuous observation over 3,000 yards of mountainous country. Nor is it necessary; for the piquet positions are sited to afford good observation, and are primarily responsible for watching their areas and the enemy movements therein.

But if the observation groups of the intelligence section are not to observe the enemy what are they going to do? Before discussing this it is necessary to turn to the second factor mentioned above namely :

(c) *Isolated detachments necessitated by the "all round" front.*

As mentioned above a Battalion deployed will normally have to cover a depth of 1,500 yards with two fronts, one to the left and one to the right, making a total frontage of 3,000 yards. The piquets placed to protect this "all round" front will be sited on features offering good observation, and far enough off the line of advance to protect the moving column from small arms fire. Such piquets will seldom be more than 500 yards apart, and of not less than a platoon in strength. Consequently, a fully deployed Battalion may have at least six detachments in its area. Probably it will have more.

Observation of all these detachments from Battalion Headquarters will seldom be possible. Yet direct observation from Battalion Headquarters is most advantageous in view of the mobility of the enemy and the consequent importance of the time factor.

Consequently, it is suggested that the most important role for the observation groups of the Battalion Intelligence Section will be the maintenance of continuous observation over its detachments from the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters. In this respect the third factor mentioned above must also be considered. This factor is,

(d) *The tactics of the enemy.*

The tribesman will seldom commit himself to any operation until he has had an opportunity for studying the dispositions of his adversary. This is the reason why an advance is seldom disputed with vigour, whereas a withdrawal is ferociously harassed. A dangerous period also is the interim, when piquets have been posted and are waiting in position until the operations in train have been concluded,

and their withdrawal is ordered. Having selected as their objective a piquet which is badly sited, or at some other disadvantage, the tribesmen will concentrate with their usual mobility and deliver a sudden attack, worked out, generally, with considerable tactical skill. An attack of this nature is often prepared by an increase of sniping in that particular area in order to cover the approach of the main attacking party. Similarly just prior to the withdrawal, the volume of sniping (and also the volume of the fire from the piquets themselves) will often serve as a guide to the areas from which most danger may be anticipated. Intelligent observation of these indications, and their transfer to Battalion Headquarters by the Intelligence Section observation groups will assist the Battalion Commander in siting his reserves and making his dispositions generally. Any information also sent in by these groups indicating errors in the positions of piquets, or the appearance of enemy in the immediate vicinity of piquets, will forewarn Battalion Headquarters of projected attacks.

Hence the study of enemy tactics and the deductions to be made from certain specific indications must be part of the education of Intelligence Section personnel.

(e) *Role of the Battalion Intelligence Sections.*

From the above considerations, therefore, the role of the Battalion Intelligence Sections in tribal warfare may be summarised as follows :—

- (i) To maintain a continuous observation over the Battalion area with particular regard to isolated detachments such as piquets.
- (ii) To report to Battalion Headquarters all piquet activities indicating particularly, volume of fire directed against any such piquets, signs of enemy activity indicated by fire opened from piquets, enemy attacks against piquets, and the progress of any reinforcements moving up from company reserves.
- (iii) To watch for and report any piquet occupying a badly sited, or otherwise disadvantageous position.

In order to carry out the above role successfully, Intelligence Section observation groups must be given definite zones containing specific piquets to observe. Their position must enable them to watch their zone adequately and must be within runner distance of Battalion

Headquarters. During movement these observation groups must move by bounds so that there is never less than one group in observation.

At Battalion Headquarters the Battalion Intelligence Officer, assisted by his N. C. O., will be responsible for formulating his observation group plans during rest and movement, issuing the necessary instructions to his groups to bring these plans into effect, maintaining the Battalion situation map, collecting and reporting the information received from all sources according to the instructions contained in the Manual of Military Intelligence.

(f) *The role of the Brigade Intelligence Section.*

It has long been a moot point whether the results they can achieve justifies the retention of the personnel of the Brigade Intelligence Section, (other than the Brigade Intelligence Officer and the N. C. O.) in tribal warfare.

It is argued that the redistribution of the six (or eight) men of the Brigade Section amongst the Battalion Sections would increase the efficiency of the latter by giving them an extra observation group each, and that such observation as is carried out by a Brigade Section is of little value to the Brigade Commander who will be in close touch with the situation.

To arrive at any conclusion in this controversy it is necessary to consider whether the Brigade Commander is invariably in such close touch with the situation of his Battalions that independent and continuous observation by Brigade Section Groups will remain unnecessary.

During movement, either forward or backward, it will be quite common to find three Battalions of a Brigade deployed along the route. This may mean that these Battalions are extended over a depth of some three miles of mountainous country.

It is true that the Brigade Commander himself will be in close touch with the leading Battalion Headquarters in an advance, or with the rear Headquarters in a withdrawal, and that these battalions are the ones most likely to be engaged by the enemy in the various circumstances. But the enemy is not invariably going to confine his attention to the Battalions actually engaged in movement, but will often select a stationary road piquet for the scene of his operations.

Hence at any point along these three miles, situations may arise with which the Brigade Commander is not in touch.

It is equally common to find a Battalion detached from the Brigade holding an important feature at some distance from the axis of operations, with the remainder of the Brigade employed in piqueting the route and carrying out operations against the enemy in some other area. Such a situation is illustrated in the attached diagram which shows the dispositions of the 9th Ladha Brigade during the burning of Makin in 1923.

During the period occupied by the preparation for destruction of BASAM village both 'A' and 'B' Battalions were being heavily engaged, and, in addition, enemy at point 'X' were sniping the destruction parties and threatening an attack against the protective detachments at point 'Y'.


In these circumstances it is evidently impossible for the Brigade Commander to observe personally, with any degree of continuity, the events in each of the engaged Battalion's areas. The wide dispersion of the Battalions made it impossible to maintain any personal touch with the Battalion Headquarters of 'A' and 'C' detachments, consequently observation of the events in these areas was even more necessary than usual. It is not considered that the particular deployment illustrated in the diagram is in any way an uncommon one in tribal warfare. In fact such dispersion will be normal. Nor is it unusual for more than one of the detached Battalions to be engaged at the same time. Consequently, it is considered that on all occasions when the Brigade is deployed in action against tribesmen, independent observation by Brigade Intelligence Group will be most advantageous.

During movement there must be periods during which Brigade Headquarters are "bounding" from one position to another. Consequently, if the Brigade Commander is relying upon his personal observation to keep in touch with the situation in his Battalion areas, there will be moments when he is completely out of touch. With Brigade Observation Groups in position and bounding similarly in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, this hiatus would not occur.

Consequently, it would appear that a specific use can be found for the Brigade Intelligence Section both during movement and during stationary operations.

In addition to this, if provided with ponies or saddle mules, liaison groups of the Brigade Intelligence Section can keep in touch

**ROUGH SKETCH SHOWING DISPOSITIONS DURING DESTRUCTION
OF BASAM VILLAGE.**



with Battalion Headquarters, using the covered route protected by piquets for their movements. It is suggested, therefore that the role of the Brigade Intelligence Section will be :—

- (i) Observation of Battalion areas from the vicinity of Brigade Headquarters when Battalions are dispersed over a wide area.
- (ii) Movement by bounds from observation position to position during movement, with one group invariably in observation.
- (iii) Liaison with Brigade Headquarters by means of liaison groups mounted on ponies or saddle mules where a covered route between the Battalion and Brigade Headquarters exists.

At Brigade Headquarters the Brigade Intelligence Officer will carry out his duties of maintaining the situation map, and collating and distributing information received, in accordance with the instructions laid down in the Manual of Military Intelligence. He will be responsible also for issuing the necessary orders to his section to enable them to carry out their role.

(g) *The R. A. F. and "battle intelligence."*

During actual contact with the enemy one or more close reconnaissance machines will normally be co-operating with the Striking Force. In view of the scarcity of R. T. tenders in India, and also the difficulty of moving any form of wheeled vehicle over the country without metalled roads, it is probable that communication between the air and ground will be confined to light signals, dropping messages and ground strips.

From an intelligence point of view this represents a great disadvantage because specific instructions for reconnaissance cannot be given to the air. Despite this disadvantage the close reconnaissance machines can be of great assistance to the Intelligence Staff. By means of pre-arranged light signals fired over the vicinity of enemy concentrations they can impart considerable information regarding the movements, dispositions, and numbers of tribesmen engaged out of sight of the piquet positions. Also the reports of relieved pilots, given to the Intelligence Liaison Section at the aerodrome on return from a reconnaissance over the area of operations, can be relayed by W/T to the Striking Force Headquarters. To benefit to the full from the signals given by the close reconnaissance machine it will be necessary to keep it under constant observation. A group from the Brigade Intelligence Section will probably be the best means of maintaining this constant observation.

It is evident that a R/T tender with the Striking Force Headquarters would be most advantageous. Consequently, if the road communications admit of it, and if the tender is available, one should accompany the Striking Force.

Duties of the S. F. Intelligence Staff at the conclusion of operations.

Any operations undertaken in imperfectly surveyed territory will give considerable opportunities for increasing the existing information regarding communications, local resources, sizes and positions of villages, water supplies, camp sites, etc. Consequently, at the conclusion of operations the Intelligence Staff must prepare a report summarising the information gained under the above heads, and illustrated, where possible, by marked maps or enlargements. This report will be submitted by the normal channels to Army Headquarters for the amendment, or addition to, route books and maps.

It is a curious fact that despite quite a number of minor frontier campaigns carried out since the formation of battle intelligence sections, no report has been produced dealing, from a practical point of view, with their employment in this type of fighting. Consequently the training and employment of these Sections is largely influenced by experience gained during peace training. It is considered, therefore, that the Striking Force Intelligence Staff should draw up a brief report, on the conclusion of operations, embodying remarks on the working of the Brigade and Battalion Sections, with suggestions for improving their efficiency, either by additional equipment, or by new methods of employment.

Such reports would be a source of considerable assistance to the instructing staff at Command intelligence courses where the Brigade and Battalion Intelligence Officers of the future are trained.

Conclusion.

Space has precluded the discussion of this subject in any great detail. The object of the paper, however, has been to indicate the very considerable differences that exist between military intelligence in normal warfare, (which is exhaustively dealt with in the Manual of Military Intelligence) and military intelligence in tribal warfare, (which is dismissed in the manual in the space of fourteen pages dealing entirely with principles). As it is the lot of the Army in India to deal extensively in tribal warfare, and not at all in normal warfare, the above would appear to be a situation in need of amendment.

MODERN COUNTER-BATTERY.

BY BT. LT.-COL. R. G. CHERRY, M.C., R.A.

Though counter-battery work is, primarily, the responsibility of the artillery, yet it should interest all arms. For, if the enemy has any artillery worthy of the name, that artillery will cause casualties to our troops, and will imperil the success of our operations in a greater or less degree according to the adequacy of the steps taken against it. It is proposed to consider and explain, briefly and not too technically, the theories that are now held on this subject of counter-battery. They are based largely on experience gained in the last war; yet the world has not stood still, conditions have altered, there is a great tendency to speed up in all professions, including that of arms. Obviously, therefore, much of that which is advocated has not yet been put into practice against a live enemy. It is not, therefore, easy to form an accurate idea of the effect of C. B. fire, as advocated to-day. However, if the theories are based on sound premises, one may be allowed to hope that they will prove efficacious in practice.

Let us consider the question from first principles:—(a) the object, (b) the weapons, (c) the organisation to produce that object with those weapons. Now, the main object of counter-battery work, as in all other artillery work, is to put down the requisite number of shell in the right place at the right time. If this sentence is analysed in detail, we shall very soon get a good grasp of the first principles of counter-battery work. Gunnery should always be considered in terms of Shell, and the size and nature of those shell will vary according to the task to be performed.

In counter-battery work, the task is neutralisation or destruction of hostile batteries. Generally speaking, neutralisation only need be considered in mobile warfare, as ammunition will seldom be available to allow a policy of deliberate destruction of enemy ordnance. Practical experience in the last war shewed us that the best way to neutralise a battery is to subject it to an intensive bombardment of high explosive shell of as large a calibre as possible.

This is all very well for position warfare, when unlimited ammunition and a considerable amount of heavy artillery is available, but it cannot be done in mobile warfare,

However a short, intensive, bombardment should, if accurate, suffice to disorganise the battery and prevent it from functioning for a period of time, and if this bombardment were repeated, then the period of disorganisation would be lengthened in proportion. As far as ammunition is concerned, modern research has provided us with powerful H. E. shell and an effective instantaneous fuze, so that the shattering effect of even a short bombardment would, we think, be considerable.

The policy as regards method may be illustrated by the following short example :—

About 150 shell are available to neutralise a hostile battery for about $\frac{3}{4}$ hour. They would be fired, more or less according to the following idea :—

5 minutes concentration	60 rounds.
10 minutes off	nil.
4 minutes concentration	40 rounds.
12 minutes off	nil.
4 minutes concentration	40 rounds.
10 minutes off	nil.

The best weapon in the field army for this work is the Medium Howitzer, which fires a 100 lb. shell. According to the book, its maximum rate of fire is two rounds per gun per minute, but, by means of a simple quick-loading device, this rate has recently been increased to four. Any gun or howitzer may, however, be used for this work, the latter being preferable owing to their heavier shell. In order that this fire may be effective, a considerable proportion of the shell must fall on or near the target. As the effect of H. E. is mainly lateral, a battery that is not dug in is very vulnerable to H. E. that burst in or near the line of guns.

The likelihood that a large proportion of shell fired at a battery will fall in this area depends on a number of factors. The most favourable conditions exist when the fire of the battery can be controlled or corrected from a ground or air O. P. The occasions in war when a hostile battery can be seen from a ground O. P. should be rare.

Balloons are at the moment rather under a cloud—in fact it may be said (by those who like to mix their metaphors) that they fall between the Scylla of the Air Force, who see in them a home for tired

pilots, and the Charybdis of the army, who would be glad to take them over were it not for the expense involved. There remains the Arty/R. pilot, who can correct fire on to targets if he has the opportunity to do so. He is, however, a very overworked person and experience tends to indicate that he will seldom have the time to direct our fire on to more than three or four hostile batteries per hour, and a divisional commander will be lucky if he gets one Arty/R. machine up on his front continuously throughout a day's operations.

If the fire cannot be corrected, it must be predicted, and predicted fire is always more or less a gamble. The accuracy of predicted fire depends on the accuracy with which it has been possible to fix the guns, and the target, to get up-to-date meteorological corrections, and to calibrate the guns. Under conditions of mobile warfare it is not always possible to attain great accuracy in the above factors, consequently the effectiveness of a bombardment of hostile batteries carried out predicted cannot be guaranteed.

Given sufficient numbers of the right type of shell, and a reasonable chance of ensuring that a sufficient proportion of them will fall in the close vicinity of the target, it remains to ensure the timely arrival of those shells. This is, in all phases of a battle, a matter of organisation.

The problem of organising counter-battery work in the various phases of mobile operations has been receiving a good deal of attention lately and some interesting tactical exercises have been carried out at home to study this aspect of the fire plan.

But before considering these problems it is just as well to have some picture of how counter-battery work functions when time is available, *i.e.*, during a temporary static period. Effective counter-battery work depends on good organisation, accurate information and adequate communications. Whenever possible, this work is controlled on a corps basis, and a special counter-battery staff is allowed as part of the staff of the C. C. M. A. of corps. This staff consists of C. B. O., assisted by a Staff Captain (O) and a Staff Captain (I). Their job, in general terms, is to discover the enemy artillery dispositions and to take action generally in accordance with the C. B. policy laid down and particularly as part of the fire plan for an operation. They have various sources of information, aeroplanes, balloons, flash spotters, sound rangers, air photographs, etc., and given time

they should be able to obtain and keep up to date a fairly complete knowledge of hostile battery positions.

In order that information may reach the C. B. staff quickly and that they may be able to apply fire when and where required at short notice, adequate communications are essential. In fact the question of whether corps can control C. B. work or not depends primarily on communications.

Let us consider for a moment the situation during a temporary static period. We may picture the C. B. staff in possession of more or less complete information, having a certain number of batteries allotted to this work, enough A./R. aeroplanes and adequate communications. We may also assume that at this stage survey is complete, giving the C. B. staff the power to concentrate at will.

How do they set about their task ?

There are two situations to be considered.—

- (a) a static period which may be purely defensive or preparatory for an attack.
- (b) the attack itself.

During a defensive or preparatory period, counter-battery work will depend on the policy laid down by Army or Corps H. Q.

This policy may be aggressive or the reverse. It may aim at constantly engaging hostile batteries and keeping them on the move, or it may aim at keeping them where they are and concentrating on getting accurate locations by every means other than shooting. In either case the work of the counter-battery staff is more or less a matter of routine, making out daily programmes of tasks, dealing with demands for neutralizations and recording information for use later on.

In the attack itself the important point to realize is that counter-battery work forms part of the fire plan just as much as the detailed arrangements for direct support by barrages or concentrations. It is, in fact, one form of covering fire. If full value is to be got out of it, the counter-battery plan must be carefully thought out and co-ordinated with the rest of the fire plan. In other words, the plan of attack must be studied with the map and the dispositions of the hostile artillery in order to decide which are the phases or periods during which hostile artillery fire may constitute the chief obstacle to the success of the attack and to ensure that an adequate number of guns is allotted to C. B. work during those periods.

It will not usually be possible or necessary to make a fixed allotment for the whole of an operation, since the requirements will vary, so that the relative importance of covering fire and counter-battery tasks must be considered phase by phase.

As an example of what is meant, take the case where tanks are to be used in the second phase of an attack after the first objective has been gained. In this phase the hostile field guns will be of particular importance as an obstacle to the tanks progress and C. B. attention should be specially concentrated on them. Support of our tanks may be given in the form of a timed concentration on these enemy field batteries or perhaps by a smoke barrage put down by our own field guns. Having decided on the periods during which counter-battery is of special importance, an adequate allotment of artillery for this task must be arranged and there then remain to be settled the details of the counter-battery fire plan.

This plan has to take into account two categories of hostile batteries, those whose positions are known sufficiently accurately for them to be engaged by predicted shooting, and those whose positions are suspected or quite unknown. The latter can, of course, only be dealt with by air observation after zero hour and when there are many of them, they constitute a very difficult problem. At the moment we are considering the attack after a static period when the number of unknown positions should be small and the number of known positions correspondingly large.

The normal method of dealing with these known positions is by a pre-arranged neutralization programme, consisting of a series of timed concentrations on groups of targets selected for their probable importance at those times. If our ideas on neutralization are right, it should be possible to engage them in groups in succession provided that no battery is given time to recover completely from one crash before the next arrives. This means, in practice, that not more than two or possible three successive groups can be dealt with during one phase and, even so, the crashes must be short and therefore at a high rate of fire. Each crash should be, if possible, a concentration of 2 to 1 and it will, therefore, often not be possible to engage all the known batteries which are potentially important. In this case a further selection will have to be made of the most important targets based on a knowledge of their positions and their normal zones.

Finally, in making out this neutralization programme, the probable rate of advance of the attack must be kept in mind to ensure that fire is lifted off the most forward enemy batteries in time.

There is one other point about these pre-arranged neutralisations. They are based on information up to the latest possible time, but as orders take time to produce and distribute, that time is, probably, about six o'clock the previous evening. Last minute moves of known batteries must always be anticipated, and it is, therefore, wise to tell the first A/R pilots, as their priority task, to send N. S. calls on batteries in the programme which have moved. This saves wasting ammunition on empty positions and also gives the C. B. staff guns in hand to deal with newly located batteries.

With all these factors to be considered, as well as the complications of ranges and arcs of fire of the various batteries allotted to C. B. work, it is almost always necessary for neutralisation programmes to be made out in complete detail by the C. B. Staff. In this they differ from other task tables where brigades are given tasks which they in turn allot among their batteries.

This is a very brief description of how C. B. is worked when time and information are available, and of how a C. B. fire plan is made. In England this organisation actually exists; officers are earmarked and take part in schemes as members of the C. B. staff.

It has been anticipated, and in fact it is obvious, that the necessity for some form of C. B. work will arise in operations that take place under divisional or brigade control, in fact whenever hostile artillery imperils the success of any operation. Accordingly, the C. B. staff captains are lent to C. R. A.'s of divisions to act as their C. B. advisors. At the earliest possible moment this C. B. S. O. should establish liaison with the A. C. squadron through the Squadron Artillery Officer, with artillery brigade commanders, and with the commander of any Medium artillery that may be attached to division. In conjunction with Div. "I" and the staff Lieut. R. A. he should help to organise artillery intelligence, making C. B. his own special concern.

In the early stages of operations, C. B. work will not be very complicated. The C. R. A. will have to ensure that a fair proportion of sorties, according to the tactical situation, are allotted to Arty/R. duties. He must arrange for batteries to be ready to answer calls

for fire on hostile batteries according to the general policy laid down, and for concentrations of fire to be put down, if and when required on batteries previously registered. These are, more or less, matters of routine and there are no special difficulties involved. Later on, when, for example, it is found that an attack on a comparatively large scale has to be launched, the problem is not so easy.

Infantry Brigade Commanders are always inclined to ask for all the available artillery to give covering fire for such an attack, in the form of either barrage or concentrations. They do not always realise that hostile batteries must often, if not always, be included among the targets for such covering fire. In fact every located hostile battery that might interfere with an attack should be included in the fire plan. In addition, provision must be made for engaging previously unlocated batteries as soon as they are observed from ground or air O. Ps. The chances of being able to bring concentrations of fire on any or all such batteries depends on the survey situation, and on the number of guns available for this work. It will usually be found that the number is quite inadequate to deal with all located hostile batteries at once. Often a selection will have to be made, and those noted as being specially dangerous from their position and previous activities will take precedence.

It will be recognised that the presence of this technical expert at Divisional H. Q. will ensure that C. B. work receives full consideration. Moreover, when the time comes for Corps to resume control of operations, including C. B., it will be found that much useful information has been collected, and much good liaison established. The C. B. O. will be able to start work with his two assistants completely in the picture.

How can officers of other arms help in making C. B. work effective? Much can be done by unit intelligence officers, who should make sure that all information, such as Shelling Reports, is sent through. Such reports should give as much detail as possible; the direction from which the enemy shelling is coming, a "scrape" of the shell, the time, intensity, and damage done. All this information may be, and often is, invaluable to those who are building up the C. B. picture.

Formation commanders and their staff officers can help by appreciating the importance of dealing with enemy guns, and not, therefore, diverting too much of the artillery to other purposes. In peace training there will always be a tendency to underrate the power of the

artillery. This is due to the fact that little is seen of the guns and less is heard of them. At practice camps spectators are seldom given the opportunity of seeing the effect of "fire for effect." This will be very quickly corrected in war, but it is better to start off with a true conception and conduct peace training accordingly.

It is suggested that umpires at manœuvres, and directors at T. E. W. T. S. should always paint the C. B. picture, and be prepared to discuss the action taken by those to whom the picture is painted. For example, a battalion commander is told by an umpire that this attack is being held up by artillery fire coming from a certain direction. He should appeal at once to the commander of the artillery supporting him. The latter may, and probably can do nothing with his own guns to neutralise this fire, but he can and should report at once. There may be a medium battery linked to his grid doing C. B. work with air observation and the offender may have been registered. In this case the answer is obvious. He may, however, have to report to the C. R. A. who should then take steps to have the offender neutralised.

It is suggested that whenever A. C. aeroplanes are available on manœuvres, a definite programme of C. B. work should always be included among their tasks, and artillery umpires carefully instructed to devote attention to this work. There is a tendency to-day to think that C. B. work is the sole province of the Medium Artillery, or that it is never decentralised below divisions.

It has been suggested that light field batteries acting in support of an attack can do no more than attempt to blind enemy O. Ps. with dust or smoke. But it should be remembered that an intelligent artillery commander spreads his O. Ps. over a wide area, and if only one O. P. is left unblinded, the officer installed therein can often control the fire of an artillery brigade.

Whereas batteries subjected to heavy bursts of fire, corrected from the air, will almost certainly be out of the picture for a time, and may suffer losses that may force their withdrawal. It is well within the power of a mountain or field brigade, well handled, to neutralise the fire power of their opposite number.

In conclusion, it is emphasised that success in battle depends on the appreciation of the capabilities of the supporting arms. Only thus can a commander hold a true balance between the various ways in which artillery can give it support to the best advantage.

THE SO-CALLED FORWARD POLICY.

By "MOUSE."

"Any great power is ultimately forced to absorb barbaric states contiguous to its frontiers. This is the verdict of history."—C. Collin Davies, 1932.

"Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hangs suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations."—Lord Curzon, 1907.

"It appears to the Government of India that the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under our control, and, if possible, to organise, for purposes of defence against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along our north-western frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves."—Government of India to Punjab Government, 1887.

The above quotations should be enough to show that I am not entering this controversy without the support of a few big guns. Before the days of broadcasted aviation the problem was simple; either the easy close-border system or the Forward Policy. Adherents of the former were content to sit behind the old Sikh demarcation, our present Administrative Boundary, whilst enthusiasts of the latter wished to push forward to the Durand Line. The Durand Line was fixed forty years ago, and, because our lack of policy—called the Forward Policy—has been so backward, nobody has ever seen it since. We have in the usual good old British way compromised. Those unhappy people rivetted to cool armchairs in Whitehall, New Delhi or Simla have found it comfortable to take both views; either butcher (now bomb) the beggars to hell, or bribe those gallant tribesmen so that we may have peace in our time, O Lat Sahib Bahadur. For the official or soldier on the frontier in direct contact with the tribes the problem cannot solve itself so agreeably. The soldier, rough, untutored and so licentious, has no axe to grind, no policy to enunciate and no avenue—Heaven's Light our Guide!—to explore; all he has to do is to sit tight. This he does with superb nonchalance. Occasionally—once a year at least—something goes wrong politically. And then the bugles blow, convoys creak, Brigadiers bulge, subalterns sob,

Generals germinate, sergeants swear, Majors migrate and the C. G. S—or some correspondingly high authority—presses a button and all the Army on the Frontier buttons up his.....For what purpose ?

The Afridi, starving, has come down for food to the plains of India, seduced thereto by propaganda tales, mostly true, of weakness or abdication of the powers that be. The Haramzada Faquir of Allmyai—a lunatic and therefore more influential than an Amir—has chosen to fish in the troubled waters of the Swat river. An Afghan renegade, cloaked in the mantle of Islam, holds out promises of loot and heavenly bliss in the bazaars of Kandahar, Bannu or Khost. Anything, anywhere, anyhow is enough to raise a brave, mobile *lashkar* of young, well-armed impetuous men on that most unscientific border of India which wriggles from Hunza to Harnai. The result of these alarms is a few columns on the move, a few bombs, a few shots, and a *feu de joie* at a *Jirga*. The Government of India purrs contentedly, self-persuaded that its “dissuasive restraint” policy has once again vindicated itself, smooths its waistcoat and goes out to dinner. Only when its prestige is affronted brutally in Waziristan or its women threatened in Peshawar does it, the Government of India, stir itself to real forward policy action.

The fundamental reasons—now in 1933—for these tribal disturbances and our timidity in dealing with them are economic; they are hungry and we are broke. We have succeeded for the time being in protecting the Peshawari plains and the Derajat from the ravages of the tribes. We have now imprisoned our fellow British subjects between the administrative border and the frontier of Afghanistan. More thorough than that, we are now enabled to bomb blazes out of any one of them who comes down to India—desperate, armed, uncivilised and as savage as his grandfather of 1870—to grab sustenance for his children. Indeed, sometimes we feel we ought to bomb the whole parish because one or two parishioners have misbehaved themselves. At the risk of appearing sentimental, soft, and unsoldierly I would like to submit that this bellicose attitude on the frontier is wrong. It is sinful ; it is stupid ; and, worst of all, it is directly contrary to all our historical teaching of frontier administration. The punitive system was condemned by Lord Lytton in 1877 in the following words :

“ I object to it because it perpetuates a system of semi-barbarous reprisal, and because we lower ourselves to the ideas of right and might

common to our barbarous neighbours, rather than endeavour to raise them to our own ideas, because it seldom touches the guilty, and generally falls more heavily on the innocent ; because its natural tendency is to perpetuate animosity rather than lead up to good relations : because as a rule it leaves no permanent mark."

This opinion was provoked by the close border policy of scuttle and run punitive expeditions, and I honestly cannot see why it should not apply to some of our bombing operations. I admit that I am not air-minded in the accepted meaning of the term, but I try to be fair-minded and I, therefore, regard the tribesmen as people with whom our contact ought to be persuasive rather than explosive.

I contend that since 1893, when the Durand was fixed as our goal, we have never entered our enemy's twenty-five ; we have made a few missed drop-kicks ; we have dribbled ; we have scrimmaged. On three occasions we have made combined rushes with the forwards (the military), the halves (the Political), the three-quarters (the Government of India) and even the back (the Secretary of State) on the half-way line, all co-operating magnificently ; but every time the enemy has kicked a beautiful length for touch—and touched us for a few more lakhs. Our frontier policy has been merely tidal ; it ebbs and flows. With the notable exception of Baluchistan, the dubious exception of Waziristan and the Khajuri Plain peace of resistance our policy still remains a contemptible compromise between bribery and bullying. It has never been coherent, consistent or clear ; it has always been conceited, invariably chameleonic and, since the last decade or so, constipated. To make it move forward at all it needs a dose of trans-border terrorism, and then it moves reluctantly and with great labour. This language may appear extravagant, too emphatic and perhaps melodramatic ; I don't really care. When one studies—even casually—the history of the frontier, when one reads that *four* generations ago our wise and courageous forebears urged a forward policy and proved its blessings by their own splendid labours, when one hears incessant, perfectly phrased lip-service paid to such a policy and then, when one sees so little being accomplished, such tiny, timorous steps being taken, is it any wonder that a fellow becomes impatient ?

Sir Robert (and what a man !) Sandeman is the father of the forward policy and the present continual extraordinary tranquillity in Baluchistan is the edifice built on the foundations he laid fifty-five short years ago. There are those accustomed to the velvet lawns

of the Quetta Club, the *chikor* shoots near Torquan, the dreamy atmosphere of the Staff College and such Baluchi delights who will compare these civilised amenities with the rigours of Razmak and the blood-shot life of the Khyber. They will declare that the difference between the tribes of Baluchistan and those north of the Gumal River is the difference between a sheep and a wolf. They will assert that the Bugtis, Kakars, Marris, Achakzais and Suleman Khels are pacific, pastoral folk who obey their chiefs and love autocracy; but not so the other Pathans of the border. The Wazirs, Mahsuds, Afridis and Mohmands, the Orakzais, Yusufzais, Dawars and Tarkhanis are democrats, socialists, communists. They owe no allegiance, acknowledge no power greater than their own right arms, and are fiercely, fanatically independent.

I wonder. Indeed I wonder so much that I am prepared to take a perfectly safe small bet that if Lieutenant Sandeman had been posted as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar instead of Dera Ghazi Khan in 1866 you and I would now be at a Staff College doing winter sports on the Safed Koh.

When Sandeman, a young man of less than ten years' service, broke the close border policy he met with great opposition. He was so zealous for the well-being of his people, so enthusiastic in his dream of peace, so passionate and so irrepressible that the Governments of the Punjab and India nearly wagged their heads off with disapproval. Nothing, however, succeeds like successful excess. One of his first tasks in Dera Ghazi Khan was to break the power of one Jamal Khan, a middle-man employed by government in its dealings with the trans-border tribes. This Tumandar was a thorough-paced scoundrel who hunted with hounds and ran with the hares and had conducted his villainy with such success that he thought himself omnipotent. Sandeman, after a long fight, broke him, and then started to clean up the border. This victory was Sandeman's stepping stone. And he rose on it from the depths of the riverain of the Indus to the highlands of Baluchistan.

He broke the might of the Marris, robbers and plunderers whom General Jacob described as "the worst enemies of the Khan of Kelat," and to whose charge was laid that "all is disorder, rapine and plunder on the Kachi side of the desert." Of the Bugtis Sir Lepel Griffin wrote "this was a tribe absolutely devoted to robbery." The Marris were outlawed and an award of ten rupees was offered on the Sind Frontier

for the capture of "any Marri." From Jacobabad, then a frontier post, to Dera Ghazi Khan, the Baluch border, was a sort of wild west Texas. The Khan of Kelat, a weak puppet, was being harassed by his Sirdars ; all commerce from Afghanistan was the legitimate prey of his tribes, sub-tribes, clans, villages and even individuals. These same marauders swooped continually in large, defiant bands across the border, murdering, looting and escaping. And within ten years Sandeman stopped it. He established a peace, the most enduring, save the Ulster Settlement, in modern history.

How did he do it ? I honestly cannot tell you. There are figures in modern history, Foch, Woodrow Wilson, Gandhi, Mussolini, Lenin, Montagu Norman, Hitler, Lloyd George, Hindenburg, al Capone, Amanullah, de Valera, Northcliffe—who, by sheer personality, apart from their several and often dubious gifts, have raised themselves and their followers from the common rut and brought something vital to humanity. It may be this something is too bad to be allowed existence but the personality that engendered it defies analysis. And so with Sandeman. He also was a visionary, but unlike some of the mixed crew I have cited above his visions were practical, his ideals were constructive and his aim was peace. It seems significant that his biographer, Thornton, wrote that Sandeman's policy was not a mere squabble between officials. "It was," Thornton records, "a protest against the existing systems of frontier management, against the uncompromising militarism of Sind and the "non-intervention-cum-expeditious" systems common to both Sind and the Punjab ; and was a first step towards a new policy, a policy believed by its promoters to be more humane, more sympathetic, more civilising, and, at the same time, imperatively called for on grounds of public expediency." How Sandeman achieved his goal depended entirely on his methods and character. First of all he was a man, fearless, straight and with a preference for personal action rather than impersonal letters ; secondly, he was a gentleman and had therefore the hereditary background for dealing with affairs, the certain indefinable quality which the tribes acknowledged instinctively ; thirdly, he knew his own mind ; and finally, he always continued to learn his job. He based his administrative policy on giving his support to the local chieftain, and, so long as his ally played the game, he was ready to back him up in all his troubles. "Trust begets trust," and Sandeman proved the truth of the proverb. Withal he was sympathetic, his sympathy based on his

knowledge of the tribes. He knew their code, he knew their ignorance and when they transgressed the law he brought them to book. But, because he dealt with the delicate tissue of a savage's mentality, his punishments were often absurdly lenient when compared with the standards laid down by the British India Penal Code. His judgments deserve study by penologists, for he made his enemies his friends and turned all Baluchistan from Jacobabad to Fort Sandeman into loyalty to the British throne.

The histories of Waziristan and the Tirah are sadly different. Of Waziristan it is impossible to write without heat. Never in any of our possessions except Ireland have we behaved so incoherently. We have had no settled policy, have blown hot and cold, have cajoled and cursed, bribed and beaten and now ten years after the occupation of its highlands—but I will come to that later. In 1889-90 Sandeman from the Zhob arranged with his great subordinate, R. I. Bruce, at Dera Ismail Khan to open up the Gomal and effect a circular road *via* Wano (now Wana) to bring the Kakars under one uniform administration and to improve our frontier communications. The scheme had the official blessing of a Viceroy who actually went up the Gomal on a horse. Shortly afterwards in furtherance of the project Sandeman held a Jirga at Appozai attended by all the local tribes, and by Waziris, Mahsuds and Sherannis who came in after some natural hesitation. The road from Fort Sandeman to Wana *via* Kajuri Kach was roughly aligned and *Mahsud* labourers were employed at Kajuri Kach. Half a lakh per annum was granted by Government to keep the route open and pay for the local khassadars. Sandeman died in January 1892, and the road is not yet open.

Since Sandeman's death our frontier policy has been theoretical rather than practical. We have accepted the forward policy because there is no other, but we have fiddled with it to the detriment of ourselves and the derision of the tribes. Our main stumbling block has been financial because it is a shock to our budget to demand a few crores for such a purpose; whilst, on the other hand, the dribble of money spent on expeditions and allowances annually for the last fifty years (amounting to say twenty crores) has been as imperceptible as a slow puncture. In Waziristan, following upon a triennial series of costly punitive expeditions we at last took the bull by the horns in 1920 and decided to occupy the place. We established impregnable strongholds, we built roads, we reoccupied the badly-treated Wana,

and we continue to build roads. We now enlist Mahsuds and employ the tribes in civilised employment. Waziristan is British territory—for about five hundred yards on each side of the motor roads. Yet in spite of all these efforts and the great expenditure the heart of Waziristan is to any military officer *terra incognita*. Why? Admittedly one can take a few khassadars as an escort and prowls round the adjacent hills and that one meets with great hospitality and friendliness. But there are the great dark patches. If we do control the country—a supposition which I personally consider doubtful—why can't we move about more? Why can't I go outside my barbed wire at night? Why can't I take my company for a week-end in the hills away from the office, Brigadiers, telephones, clerks and all the other things that prevent me from being tactically mobile? If permission would be granted to the young company commander to move about on company training (his only pigeon in this over-administered age) on the condition that he passed colloquial Pushtoo and that his C. O., recommended him as not being a congenital idiot, I guarantee that not only would it lead to military efficiency but that it would have an incalculable political effect. There might be some regrettable incidents but these, I contend, would be minor in comparison with the annual ballyhoo which occurs whenever a faquir goes bolshy.

We are now the conquerors of Waziristan and our only desire is peace. There are no commercial, no political and no religious advantages to be wrung from that barren land. Any action we take there to preserve peace and ensure tranquillity is certain to have the blessings of the League of Nations and even the U. S. A. The most extreme sections of political opinion in England will applaud any effort to improve the conditions of life and employment in this sadly derelict portion of the Empire. There seems to be nothing to prevent an amiable forward policy except our imperial ingrowing toe-nails. Recent unrest in Waziristan shows that we are diffident, and so long as we are too timid to grasp the bull by the horns, so long to peace on the frontier!

Now for the Tirah. This is a more difficult question both ethnologically and geographically. The Afridis are more fiercely independent than even the Mahsuds. The Durand Line split their kinsfolk rather arbitrarily and left them convenient back-doors to walk down the gardens of Afghanistan. With them we have always adopted the "hands off" policy. All we have asked for is the integrity of the

Khyber Pass and the inviolability of British territory. History relates a sad tale of treachery, raids, broken promises, insults and invasion. Our first skirmish with the Afridis was in 1839, and from 1849 to 1898 there were eight expeditions to coerce them. In October 1898, an Agreement was made which bought peace at a price. The Maliks were on the whole loyal but were unable to oppose the intrigue of mullahs and anti-British propaganda, and in 1904 some desperate outrages occurred in British territory. In 1905 raids and murders, sponsored and concealed in the Tirah,—increased, and the Zakka Khels were as usual the prime movers. From 1905 to 1908 these outrages grew steadily in spite of all efforts to prevent them. In 1908 the Zakka Khels arranged a raid on Peshawar City and despoiled a Hindu *bania* to the tune of a lakh of rupees under the noses of political officers, police and military. Roos-Keppell, Sandeman's great successor, reported officially. "Year after year the evil has grown, and each year the necessity for punishing the Zakka Khel has become more pressing. Circumstances, larger questions of policy, and the natural dislike of Government to strong measures, have saved the clan from the punishment which it so richly deserves." He recommended the *permanent* occupation of the Bazar Valley. It is pleasant to record that the Viceroy, Lord Minto, agreed with this opinion. He wrote to the Secretary of State : "There need be no necessity for taking the country in the sense of forcing upon it British administration, collection of revenues, etc. We could simply hold it by the creation of one or two roads, or rather by the improvement of the existing roads by tribal labour.....and the establishment of a few advanced posts, leaving the tribesmen as heretofore to carry on their own tribal administration" (*cf.* Waziristan 1920—1933).

Our recent dealings with the Afridis are too fresh in our minds to permit dispassionate comment. We have managed to shut them up, which is, I suppose, an advantage, but a policy unlikely to lead to friendly relations when the pendulum of the Government of India swings back again to indecision and misplaced conciliation. A kindly light has forced us to occupy the Khajuri Plain. "One step enough for me, lead Thou me on."

What is the best solution of the frontier problem? There are several academies of thought, and it might be amusing to display them under their various mottoes:—

I. The Government of India Policy:—

Vigilate et orate. (Watch and pray.)

II. The Foreign and Political Policy :—

Cedant arma togae. (Let the military yield to the politicians.)

III. The Army policy :—

Aut vincere aut mori. (We'll conquer or die.)

IV. The Air Policy :—

Sic itur ad astra. (This is another road to fame.)

V. The Mouse Policy :—

Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo. (If I can't ginger up the high-hats I'll raise hell.)

Of these policies there are various permutations and combinations with which we are familiar in general vague outlines. We know that the Politicals and Scouts have run the Frontier, and can do it so long as no forward movement is adumbrated ; we know that the Politicals and the Air could run the Frontier, but I doubt if this combination would be conducive to a permanent settlement of the problem ; we think that the blessed co-operation of all services can keep the cursed place quiet, as at present ; and in the end the unadministered territory runs itself, and remains in this year of grace the most untidy, slipshod, dangerous part of the Empire.

For so far my criticisms have been destructive. I have not been fair. I have not acknowledged the great work done by political officers, soldiers, airmen and others who have ploughed the sands in the hope that their work would be permanent. I have ignored historical instances which might prejudice my case ; I have quoted authorities suitable for my purposes. I have even been, I hope, unkind.

I plead forgiveness by producing that sterling motto : "*Flectere si nequeo superos, acheronta movebo*," and I submit in all humility and sincerity a constructive solution. It is open to any criticism. It may be derided by the more knowledgable political officer, it may be abused by the more aggressive military officer, it may be ridiculed by the air officer, and it might even be laughed at by the Government of India. I pray that it does exhume these healthy reactions, because then I will know that I have made these people think about something which they are at present afraid to face up to.

My plan is necessarily based on a few assumptions. Firstly, the new Federation of India will extend to the Durand Line ; secondly, the Forward Policy—from the point of view of a great civilised nation such as this Federation—is inevitable and, thirdly, I assume that we,

the British, wish to hand over to our successors a Defence Balance as secure and impregnable as the Finance Member's successive budgets. Our Defence Balance is shaky, and its weakness lies on the N.-W. F. P. If the covering troops immobilised in Chitral, the Khyber, the Kurram, Waziristan and the Zhob could be utilised for the normal purposes of military forces, instead of being the handmaidens of political (in its original sense) intrigue the Army in India could be reduced considerably. I submit therefore a plan; let us call it a Twenty Year Plan, and divide it into four phases.

1st Phase.—Inform Afghanistan of our intentions and seek Afghan co-operation and understanding. Warn and keep warning the tribes of our determination to penetrate peacefully their countries as far as the Durand Line. Warn them that in the event of opposition the most severe action will be taken *vi et armis*. Place the whole of the unadministered territory during these phases under a military governorship. For, as Sir William Barton points out in his chapter in "Modern India" (Oxford University Press), "the problem of the Afghan Frontier is in its essence a question of military strategy." A study of the occupation of the Sudan and French Morocco will show that a military *régime* is a necessary prelude to the civilisation of a savage country. Commence with Waziristan by opening it up; and as a preliminary to the settlement of the Afridi problem nip off that impertinent salient into British territory between Fort Mackeson and Kohat.

2nd Phase.—Learning from our successes and mistakes in Waziristan then deal with the Tirah and the Mohmands.

3rd Phase.—These events will have had their reactions in the States of Buner, Swat and Chitral and it should not be a difficult matter to persuade these at present mediæval territories to come into line with our peaceful forward policy.

4th Phase.—Order general disarmament throughout the whole N.-W. F. P. as in British India, and after enforcing it hand the country back to the civil power.

Admittedly such a simple solution on paper teems with snags, but with resolution and money it—or any other planned advance—should not prove unworkable. To quote Sir William Barton, a political officer of thirty-five years' service twenty of which were in the N.-W. F. P. :—"As already observed, we have no definite policy with the tribesmen.....The ideal policy would be to


SKETCH MAP
OF
N.W.F.P.
SHOWING THE
FORWARD POLICY.

Scale of Miles.

Miles 10 0 10 20 30 Miles.

International Boundary, demarcated.....
" " undemarcated.....
Administrative Border.....

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develop the indigenous institutions of the Pathan tribesmen into some form of rough and ready administrative machinery with which the authorities of the Indian Government could deal..... Government support would be necessary and this would involve expense. Indian statesmen will, however, have to realise that if the Frontier menace is to be exorcised it will mean heavy expenditure; education, economic and political development are the main things necessary if the Afridi, the Mohmand, the Wazir are one day to sit as Senators in the Imperial Councils."

This ideal policy can never be achieved until we move to the Durand Line.

I can now see the majority of my readers fingering their moustaches, rather sorry that I have given vent to such wild-eyed enthusiasm, bred on ignorance and fantastic ideals. They will assert—and I agree cordially—that such a plan is founded on theory and in the present state of India's finances is totally impracticable. But let us look ahead and take the long view, the horizon view on which all policy should be based.

If we do not *now* begin some sort of progressive policy, what will be the result in, say, thirty years' time? My outlook is pessimistic, because of a cursory reading of Indian history, a petty knowledge of Indian politics and my own prophetic conceit. I visualise a Central Government with an inevitable Hindu majority; a Muslim minority continually in opposition on religious and imaginary grounds; an army cut to the bone so as to make Federation safe for democracy; and, finally, a forward policy such as we have now only less so.

Then the Mahsud loots the rich cantonment of Razmak, or the Afridi occupies the Hindu bungalows of Peshawar, or the Achakzai raids the Staff College in Quetta. A crisis will develope. The Commander-in-Chief will demand strong action and fifty crores, and will be supported by the Central Government. And then, ladies and gentlemen, the sinister figure of Pakistan will rear his arrogant head.

It is idle and extremely foolish for anybody in India to shut his eyes to the Islamic movement which dreams of an Indian Muslim Confederation composed of the Punjab, the tribal territory (called Afghan), Kashmir and Sind. On such a pretext of war against the Muhammadans of the border an agitation, spreading through Provinces and States, will arise which will make Civil Disobedience look

like a dhobi-ghat scuffle. Pakistan will have tremendous backing ; it already possesses great resources in fighting men ; and it still dreams of the old Moghul glories in Hindustan. It would split Federation from top to bottom.

I have written enough. For these reasons, kind ladies and scoffing gentlemen, I do feel most earnestly that we ought to remove all possible sources of irritation and infection before we hand the baby over to its wet nurses.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN ATTACK. THE FALLACY OF THE LINE.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL O. G. BODY, D.S.O., R.A.

The rapid development of modern armament and its absorption into our fighting organization has led to great confusion of thought as to the handling of units and formations on the battlefield. The study of tactics as an art has been clouded by the introduction of a mass of new material with which to work and with which to produce new effects. In order to understand the true significance of recent innovations it is necessary to appreciate the old principles which have ruled the art of tactics since time immemorial ; for, by respecting those principles we shall comprehend more fully the trend of tactical thought and whither it is leading us.

Within the realm of tactics the first principle to accept is, that we must arm and organize all fighting units and formations primarily for the attack. The evolution of the attack therefore is the important study and to that aspect in particular the following short survey is confined.

Throughout the last two centuries there have been two schools of tactical thought, in constant conflict one with the other ; namely, those who have advocated the line formation in attack and those who have advocated the column. These two schools are still in conflict to-day. The three great masters of war who influenced the military thought of many succeeding generations were Frederick the Great, The Duke of Wellington and Napoleon. Of these, Frederick and the Duke were exponents of the line theory and Napoleon a wholehearted advocate of the column.

Frederick's success as a general was due to his perfection of battle drill. This enabled him to attain a greater degree of mobility on the battlefield. He attacked in line, but his increased mobility always enabled him to attack in flank on the restricted battlefield of that day. The line tactics of Frederick were not employed in frontal attack. Modern armies cannot expect to roll up flanks in the same manner. Strategical flank attacks hold good, but tactical flanks are not so clearly defined, neither can they be menaced by tactical manoeuvre to the same degree as they could before the advent of the machine gun and smokeless powder. Now tactical flanks belong to the lighter affairs of war, advanced guard and rear guard fighting and the gaining of contact phases. In battle proper when both contending armies are

seeking decision the bulk of the attacking troops are condemned to the tactical frontal attack although the movement generally may be that of strategical flank envelopment.

The power of modern artillery had not made itself felt in Frederick's day and the Infantry arm could advance to the attack without the careful preparation which is now essential.

The Duke was the great exponent of the line school and his tactical doctrine was carried on in the British Army as a holy tradition right down to the outbreak of the Great War—a tradition which stood us in good stead in the lighter affairs of colonial warfare. The Duke's great reputation in battle was, however, gained on the defensive, and, indeed, perhaps no one has ever excelled him in the conduct of the defensive battle. He opposed the attacking French columns with the line and defeated them again and again. The column seemed powerless against the vigour of the Duke's defence—the column met by the line and counter-attacked by the line.

The Duke also used the line formations in main attack, but there are few battles in which we can study the minor tactics of the attack as employed by the Peninsular Army. At SALAMANCA the Duke was all set for the defence when his master hand set his troops in forward movement at such short notice. That battle was in reality a gigantic counter-attack. Success was due to the exploitation of the principle of surprise rather than the inherent soundness of the tactical principles employed. VITTORIA provides us with an example of an offensive, strategical as well as tactical. Here the Duke's line methods met with complete success, and furthermore carried the attack to great depth. The French defended successive features right back from the ZADORA river crossings about the heights of PEUBLA to VITTORIA itself—some seven or eight miles. One of the main arguments against the line in attack is that it cannot penetrate to sufficient depth to achieve decisive results. But we cannot pin our faith on isolated instances of success.

The Duke exploited to the full the power of musketry both in attack and defence, and this reliance on the rifle certainly demanded line formation. The Duke did not use his artillery offensively as Napoleon did, but he used it very much as close support artillery is employed to-day. To the Duke the Infantry was the Army—a condition which no longer exists.

All Napoleon's military operations are characterized by offensive action—strategical as well as tactical. He was a rigid adherent to the column school. He fought with a national army, whereas Frederick and the Duke fought with highly trained professional armies. The column was undoubtedly suited to the mass psychology of the personnel at Napoleon's disposal.

The attacking columns were preceded by skirmishers whose duty it was to provide the fire which covered the movement; the artillery having pounded and weakened the enemy by concentrations of fire on selected areas. During the twenty odd years of the Napoleonic wars the number of troops deployed as skirmishers considerably increased, and this tendency went on in the Continental armies right down to the outbreak of the Great War when the bulk of the attacking troops were deployed to form a firing line behind which the supports and reserves moved in closer formation—in small groups approximating to the column, but not in such large packets as in the Napoleonic days.

The attack formation consisted normally of the battalion moving in close column of half companies, something akin to a battalion moving forward in close column of platoons, *i.e.*, about 16 to 20 files in frontage and about 20 to 30 files in depth. Although the Duke's defensive methods seemed to beat the column every time, yet Napoleon always held that the principle of the column was correct, and that the failure of the column against the British Infantry was due to the fact that in his latter campaigns the columns were too dense. With the raw levies he called up, he and his Marshals were compelled to increase the density of the columns, and brigade columns were often resorted to. He maintained that the correct answer to a more efficient small arms fire was to have less dense columns and more of them, and also greater reliance on artillery preparation. He wished to distribute his columns in greater depth and in smaller groups and not to expand them into line.

Napoleon was an artillery general. His tactics were combined artillery and infantry tactics, and not based on the consideration of the latter arm alone. Again and again he exhorted his Marshals to make more use of their guns. "Artillery wins battles" he frequently declared. Just as the Duke's faith in the line was the natural outcome of his faith in the rifle, so was Napoleon's adherence to the column the logical outcome of his dependence on the artillery to blast a way for

the Infantry advance. As attacking Infantry have become more and more dependent upon Artillery to provide the fire which covers their movement, and as the power of the rifle in attack has waned, so, most surely, have the arguments in favour of the column become more evident.

In the century which intervened between the Napoleonic wars and 1914 those armies which had developed their attack formations from the column had been compelled to break their columns into smaller and smaller groups and also to garnish their columns with additional skirmishers. The line, too, had opened out with intervals between the files, and the supports and reserves moving in rear of the firing line had been broken up into smaller groups. In some respects the two methods of attack tended to approximate into one and the same thing, but nevertheless there was still an essential difference in principle. If the difference between the British and the German attack doctrine is to be fully appreciated, it must be clearly understood that the one was developed from the line and the other from the column.

The foremost British troops comprised a firing line charged with the duty of delivering the assault. The German firing line such as it was, had been evolved from the old skirmishing line and was in effect a protective screen behind which the assaulting troops advanced.

In their evolution of the attack however, the Germans had gone a stage further. They had realized even at the commencement of 1914 that the skirmisher could no longer provide the fire to permit movement. The fire of the skirmisher had been replaced by the fire of the Machine Gunner, while artillery concentrations were employed in the true Napoleonic style. In the British army the attacking Infantry were still expected to provide the bulk of the fire to cover their own movement, while the artillery attempted to satisfy the requirements of the infantry by placing their fire from the deductions of immediate observation.

The Germans held their troops in bigger packets, advanced straight on to their objectives without indulging in a fire fight and broke into the defences in groups and not in line. The assaulting infantry's role was movement and the rifle was scarcely used in working forward. The assaulting groups were given far more adequate protection than their own rifles could give. They were preceded, not by skirmishers but by a framework of artillery, machine gun and mortar

fire. There is a popular fallacy that the methods of attack employed by the Germans were costly in life. This was not so. Nothing could vindicate their minor tactical doctrine better than a comparative study of the casualty lists in some of the major battles of the Great War.

The figures at the outbreak of the war are not available for accurate comparison. The official history gives the following figures for the main attacks of 1915 :—

Second Battle of YPRES.

British losses. K. W. M.	.. Officers	2,150
	O. R's.	57,125
German losses. K. W. M.	.. Officers	860
	O. R's.	34,673

In this battle the Germans were attacking and the British and French were on the defensive. The French casualties, which must have been as big as our own, are not included, although the German casualty list includes the whole front involved. The Germans although employed in an unsuccessful attack were giving approximately three casualties to one received.

Loos.

British losses. Officers K. W. M.	..	2,013
	O. R's.	.. 48,367
German losses. Officers K. W. M.	..	441
	O. R's.	.. 19,395

At LOOS the British were attacking and the Germans on the defensive. These figures speak for themselves and show that the German Infantryman had a better fighting chance than the British.

The British attacks from Neuve Chapelle to the end of the Somme fighting were all " line " attacks. Old soldiers talking of these earlier battles will talk of the " first wave " the " second wave," etc., of an attack. In referring to the later attacks, Cambrai or the attacks of August 1918, they will not use such terms. There had been a marked change in our tactics after the lessons of the Somme had been absorbed. The instructions for the attack on 1st July 1916 stated that " each line of attacking troops must leave the trenches simultaneously, etc." The German official comment on the Somme fighting (also contained in the official history) states " great attacks were carried out in thick

and often irregular lines—to this must be attributed mainly the heavy losses of the British attacks, although they were certainly carried out with most conspicuous courage.” The line pervaded our whole conception of attack at this time.

As regards artillery fire, the barrage was a British development and the natural consequence of the Infantry attack formations developed from the line, whereas the Germans employed concentrations which followed the application of the column theory.

The battle of Cambrai, marked the birth of a new tactical era as far as the British Army was concerned. In the space of this short article it would be impossible to trace the various modifications and changes which have been gradually introduced and which make up the sum total of a great tactical revolution. The modern attack, “arranged in depth so as to retain power of manœuvre,” as Infantry Training explains, is nothing more than the attack arranged on the old column principle. Each successive edition of our training manuals marks a stricter adherence to the principle, but our equipment, organization and training still linger under the influence of the old line school, which is dying a very hard death. The fallacy of the line in the attack and all that pertains to it has now definitely been established. Much of the confusion in tactical thought which has occurred in these post-war years has been due to the fact that opinion has gradually veered round and few have understood the fundamental principles involved.

The role of the artillery remains much the same as heretofore. It is still the primary means of protecting the troops detailed to carry out the assault. The role of the skirmishers or Light companies has entirely disappeared and in their place we have the machine gun company and the tank. It seems likely that the machine gun company will develop into a fire support company in which mortars and anti-tank guns are also incorporated. The role of the fire support company will be the protection of the assaulting groups. If the artillery, the support company and the tanks fulfil their role, then the troops detailed for the assault will be able to proceed straight on to their objective, without the delay or hazard of being compelled to defend themselves during the approach by recourse to their rifles. The principle that the rifle companies should not open fire in attack if they can possibly continue to make ground is new to our manuals, and it is entirely contrary to the pre-1914 conception of building up a firing

line from the rear by pushing in supports and reserves, and the general conception that a fire fight must precede the assault.

The most recent edition of Section leading still divides the attack into five phases. The reconnaissance, the approach, the fire fight, the assault and the reorganization. The fire fight has no place in the column doctrine, and infantry should not be taught to look for it as a definite phase in the attack. This is an instance of the lingering influence of the old line school of tactics and it contravenes the principle that fire should not be opened with the rifle in attack if progress can be made without it. The section must advance in file and not in line. It assumes line formation only when it is compelled to defend itself. The column adherents have always attempted to guarantee the assaulting columns adequate protection from enemy fire so that they can retain their power of forward movement right on to their objectives. Umpires seldom let attacking infantry in on to positions until they have completed the fire fight phase. Infantry advancing on to their objective are invariably "blue flagged" half-way between the starting line and the foremost defended localities. If rifle fire has to be resorted to at this stage, then the covering fire has proved inadequate, and the attack definitely has failed.

The institution of the fire support company and the abolition of the Lewis gun as a platoon weapon are two immediate developments which the wholehearted application of the column theory demands. This will make for much greater speed in the attack and give it greater cohesion and impetus. The platoon commander cannot effectively control sub-units so distinct and separate in character as the Rifle section and the Lewis gun section. They must be charged with the responsibility of providing movement, while the fire to cover that movement is guaranteed from other sources.

A multiplication of instances in which the two great schools of tactical thought are in conflict cannot be entered into here. The appreciation of the fact that all that pertains to the old line theory is dead, and that the modern attack is based entirely on the column theory will give the correct answer to many of the problems concerning organization and tactical handling which are in doubt to-day. A distinct and separate relationship exists between the various arms and weapons according to the origin of the tactical doctrine applied.

THE CAPTURE OF KHAZANA GHUND. A FRONTIER EPISODE.

BY "SHIGGADAR."

It was in September 1916, after a prolonged sojourn in India, which was happily shortly to be brought to an end by the move of my regiment to Mesopotamia, that I found myself on detachment at Abazai with my company and a troop of cavalry. Abazai is, or rather was, one of the old mud forts built during the Sikh occupation of the North-West Frontier, situated on the left bank of the Swat river where it debouches from the hills of Swat. It has since been pulled down, but in days gone by my regiment kept a permanent detachment there. Across the river is Mohmand country, of which the Swat river forms the northern boundary, separating that tribe from the Utman Khel who occupy the hills and glens on the Abazai side of the river. North of, and close to, the fort lies the frontier village of Abazai and half a mile further up the river is Munda, a small Frontier Constabulary post guarding the headworks of the Lower Swat Canal and the weir, which latter in 1916 was under construction.

For some months past work on this weir had been constantly obstructed by Mohmand tribesmen, who used at intervals to occupy a hill called Khazana Ghund, which overlooks the weir from the Mohmand side of the river, and shoot up the coolies at work on the weir—just for the fun of the thing. Whenever this happened the coolies naturally bolted and the work was held up until others could be collected to take their place.

These periodical shooting matches became such a nuisance that negotiations were set on foot with a view to inducing the Mohmands to agree to handing over the ridge, of which Khazana Ghund formed the northern peak, in return for a consideration. The Mohmands, however, refused to surrender an inch of territory on their side of the border under any circumstances and announced, moreover, that if we ever set foot across their border in this vicinity they would resist with all their souls and with all their strength. To what extent the Mohmands fulfilled this typical frontier tribesman's boast, will be seen later.

At this time the Mohmands were thoroughly above themselves. They had been constantly raiding our border villages; and things

eventually got to such a pitch that Government decided to take action against them by a complete blockade of the tribe, to be effected by the construction of a barbed-wire line, with posts at intervals occupied by regular troops, right across their border from the Swat river in the north to the Kabul river in the south, a distance of about 13 miles. In conjunction with the erection of this blockade line it was decided to settle the question of the Abazai weir once and for all by occupying the Khazana Ghund ridge and by constructing on it three 'pucca' blockhouses, the northern one of which was to be on Khazana Ghund itself.

When I arrived at Abazai at the beginning of September this plan had just been decided upon and I was sent for by the Brigade Commander, whose headquarters were at Shabkadr, another fort seven miles along the Mohmand border in the direction of Peshawar, who told me that my company at Abazai would have to carry out the occupation of Khazana Ghund ridge and that it would be our job to afford protection daily for a fortnight or more to the civilian labourers who were going to build the three blockhouses.

After some discussion the Brigade Commander decided that two companies would be necessary for the job and he said he would order another company of my regiment to join me at Abazai. Meanwhile he told me to go away and think about it and to make a plan, which I was to submit to him in due course, and he warned me to keep what he had told me secret.

I rode back to Abazai that afternoon and the following morning accompanied by an Afridi Subedar, I went up to Munda post to have a look at the ground from there. We had a good look at the ridge through our glasses and as we could see no sign of life about we decided to risk it and do a reconnaissance of the ridge itself. We crossed the river by the foot-bridge over the weir, climbed up on to Khazana Ghund and thence walked along the ridge to the far end and down by a spur on to the open ground on the right bank of the river; and so back to Abazai, crossing the river again by the ferry opposite the fort. We had not stopped long in any one place, as we naturally did not want to attract attention, and this was the only occasion on which I had a chance of looking at the ground before the operation eventually came off.

I had decided to take the Afridi Subedar into my confidence, as I knew I could trust him and I also knew that he was the best man I

could have found to assist me in making a plan for this particular kind of operation. My confidence was fully justified, as events proved later, and this Afridi's experience and knowledge of Pathans and their ways were invaluable.

As the result of my reconnaissance I discovered that the Khazana Ghund ridge was about half a mile long and was separated from the main Mohmand hills by a valley 300 to 400 yards broad and thus formed a very strong and commanding position. The average height was about 350 feet and the slopes were easy and covered with loose round stones, but there were no large stones or rocks suitable for building piquets. At its northern end was Khazana Ghund, a small circular peak artificially built up and evidently of Buddhist origin, whence the ridge fell precipitously down to the Swat river below.

In thinking over a plan for affording protection for the work which was to be done it struck me as obvious that, having once established oneself on the ridge it would be asking for trouble not to stick to it permanently, as if we evacuated it each evening, as was the original intention, it would probably mean fighting a battle each day to retake it.

I estimated that for permanent occupation six platoon piquets would be necessary and I found a good site for a camp for the reserve, close to the river and easily defended at the foot of the ridge. Moreover, I decided to occupy and consolidate the ridge during the hours of darkness.

The following day I rode over to Shabkadr again to see the Brigadier and explain my plan, which he approved. He told me that the erection of the blockade line would commence the day after the taking of Khazana Ghund, which would be a separate operation, and that zero day would be in about a fortnight's time. He also said that owing to the bellicose attitude which was being adopted by the Mohmands generally he had decided to increase the size of the Khazana Ghund force by the addition of the remainder of my battalion and a section of a Mountain Battery. The additional infantry would arrive on the morning before the operation took place and the Artillery would reach Khazana Ghund from Shabkadr at daylight on the morning after the ridge was taken.

Meanwhile I was to work out details and make all the preliminary arrangements for the night operation. The Brigadier subsequently

agreed to the Machine Gun troop of an Indian Cavalry regiment with which I had always been closely associated and who were very anxious to take part in the 'stunt' being included in the force, and it was decided that they should come up on the morning following the night operation.

A day or two later the other company of my regiment, which had been previously ordered up, arrived at Abazai. The Company Commander, who was known in the regiment as Harry Fragon (or 'Fragger' for short) owing to his alleged likeness to a music-hall comedian of that name, and who was subsequently killed in Palestine, was a first class soldier and a most delightful companion and we spent many long and humorous hours together working out details. Various difficulties confronted us, the first and foremost being how to get across the river. There were two possibilities. We could either cross by the foot-bridge at Munda, which would lead us almost directly on to the hill, or we could cross by the ferry at Abazai fort.

The former had two disadvantages : firstly, that it would necessitate our moving through Abazi village immediately after leaving the fort, which would give the show away at an early stage, and secondly that should the foot-bridge be held, even by a few armed men, we should have considerable difficulty in getting on to the hill at all. We therefore ruled it out.

The ferry on the other hand was safe enough as it was well inside British territory, but it had one grave disadvantage, *viz.*, the time it would take to get the whole regiment across in a single ferry boat. We had often crossed with the regiment this way before and in daylight, it always took at least four hours, so we could not rely on crossing at night in under about six hours. This, combined with a march of a little over a mile across a stony plain and then the climb up the hill, would result in our only just reaching our piquet positions at daylight, thus leaving no time to construct the piquets before it got light.

So that was no good. Eventually after a lot of thought and discussion we decided that the best thing to do would be to establish a battalion camp on the other side of the river on the morning previous to the operation and to endeavour to bluff the local inhabitants as to our real intentions. News travels with amazing rapidity on the frontier and trans-border tribes always have their spies in frontier villages, hence the necessity for caution,

The next difficulty we had to consider was the building of the piquets without suitable rocks or stones. On the ridge the stones were all small and round, such as one finds in a river bed, and they would not do for building sangar walls; and the ground too, was too hard for digging. This seemed to us an insuperable difficulty and we racked our brains for several days on end without result. We thought of brushwood gabions, but they were too heavy to carry up, and we thought of all sorts of other things, but they were all no good. At last a brain wave—why not gabions made of rabbit wire? They would be light, very easily made up and should serve the purpose admirably. Fortunately there was plenty of rabbit wire available, supplied like everything else we wanted by those handy-men, the Irrigation Engineers, who were building the weir, so we worked out how many gabions we would want for each piquet, cut the wire into the required lengths, joined the ends by interlacing them with thin bamboos, squashed them flat and tied them up in bundles suitable for man loads. So that was that.

Next we had to consider what we were going to do about wiring. We had plenty of barbed wire but no stakes. The Irrigation Department offered us wooden stakes, but the ground was too hard for them on the hill top, so what were we to do about it? Regimental brains again set to work and this time decided on knife-rests made up of light bamboos produced out of a godown by our general provisioners, the Irrigation Engineers.

And so for several days on end our soldiers were busy within the privacy of the fort wall making up knife-rests, no less than 120 of which they manufactured and eventually carried up the hill. Thus was another difficulty surmounted.

All this time we were doing all we could to keep our intentions secret and though we cast many surreptitious glances through our field glasses at the promised land, we took good care that no one noticed us doing so. Actually the only people 'in the know' were our two selves, the Afridi Subedar, and the two Irrigation Engineers—'Biggo,' the underling, and 'Frankie', the big noise. The former was a very solemn but extremely amiable and efficient canal officer and the latter a very spirited and amusing little Irishman, who had been out with us before on a small frontier show and had received an honourable mention for his ingenuity in fixing up "Heath Robinson" flares and booby-traps around our camp. These Canal Officers, in addition to

their ordinary work, were busy making arrangements for the three blockhouses which were to be constructed under their supervision and also for the live-wire line, the erection of which they had agreed to undertake right across the Mohmand border from the Swat to the Kabul river (in front of the barbed-wire line), the current being provided from the Canal Power House which was then in existence at Abazai.

One afternoon Frankie asked us to go out and watch a demonstration of the efficacy of this live-wire line, a section of which he had erected for experimental purposes between the fort and the village, and he told us to collect all the sepoy and villagers we could get hold of to watch the show. Accordingly we all assembled at the spot to witness the execution of a miserable goat, which had been purchased as the victim for electrocution.

In due course Frankie and Biggo arrived upon the scene, followed by the goat and several babus armed with sticks and umbrellas. When all was ready and the current had been turned full on the goat was urged to advance to his doom. This he was very unwilling to do, but after a series of shooings and proddings from the assembled babus he skipped gaily forward towards the wire. We all held our breath, expecting to see a flash, a sizzle and a dead goat, but what actually happened was that the goat, after tripping when he came to the wire, pushed his way through it and came out smiling—or rather bleating—on the other side. This performance was repeated three times, more volts, amperes and what-nots being added on each occasion, but the goat survived and was apparently none the worse at the end of it.

Then we went home, looking very solemn and trying not to laugh. What the reason was for the tenacity of this particular goat I was never able to discover, but the same could not be said for the Mohmands, for when the live-wire line was afterwards erected across the border, the first two Mohmands who had the temerity to endeavour to get through it were laid out as dead as mutton. After that they gave up trying and rumour had it that Frankie and Biggo were afterwards known in Mohmand country as the 'sparking plugs'.

Meanwhile we were collecting what information we could about what the Mohmands were doing and thinking, chiefly from a Border Police havildar who was attached to us for the purpose. This havildar was always very inquisitive about the occupation of Khazana

Ghund, which he knew was in the air, and as time went on we began to get suspicious as to his reliability.

A week before the operation was due to take place, the Chief Commissioner came out to Abazai from Peshawar and insisted on our taking him to Munda to have a look at Khazana Ghund. When we got there we went on to the roof of the Frontier Constabulary post and there, in front of everyone, the Chief Commissioner gazed at the hill and discussed its occupation, fortunately in English of which in those days the man of the mountains did not understand a word.

This episode, we felt sure, would give the whole show away unless we did something about it, so, at the suggestion of the Afridi Subedar who was a great deal wiser man than either of us, we decided to practise deception of a very unmilitary character.


The Subedar had discovered that the Border Police Havildar was married to the sister of a Mohmand Malik and he said he was sure that any information the Havildar got from us was going straight to the Mohmands. He suggested therefore that if we were to make the Havildar believe that the hill was not to be occupied, the Mohmands would probably believe it too. So the Havildar was sent for and was assured by us in all solemnity that, whereas it had formerly been our intention to occupy the hill, the Chief Commissioner had decided as the result of his visit that it was too difficult and the operation had consequently been cancelled. The Havildar went away duly impressed and the Afridi Subedar gave him still further assurances in private, conveying the impression that in reality the Sahibs were frightened of the great Mohmand tribe.

A day or two after this Biggo unwittingly nearly upset the whole apple cart by dumping a large stack of bricks at the foot of Khazana Ghund on the Mohmand side of the river. Next morning Mohmand tribesmen were seen on the ridge and we thought all hope of affecting a surprise was gone for ever. However the bricks were hastily brought back, the Mohmands went away and the Havildar was assured that this was merely a mistake on the part of the Canal Officer who had not heard that the show was off! So all was well for the time being.

The transportation of all the material for the construction of the blockhouses was a difficult problem which had to be solved somehow. It meant moving the bricks from Abazai by man-propelled

ROUGH SKETCH OF RIDGE

KHAZANA GHUND.



trucks on a miniature railway up to Munda, and then carrying them by hand across the footbridge over the weir, whence they would be transported up the hill on donkeys.

One night after dinner we found Biggo involved in abtruse calculations. He worked for about an hour and then announced with a woebegone smile that he would have to carry up a million pounds of bricks and only had thirty donkeys to do it with ; moreover, that the donkey drivers were unreliable and would probably all bolt when the first shot was fired. This was such depressing news that I rode over to Shabkadr next day and managed to arrange for some Government mules and also the promise of a company of Pioneers to assist in the building of the block-houses. These Pioneers subsequently proved invaluable.

Another thing we had to think of was how to afford protection for the masons while they were working in the event of sniping.

The Canal Department again came to the rescue and produced some large iron sheets, which we eventually erected with some difficulty on the piquet walls, but which, as things turned out, were not actually required.

We had great difficulty in raising any bombs ; although the Great War had been going for over two years, these everyday weapons of offence had not yet penetrated into India. However by making friends with a kindly Sapper subaltern at Shabkadr we managed to secure a small number of jam-tin bombs of local manufacture and also a few flares.

Zero day was now approaching and we had worked out all details about stores, carrying parties, etc., for each piquet and had drafted orders for the night operation. We had discussed various ways of advancing up the hill, as there were three distinct spurs which were possible routes, and we finally decided—and I think wisely—to use only one route, the spur furthest from the river and to drop piquets as we went along. This would take longer than a simultaneous advance up different spurs but it would eliminate all chance of a battle-fight in the darkness between separate parties of our own men. I made a rough sketch map of the ridge on which I marked the positions where I thought piquets should be located and a copy of this map was subsequently given to each British officer. The day before Zero I gave out that orders had been received for the regiment to

march to Shabkadr in two days time, complete with all the knife-rests which were required by the Brigade Commander, and that afternoon I established a camp on the other bank of the river and close to the ferry and moved most of the stores over to it.

On the following morning the rest of the regiment marched in and it took most of the day getting the men and the remainder of the stores and knife-rests across the river on the ferryboat.

We explained the whole scheme to the C. O. and other British Officers and two hours before sunset the Indian officers and men, who up to that moment were under the impression that we were marching to Shabkadr next day, were told what they had got to do.

Company Commanders had a very busy time detailing men for protective duties, working parties and carrying parties and they were still at it when darkness set in. A small guard was to remain at our temporary camp, which was to be moved to the foot of the ridge next morning.

The secret of the operation about which we were about to embark had been well kept and our Border Police Havildar had been so thoroughly bamboozled that he was quite convinced that we were off to Shabkadr next day. We heard afterwards that when some time that night he was told by a villager that the regiment was going up Khazana Ghund, he betted his informant a rupee that it wasn't true! Nevertheless we had no idea whether we should meet with opposition or not during our night advance.

At 8 p.m., the battalion fell in and started the march to the foot of the ridge, a long and straggling column in which every man seemed to be carrying something, for 240 men were required for the knife-rests alone and there were plenty of other stores to take up in addition. The night was very dark, there was no path and the ground was rough and stony, which caused much tribulation to the knife-rest carriers who were stumbling and falling all over the place. Fortunately the night operation prohibited all speech, otherwise the air would surely have been scorched by the curses of these unfortunates.

We had a short halt at the foot of the ridge to enable the Afridi Subedar, who was leading the column, to find the best route up; then we slowly and cautiously climbed the ridge, expecting each moment a volley from above. As we climbed we heard a noise like

thunder across the river, which proclaimed that Frankie and Biggo were busy pushing their bricks up the railway line to Munda. This frightful commotion we thought would surely awaken the whole Mohmand tribe, but nothing happened and we reached the summit of the ridge without opposition and hurried along the top dropping piquets as we went.

As each piquet got into place, it put out its covering party and building operations started, the men working like beavers.

The rabbit wire gabions proved an immense success and we soon had a solid breastwork of them round each piquet, on top of which we put sandbags filled with rubble for there was no earth available. As soon as the walls were complete, the knife-rests were put in position round them and securely wired together, and before morning we had six quite good piquets built and wired and were ready to take on all comers. But what of the Mohmands ?

Needless to say we anxiously awaited the dawn, to see what we should see, but when daylight came we saw nothing—not a sign of a Mohmand anywhere !

I was with the piquet on Khazana Ghund and with the dawn came Frankie with his babu and the masons who were going to build the block-house there. Frankie marked out the trace in no time and his men started off at once digging the foundations. They were extraordinarily quick off the mark and by that evening the walls of the block-house, which was inside my piquet, were three feet high. These building operations caused us a good deal of discomfort and every evening when the work was over for the day we had to clear up the mess before we could find room to lie down. That morning we had a succession of visitors, including the Chief Commissioner, and one of the first arrivals was our old friend the Border Police Havildar, who met me with a sickly smile and said “Sahib, you *have* done the dirty ; I would have expected this from a Politician, but not from a soldier.”

Poor man, he had been properly ‘had’ and it is my everlasting regret that I never heard what his wife said to him when he got home.

Amongst various celebrities who visited Khazana Ghund was a Secretary in the Government of India, who caused much merriment by enquiring whether we had made use of hurricane ‘Butties’ to light our way up in the dark.

The following day the Staff sent us up an immense search light, complete with a British sergeant in charge. This was placed with much ceremony in Fragger's piquet which was next to mine. Fragger didn't like the look of it much and the sergeant was obviously frightened of it, and when that night it let off a resounding explosion and nearly blew the two of them over the piquet wall, they hated the contraption even more.

Meanwhile the work on the blockhouses progressed rapidly and the Mohmands, so we heard, were running about Mohmand country trying to raise a lashkar. Nothing happened during the first two days and not a sign of a Mohmand was to be seen, but on the afternoon of the third day figures began to appear on the hill tops and a few snipers started to fire in our direction.

They found it very difficult to get nearer than about 800 yards however, for to do so meant exposing themselves on the forward slopes of the hills opposite us and those who were bold enough to try it were met with such a blast of rifle, machine gun and, sometimes, mountain gun fire that they soon scuttled back under cover. They tried this sniping spasmodically for the next day or two and then chucked it, evidently realising that our position, which we were rapidly strengthening with more barbed-wire, was impregnable.


And so the days went by and in just over three weeks the blockhouses were complete and ready for occupation and we left the ridge for good. During this time our total casualties were one sepoy hit in the leg and one Canal babu, who was sitting on a block-house wall singing a lullaby and thinking of the girl he'd left behind him, wounded slightly in the hind quarters. He was a proud man afterwards, was that babu, and many were the yarns I expect he told when he got back to his village of fierce fighting on the Mohmand border.

Thus ended a battle without bullets, a very pleasant episode with quite enough excitement to make it interesting and none of the danger and bloodiness of real war, the happiest recollection of which will always be, to those who took part in it, the ever ready co-operation of our friends in the Irrigation Department.

Old Abazai fort is now no more and the Power House and live-wire have long since been removed ; all that now remains to remind one of this frontier episode are the three block-houses sticking up on Khazana Ghund ridge, trying to look as if they had always been there.

But in Abazai village, if you ask for the headman's house, you will find sitting under a tree in the courtyard a fat little old gentleman with twinkly eyes and an immense loyalty to Government, who will always remember, and often talks of, the four mad sahibs—two soldiers and two civilians—who conspired to erect more bricks and mortar upon the 'bloody border'.

SKETCH SHEWING ADVANCE TO KHAZANA GHUND.



A FIRST DAY'S PIG-STICKING.

BY "NEW HAND".

It was April. I happened to be paying a little visit *en passant* through Central India. We were recuperating in the Mess one evening when the leader of the local Tent Club came in and said there was a meet on the Sunday and what about it.

I must admit here and now, that this struck me as a leading question. What with the old grey hair, the baby farm at home and I being dismounted branch, etc., my first inclination definitely was to cry off, especially as all the company had a decidedly professional and horsy look about them. However, it did seem a marvellous opportunity and so I hesitatingly accepted.

An excuse that I had no horses cut no ice at all, the leader of the Tent Club offering to mount me at once. In the light of what came after, this was a truly noble action on his part, for people don't usually offer their best pig-stickers to unknown strangers to ride over ghastly country, with a large risk of losing them lame for the rest of the season.

Thus committed, the next step was to take aside the Leader, as I shall call him for short, and confess the whole situation—that I knew absolutely nothing about pig-sticking, had never even seen a pig, and so on. His nobility was merely accentuated thereby. He told me all about "heats" and pig-sticking tactics and which end of the spear to hold and many other things. I had some grand practice sitting on a chair and spearing oranges. I rather wondered at the time what you did if the chair swerved or bucked but by this time had become so enthusiastic that little things like that couldn't put me off.

So bright and early on the Sunday we set off, a party of nine. A storm overnight had taken some of the bone out of the ground and left the air cool. We drove out about 12 miles and coursed a sambhur doe and her bachha for about a mile on the way, for she wanted to cross our road to her jungle and couldn't quite beat our lorry. A pretty sight they were.

Arrived at the meet, I was introduced to my transport for the rest of the day, a spirited looking animal, which I must confess let me mount quite nicely with the aid of two syces. The spear I thought

rather got in the way. However, there we were and we jogged on a mile or more to the rendezvous with the beaters, near a little village.

Here a fine old man, whom I was told had run the beats for upwards of half a century, conferred with the Leader as to the days plans. There were to be three beats, two before lunch and one after. The first two were scrubby hills, the third a wide patch of jungle. The way in which the old man distributed his orders to 60 odd beaters would have been a lesson to Staff College candidates.

We then moved off to our first positions. We were divided into three heats of three spears each. The Leader kindly took me, with one B———as our third. We were trotting past a patch of scrub and discussing world politics when a most ridable boar (they told me afterwards that it was (a) boar and (b) "ridable"—all I could see was a pig!) darted out of the scrub. The Leader and B———appeared to me to become suddenly mental—I learnt subsequently a sure sign of a true pig-sticker—at any rate off they went at what seemed to my eyes a lunatic pace over bushes and rocks after this pig. I did a brave best to follow:—"George", I said to myself at this point, "I wonder if this really is your metier!" The pig made first towards the hill which the beaters were about to drive. B——dived into a sunken pit and nearly crashed. The Leader, however, got near the pig and got him with what they said was a poor stroke, a surface prick in the hindquarters—but then, horror of horrors—the pig swung right handed, towards the village, and joined a herd of tame ones! The Leader was rather shaken. Not until lunch time, when the owner wanted backsheesh for his dear pet, raised so carefully from infancy, would our Leader admit that it had all been a mistake. Bad luck on him really, as I couldn't see how anyone could tell.

However, all this was only a curtain raiser. We rode on to lie up at the far end of the first hill, the three heats ready to ride any pig that might break across the fields to the hills beyond. The sight of fields filled me with hope. Even I could ride over fields.

We sat down and waited, each heat supplied with a man up a tree as scout. We sat I suppose for 30 minutes while the beat drew closer. Deer of various types darted along. Last year this beat produced two panther so a gun went with the beaters but this year all he shot was a peacock and some hares. Presently an excited "Sahib, Sahib" from the tree caused us to spring to our horses, only to see a largish pig break in the sector allotted to the heat on our right. We

had a fine view, however. Capt. A—galloped his line leisurely for a mile or so and then closed to spear. The pig, wounded, charged his pony and carried its forelegs, bringing rider and all nicely to ground. The supporting spears, however, soon killed and the heat came back to position. It was pretty exciting to watch.

Meanwhile, while we were sitting, suddenly two pigs came out on our near left and peered about. Like an idiot, I moved my hand. That was quite enough and back they darted again while I got a round curse from the Leader. However, presently they came again, but by this time it had been agreed they were just too small to ride and we let them by.

The beat produced no more, and neither did the next and we rode back to lunch definitely disappointed. When after lunch in the main beat we also viewed only a few small fry, it seemed a poor day. However, about 3 p.m. beaters and heats formed one long line to walk a rocky scrubby ridge back to the lorry. We had done this for some time when suddenly there was a great shout from somewhere and a tidy boar came rushing back through the line right through our heat. In about two seconds the whole scene was transformed. A couple of spears from other heats joined in and off we went on the craziest ride I have ever conceived possible.

The odd bit of hunting at home and in Ireland seemed child's play compared to it. There wasn't literally a yard of decent going, rocks, scrub, nullahs and trees alternating. My gallant horse, seeing the pig, went stark staring mad took charge and carted us willy nilly with astonishing success. The Leader lost a curb chain and control and soon hit a tree and missed the hunt, luckless man. It was B—, on a new young horse that filled me with admiration. He stuck to his pig in that thick stuff in a way I could never have believed possible. Personally, after preventing one jink, I found myself riding too wide and presently lost the hunt. When we joined up at the end of the day I heard B—caught his pig and speared so well as to go right through into the ground where the spear broke. The pig then charged him and his young horse jumped the pig so suddenly as to unseat B—fortunately another spear arrived just in time.

Meanwhile, searching about now quite alone I caught sight of a long sounder, ambling off in the distance. Catching them up gradually, the leaders seemed well over minimum size and off we went as fast as my excitable mount could go.

For a couple of miles we went over terribly rough stuff, sometimes gaining, sometimes losing. The trees were the chief trouble with low hanging boughs. It was clear what an advantage the pig has in bad going. Finally reaching impassable jungle, it was useless to pursue and we had to give up. Horse and I made our way slowly back.

On getting back, I found another heat had also met this sounder and cut out a leading boar and accounted for him. So after all, we returned very contented, with a bag of three—good for those parts—and oh; what a marvellous thirst!

I rather felt I had hardly done my share of the day's work. However I hadn't fallen off and, obviously this sport required as much experience as any other, particularly over that going.

At least I returned very grateful to the Leader, infected with the germ of madness, and determined that my next move in India will be to a pig-sticking station, cost it what it may! The amazing thing about the whole day was that none of the horses came back lamed.

THE ORGANISATION OF SECOND AND THIRD LINE TRANSPORT IN INDIA.

BY CAPT. A. H. J. SNELLING, I.A.S.C.

A study of the Home organisation of second and third line transport does not present much difficulty. On turning, however, to the Indian establishments one finds very little in the various manuals that give a clear picture of the system in this country. It is therefore proposed in this article to review briefly the existing Indian organisation and then to compare it with that at Home with a view to ascertaining to what extent the latter would, or would not, meet conditions in India.

As a change over to the Home system has recently been foreshadowed in a certain training report* it is considered that it may be of advantage to officers to know some few of the considerations involved.

Provision on Mobilisation.

Before the question can be considered in detail the provision of both vehicles and men on mobilisation must be discussed. While this problem does exist at Home it is very small when compared with the difficulties in India. In the United Kingdom there are many lorries on the roads that are suitable for military work and these could be impressed in an emergency. Again the factories that manufacture these vehicles exist in peace and could, within a short time, begin delivery of suitable lorries on war being declared. These factories could also deal with any heavy repairs thereby dispensing with the need for maintaining expensive military repair shops in peace. There are also a vast number of garages, large and small, which could turn out a considerable number of fitters and technical workmen should the army require them. Many firms have their fleets of lorries, all efficiently maintained, which could be reduced in a national emergency and drivers so liberated would be available for the Service even if the lorries were not of the required type. In England many men have a smattering of mechanical knowledge and these could, with a little training, be turned rapidly into efficient drivers or, in some cases, mechanics.

* A. H. Q. India Training Memorandum No. 4 of 1932.

In India the situation is very different. Except perhaps those with the larger firms in cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi, the ordinary civil lorry receives short shrift at the hands of its driver and very few would be fit to impress for army use. One or two motor firms have now erected assembly shops in this country but their out-turn is very small compared with the requirements of an army and even these shops have to import most of the "parts" of the vehicles. The ordinary Indian garage mechanics are quite unfit for absorption in the Service without a long period of training. Most drivers are also inefficient, have no ideas of maintenance and are imbued with the idea that, being made of metal, the vehicle just goes on for ever provided petrol is poured into the tank. India can thus rely on very few lorries, mechanics or drivers being available immediately on mobilisation.

From these two different situations it is clear that, while at Home the peace organisation can be small and capable of rapid expansion, India must maintain, at considerable cost, nearly all her mobilisation requirements in peace. As a natural corollary it follows that India cannot possibly visualise or afford the lavish Home war establishments. In the British Isles all mechanical transport units are on a cadre basis or are to be raised on mobilisation but there is every likelihood that these establishments could be raised, and raised rapidly, when required. In India, whilst a certain amount of "watering down" of existing units by insufficiently trained personnel might be allowed for, expansion on any considerable scale, either in men or vehicles, is out of the question for a long period. Thus it must be borne in mind that the organisation of M. T. in India is governed by the fact that what she can afford in peace time is all that she will get in the early stages of a war and the problem is how best this quantity can be organised to meet situations which may face the Army in India.

The Indian System.

The second line transport allotted to various units is shewn under the headings of "baggage and stores," "supplies" and "tents" in the establishment of each unit. In the Division itself the transport is shewn as being supplied by two M. T. companies. The organisation of these two companies, as now appears in establishments, has recently been altered and is now the equivalent of twelve sections of 30-cwt. light lorries, organised in two companies, each section comprising 25 working lorries and 5 spares. This transport will usually consist of

eight 30-cwt. sections and two 3-ton sections but it might be any other proportion as could be made available. At present no third line transport is permanently organised to serve the Division. At Home such transport is provided by the Maintenance Company.

It may thus be said that there are in India at present no definitely organised transport units allotted to serve a Division. The system is for all second and third line transport to be allotted from a "pool" of all the M. T. available. The allotment and organisation is based on the standard section of 25 working lorries. These sections are either 30-cwt. or 3-ton lorries, the composite section having been abolished under the recent reorganisation.

Mobile Warfare.

Generally speaking the Indian system has been organised to ensure the most economical employment of the M. T. available. While none is permanently allotted to a formation it can be made available in the required numbers when necessary. The most obvious objection to this method is that, were an Indian Division required to go overseas for mobile warfare, it would be necessary to organise second and third line transport units on the Home or some such system. Military history shews that sudden extemporisation of this type nearly always leads to failure. The protagonist of the Home system can, quite rightly, point out that a "pool" is very easily formed by withdrawing Divisional and Corps transport units when the formations concerned are within a short distance of railhead. It is the work of transport units within the Division that requires training and specialised knowledge. Provided the transport has this training pool work, such as the carriage of road metal or the transfer of stores from a dock area to a base depot, is a simple matter. On the other hand units which are only trained for pool work will have considerable difficulty in carrying out duties, especially ammunition supply, within the Division.

There thus seems little doubt that the Home system is undoubtedly preferable to the "pool" in mobile operations.

Major Frontier Warfare Operations.

Few will disagree that the primary task which the Army in India has to face is operations on the Frontier. It is, therefore, now proposed to examine the two systems in the light of this problem.

For various reasons, which it is unnecessary to discuss here, major operations on the Frontier will not consist of a rapid advance to

any great depth. It is probable that a Division, or part of one, may advance some thirty miles in, say, three days. On completion of this distance the force will halt. Supplies and stores will then be brought up, dumps and reserves formed for a further movement, L. of C. marching posts built and stocked, roads constructed and reinforced and perhaps even a railway laid. The advancing force will thus be immobilised for some considerable period. It will have no need for a Baggage company and, possibly being in the same perimeter camp as the advanced supply depot, a Supply company will be superfluous. While it is a principle in mobile warfare that the second and third line ammunition must nearly always be "on wheels" such a necessity cannot arise in this situation. It will be possible to give warning several days before the force is to move on again and thus there is no objection to the ammunition being dumped within easy reach of the troops. The Ammunition company can thus also be liberated.

There thus appears little doubt that all second line transport can be withdrawn and utilised to assist the third line transport in convoy work. As units will be drawing supplies from a depot where stocks exist, as opposed to drawing through the normal S. R. P. where no stocks are maintained, the Maintenance company might not load with the specific stores required for the Division for one day. It is more likely to carry any commodities required to stock advanced depots. Thus the normal *raison d'être* of even this unit has ceased to exist. Here it should be noted that it may be some time before "as required" stocking of supplies can be resorted to. If it is allowed to begin too early and the L. of C. is cut, then the advanced depot may find itself with large quantities of bhoosa and none, perhaps, of flour. It is thus open to argument whether it will ever be possible to do other than send up so many days' complete rations by each delivery.

When, as above, convoy work only is required, it is suggested that it would be much simpler to have standard sections than to have three (Divisional)* companies of different load capacities, different types of vehicles and varying organisations with which to deal. This must be admitted, as also the fact that the organisation, with its three unit headquarters and consequently high overhead charges, is an expensive method when only convoy running is required. The organisation difficulty, while it may give extra work to the L. of C. authorities, can hardly be said to be a valid excuse for extemporisation as opposed to

* The Maintenance Company, being a Corps unit, is not part of a Division and though normally serving one Division, has not been included here.

organisation within the Division. Any extra expense during a stationary period is likely to be more than set off by the additional efficiency and liaison within the Division when it moves forward again. War is expensive in any case and possibly Mesopotamia has proved to India the danger of excessive parsimony. Even if the three company organisation be expensive for some given period, this should not be allowed to outweigh other considerations.

The conclusion, therefore, as regards this type of warfare is that, while the present "pool" system may be cheaper and easier to work during, perhaps, a considerable period of the operations, yet the Home system can carry out such work without difficulty. On the other hand, under the existing system, when the Division moves forward extemporisation of second line transport units from the "pool" of standard sections will be necessary. Thus, in the circumstances discussed, it would seem preferable to adopt the Home system.

Minor Frontier Operations.

It often happens that operations necessitating the employment of a smaller force than a Division have to be undertaken.

One of the chief reasons for the adoption of the existing system at Home was the realisation that supply, baggage and ammunition lorries would have entirely different functions to perform and that, on any given night, they would be scattered throughout the Divisional area. Thus baggage lorries might be with Brigades, supply lorries near S. R. P., while the ammunition lorries, some at F. A. P., might be anywhere where cover and accommodation permitted. Such a situation could not arise in the circumstances now to be considered as all lorries, except possibly supply vehicles, would have to be inside the perimeter camp with the Brigade. From this point of view there is thus no objection to the employment of a single company.

To discuss minor frontier operations, it is proposed to consider a mixed Brigade with the usual ancillary arms and services. Its actual composition need not be detailed here but it may be concluded that it requires M. T. as follows :—

	<i>Baggage. Supplies.</i>		<i>Ammn. Total.</i>	
For the Inf. Bde.	..	25 10	8	43
For attd. Div. Tps.	..	19 16	16	51
Total 30-cwt. light lorries				94

Under the "pool" system there is little difficulty. One company of four sections (100 working lorries) could be allotted complete. This would be a single self-contained unit with its workshop and headquarters.

With the Home organisation the situation from a transport point of view is much more complicated. Detachments from all three companies are involved and the lorries will be drawn from different sections of those three companies. No headquarters is available. Presumably the commander of one of the Brigade sections (supply or baggage) will command but he has no adequate staff. Again the detachments from the Divisional Troops sections will have to be attached to the corresponding Brigade sections. Some workshop organisation will have to be extemporised or detached from the headquarters of one of the companies. Actually this is not a great difficulty as companies can detach workshop units of one workshop lorry and suitable personnel up to maximum of four each.

Thus, where a mixed Brigade is concerned, the Home system would require to be broken up to some extent and extemporisation of headquarters, cooking arrangements, etc., would be necessary. The Indian standard section organisation would, however, meet the situation adequately and efficiently.

Transfer of Units between and within Divisions.

Under the Home organisation the attachment of Divisional Troops to a certain Brigade for a particular operation provides no transport difficulties. The Divisional order would state what such units are to be and supplies, etc., for them would be automatically diverted to the S. R. P. of that Brigade. Corps Troops attached to a Division would similarly be diverted from the Corps Transport Column to the Division concerned. Similarly if a Brigade of one Division was temporarily attached to another Division, the supply and baggage lorries would deliver automatically in the area of the augmented Division. In this last case the supply lorries for that Brigade in the supply section of the Maintenance company would be temporarily attached to the Maintenance company of the larger Division.

With the Indian "pool" system the matter is not so simple. The number and detail of lorries would have to be worked out each time by the C. I. A. S. C. and the two M. T. companies of the Division, or each of the Divisions, informed of all alterations to be made.

Lorries would have to be detached individually instead of one complete Brigade section being detailed. If third line were involved the H. Q. Army (Corps at Home) would also have to calculate and give detailed orders for the diversion of the necessary number of lorries from the M. T. companies carrying out such duties. Such calculations would inevitably cause delay and confusion and the Indian system cannot be said to be efficient in such circumstances.

Ammunition.

At present no fixed organisation exists in India for the delivery of ammunition beyond railhead. While it may be admitted, not without some reservations, that Supply and Baggage companies could be improvised, this is hardly so with ammunition. This commodity requires expert handling and a fairly complete knowledge of all the widely differing types of shell, their different fillings, the various kinds of fuzes and how all are packed and marked. The Home Ammunition company has attached to it 3 Officers and 27 Other Ranks of the R. A. and it might appear that these are for sorting duties. But further investigation will disclose that these are "located at the F. A. P." and that 21 of the Other Ranks, on motor cycles, are normally located with Artillery Brigade H. Qs., etc. For superintending the loading at A. R. P. there is one R. A. S. C. (not R. A.) Officer. Perhaps Ordnance personnel might be allotted to assist in this work. But even then they could not do everything, and it is doubtful if they and the I. A. S. C. Officer could do all the sorting and superintending in detail which is required. It thus seems essential that N. C. Os. and even Drivers of the Ammunition company should know something of the different types and packings of all ammunition in common use if loading is to be done expeditiously and efficiently. Inefficiency in loading may result in delay, or even worse, if shell of an incorrect filling is delivered at the gun. It is not generally realised that there are four different "packings" for S. A. A. excluding the "special for R. A. F." Again there are seven different types of shell for the 18 pdr. gun. These are all fused and special precautions are necessary with certain types of fuze. A further complication is the necessity, where possible, of delivering to any one Battery shells of the same "batch" of manufacture of the type required in order to produce level shooting. In addition there are the various shells, charges and fuzes of 4.5" and 3.7" hows. as well as the different explosives and pyrotechnics used in the Division,

There thus seems little doubt that the personnel charged with the carriage and delivery of ammunition should have at least a working knowledge of the different types with their "packings" and markings. The fact that no organised carrying unit exists as such in published establishments at the moment is a little disquieting. Possibly the fact that the "endless chain" system is under investigation at Home makes the authorities out here reluctant to introduce the Ammunition company in its present form with the possibility of a further reorganisation in the near future. However some form of Ammunition company appears essential. If the R. A. S. C. unit is adopted it would appear reasonable to introduce the Home second, and perhaps third, line organisation *in toto*.

As regards the actual carrying capacity of the Ammunition company in India. Recently the number of rounds to be carried in advance of railhead has been much reduced.

At railhead and at advanced base the number has been correspondingly increased. This presumably is due to the fact that the large quantity of rounds considered necessary to be at immediate call in ordinary mobile warfare would never be required on the Frontier. It is therefore suggested that the carrying capacity of an Indian Ammunition company need only be roughly 50 per cent. of the carrying capacity of the Home company. Should a Division be called upon to go overseas then the existing company could easily be diluted with the remaining 50 per cent. vehicles and that this would not adversely affect the efficiency of the whole unit.

Peace Training.

It is suggested that the peace training of M. T. in India is almost entirely neglected, except for its technical duties. For financial reasons all available M. T. is employed on "Carter, Patterson" work in the large cantonments. The fact that this absence of war training is tacitly approved of may possibly be due to the fact that the M. T. units themselves have no defined end to which to direct such training. If the Home system were introduced then every M. T. company would have its war duties automatically defined. A certain company would know that it was the Supply company of the 1st Division and it could train for its specific war duties. The Divisional Commander in peace would know that this unit was just as much a part of his war Division as was his Infantry. The probability is that he would then demand that the unit be given the time and opportunity for training. The

efficiency of such companies would be bound to improve once they felt that they formed part of a definite formation and were under a Commander who insisted on a high standard of training and who saw that time "off the road" was allotted for such work. Naturally, if I. A. S. C. training were brought under the D. M. T., as is the case with the R. A. S. C., the situation would be even better. The necessity for such training is especially conspicuous in the Divisional Ammunition Company which cannot be expected to function efficiently in war, as already explained, without a thorough peace training.

Whether it will be decided to include in the company the R. A. personnel as allotted to the Home unit is a matter for discussion. But, if they are to be so attached, then it is suggested that such personnel should do some training with the Ammunition company in peace. This would enable the R. A. and I. A. S. C. to understand each other's difficulties. As a result impossible demands on the carrying service would not be made and the I. A. S. C. would understand the difficulties, delays and dangers that might result from incorrect loading. As things are at present the Gunner must view the ammunition situation with some alarm. The introduction of an Ammunition company would go some way to allay this but would still not settle the question as to whether the company should be an R. A. or an I. A. S. C. unit to the satisfaction of the Gunner. But the attachment of R. A. Officers and men in peace time would go much further and would be bound to result in considerably increased confidence between the "user" and the carrying service.

General Conclusions and Provision.

There thus seems little doubt that some system on the lines of the Home second and third line transport is necessary in India. Only in minor Frontier operations does the Indian system appear the better and, as the whole force is likely to be an extemporisation, there would be little disadvantage in temporarily changing the M. T. organisation to meet the special situation. Owing to financial stringency it is manifestly out of the question to consider the provision of more lorries, even if it was considered otherwise advisable. It is therefore proposed to examine very roughly how far the vehicles now in the Service would go if the suggested organisation were adopted. As a basis of calculation only load carrying lorries are being considered, workshop and technical vehicles being excluded. Except in the Ammunition Company it is assumed that the loads to be carried are similar to those at

Home as far as weight goes. This would not be quite the case but, for purposes of comparison, it is not an unfair basis.

In every section of 30 lorries in India, 25 are working vehicles and 5 are spare. The percentage of spares to working lorries is thus 20 per cent. As most replacement lorries in this country have to be imported, it is necessary to maintain a higher percentage of spares than is required at Home. But, under the recent reorganisation, the Vehicle Reserve Depot is now definitely established. It holds as a reserve for I. A. S. C. units and as a general reserve some 99 medium 3-tonners and 200 odd light 30-cwt. lorries, all load carriers. In view of this it is suggested that a 10 per cent. reserve with units is sufficient during the present financial emergency and that we cannot afford more. When money is available the matter could be reconsidered. Thus, in considering what units could be formed, only 10 per cent. spare lorries, as at Home, have been allowed for.

There are now in India 11 M. T. carrying companies of different load capacities. These contain 11 headquarters, 960 30-cwt. lorries and 360 medium 3-tonners. A Baggage company and a Supply company require 109 and 134 light 30-cwt. lorries, respectively. An Ammunition company requires, as stated above, about 50 medium 3-ton lorries. A Maintenance company needs, on a reduced ammunition lift, some 121 medium 3-ton lorries. It would thus be possible to supply second line transport to either four Divisions or three Divisions and Army Troops (Corps Troops at Home), or any other suitable combination. In addition two Maintenance companies on a cadre scale with 70 medium 3-ton lorries each would be available. These figures give only a rough indication of actual requirements but they do shew that the introduction of the Home system is at least feasible and that, at the very worst, the first two or three Divisions can be completed while M. T. for the rest could be arranged on a cadre basis.

There is one serious objection to the above proposed distribution of the available lorry power. Some 80 per cent. of the available lorries have been allotted to second line transport and only about 20 per cent. to third line, thus making the organisation appear very top heavy. As has already been explained major Frontier operations entail a series of bounds and it is not possible for a force to move forward on its second bound until adequate stocks have been laid in at the post which marks the limit of the first bound. Thus, while the force is halted the greater part of its second line mechanical transport vehicles

can be withdrawn and employed as third line. Under these conditions of warfare in the early stages the force is unlikely to proceed beyond the radius of one echelon of transport (25 miles) from its railhead or advanced supply depot. When so withdrawn the second line will merely be required for convoy work which, it is suggested, requires little or no special training. At the same time, when supplies have been built up and the force is ready to move forward again, the specifically trained second line transport can be released for its proper specialist duties. Once again it is emphasised that trained second line transport can easily perform third line work whereas the converse is not the case.

As regards the other situations that have been discussed, that is to say minor Frontier operations or a force proceeding overseas. It is unlikely that more than one Division, if as much, would be employed on the former or, at the outset, more than two on the latter. Then the two cadre Maintenance companies would probably suffice but, if more third line was required, then the second line could be withdrawn from the 3rd and 4th Divisions and formed into Maintenance companies for the other two, the original Ammunition companies forming the Ammunition sections of the Maintenance companies. Admittedly this is extemporisation but it is a case of specially trained companies carrying out simpler duties than those for which they have been trained and not *vice-versa* as is visualised in the present "pool" system.

Again there may be a few lorries and trained drivers available from civil resources. As less training is required for convoy work than for second line duties these drivers could be formed into Maintenance companies and would then be ready for work much earlier than they would be if it were necessary to train them for second line duties.

It is therefore considered that the proposed organisation does possess sufficient "fluidity" to meet any situation that may arise while its efficiency, as compared with the existing system, is likely to be much greater.

The above does not take into consideration the somewhat lavish scale of technical personnel and drivers that are allowed for in existing Home establishments for reasons that have been given earlier in the article. Further economy is foreshadowed and some may fall on the M. T. If further cuts are necessary, a modification of the cadre system as exists at Home is at least likely to be considered in India.

With impressed or subsidised (if any) lorries the need for unit organisation for second line work is even more apparent than with a fully maintained company. Thus the necessity for economy itself seems to call for a Divisional M. T. organisation analogous to that which serves a British Division.

“ THE LION OF THE PUNJAB.”

Some extracts from the diary of Captain Lowe, of the 16th (Queen's) Lancers, describing the meeting between Lord Auckland, Governor-General, and Maharaja Runjeet Singh, at Ferozepore, November 1838.

—BY “ZARIF.”

* * * * *

The extremely interesting article, “An Historic Durbar,” by Colonel E. B. MAUNSELL in the April 1932 number of this Journal, has inspired the writer to present for comparison an account of the meeting between Lord Auckland, Governor-General, and Maharaja Runjeet Singh, at Ferozepore, in November, 1838. Extracts are taken from “The Diary of an Officer,” which was printed by Messrs. Thacker Spink & Co. of Calcutta, in 1894, ‘for private circulation only;’ a copy of which came into the hands of the writer as a present from an Indian friend, some years ago. The author of the diary is a Captain Lowe of the 16th (Queen's) Lancers, and the period which he covers in this one volume ranges from June the 16th, 1822, to June 16th, 1840.

The meeting referred to in this instance was on the occasion of the passing through the Maharaja's territory of the British Force, whose actions in Afghanistan culminated in the occupation of Kandahar on April 26th, 1839.

The majority of the names mentioned in this diary are blank, merely an initial being given; but the present writer has been able to fill in a number of these names where he has reason to believe them to be correct, and those names appear in full in the text given below; otherwise the text is unchanged, and given in full, save for the omission of a few irrelevant passages.

CAPTAIN LOWE'S DIARY.

November 28th, 1837.

Joined my Regiment (from leave) at Meerut, and shall now count the days till I obtain my leave to return to England.

1838. During the months of May and June rumours were afloat of the probability of a war with the Afghans, and of its being

the intention of our Government to depose Dost Mohamed from the throne of Cabul, and to re-establish the sovereignty of Shah Sujah, the rightful ruler, who has long been a pensioner of our Government, and who was for his misdeeds kicked out of Afghanistan by Dost Mohamed. It is also said the views of our Government extend to Herat, which we are to recapture, should it fall into the hands of the Persians, who, now aided by Russia, are besieging it.

In July it was supposed these extensive views had been abandoned, and I applied for leave of absence to England.

My leave was, however, refused with the intimation that the Commander-in-Chief thought it probable that I should not wish just now to be absent from my Regiment. So that we are to be employed on service seems certain, and I gladly abandon all thoughts of immediate return to England.

October 30th, 1838.

The probability of a campaign beyond our North-West Frontier had been for some months the general topic of conversation, but till the beginning of August it was not decidedly known, our Government had determined to march an army down the left bank of the Indus, while a force from Bombay would march up the right bank and meet us at Shikarpur.

After the free navigation of the Indus has been established, the united forces proceed through Kandahar to Cabul, depose Dost Mohamed from the Throne of Cabul and reinstate Shah Sujah.

It is supposed all this will be effected by the summer of 1839, and the force is to pass the hot weather in Guzni or some Highlands of Afghanistan. We are then to proceed to Herat (at a rough guess I suppose 2,000 miles from our territories) now besieged by the Persians, aided by Russia, and recapture the Fort for Kam Raan should it have fallen.

Kam Raan is, I believe, first cousin to our protégé Shah Sujah.

Such is the programme of our campaign, and in good truth if we accomplish all this we must not remain idle.

It will be well to take view of the characters of Dost Mohamed, who we style a usurper, and Shah Sujah, who, after thirty years consideration, our Government discover to have been an extremely ill-used potentate,

Sir A. B. ——— and all European travellers who have visited his court speak of Dost Mohamed as a fine soldier of high character, governing his country mildly and beneficially for all classes, and well-disposed towards our Government.

One of the best actions of his life, undoubtedly, was kicking Shah Sujah for his many misdeeds out of Afghanistan.

Our protégé Shah Sujah is, we understand, universally despised as a coward and tyrant in the country he lost.

When he took refuge at Lahore he was treated with every indignity and humiliation by Runjeet Singh who plundered him remorselessly of the Koh-i-Nor, the supposed largest diamond in the world, and all the valuables in his possession, and who then allowed him to fly, a beggarly outcast, to our territories where since he has remained our pensioner.

Now, Runjeet is our good and trustworthy ally (?) in espousing the cause of the injured Shah (I have not heard whether he has restored or will give up the Koh-i-Nor), and is about to march a large force of Sikhs through Peshawar, and by the Kybur Pass attack Cabul on that frontier.

The policy of Government cannot be fathomed, and we can only surmise there must be some intelligence of Russia intriguing with Dost Mohamed for a passage of troops through Afghanistan for the invasion of Hindustan.

Meanwhile all we have to accomplish is talked of just as if we should have no further trouble than to order the Afghans to pluck their ripest fruit for us, and chastise them if they hesitate. I should say the Afghans are as fine a race of men as ever I saw, as muscular as Europeans, and they have the reputation of being brave and extraordinary fine horsemen.

There will be more work for us than is thought of.

On the 20th of October, 1838, after being inspected in marching order, the 16th Lancers encamped on the exercising ground of the Regiment preparatory to commencing their march . . . to Ferozepoor, where they are to join the Bengal Divisions of the Army of the Indus.

On the 30th of October, at sunrise, the 16th Lancers commenced their march from Meerut to Ferozepoor, where the Bengal Divisions of the Bengal Army, the first commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton,

the second by Major-General Duncan, are to be assembled and reviewed by Lord Auckland, Sir H. Fane, and Runjeet Singh, our ally of the Punjab.

The route we are ordered to take, increases the length of our march considerably ; and we hear we may expect difficulties in obtaining supplies ; and in the scarcity and brackishness of water at many stages ; that after quitting Dehlee there is no regular road ; and, in short, nothing can be more ill-judged than throwing these obstacles in the way of cavalry, who have such an endless march before them. Over and over again, we hear, all this has been urged to Sir H. Fane, but he only replies with a growl ; and the more he is asked to alter the route the more he won't ; so all we have to do is to make the best of it and overcome any difficulties that may present themselves.

* * * * *

On the 21st, at Rampoorah, official information arrived of the Persians having raised the siege and retreated from before Herat, this will have considerable influence on our proceedings ; and it is supposed our campaign will not now extend beyond Cabul.

At Kotkapoorah there is a strong little mud fort carrying guns, with a double ditch ; it belongs to Runjeet Singh and we were not allowed to enter the gates.

At Furreedkote there is a dilapidated brick fort with an endless number of bastions, the curtain presenting the impression of several shot presented in days of yore by Runjeet.

November 28th, 1838.

Marched into Ferozepoor and joined the Army of the Indus. I forgot to mention the 2nd Cavalry, under the command of Colonel D———, had accompanied us from Meerut, and Major Pew's Camel Battery from Dehlee ; Major Pew has the merit of having introduced the camel as a beast of draught into the artillery service, and his system has proved successful beyond expectation. Four camels are attached to each gun in strong and well-constructed harness, and in no instance was there any delay on the road ; there can be no doubt whatever of the camel being a better beast of draught than the bullock ; and in this country, unless where very rapid manœuvres are to be effected, I think superior to the horse. A driver is seated on each camel, the animal requires comparatively little care or breaking, and

thrives upon scanty food ; he walks along at the rate of nearly, if not quite, 4 miles an hour, and the team will trot away with a gun at 8 and keep this pace up for a distance if required.

It appears Sir H. Fane was quite right in not altering the route he laid down for us ; no difficulties of any kind presented themselves, and all through the protected Sikh States the road had been recently and well laid down ; through our own territories, from the Kurnaul road, no care or trouble appeared to have been taken by the overpaid civil functionaries.

Ferozepoor has only lately lapsed into the Company's possession and is about four miles east of the River Sutledje, the old brick fort is in ruins and could never have been a strong place. We have already encircled the town with a broad deep ditch and a well-constructed mud wall and bastions and, before long, I make no doubt this place will be strongly and regularly fortified ; in the town large brick store-houses have recently been erected, and it seems intended Ferozepoor should form an extensive mart for the merchandise brought up the Indus and the Sutledje. Against this, however, there is one great drawback, it is situated in so unhealthy a spot, the natives at one time of the year (after the rains, when the waters subside) are obliged to leave it.

A General Order promulgates, in consequence of the retreat of the Persians from Herat the aspect of our affairs to the North-Westward have so materially changed, that a smaller force is now deemed adequate to execute the views of Government, and, therefore, only the First Division under Sir Willoughby Cotton will proceed down the Indus, while the Second Division under Major-General Duncan will remain at this point, and form a *corps de reserve*.

The First Division under Sir Willoughby Cotton is composed of :—
Brigadier Arnold's Brigade :—

16th Lancers, 2nd and 3rd Regiments Native Cavalry, 4th
Local Horse, Captain Grant's Troop of Horse Artillery.

The Camel Battery, Major Pew.

The Siege Ordnance, Captain Garbetts.

Brigadier Sale's 1st Brigade Infantry :—

13th Light Infantry, 16th and 48th Regiments Native Infantry.

Major-General Nott's 2nd Brigade (subsequently Brigadier Denny's) :—

31st, 42nd and 43rd Regiments Native Infantry.

Brigadier Robert's Brigade :—

4th European Regiment, 35th and 37th Native Infantry.

Major-General Nott commands the three Brigades.

The Second Division under Major-General Duncan, remaining at Ferozepoor, consists of :—

Captain Alexander's Troop Horse Artillery.

The Artillery of the Park, Captain Sanders Skinner's Horse.

Brigadier Paul's 5th Brigade :—

The 5th, 20th, 53rd Regiments of Native Infantry.

Brigadier Dennis—3rd Brigade :—

3rd Buffs, 2nd and 27th Regiments Native Infantry.

Loud and deep are the execrations of the Buffs at being left behind !

Our encampment is semi-circular, and must extend four miles ; Lord Auckland's tents are pitched at the S.-W. extremity, the Commander-in-Chief's at the N.-W. Altogether about 13,500 troops are under canvas, independent of S——'s and S——'s Irregular Horse, amounting to 1,500 more ; while the camp-followers will be, I should say, full six times the number.

November 29th, 1838.

I was on escort duty with the right squadron at the tents of the Governor-General. Lord Auckland this morning held a durbar to receive Runjeet Singh, and to present him with two beautifully ornamented howitzers.

I was posted at the extremity of the line, a squadron of the 4th Native Lancers opposite.

After an hour's suspense the Sikhs were heard approaching from the Sutledje, and as they drew near Mr. T——, one of the Secretaries of the Governor-General, passed on a quick-running elephant and very accurately folded up in a military cloak. When he perceived Lord Auckland's line of elephants were advancing, and at such a distance as must ensure the meeting taking place at precisely the proper spot, Mr. T——stood up in the *howdah* and at arm's length flourished certainly the very largest cocked hat I ever saw ; it was deeply

fringed on the edges with white feathers, and must have been purchased from the Drum-Major of the Coldstream. He now put on the most determined expression of countenance, and resolutely waved his cocked hat for Runjeet and the Sikhs to advance.

Assuredly Mr. T—must have convinced himself that he was engaged in a most desperate enterprise, his manner and attitude precisely what you can imagine V——'s when he fell cheering on his men with "On, on, my lads, every bullet has its billet." What immensely important people Secretaries fancy themselves!

I could not leave my Squadron and therefore only saw the meeting between Lord Auckland and Runjeet on their elephants; and being at open order and my horse very unsteady, it was as much as I could prevent being driven away or crushed.

Runjeet was very plainly dressed in crimson muslin, with a turban of the same; he wore no ornaments, the only mark to distinguish him was the yellow 'chattah' (umbrella) carried over him. In the Durbar tent I heard the two howitzers were drawn up, and a pile of shrapnel shot disposed between them. The tent was so dark and crowded that Lord Auckland and Sir H. Fane who were dandying about little Runjeet, as you may fancy two giants exhibiting themselves with a dwarf between them, in a booth at a country fair, did not perceive the shot, and they proved such trustless conductors that Runjeet pitched over the shot and almost alighted on his nose on the other side of them. The Maharaja will consider this a bad omen for his new treaty with us. Since then Runjeet has discovered the guns are flawed and asked for others.

The crowd in the tent was now beyond bearing, and the band-master, who must be a wag, played "We met 'twas in a crowd," and this was by far the best thing that transpired at the visit of the Lion of the Punjab to the Governor-General of India. There never was, I believe, so silly a conversation recorded, as the public observations of these mighty potentates.

On returning from the Durbar, Runjeet stopped at the flank of the troops lining the road and had Major Pews' Camel Battery paraded for his inspection, and he seemed much pleased with it.

Several of Runjeet's parade horses were drawn up opposite my squadron; they were all large fat northern horses, and appeared very highly broke; they were most sumptuously caparisoned.

November 30th, 1838.

Lord Auckland visited Runjeet's camp on the Western bank of the Sutledje, where he has assembled about 40,000 of his troops ; our Regiment and the 2nd Cavalry formed the escort, and having crossed the Sutledje on a bridge of boats, formed a street from the bridge towards the Sikh Camp. The Sutledje is here a clear rapid river, about the breadth of the Severn at Gloucester.

Lord Auckland, who is generally very punctual, soon made his appearance, and as soon as he passed, I followed his retinue.

About two hundred yards on our right rested the left of Runjeet's Regular Cavalry ; four numerically strong Regiments, tawdrily dressed in scarlet, and miserably mounted on under-sized ill-conditional horses, now lined the road and to do them justice were immovably steady, for I don't think they could have concentrated a kick. (There are some European officers in this branch of the service and amongst them Mr. F——, who I remember passing through Cawnpore as an adventurer). On the right of the Cavalry rose a sandbank sufficiently high to obstruct all view except of the Zambureks, who were posted on its summit and fired a salute from their camels as Lord Auckland passed. This termination of the view was most judicious. Having ascended the sand-bank an entire new scene developed itself. A broad street now appeared formed of the Regular Infantry drawn up three deep "*à la Francaise*" on one side, and two deep on the other ; these troops wore scarlet cloth jackets, generally faced with yellow, red turbans, and white trowsers : their arms the musket and bayonet, the belts black leather. I have never seen so tall a body of men collected together, or so steady, standing under arms. This street extended nearly, if not quite, half a mile, and the view was now terminated by the Maharaja's line of superbly caparisoned elephants drawn up in front of the arch leading to the Durbar tents. As Lord Auckland appeared, Runjeet advanced in the centre of his line of elephants, each line moving with the exactest regularity till the meeting took place in the centre of the Infantry. The '*Salaam*' having been made, Runjeet stepped from his own into Lord Auckland's '*howduh*,' and after embracing, proceeded on the same elephant through the arch to the Durbar.

Here a guard superbly dressed in yellow silk (the favourite colour of the Sikhs) some of these in curious and delicate chain armour, and

all most sumptuously armed, were stationed to prevent intrusion. There was some little difficulty in persuading this magnificent guard to allow us ingress ; at length, however, this was permitted, and I found myself in a square of about four acres artificially laid out as a garden with shrubs and flowers, which must have been brought from a considerable distance ; this space was enclosed with canvas walls seven feet high and in it were collected the body-guard, all armed with sword and matchlock, the stock curiously inlaid with gold, or silver, or ivory ; these troops were dressed in kincob, a thick and costly manufacture of silk, wrought with gold thread in various rich patterns—the appointments and belts worked in gold on scarlet cloth, as rich as embroidery could make them.

On arriving at the Durbar tents, formed of the choicest fabric of Cashmeer, worked in most beautiful patterns and gorgeous colours, I perceived Runjeet seated between Lord Auckland and Sir H. Fane ; there was no mistaking him from the loss of his left eye ; yet, notwithstanding this, the expression of his countenance is remarkably acute and intelligent—I may perhaps observe, restless.

The Lion of the Punjab was by far the plainest attired man in his court ; he wore the same dress he appeared in when he visited Lord Auckland, of dark crimson and turban of the same colour, and he had not decked himself in any of the jewelry of immense value which he has in his possession. I was disappointed in not getting a glimpse of the Koh-i-Nor, which he generally exhibits on his person on great occasions. I fear Shah Sujah has little chance of ever recovering this inestimable diamond—who knows in a few years in whose possession it may be found ; Shah Sujah's ancestors plundered it from the treasure of Nadir Shah after he was assassinated, and Nadir extorted it from the Great Mogul after the massacre at Dehli.

Runjeet is a little man but not emaciated, as I had been led to expect, from debauchery ; he is dark for a Sikh, and has not the usual hooked nose of the Sect ; his face rather full and his beard long and white. Those of the Sikh Court who were admitted to the Durbar were most superbly dressed, some in flowing yellow or bright red silk dresses their 'kummerbunds' always a Cashmeer shawl of very great value, some in highly polished cuirasses, and others in choice and glittering armour, and all appeared decked in jewels of immense price.

I should mention Runjeet has wrested Cashmeer from the rule of Cabul, and will perhaps restore the Unequalled Valley to Shah Sujah

with the Koh-i-Nor ; however, at the Sikh Court, under a tent formed as it were of immense shawls, seemed to be collected the very choicest fabrics of that heavenly country ; whilst all that superb armour, jewels of inestimable value, silks of the richest manufacture, ornaments of pure and elaborately wrought gold, shawls of the finest texture and most beautifully worked colours and patterns, and embroidery curiously worked on cloth or velvet, here met the eye.

Even those in the retinue who were far too inferior to gain admittance to the Durbar wore shawls of such beauty as would have excited the envy of our richest ladies.

Immediately in front of the Maharajah and Lord Auckland the never failing 'nautch' was exhibiting, the singer was covered in jewels, and wore a dark green dress, very tastefully embroidered in silver, and she modulated her voice sufficiently not to make herself very disagreeable.

The presents were now handed round and we took our leave.

I rode down both lines of the Sikh Infantry : I think I mentioned I never saw so tall a body of men collected. I don't think there was one man under six feet in the front rank, and many appeared six feet four inches, and even more than that.

I think one of the standard bearers must have been close on seven feet ; but these giants in height wanted breadth and muscle. Several of the officers were magnificently dressed, and I observed more than one whose epaulettes were formed of pearls.

Runjeet has several Europeans, both English and French, in his service ; he devotes almost his whole attention to the Artillery and Infantry, which accounts for the inferiority of the Regular Cavalry.

December 1st.—The whole force under Sir H. Fane was out to rehearse a grand field day for Lord Auckland and Runjeet : 10,000 men of all arms were on the ground. We supported the guns on the right of the line, and had little to do but sit on our horses and endeavour to see through the dust what was going forward. We made one charge over some ground, dotted with small wells, which threw our advance sadly out.

December 2nd.—The Regiment was seen by Sir Willoughby Cotton, who went through his inspection as quickly as possible.

December 3rd.—A grand review for Lord Auckland and Runjeet, the same number of troops were on the ground, as at the rehearsal.

The troops worked with the greatest precision, and the marching past of the Buffs elicited unqualified approbation.

Everything went off very well, and even Sir H. Fane was, we understood, pleased.

December 4th.—Runjeet had a review of his troops which I did not attend ; but I hear the Sikhs worked very well and steadily."

* * * * *

This account of a meeting between Runjeet and the Governor-General just seven years after the meeting described by Colonel Skinner in Colonel Maunsell's article provides at least one interesting comparison.

To borrow from Colonel Maunsell's article :—

"The Maharaja was dressed very richly with jewels and wore on his left arm the famous diamond called the Khoe Noore." Seven years later at an almost exactly similar function we read : "The Lion of the Punjab was by far the plainest attired man in his Court, he had not decked himself in any of the jewelry of immense value which he has in his possession. I was disappointed at not getting a glimpse of the Koh-i-Noor."

It is to be wondered whether Runjeet had outgrown his taste for personal decoration or whether the change was due to a tactful desire not to draw too much attention to the source from which much of this "jewelry of immense value" had been obtained.

On the 10th of December, the First Division left Ferozepore and began its march up to Kandahar, with what result History has already told us. Captain Lowe accompanied this force with his Regiment, but the incidents recorded in his diary are not concerned with Runjeet Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, any further.

A MATRIMONIAL TANGLE (OR MOUNTAINS AND MACHINE GUNS).

By "AUSPEX."

An action has been brought for the dissolution of the union solemnised during the Great War between the Rifleman (ex-King) and a young lady, a nouveau riche, who, by virtue of the marriage, now styles herself the Queen of all Battlefields. The plaintiff is the Rifleman and the grounds are alleged coercion and misrepresentation, followed by neglect and desertion. The plaintiff sought to show that the conditions of the marriage had been unbearable to him, particularly when his business had compelled the couple to reside on the Frontier of India away from the social diversions and distractions of civilisation.

The costs, which had already been paid by the Rifleman, were unfortunately not recoverable.

The address of the plaintiff's counsel is given verbatim and ran as follows :—

Description of the neighbourhood. Its disadvantages and advantages.

1. The disadvantages of ground with which we have to contend on the Frontier are :—

The cover from view and fire for the enemy, given by rocks and bushes. This gives him a great measure of immunity and makes it extremely difficult for us to pick up a target.

The rocky ground, which makes it difficult to see the strike of bullets and so to observe or to range properly.

The lack of roads and tracks by which we can move our transport and heavier weapons. This limits the scope of our action and puts us at the severe disadvantage of moving this transport and these weapons by the few roads and paths that there are, thus enabling our opponent to predetermine our direction of movement and to prepare his positions for, and to lay his weapons on to, one or two definite routes up which we must move.

The command which the ground gives him.

Its Advantages.

2. But there are, paradoxically many advantages for us, born, in many cases, of these very disadvantages.

The most important is the lack of paths and tracks and the lack of obstacles insuperable to the movement of men of rifle companies. This enables us to move almost at will from one point to another, provided that we leave our transport and heavier weapons behind. The great expanse of barren and unwatched country makes it almost certain, as long as we march on no known track or road, that we will reach our objective undetected and unopposed and so have the initial advantage of surprise. We can achieve this provided that our original movement from camp or place of concentration is properly concealed. This is worth some trouble as the advance is almost always more important than the actual conduct of the battle, for a good, concealed approach that brings with it the benefits of surprise may make a battle a very simple affair for us.

The cover from view and fire is again a great advantage if we will only allow ourselves to make use of it. The tribesman is assisted in his use of cover by the fact that he can, once he has predetermined our movements on tracks and roads and to protect ourselves on these tracks and roads, take cover from a known direction and make full use of it to oppose us. If our movements are not from a known direction, a great deal of the disadvantage to ourselves disappears. We may, in fact, if we know the enemy's concentrations, be able to make use of this cover to turn the tables on him as he leaves his villages or bivouacs.

Their Rustic Neighbours.

3. As the enemy may be supposed to make what is, for his purposes, the best use of ground, then we should, up to a point, imitate him and surpass him in his own methods. His method of obtaining possession of commanding ground is to make for that ground by a detour or by arriving there some time before we can arrive there. Very occasionally he obtains this high ground by a skilful surprise attack on our picquets.

But his tactics are almost always qualified by his desire to achieve what he wants without undue risk to his person and by the fact that, being unorganised, he cannot for long hold what he has gained. Throughout, he nearly always has the initiative, owing to his knowledge of the ground about our road, to his lack of hampering weapons and

supplies and to the fact that we are never there to molest his advance and to make it a slow progress, undertaken with great care and step by step. By seeking for surprise, while we are unable to get surprise by allowing ourselves to be tied to our column, he keeps the initiative. It is, however, less likely that his knowledge of the ground will help him so much over country seldom trodden by human beings, away from villages and tracks, as it does about the few routes that exist and that he treads daily in his search for a livelihood. But in the hills we may expect to be on more even terms with him.

The Social Whirl.

4. We still make the killing of the enemy the first object in our tactics and, if that object can be achieved sufficiently often and completely, it is undoubtedly the most effective. In order to get at one's enemy one must so place oneself as to obtain a suitable target at which to hit. That usually means, in this country, that one must be above him. The Pathan has no great wish to sacrifice his life so he will not ordinarily stay for very long after the tables are turned on him. Hitherto, we have placed great reliance on the bullet or shell fired from below, from the road, path or nullah, for the inflicting of casualties. This is a promiscuous method of trying to kill which seldom yields any great results because the enemy is at liberty to go when he pleases. We must, therefore, restrict this liberty and can only do this by "hoisting him on his own petard;" by mobility and surprise to place him so that he cannot easily get away from us.

Against his mobility and knowledge of the ground, we place our superior firepower. It is questionable how far our better organisation confers a further advantage on us. In part, if we gain surprise, it must benefit us and in one way in particular. Once his loose organisation is broken, it becomes for him a matter of each man for himself and he cannot put up any co-ordinated resistance owing to his lack of methods of communication. At such a time we can put up an organised offensive if we make use of our simplest and quickest means of communication, but very seldom if we use our more complex forms. If, in attempting surprise, we should in our turn be surprised, our habits of cohesion stand us in good stead.

Effect of the terrain on the lady's mobility.

5. Looking at a typical piece of Frontier country, one soon concludes that riflemen can get over it without great difficulty and that

pack animals can only traverse it by carefully selected detours after excellent reconnaissance. If, then, we are to move over the hills, avoiding the tracks, we conclude that usually our pack animals cannot go with us. That is, we will have to leave behind us our Vickers and Lewis gun mules, our reserve ammunition and other pack-carried equipment. Without these mules we have with us rifles and manhandled Lewis guns. Troops that are physically fit can manhandle Lewis guns over great distances for a limited operation, though their mobility will suffer thereby. We are then at least on equal terms with our enemy except for his better knowledge of the ground, possibly his keener sight and, assuredly, our better marksmanship.

This last asset is an important one, for it is our habit to contend that the tribesman is a superlative shot and thereby to infer that he is a better shot than our own men. This cannot be true for he has but a limited supply of ammunition with which to practice and lacks proper means of caring for his weapons, while our men are carefully trained in the use of the rifle, have a large supply of ammunition and have experts to keep their arms in good condition. If, by chance, it were true that the tribesman is a better shot, then the whole of our weapon training is at fault as far as the rifle is concerned. It is naturally to be regretted that there is a tendency to reduce the number of rounds that the rifleman may use in a year.

However, even the advantage that better marksmanship may confer upon us is not sufficient. We need a further advantage and that must be the advantage of surprise.

6. Trained troops can carry their Lewis guns over considerable distances along with a proportion of ammunition. This is not so with the Vickers gun and it is a very serious disadvantage for it means that only by stepping these guns painfully and carefully forward—and that is a slow process—can we get any use from their fire. The question is whether, in the ordinary way, attempting a surprise operation, this slow process is worth the fire effect that we can expect from the weapon. To answer this it is necessary to examine the probable fire effect that we may in reality rely upon, allowing the guns all the ammunition they require—an unlikely condition for a prolonged offensive action.

To begin with the probable target to be offered. In hill country and with an enemy who is adept at taking cover, the target is well

concealed and hard to pick up at over 500 yards ; it is also a scattered one. To keep the guns at even 500 yards from the leading rifleman is nearly always impossible owing to the slowness engendered by constantly moving the guns and to their vulnerability and need for command for firing over the forward troops.

Next, the matter of getting the range. Inaccuracies due to the man at the range-finding instrument, the hard use to which the instrument is subjected, the conditions of battle and lack of good marks on which to range, all tend to throw the bullets clean off the mark. As the guns are usually firing at a crest line or against a steep hill, this inaccuracy is seldom offset by the width or depth of the beaten zone. The target is usually fleeting, so that there is little time to range by fire even if the strike could readily be observed ; it is not often that strike can be seen at over 800 yards and then only the strike of an occasional bullet.

It is therefore more than risky to base an offensive on the neutralising or destructive effect of machine gun fire. It is no good to argue that the fire will have a great moral effect for this effect is problematical, varying and indeterminate.

Then the difficulty of fire direction and " recognition." Where it is so hard to select reference points and to pick up targets, it is, even under peace conditions, a matter of great uncertainty that the gunners will get on to the correct targets.

From all this one has to deduce that the guns can usually only operate against an area in which an enemy is expected to be. This must mean a great waste of ammunition and a small chance of killing. With the eight guns in an Indian infantry battalion, the minute size of the bullet and the sparseness of the spray of the bullets over an area, there is no great chance of even neutralising an enemy's fire except at short ranges, where accurate fire on to an obvious target can be obtained.

The immobility and vulnerability of the guns must again be emphasised. They are, in withdrawal, by a long way the first to go and their going is a matter of anxiety until they are out of harm's way.

Demoralising Effect on the Plaintiff.

7. It is the machine gun and our conventional columns that are tying us down to the use, or rather abuse, of continually fighting and moving along Frontier tracks and roads. We are for ever fighting for

ground—for a reasonable command—to get protection for our columns, instead of being free to concentrate on outwitting our enemy by movement in any direction of our, and not his, choosing. We are thus forced back more and more on the unreliable and wasteful firepower of these weapons and on entrusting to them the task of putting our riflemen on to their objectives. This is having a disastrous effect on the training of the rifleman, both in his use of his weapon and in the use he makes of the ground. He moves to the attack over ground that he can only just, most painfully slowly climb, and on which he cannot, after supporting weapons have ceased their fire, get forward with his own weapons or collect to deliver a strong and speedy assault. There is a lack of realism and of true comprehension of the actual conditions of a fight under these circumstances, resulting in a lack of confidence by the man both in his rifle and in his ability to get himself to his enemy with its aid and with the aid given him by the ground. If this process continues it will lead to his complete demoralisation.

Examples of misrepresentation by the Defendant.

8. Without doubt the prevalent conception of mountain warfare has been that of the much-encumbered column moving along a road, probably in the nullah bed, throwing out piquets as it goes and so clawing itself forward as a cat claws its way up a tree.

In the precis of a lecture at one of our instructional establishments, this remark occurs. (The lecture deals with warfare on the North-West Frontier.)

“ Battle is, as a rule, only a fight to secure, maintain or evacuate piquet positions. Defence, etc.....”

Frontier fighting is no different in essentials from any other form of fighting except that it is modified and exaggerated in some respects by the conditions peculiar to the country and the enemy. We cannot take as our pattern the fighting in Waziristan in 1919-20, undertaken as it was largely by untrained or partially-trained troops. It is, however, remarkable that the Official History of those operations shows more than once the success of a movement undertaken in an unexpected direction perhaps by night, and the casualties of the succeeding withdrawal in an obvious destination by day. Machine guns could not well have participated in these operations by night and their withdrawal by day would have been a nightmare.

In a precis of another lecture from the same establishment, not, admittedly, dealing with frontier warfare, there is this remark.

“The task of the attacking Commander. To get his troops across the ground swept by the fire of the defender’s weapons. He cannot, therefore, attack with more men than he can effectively cover with fire.”

If this is all there is in the Commander’s task, then the idea of manœuvre is deader than ever, and the infantryman is still there to be fed to the lions, still there for a Roman holiday.

Capital Sentence not applied for.

9. We cannot, at present, do away with the machine gun for we have no substitute for it and, even on mules or in limbers, it has proved its use abundantly as a defensive weapon in suitable country and under suitable conditions, but we must realise that its uses in attack and withdrawal are confined to those occasions when we cannot get surprise by movement and have to rely on a slow-moving, staged attack, or on surprise by volume of fire in the few cases when this opportunity offers; and to those occasions when the guns can be sited beforehand to form a strong pivot on which to withdraw.

The Plaintiff’s Future.

10. This future is likely to be a very much longer one than that of the mule-borne machine gun.

There seems to be every chance that the rifleman will now be trained as an expert, if it is only in order to save his own skin, and that he will once more be given a higher status on the battlefield. One very much hopes that, while the methods of training, lightening and improving him are under consideration, his rifle will be given a careful examination with a view to substituting for it a light sporting rifle sighted up to 1,000 or 1,200 yards, with a “V” backsight and, perhaps, a smaller bore. Perhaps a separate weapon might be found as useful as the bayonet.

The Defendant’s Future.

11. It is possible that the evolution of the rifleman may lead to separation from his machine guns and that these weapons, if they do not evolve at the same pace, will, instead of queening it within the unit, once more be herded into bevvies of royalty in machine gun companies.

Finally.

12. The rifleman's motto must be, "Use your brains to save your legs and your legs to save your skin." With greater skill, quicker movement and more confidence, he can instil the fear of God into his enemy and so avoid the humility of being continually pushed uphill at him.

ESCAPE FROM DELHI, 1857.

By "SAMEJ."

I.—Introduction.

On Sunday, the 10th May, some troopers at Meerut, who had refused to take the new cartridges, were sentenced by Court Martial to different periods of imprisonment. Their comrades, after releasing them and killing some of the officers there, and committing outrages on helpless women (in which they were joined by the people in the Suddar Bazaar), left Meerut for Delhi the same evening which place they entered about 8-30 a.m. on Monday morning, the 11th.

The bungalows on the Jumna Canal were first burnt by them and the officers of the Telegraph Office killed.

On entering the city, they met Captain——of the Palace Guard and the Commissioner and killed them. After this it is not certain how they proceeded. Some say they divided into parties; one party entered the Palace and then went to Dusruao Gunge and after burning all the houses there and murdering the European men and women whom they met, joined the other party which had gone towards the Cashmere Gate, and had killed on their way families of the——and——; also the Chaplain and his party. They were attacking the offices of the Quarter Guard, when the N. I. entered the Cashmere Gate; and on the Commanding Officer, Colonel R.——, ordering his men to fire on the mutineers, they turned round and killed him and the other officers, and secured the guns which had gone over with them. Here they remained some time firing into the Quarter Guard on the officers on Guard and others who had taken refuge there.

It is said that one trooper was killed by Captain——of the N. I. before he fell by the hands of his own men. From this they proceeded to the Bank and killed Mr.——and his family; and then the Delhi Gazette Press, which they burnt.

I was informed about 10 a.m., that all this had taken place by one of my chaprasis who had come in breathless from the City. I had heard the firing for some time, and had seen the N. I. marching in, but of course concluded that some slight outbreak had taken place in the City, which was being quelled by a high hand.

Some of my men, however, told me that the disturbance was a serious one—which I did not believe till a note and carriage was sent over by Captain——for us to go to his house.

II.—Narrative.

I had reluctantly gone to the Kutchery on the 11th May, as I was not feeling well : and this made me return earlier than usual. Had I gone to the City as I generally did of a morning to inspect some disputed place and as I had intended to do that morning to look after some work a carpenter was doing for me, I should certainly have shared the fate of so many other Europeans. I got home at 8 a.m. and was lying on the couch when Nurput (my bearer), reported that all the masons and coolies who were engaged in building our new rooms had bolted ; and shots were heard in the direction of the Cashmere Gate.

I ordered my horse with the intention of going to see what the row was, as I thought it must be some slight disturbance ; but, before the horse came, the N. I. was seen marching towards the City—the sepoys shouting vehemently.

Soon after the firing increased and cannon shots were heard. I was deliberating what to do, when a man whom I had not seen before, came breathless and said the Europeans in the City had all been killed by some troopers from Meerut. I cross questioned him ; he said he had seen the Killedar Sahib lying in a ditch ; the Barra Sahib had also been killed ; the Collector Sahib had been attacked ; that he did not wait but ran along the road, and on passing the Cashmere Gate he saw 3 or 4 “goras” lying there dead—and advised me to save myself.

Shots were now heard in every part of the City, and occasional volleys of musketry.

Even then I thought the N. I. having arrived at the City had quelled any disturbance on the spot, but when one of my chaprasis told me that the sepoys had turned against us and killed their own officers and had sworn that they would not leave alive any European in the place, I began to think more seriously of the outbreak. At this time a carriage came from Captain N.——for Eliza, asking her to come over and keep Mrs. H.——company, who was alone at his house. The baby had just gone to sleep, but Eliza said she would not go without her. I therefore put both into the

-arriage and told her I would fetch Miss S——who might not perhaps be aware of the disturbance, and meet her at Captain N.'s house.

I got into my buggy and fetched Miss S——the doctor said he would remain there. We drove over Hindoo Roy's hill and came into Cantonments, and went first to the Brigadier's bungalow, and then to Captain N.'s house, but Eliza was at neither place, and our enquiries about her were useless.

The houses seemed empty; the servants would hardly reply to our questions, and the people in the Suddar Bazaar were standing in groups—well armed detachments of sepoy were marching hither and thither.

My anxieties had increased. We drove to every place we would think of in this confusion. At last we met an officer who said several carriages had gone to the Sergeant's house. When we got there, we could get no information, but saw several carriages going along the parade ground. On driving up to them, I found Eliza and Mrs. H.——in one carriage crying, and other ladies who were in great distress. I told the former to be calm—that everything would soon be right—but on consulting Captain N——, he said matters were very serious, that none of the sepoy could be relied on and he wished to take us to a place of safety, and we had better go to the Flagstaff, where others had taken refuge. We had now been out for upwards of one hour, and the heat was excessive. On arriving at the Flagstaff, we found the room nearly crowded with ladies and children; and the Brigadier and some officers consulting outside. It was agreed that the place should be put into a state of defence; muskets were loaded and piled upon the upper storey, and water and provisions ordered in the hope that relief would soon be coming from Meerut, which was not more than 35 miles from Delhi, but we soon saw the folly of expecting any help.

The heat was fearful and the confusion increasing—the ladies were sometimes ordered up, and then down again.

The alarm that we were about to be attacked was given several times by the sepoy standing around us, and parties of men were seen moving about the hill. An explosion was now heard and a column of smoke rose up to the skies and soon after enveloped the City in a cloud. There was no mistake that the magazine had blown up.

We spoke to the sepoys and asked if they would do their duty and stand by us should they be required, and this question was repeated with promises of presents and advancement; but I shall not forget the fiendish expression of their countenances. One man called out to the others in a loud voice what we said, but before they could reply, he added "Yes, we will fight against our enemies, but not against our friends." This was enough—we knew their mind. It was only a wonder that they continued passive.

The whole City was now in a cloud—the Bank in flames on one side and the Press on the other. Colonel R———was brought in badly wounded and covered with blood, and then a cart load of the bodies of the officers killed in the City with the dresses of ladies thrown over them. The sight was most distressing and sickening. I knew not why the corpses were brought to us—except as a taunt to show us how much we were in their power, to be sacrificed at their pleasure. The cart was pushed by two sepoys, who, when it came near the Flagstaff, gave it a shove and left it. There was a grin on the countenances of those standing round—such a fiendish grin as I shall never forget.

Everybody's attention was now attracted on hearing a rumbling noise, and soon after, seeing the guns which had gone to the City in the morning with the N. I. making their way to Cantonments, Captain De T———mounted his horse and rode up to them within 50 yards and ordered them back (not knowing they were in possession of the enemy), but a volley was fired at him, when he turned back. His horse staggered and we thought he would have fallen. Other shots were fired but the horse, though shot through the head and rump, got up to the Flagstaff and Captain De T———covered with blood, (but not touched) got off. The horse soon after rolled over. The guns were then levelled at us and I expected to be blown to bits, but they soon turned them away, and after securing the magazine in the Cantonments cantered back to the Cashmere Gate.

Our state, which was always dangerous, was now becoming really precarious, but a special Providence watched over us. It was indeed a miracle that we were spared. We were told the troopers, who had committed all the outrages in the City, were refreshing themselves in the Subzee Mundee and would soon be on us. It was madness to remain where we were.

The Brigadier was consulted—he said, “My advice is to remain here, but you may do as you like.”

On this a general rush was made to the conveyances standing around. Captain N——very kindly called out to us “Take my carriage”—into which we went, and almost all left the Flagstaff at the same time. The sepoy turned into their lines, but the two guns went with us as far as the Cantonment gardens, and then refused to go any further. We passed them, and C——who was on one, called out if we would take him up. Mrs. P——and her two daughters, with another lady, were running along the road. I told them to get into our buggy,—our carriage being full—as we had previously taken up a poor sergeant’s wife and her child—the husband having been killed.

Dr. N——was lying on the road wounded, and Mrs. N——standing by him. The rush of carriages was now very great. I had made up my mind to go to Umballa, but all drove for some 6 or 8 miles on the Kurnaul Road (we left Delhi at 6 o’clock in the evening) from where De T——and a few others turned off to Meerut. There was a great dread of the troopers following us—the only hope being that they were tired and glutted with blood and loot in the City to go any further. The road was covered with large bodies of men, and on one occasion they tried to stop us but thought better of it.

After a wearisome drive of some 40 to 50 miles, we arrived at a Dak Bungalow. It was, however, not thought safe to remain there long. The horses were dead beat—it was impossible to take them on further. There were besides ourselves a great many ladies who were anxious to go on (Mrs. P——, 3 Misses B——, Mrs. A——and two children, Miss N——who had lost her brother, Mrs. P——and two daughters, Mrs. H——Miss H——, and Mrs. T——and two children). I promised to do my best to get them on, and on hearing a bugle sound, I went to the road where a Government conveyance with parcels was going to Delhi, but the driver would not hear of my detaining him and I was determined he should not go on. As persuasion was of no avail, I pulled him down and with a sound box on the ear brought him to terms. The parcels were thrown out on the road. In this way, two other carriages belonging to private companies were secured and the ladies as comfortably stowed away as circumstances would permit. We

drove on, finding changes of horses on the road—as we were a large party and carried a high hand (the police sowars being also turned out to accompany us), we got into Kurnaul between 10 and 11 a.m.

The news of the fall of Delhi having previously been spread by an officer who had preceded us—we were hospitably received in Mr. Mc-W's house and received every assistance and kindness from the Assistant Collector. The heat, excitement, and fatigues of the travelling, added to the anxiety of the previous day, had very much done up the ladies, but it was admirable the way they bore it all. The sepoy's here on the Treasure Guard could not be trusted, and after refreshing ourselves we were determined to push on, and with some difficulty procured carriages. We started from Kurnaul at about 7 or 8 p.m., and arrived at Thanasur between 12 and 1 a.m. We put up at a friend's and the ladies having had no rest or sleep since our flight, had gone to sleep on the floor.

At 3 a.m., we were roused by the servants with the news that some sowars had surrounded the Deputy Commissioner's house. We concluded at once that they had come from Delhi to cut us up and of course were in a great fix what to do, and really thought though we had escaped so far, there was no hope left for us and we must be lost. I consulted with my friend and the ladies were directly roused up, and taken into the fields and ditches to hide, and there they remained for nearly two hours.

We heard the tramp of horses and voices of natives laughing and talking. Our suspense during this time was very great and it was only at daybreak that we ascertained that some troopers had been sent to Thanasur to escort the Treasure away as the guards of sepoy's could not be relied on, and had shown signs of disaffection. This was indeed a great relief to us and it appeared even a more miraculous escape than from the Flagstaff at Delhi.

From Thanasur we proceeded in a parcel gharree in which all the party was stowed away, packed close, and 30 coolies engaged to push the vehicle. The roads were dreadful but we managed to reach Umballa at about 8 a.m., quite worn out.

We were very hospitably received by the—who got us a small house, but there was no rest for us even here. We were taken away to the lines of the 9th Lancers as soon as it was evening, as there was a report that the—and—— N. I. Regiments were

going to rise and murder the residents. In this confusion and uncertainty we remained for more than a month. Our daks were several times laid for Simla, but as often countermanded, as we were told the Ghoorkhas had mutined and murdered the inhabitants of Simla ; but when the report was proved incorrect, we went up to Kussoolie and there remained.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

RECONNAISSANCE.

SIR,

In European countries reconnaissance is almost always undertaken to find out something about the enemy, but, when we come to conduct operations, whether real or training, in countries that are not so well mapped and in which roads are comparatively few, there arises the need for information about the ways and means of moving from point to point.

Aircraft are becoming more and more expert at finding the enemy, who, like ourselves, is growing an alarmingly large M. T. tail that can't be hidden.

Distant reconnaissance the book says is an Armoured Car job (and may possibly become a Light Tank job when improvements are introduced).

The problem that faces the Commander and most particularly the mechanized Cavalry Brigade Commander is whether a certain route is feasible, firstly for light tanks, and secondly, for six-wheeler M. T.

He may be able to get this information by using his Light Tanks or Armoured Cars, if he has any, but it is far more likely that he will have to rely on Cavalry reconnaissances.

The whole situation as regards flanking or turning movements by mobile forces has changed ; generally speaking whatever surprise is to be gained by any such movement is possible only as the result of a march from dusk till dawn the next morning. To send Armoured Cars or Light Tanks to reconnoitre on the afternoon before a night march may give away the Commander's intention and they may not be available or may want the time for overhaul and rest. Incidentally comparatively small obstacles hold up reconnaissances of this kind which have no means of improving crossings over nalas, etc.

Cavalry, most likely have been on the move and are at the end of a long and tiring day. Patrols have got to go out at speed and to come back at speed, for, on their information, the Commander bases his plans and without it his move may be a pure gamble.

There is a limit to the pace and endurance of Cavalry horses but, as matters stand at present, we send out our patrols in full marching kit, which must reduce their chances of getting through and nearly double the time taken. The Navy and the Air Force maintain special light craft capable of the highest speeds so as to escape by pace rather than fighting.

If we take the example of the hunting field, not to mention the race course, the greatest attention is paid to reducing weight on the horse to a minimum.

The answer lies in having certain officers and men specially trained in getting over country at speed—their horses must be specially selected and should be led and not ridden till they start on special patrols. They should have light hunting saddles and snaffle bridles and their riders should carry only an automatic pistol and a light haversack.

Very considerable training of the rider is necessary to teach him how to nurse his horse on long distance rides or endurance tests if you prefer the latter term and, of course, very special training of the horse is necessary. Ignorance often means the riding of a horse to death in any attempt to cover upwards of 30 miles at 8 miles per hour or faster.

It is reasonable to suggest that the first people to welcome the idea of "Speed patrols" would be those interested in horse breeding in India—the satisfaction of seeing your brand on the horses of speed patrols ought to be at least equal to that of seeing it on the winners of a 3 furlong race. Carefully worked out speed patrolling contests would provide a welcome change from the annual tent-pegging competitions, which, to say the least of it, are difficult to justify in the light of our various manuals on horsemanship. Classes for teams of speed patrol horses might be introduced into our premier horse show even at the cost of excluding four in hand teams and coaching marathons, which we all like to see but for which it is not easy to produce any convincing arguments.

If a precedent for speed patrols is required, we have only to refer to the British Officers in the Peninsular war who, mounted on blood hunters, brought in information for the British Armies.

Yours faithfully,

"LUMBIDUM."

MECHANIZATION.

SIR,

There has been some correspondence lately in Service and other journals about the lack of progress in mechanization of the Army, and in particular, about the demonstration of a post-war Division on the march, held in the U.K. a year or two ago. The criticisms were generally to the effect that, in spite of partial mechanization of certain components of the Division, the formation as a whole, was longer and more unwieldy than its predecessor of pre-war days. There is much point in these remarks but it seems that many of the critics have missed the main point, which is that if the Division is to be more mobile, it must be smaller. The whole tendency of modern thought is for increase of speed and reduction of man-power by increased use of mechanical devices. It seems, therefore, that the time may have come to adopt the continental system of Brigades of 3 Battalions. The reduction of the 4th Battalion in each Brigade would automatically bring about a reduction of the ancillary services within the Division, thus bringing about a considerable reduction in the length of the columns and an increase in flexibility and mobility.

2. It is not suggested that there should be any further reduction in the actual number of Battalions noted for Defence Services, but that existing Battalions would be more suitably organized in a slightly larger number of Divisions, each Division being smaller. With the reduced number of Battalions in a Brigade, it would be advisable to allot sufficient extra mechanical transport to the Division to allow of a portion of the Infantry being made really mobile.

3. A further point which has been adversely commented on is the inclusion of a Cavalry Regiment as Divisional Troops. The inclusion of this unit has, it is said, tended to overload the Division and its ancillary services without any real compensating advantage. The trend of modern opinion and especially those who have been privileged to observe the recent Sino-Japanese operations in Manchuria, is that Cavalry should be organised in large formations, acting boldly and rapidly in advance of or on the flanks of the main bodies of Corps, in co-operation with armoured units and aircraft. It is thought that the Divisional Cavalry could be largely reduced if not entirely abolished, and the units thus set free, used to form additional Cavalry Brigades.

4. In view of the proposed demonstrations in the Northern Command next winter, it is thought that the question of the most suitable organization for a Division under modern conditions, will be very much in the foreground during the next year or two.

Yours faithfully,
"HORSEMAN."

GROUND TROOPS.

SIR,

As an ancient member of the Institution of at least twenty-five years' standing, I crave your indulgence. I have not the pen of a ready writer. I confess that once, many years ago, I did submit an article for consideration to one of your distinguished predecessors. It was returned with the usual polite expressions of regret. You will realise, then, that only the strongest feelings can have impelled me to write to you to-day.

The April number of the Journal contains the usual able "Editorial" in which, under the heading of "Frontier Unrest" occur the words "ground troops and irregulars."

"Ground troops"! Slugs! Blind worms! I do not know who was responsible for the introduction of this detestable expression. I wish I did. You may ask what is wrong with the term. It is hard to give a definite answer to this question, but let me assure you that to me and to many other simple soldiers it conveys a veiled expression of contempt.

Shades of Marlborough, Wellington, Roberts and a hundred more! who are we that we should be thus labelled?

There are sea forces, land forces and air forces. You do not speak of "water troops" or "air troops." Why, then, "ground troops"? Ships are ships, troops are troops and aircraft are aircraft.

I ask you, of your goodness, to erase this horrible phrase from your vocabulary.

Yours faithfully,
"EARTHWORM."

[We admit the horrible impeachment, and hasten to offer our apologies for such a catastrophic slip of the Editorial pen, at the same time we can hardly agree that the use of the term "ground troops" implies a feeling of contempt.—ED.]

FRANCE.

Release from the Colours of the 1st half of the 1931 Class.

The 1st half of the 1931 Class of conscripts will be released from Colour service on 31st March, 1933, instead of 15th April. Soldiers thus due for transfer to the reserve will be shown on leave without pay until 15th April, from which date their reserve service (*disponibilité*) will count.

Auxiliaries (soldiers unfit for general service who are employed as orderlies, batmen, &c.) will not be liberated on 31st March, but will be retained with the Colours for a period of three weeks, which period will count as one of the periods of training which they are liable to carry out during their *disponibilité* and reserve service.

Appointment of Under-Secretary of State for War.

By a Decree dated 18th December, 1932, Monsieur Guy de Chambre has been appointed *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat* at the *Ministère de la Guerre*.

This Under-Secretaryship was allowed to lapse on the formation of the second Laval Ministry at the end of January, 1932. When Monsieur Tardeu formed his Cabinet in February and introduced a Ministry of National Defence, the Minister, Monsieur Piétri, was given two Under-Secretaries. On the fall of this Government in May, Monsieur Herriot, who reappointed the three separate Ministers for War, Marine and War, did not appoint an Under-Secretary of State for War.

In a recently published statement, the duties of the Under-Secretary of State for War are stated to be as follows :—

Article 1. He will assist, and if necessary act for, the War Minister in the consideration of any questions which the latter may pass to him for opinion or decision. In the latter case the full powers of the Minister are delegated to him.

Article 2. The main object of his post is to study the possibilities of economy in the administration of the various departments and services.

Article 3. Questions relative to pay, cost of movements, supplies, clothing, bedding, hygiene, the comfort and health of the troops, fall more particularly within his functions. In fact any decree affecting the above will come to him for approval before being submitted to the War Minister for signature.

Article 4. He will study the question of the creation of a special department dealing with the manufacture of arms, and of a Corps of Military Engineers, as well as possible measures for the reorganization of the *Service des Poudres*.

Article 5. In addition, the Minister for War may delegate him to speak in either House on subjects concerning the War Department.

Military Appointments.

Under Presidential Decrees dated 7th January *Général de Division* Weygand is confirmed in his appointments as Vice-President of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* and Inspector-General of the Army for the year 1933.

General Gamelin, Chief of Staff, and all the other members of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*, are similarly confirmed in their appointments for 1933.

General Baratier, *Chef de la Section Militaire d'Etudes des Traites*, has been placed on the Reserve with effect from 11th December, 1932. He is succeeded by Colonel J. Mollard.

Appointments to the Higher Command and Staff in the Air Force.

General Hergault, member of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*, Inspector-General of the Air Force and Chief of the Staff of the Air Force, has relinquished these two appointments in the Air Force on the appointment of an Air Force General Officer to these appointments.

General Barés, member of the *Conseil Supérieur de l'Air*, has been appointed Inspector-General of the Air Force and Chief of the Air Staff *vice* General Hergault.

General Amengaud, member of the *Conseil Supérieur de l'Air*, and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, has been appointed Assistant Inspector-General of the Air Force.

General Denain, member of the *Conseil Supérieur de l'Air*, has been appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Force.

Army Reorganization.

Details of the new reorganization of the infantry divisions stationed near the frontier fortifications have been recently announced.

(a) Fortified Regions.

There will be two fortified area commands (*Régions Fortifiées*), i.e. :—

(i) Metz.

(ii) The Lauter.

In addition there will be three Rhine fortified sectors (*secteurs fortifiés du Rhin*). The fortified area commanders will have under their command all the infantry, artillery and engineer units detailed for the permanent occupation and defence of the fortified works in their respective areas.

The infantry units which are to form part of the permanent garrisons of these fortified areas are to be taken from the four divisions (11th, 12th, 42nd and 43rd) at present stationed in the 6th and 20th regions, and will consist of the four infantry regiments (23rd, 146th, 153rd and 168th) which are to be transformed into regiments of the *Type Région Fortifiée*, and one regiment (170th) of those which are to be transformed into *Type Mixte* regiments. This reorganization involves practically no movement of troops.

As a consequence of the above measures, the four infantry divisions concerned will be reduced to two infantry regiments each, instead of the normal three, which they all have at present, except the 43rd Division, which has four regiments. In other words the 11th, 12th and 42nd Divisions are to be reduced from nine battalions to six battalions each and the 43rd Division from twelve battalions to seven battalions.

(N.B.—The 43rd Division is to include one *Type Mixte* regiment, the 158th, of four battalions.)

It is announced that the groups of fortified area horse drawn artillery will be organized into one regiment consisting of eight batteries of light and four batteries of heavy guns, and one group consisting of four batteries of light and two batteries of heavy guns. It is also stated that the five regiments of foot artillery are to have increased establishments and will consist of a varying number of batteries—seven to twelve. These five regiments are to be mechanized.

(b) *Mechanization.*

The artillery of the 15th Division is to be mechanized, for which purpose credits have been asked for in the 1933 Estimates.

(c) *Foreign Legion (Infantry Units).*

A decree dated 1st February, 1933, lays down new establishments for the infantry units of the Foreign Legion. The principal features of this decree are—

- (i) The 5th Regiment (stationed in Indo-China) will have three instead of four battalions.
- (ii) The establishment of each infantry regiment of the Foreign Legion will be 80 officers, 2,924 other ranks, an increase of 2 officers and 24 other ranks.
- (iii) The establishment of the French *cadre* is now laid down, *i.e.*, 100 per regiment.
- (iv) A depot is formed for the five regiments, the establishment of which will be 50 officers and 4,246 other ranks.
- (v) Motor companies will take the place of mounted companies, except in the case of certain regiments as decided by the War Minister.

(d) *Colonies.*

Certain changes are contemplated in the organization of the troops in the Colonies :—

- (i) *Indo-China.*—The autonomous Tong Brigade will be transformed into a division.

A battalion will (as noted above), be withdrawn from the 5th Regiment of the Foreign Legion.

- (ii) *West Indies.*—A machine-gun company and a battalion headquarters are to be created at Martinique. The reasons given for this are :—

To enable the natives to receive their military training under the recruiting law (although for reasons of economy they will only receive 6 months training instead of the usual 12 months).

To make a start with the organization of the naval station at Fort-de-France.

(N.B.—This naval station has not been in use since 1924 when it was sold.)

- (iii) *Pacific*.—The detachment at Tahiti is to become a company.
- (iv) *French Somaliland*.—The creation of a company of *tirailleurs indigènes* at Djibouti.

This port of call has hitherto possessed no military defensive organization. The Colonial Department considers that the time has come when a military organization should be given to this base which forms an important strategical link.

For reasons of economy it will not be possible to carry this out before 1st January, 1934, but token credits have been asked for in this year's estimates.

The native police forces in French Somaliland are to be reorganized into a native militia, which however, in peace remains a police organization under the civil authorities.

The organization and establishment of this militia will be as follows :—

Commander : A captain of Colonial infantry.

A foot " brigade " :

Europeans—1 subaltern officer.

5 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

Natives—180 other ranks.

A camel troop :

Europeans—2 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

Natives—50 other ranks.

On mobilization the militia will be placed entirely at the disposal of the military authorities. The mobilization of the militia will be authorized by the Governor after consultation with the O. C. Troops.

INDO-CHINA.

Pacification.

The Headquarters of the French forces in Indo-China have issued a statement on the work of peaceful penetration which has been carried out in the central plateau of South Indo-China.

In December, 1931, the Governor-General, acting on military advice, drew up a plan for the occupation of the central plateau on the

borders of Cambodia, Cochin-China and Annam. The task was entrusted to two companies. The first company of Annamite Mountain Light Infantry set out from Ban-Me-Thuot in a south-westerly direction and after a difficult advance through almost impenetrable forest made a strong post at Buon Djeng Drom in the heart of the unsubdued area from which the work of pacification and reconnaissance was carried out. By the end of the year over 60 villages, the existence of which had been unknown, submitted to authority.

Meanwhile the second company of Cambodian Light Infantry marching eastwards reached its advance base at Shrektum in February and there, with the aid of penal labour, made a road through an extremely unhealthy region of dense forest. At the end of six months they had advanced 40 kilometres and reached the Plateau des Herbes. It was decided after a reconnaissance carried out in October to make a permanent base 80 kilometres from Shrektum, which it is hoped the Annamite company will also shortly reach.

The authorities are very well satisfied at the peaceful manner and the short time in which the occupation has been carried out. It will be consolidated by building roads, establishing medical posts and by making local heads of tribes responsible for minor administration.

Repatriation of Indo-Chinese-Malgache troops.

In pursuance of the policy by which the number of Indo-Chinese-Malgache troops serving in France is to be greatly reduced, Annamite and Tonkinese troops are being steadily repatriated.

Promotions and Appointments.

General Bidon has taken over the command of the Cochin China-Cambodia Division, *vice* General Vallier.

General Thiry, it is said, will take over the supreme command of the Indo-China Group when General Billottee returns to France early in 1933. General Thiry at present commands the Annam-Tonkin Division.

ALGERIA.

Tour by Governor-General.

M. Carde, the Governor-General of Algeria, has been making an official tour by air through the Southern Territories. M. Carde left Algiers on the morning of 4th March in a military aeroplane escorted

by four other machines carrying his personal staff, and covered the 1,320 miles from Algiers *via* Biskra to Janet in 14 flying hours.

The Italian officer in charge of the Southern Territories of Tripolitania came from Ghat to Janet to greet the Governor-General by order of Marshal Badoglio, the Governor of Tripolitania, acting on instructions from Signor Mussolini. Franco-Italian courtesies were exchanged at an official banquet at Janet on 7th March.

BELGIUM.

Gendarmerie.

The press announces that the budget for the *Gendarmerie* for 1933 shows a reduction of 12,000,000 francs as compared with the budget for 1932. There is, however, one new item of importance, a sum of 410,000 francs for the installation of a permanent special system of wireless communication in the *Gendarmerie*.

Change in organization in the Ministry of National Defence.

It has been decided to do away with the Directorate of Military Personnel and Recruitment in the Ministry of National Defence, and to create a bureau in the General Staff to perform its functions. Colonel Colpin, who has been commanding the Regiment of *Carabiniers* in Brussels, will be at the head of this bureau. At the same time a new General Inspectorate of Recruiting and External Services (*Bureau de recruitment et des services extérieurs*) is being created, and Lieut. General Maton, the late Director-General of Personnel and Recruitment, has been appointed Inspector-General.

Appointments.

Lieut.-General Swagers, the present Commandant of the Staff College, is to be replaced in June by Major-General Tasnier, the present *chef-de-cabinet* of the Minister of National Defence. Major-General Tasnier is to be attached to the Staff College almost at once, and is being replaced in his present functions by Colonel Duvivier, who is at present commanding the Air Defence Regiment in Brussels.

Non-commissioned officers statute.

The Minister of National Defence has submitted a *project de loi* to the Chamber with the object of reforming the statute under which professional non-commissioned officers serve in the army, with the object of giving them an assured position up to the age limit. The

basis of the new statute is similar to that which governs the conditions of service of commissioned officers. Non-commissioned officers will only come under the statute when they have been admitted to the *cadre* of non-commissioned officers which can only take place after a certain period of service during which they have given proof of efficiency and goodwill. Vacancies in the *cadre* are published quarterly in all units and may be applied for by non-commissioned officers and are filled, other conditions being equal, by seniority. A non-commissioned officer may forfeit his membership of the *cadre* for the following reasons :—

- (i) Loss of Belgian nationality.
- (ii) Retirement in the normal way.
- (iii) Public manifestation of opinions hostile to the Constitutional Monarchy, to the fundamental institutions of the State, to the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, or for offences against the person of the King.
- (iv) Having been condemned to a criminal award or to a sentence of imprisonment for certain offences.
- (v) Deprivation of rank as a result of a military award.

The linguistic question in the army.

An Army Order has recently been published on this subject with the object of reducing the penalties of failure to pass the language examinations required for commissions. Henceforward any cadet of the Military College who fails to pass the examination in French or Flemish may present himself for re-examination in this subject only after a lapse, of not less than 3 months and not more than 12 months. In case of success he receives his commission immediately after the examination. While waiting for the new examination the cadet is sent either to the School of Application, to the school of his arm, or to his future unit in the rank of *adjudant*. In the event of failure to pass the second examination he is posted to his unit in the rank of *adjudant*. The same conditions will apply to candidates for commissions through the ranks.

Cadet schools.

The Minister of National Defence proposes as a measure of economy to suppress the elementary cadet schools which cater for the education of boys from ten to twelve years of age, who can, it is considered, perfectly well be educated in the ordinary State schools. There is no

question of abolishing the secondary or higher grade cadet schools. It is, however, probable that the Flemish section of the higher grade school now situated at Namur will be moved to Flanders.

Army Strength.

A *Project de loi* fixing the contingent for 1933 at 61,500 men was recently passed by the Chamber of Representatives. The numbers are made up as follows :—

Volunteers and re-engaged men	..	23,000
Recruits of the Annual Class	..	34,200
Reservists called up for training	..	4,300
		<hr/>
Total	..	61,500

The total figure, 61,500, shows a diminution of 1,500 men as compared with 1932. The Government stated that the major portion of this reduction has been achieved by the suppression of certain employments occupied by re-engaged men.

Financial situation.

The *project de loi* submitted to the Chamber by the Government to deal with the financial situation of the country and to institute the necessary economies has been voted by the Chamber. It includes certain amendments to the recruiting law. In future, conscripts serving over 8 months will receive an indemnity of 200 francs a month for the extra period of their service instead of 400 francs a month as heretofore. Married conscripts will in future receive an allowance of 100 francs a week during the period of their reservist training instead of 150 francs a week as in the past. The Minister of National Defence is authorised, however, to carry forward to 1933 the credits which remain from the sum of 210,000,000 francs which was voted in 1931 for fortification purposes. About 60,000,000 francs still remain unspent.

Inter-Ministerial Commission.

In the opinion of the Government, certain incidents during the strike of July last have shown the necessity of establishing a constant liaison between the three Departments of the Interior, Justice, and National Defence, with a view to the maintenance of order in the country. With this object it has been decided to create an inter-ministerial commission which will have the duty of studying the problem of the maintenance of order and deciding the measures which shall be taken to prevent a repetition of the errors committed in July.

ITALY.

The calling up of conscripts in 1933.

Instructions have recently been issued for the calling to the colours of this year's conscript class. As in former years, the class is divided into four main categories corresponding to the various periods of service—18 months, 12 months, 6 months and 3 months—to which conscripts may be liable. The normal period is 18 months but, provided that a conscript has passed his courses of "pre-military" training he may, for various family reasons, be allowed to serve for a reduced period.

The rules which govern the various kinds of "family situations" are lengthy and somewhat complicated. There are, for instance, 15 different "situations" which normally entitle conscripts to serve for a reduced period of 6 months, provided that they possess the requisite "pre-military" qualification. This reduction is, however, by no means automatic and the Minister of War is empowered to cause conscripts "collectively to pass from one category of liability of service to another." Thus, this year, conscripts belonging to 7 of the 15 categories are being excused all military training, whilst the greater part of the remainder are being held to serve for 12 months instead of 6. Conscripts who, for family reasons, are nominally liable to only 3 months service are, as usual, not actually being called to the colours.

Conscripts are enrolled at different times of the year according to the length of service to which they are liable. Those liable to serve for the full period of 18 months or for a reduced period of 6 months join their units in March. Those liable to serve for 12 months are called up in the autumn. The total strength of the annual class normally available for service in the army is approximately 250,000, of whom some 200,000 join the colours, whilst the remaining 50,000 obtain total exemption.

Promotion of Officers.

The question of blocks in promotion has for some time been exercising the attention of the Italian military authorities, and has, more than once, been ventilated in the Chamber and Senate. A special law has now been promulgated which is designed to deal with this problem.

There are two main blocks. The first consists of some 2,500 infantry captains commissioned in 1916, or earlier, and quickly

promoted to their present rank. The other is in the list of lieutenants, and includes those who were commissioned from the Reserve in 1921 with ante-dates according to war service.

Under the new law accelerated promotion is to be given to selected officers who are successful in passing certain tests or examinations, whilst a number will be absorbed by being seconded for special appointment in connection with mobilization, store-keeping and record duties. Special terms are also offered to a certain number of officers who, during the next 5 years, may elect to accept transfer to the half-pay list with a view to subsequent retirement. Provision is also made for the removal from the Active List of officers who are definitely not being considered for promotion. The law, in addition, makes special provision for dealing with promotion difficulties in the Carabinieri, and raises the age limit for the final retirement of those war disabled officers who are employed in government offices.

Protection of the civilian population against air attack.

For some time past the Italian Government has shown a keen interest in the question of the protection of the civilian population against air attack, and recently a law has been published which is intended to ensure that all tunnels constructed in urban districts shall be suitable for use as shelters against aerial bombardment.

It is laid down that in important towns or in their vicinity, newly constructed tunnels for roads, tramways, underground railways, ordinary railways, &c., must be fit for use as permanent shelters in case of air raids. In order to fulfil this purpose, they must comply with certain conditions specified in the law relating to depth, strength of roof, number of entrances, ventilation, lighting, &c. In the event of non-compliance with these regulations the offender will be liable to a fine varying from a minimum of 5,000 lire to a maximum equivalent to double the cost of the work executed. Responsibility for bringing the offender to justice will lie with the "Central Inter-Ministerial Organ for air protection of the national territory."

Apart from the fact that this is the first legislation of its kind, interest attaches to the reference to the "Central Inter-Ministerial Organ." This is presumably a Committee created to assist the Minister of War in discharging the responsibilities for passive air defence which were transferred to him last year from the Ministry of the Interior by decision of the Supreme Council of Defence.

Pre-military training in the Colonies.

Under a recent decree pre-military training has now been made compulsory in the Italian Colonies. The system is apparently to be similar to that in force in the mother country which provides for the training, under the direction of the Minister of War of all youths between the ages of 18 and 21 by means of two annual courses each of about 20 lessons.

In Lybia responsibility for the training is allocated to the 1st and 2nd Lybian Legions of the Fascist Militia and in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland to the autonomous cohorts of the Fascist Militia stationed in those colonies. As a temporary measure it is laid down that the young men of the 1912 class will only attend one annual course.

JAPAN.*Patriotic contributions to the Army.*

On 26th January, 1933, the Tokyo " Nichi-Nichi " reported that public monetary donations to the army for national defence had reached a total of Yen 6,764,779 (roughly £676,000 at par). The following were some of the items purchased with this money :—

- 63 aeroplanes.
- 27 A. A. guns.
- 27 A. A. machine guns.
- 7 observation cars.
- 9 searchlights.
- 32 audiophones.
- 1 tank.
- 3 armoured cars.
- 1 tractor.
- 9 motor trucks.
- 4 infantry guns.
- 3 motors.
- 23 heavy machine guns.
- 137 light machine guns.
- 32 bullet proof vests.
- 190 gas masks.
- 29,600 steel helmets.

In addition to specific subscriptions for the above material, numerous other voluntary contributions are being made to supplement army funds. For example, officers' wives, through a form of savings associations have contributed a sum of Yen 33,000 ; school children are encouraged in many instances to make small daily savings and the sum collected by this means is used to swell the funds raised for various patriotic motives. A further example of the constant and intensive patriotic propaganda that is being carried out, is provided by the action of the entire staff of the Osaka arsenal who worked one Sunday, which is normally a holiday, and gave their day's earnings of over Yen 10,000 to the "State Defence Fund of the Army."

Army Estimates.

According to the Japanese Press, the Cabinet has given approval to draft estimates for the financial year 1933-34 amounting to Yen 2,238,000,000 (£223,800,000 at par), which, incidentally, is the highest figure in the history of Japan. Of this total, approximately Yen 900,000,000, or 40 per cent., is, apparently, to be raised by loans. The estimated expenditure on the Army is Yen 447,883,000, and on the Navy Yen 372,606,000 ; together these sums amount to 37 per cent. of the whole. These estimates have to receive the sanction of the Diet before they become effective.

PORTUGAL.

Chief of General Staff.

General Eduardo Marques, who was Minister for the Colonies in the Portuguese Cabinet in 1930, has been appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Army. This appointment became vacant on the death of General Ivens Ferraz on 16th January, 1933.

Peninsula War Memorial.

A monument commemorative of the Peninsula War was unveiled at Lisbon on Sunday, 8th January, 1933. The decision to erect this memorial dates from the centenary celebrations of 24 years ago, but the completion of it has been delayed by various causes, among others the Great War, and then by what was judged to be the prior claim to commemoration of that cataclysm, to which a monument was inaugurated last year.

The new memorial stands in the main avenue of Lisbon. It takes the form of a high *stele*, surrounded by stone figures, life-like and allegorical, including a British lion, and surmounted by a bronze eagle about to take flight, symbolic, no doubt, of the expulsion of the armies of Imperial France.

The programme was such as is usual on these occasions. It was carried out with commendable punctuality and order, and was followed by a march past of representative units of the garrison of Lisbon. The troops were well turned out, and had the serviceable appearance which marks the Portuguese Army.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, the President of the Republic spoke to the British Minister gratefully of the participation of the British Army in the Peninsula War, and especially of the services of Wellington and Beresford.

Recruiting laws.

By a decree dated 22nd November, 1932, the Portuguese Recruiting Laws have been amended as follows :—

(a) Duration of active service.

In normal circumstances the duration of service in the ranks will be 17 months. Of this period the first 5 months will be devoted to general instruction and the elementary instruction of specialists. The remaining 12 months will be devoted to completing the instruction of specialists and to the professional instruction of the permanent cadres.

In exceptional circumstances, when the financial situation of the country so demands, the period of 5 months, referred to above, for general instruction, may be reduced by the Minister for War to 3 months.

(b) Incorporation of Recruits.

In future there will be two incorporations annually in all arms and services. The first will take place between 1st-5th May ; these recruits concluding their first 5 months by 30th September. The second incorporation will be from 1st-5th November, the recruits finishing their first period by 30th March in the following year.

The two incorporations, as far as possible, will consist of an equal number of recruits.

The first incorporation in 1933 took place from 1st-5th April, an exception being made in this instance only.

(c) *Discharge.*

Normally the discharge of recruits of the first and second incorporations in any year will take place respectively as follows: 1st-5th October, and 1st-5th April.

Anti-aircraft battery.

The arrival at Lisbon is announced of the first anti-aircraft battery for the Portuguese Army, purchased from Messrs. Vickers Armstrong.

It is further stated that the contract for a second battery, exactly similar to the first, is shortly to be signed with the same British firm.

Thus a first anti-aircraft group will be formed, with probable headquarters at Cascais.

Other anti-aircraft material is to be acquired for the Coast Artillery School, for training purposes.

Conversion of rifles.

The *Diario da Manha* announces that contract will shortly be signed between the Portuguese Government and the firm of Steyr Solothurn Waffen, of Zurich, for the conversion of all the rifles at present in use in the Portuguese Army.

Obituary.

General Arthur Ivens Ferraz, D.S.O., died on 16th January at Lisbon. General Ferraz was successively Chief of Staff, Chief Liaison Officer, and Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Corps in France during the Great War. From 1919 to 1922 he was Portuguese Military Attaché in London, holding later the same appointment at Washington. In 1928 he became Colonial Minister in Portugal, whilst in the following year he became Prime Minister. He subsequently held appointments as Administrator-General and Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Army. The funeral took place on 18th January with full military honours.

SPAIN.

Strength of the Army in Spain.

The *Gaceta de Madrid* of 1st January, 1933, contained the text of a law fixing for 1933 the strength in other ranks of the Army in Spain at 145,000. This law annulled the decree of 8th September, 1932,

which gave the figure as 151,000, and also provided further that " the Minister of War shall proceed to examine the question of a future reduction of the period of service in the ranks."

Strength of the Army in Morocco.

A Circular Order of 26th December, 1932, fixed the establishments of the Army in Morocco for 1933. The total figures given were :—

Officers.	Other ranks.
1,509	36,897

Co-ordination of Air Services.

In the Budgetary Law published on 29th December, the President of the Council of Ministers was authorized to organize the National Air Service by the co-ordination of the three branches—War, Marine and Interior.

Communist outbreak.

On 29th December, following an accidental explosion which led to the discovery of a bomb factory and arms store in Barcelona, the organization of a widespread revolutionary plot was prematurely set in motion. It is believed that the plot was originally intended to coincide with the railway strike due to take place on 20th December but which was eventually called off. On Sunday, 8th January, the anarchist outbreak became general, the more serious incidents being at Barcelona, Lerida, Valencia, Cadiz and in the neighbourhood of Madrid. Everywhere the scheme appears to have envisaged an assault on the barracks and military posts, in the belief that they would be found almost deserted on a Sunday.

In all cases the attacks failed, but a considerable number of the police, civil guard and *Guardias de Asalto* were killed in the disturbances.

Subsequent investigations have revealed extensive ramifications of the plot in all parts of Spain together with " cells " in the army, but there is no evidence to show that any military element was connected with the movement ; indeed, the soldiers appear to have acted loyally everywhere, nor is it probable that the Monarchists were concerned. The plot was undoubtedly organised by the Anarchists (*Federación Anarquista Ibérica*) with strong foreign financial backing. The situation is now once again normal.

Military frontier areas.

By the Decree of 15th February, the new boundaries of the military frontier areas are laid down. The frontier zone is divided into four sectors as follows :—

- (1) Pyrenees or North Frontier.
- (2) Portuguese Frontier.
- (3) North Coast.
- (4) East and South Coast.

The entire area of the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, and Spanish possessions in Africa will be regarded as military territory.

In the military districts there will be no restrictions in regard to building with the exception of roads, railways and aerodromes, which must be submitted for the approval of the War Ministry.

MOROCCO.

*Spanish Zone.**Army reductions.*

A Circular Order of 26th December fixes the establishment of the various units of the army in Morocco for 1933. These came into force with the new Spanish Budget on 1st January 1933, and entailed a slight reorganization and a reduction of some 245 officers and 5,280 other ranks. The total strength is :—

Officers, 1,509 ; other ranks, 35,169 ; grand total, 36,678.

The principal changes are as follows :—

- (i) Suppression of the Military Commands of Ceuta and Melilla, the troops coming directly under the orders of the G.O.C. the Circumscription.
- (ii) The 8 *Cazador* battalions to be reduced to 7 by the suppression of 1 battalion in the Western Circumspection (the battalion to be disbanded will be decided by ballot).
- (iii) The remaining 7 *Cazador* battalions will form two Infantry Groups, one in the Western Circumscription consisting of 4 battalions, and the other in the Eastern Circumscription, with 3 battalions.
- (iv) The cavalry Squadron of the *Tercio* to be suppressed.

(v) The *Tercio* to consist in future of 2 Legions each of 3 *Banderas*.

(vi) Cyclist sections are to be converted into platoons.

(vii) The number of military hospitals will be reduced to three, viz., Tetuan, Ceuta and Melilla. All other hospitals, both military and civil, will be converted into subsidiary hospitals under these three main hospitals.

In this reorganization, preference will be given to the volunteer personnel. All surplus soldiers will be discharged.

Surplus officers will be placed *en disponibilité*.

Administration.

A decree reorganizing the administration of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco was published on 6th January. All officials who have held posts for more than nine years in Morocco will be retired. The High Commissionership is henceforth attached to the Presidency of the Council, so that the High Commissioner will be under the direct orders of the Prime Minister instead of the Foreign Minister, and all officials, both civil and military, will be appointed by the former.

Orders and decrees affecting Morocco must be approved by both the Calipha and the Prime Minister, and will be published in the official "Journal" of the Protectorate before taking effect in that country.

New Gun.

The Ministry of War has adopted a new 40-mm. gun for infantry, invented by Major Antonio Ramirez de Avellano (artillery). It will be known as the *Canon Acero de 40 milímetros para Infantería modelo, 1933*; abbrev.: *C. Ac. 40 mm. I. mod. 1933*.

Military Appointments.

The following appointments have just been gazetted:—

To be Under-Secretary of War.

General de Brigada.—D. Luis Castello Pantoja, Commanding 6th Infantry Brigade, *vice* General Ruiz Fornells, stated to have resigned. General Ruiz Fornells has held the appointment since February, 1931. (General Castello was promoted *General de Brigada* in 1932).

To be Inspector-General—3rd Inspectorate.

General de Division.—D. Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, the last Director-General of the Guardia Civil, which appointment was

abolished on the organization of the Corps following the 10th August Revolution, 1932. Previously he was C.-in-C., Morocco.

This appointment has been vacant since June 1932.

To be Chief of Central General Staff.

General de Division.—D. Carlos Masquelet Lacaci, who has been acting Chief of the General Staff since the removal of General Goded in June, 1932.

To be G. O. C. 2nd Division.

General de Division.—D. Miguel Nunez de Prado, Military Commander of the Balearic Islands. This command has been vacant since General Gonzalez was removed from it after the 10th August Revolution. It has been held temporarily by General Ruiz Trillo in addition to his other duties as Inspector-General, 1st Inspectorate.

To be G. O. C. 6th Division.

General de Division.—D. Jose Fernandez Villa Abrille.

To be G. O. C. 7th Division.

General de Brigada.—D. Juan Garcia Gomez Caminero.

To be Military Commander—Balearic Islands.

General de Brigada.—D. Franciso Franco Bahamonde, commanding 5th Infantry Brigade.

U. S. A.

Mechanization.

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Douglas MacArthur, deals with the subject of mechanization at considerable length in his annual report for the year ending 30th June, 1932. After tracing the progress of mechanization from the introduction of the tank in the Great War and referring to the study of the problem in foreign armies, he states that during the past year seven combat vehicles of the "Christie" combination wheel and track type were obtained at a cost of 262,000 dollars (£55,000 at par) and 12 armoured cars of the most modern type for 190,000 dollars (£40,000 at par). Viewed solely from the standpoint of the acquisition of mechanized equipment these accomplishments appear small specially when compared with the probable requirements of the United States Army in a major mobilization; in contrast it is interesting to note that the United States

Government had made arrangements at the time of the Armistice for the production of 19,000 tanks for the 1919 campaign. Nevertheless the Chief of Staff claims that progress in the solution of such a complicated problem cannot be measured by the number of vehicles produced.

He then reviews the progress of mechanization in the various arms of the service, for the United States Army has no separate Tank Corps. The cavalry are chiefly interested in armoured cars and cross country vehicles possessing a high degree of strategic mobility, with fighting power and tactical mobility an important, though secondary, consideration. One cavalry unit, the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) stationed at Fort Knox, Ky., has been set aside as a laboratory in which to develop tactics and test the machines made available. Development cannot come suddenly and cavalry must still depend upon mounted units in carrying out certain of its missions. While the eventual elimination of the horse can be predicted, it is certain under present conditions some mounted units must be kept available for use in emergency.

The infantry, on the other hand, require a machine with a high degree of tactical mobility even at the cost of reducing strategic mobility. An essential requisite in the assaulting tank is sufficient armour to enable it to negotiate the band of fire laid down by the defence. Defence against small arms fire alone is possible, anything else being impracticable owing to the weight of armour which would have to be carried. For protection against artillery fire the tank must rely on mobility and the use of ground.

The Tank School has been incorporated as a part of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., during the year.

The artillery also has made progress in substituting machines for animals, and early mechanization of practically all field artillery can be predicted. This arm is not primarily concerned with protective armour for its personnel and the problem is principally one of mobility.

The Chief of Staff next reviews some of the limitations governing the practical application of mechanization. He mentions the inability of armoured fighting vehicles to negotiate unsuitable terrain such as swamps, mountains, thick woods, streams and extremely rough ground. Another factor is the lack of sustained defensive power in machines whether armoured or not, their usefulness in battle being limited to situations demanding continuous movement.

If the attack is to be supported by strong mechanized units, development in infantry equipment must be towards the inclusion of greater numbers of weapons capable of disabling the tank. A factor complicating tank design is the continuous progress in producing bullets of extraordinarily armour piercing qualities. A very high velocity bullet (5,800 feet per second) has recently been developed which gives promise of being able to pierce any armour now carried on tanks and other fighting vehicles. If this development should prove capable of general application in all types of small arms, tank design and even the whole theory of mechanization will necessarily undergo revolutionary changes.

Models of armoured fighting vehicles tend to become rapidly obsolete owing to new inventions. Under present conditions General MacArthur considers that any attempt to maintain large units equipped with efficient models of armoured fighting vehicles would entail the replacement of equipment every few years at prohibitive cost. He says:— "In view of these considerations present progress towards mechanization must consist principally in the production of the best in pilot models ; making precise pre-arrangements for speeding up their production in emergency ; procuring annually sufficient numbers for thorough tactical test and for developing tactical doctrine of mechanized units ; and indoctrinating the whole army in methods of co-operation so as to capitalize fully the inherent capabilities of these machines and make allowances for their inherent weaknesses."

Reviewing the actual production of pilot models he refers to the "Christie" wheel-cum-track vehicle which, owing to its speed, was responsible for awakening the cavalry to the possibility of supplanting the horse in some of its units by fighting machines. Seven of these tanks have been acquired during the past fiscal year and are being tested by both infantry and cavalry. He says: "Preliminary reports indicate that mechanical defects are still such as to bar the adoption of these machines as standard equipment, but hope exists that improved models may yet prove satisfactory." Development in armoured cars has been more satisfactory.

There can be no possibility for some years to come that units equipped with the most modern types of fighting vehicles will be available at the outbreak of war. The army must therefore be prepared to utilize existing means at the same time that it tries to develop more efficient means to achieve victory.

"This brings up the important question of providing for speedy production by commercial firms of tanks and other types of armoured vehicles in emergency. These arrangements cannot be complete while experimental types are still being developed as exact manufacturing specifications cannot be prepared. Plans will necessarily be revised continuously. In spite of difficulties definite progress in this direction has been realized the supply branches working under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War are making every practicable preparation. As a result it is now possible to predict that, in any emergency involving a major mobilization, tanks will reach quantity production in approximately 12 months. While this estimate may eventually be somewhat reduced, it is certain that an appreciable length of time will always be required for the conversion of manufacturing plants from peace time activity to production of this character."

The effect of mechanization on the manpower required for mobilization cannot be foreseen owing to maintenance problems. Complicated weapons and machinery applied to the battlefield have tended to require a highly trained personnel and the use of more rather than fewer men.

Philippine Independence.

On 29th December 1932, a Philippine Independence Bill was finally passed by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President for his approval. On 13th January, President Hoover returned the bill to Congress without approving it. The President's veto was, however, subsequently over-ruled by the necessary two-thirds majority of both Houses and the measure thus became law, subject to its acceptance by the Filipinos.

The Bill provides for a Philippine Convention to be called within two years to draft a Constitution which shall then be submitted to a plebiscite of the Filipinos. If they accept this constitution they accept independence. As soon as the constitution is accepted, a ten-year period of transition government under an American High Commissioner begins. During this period American military occupation of the islands continues and certain measures are put into force to prepare the way for complete independence. Philippine immigration into the United States is regulated, and duty free exports to the United States are restricted to specific quantities and tariffs gradually intro-

duced so that by the end of the period the islands are prepared to take their place outside the tariff walls of the United States.

Finally, after the ten-year period, when independence becomes complete, the United States retains the right to maintain naval and military stations in the islands and promises to make an effort to secure the international neutralization of the islands.

GERMANY.

Changes in organization and drill movements.

The new organization of companies in 3 platoons each of 3 homogeneous groups (*Einheitsgruppen*) of a light automatic section and a rifle section, and a new column of route system (column of threes instead of column of fours).

German Army Orders of January, 1933, lay down that the organization of nine homogeneous groups will now be adopted in all rifle and pioneer companies. In addition, other units (*e.g.*, cavalry, &c.) will adopt this organization and the column of threes when fighting or marching dismounted.

REVIEWS.

“Modern Military Administration, Organisation and Transportation.” BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. C. HARDING-NEWMAN,
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(*Messrs. Gale and Polden, Ltd., London, 1933*) 2s. 6d.

Many men who retire from active employment feel the urge to put down on paper something of the experience they have gained in the hope that thereby they may benefit the younger generation. Some write a ‘Story of My Life,’ and when the writer is an outstanding national personality, a public is assured. When the writer has led a life off the beaten track, full of adventure and strange occurrences, a public to read his ‘Life’ will not be wanting.

The author of “Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation” belongs perhaps to a third category. He has no desire to inflict on the public his personal history but he does wish those of his own profession to benefit by his knowledge and experience of his subject. In this pamphlet he hopes to appeal to “a wider public than the ranks of the Regular, Territorial and National Armies of this country and the Dominions.”

Unfortunately he has chosen a title for his work which definitely will not attract the non-military public. Indeed it will not attract the military reader except perhaps those who already are interested in the subject or who are serious students of military matters. I use the word ‘serious’ with intention because the author has a style of expression which is often not easy to follow, a style which will soon tire the casual reader.

It is not possible in a short note to comment on the very great range of subjects which are covered in this pamphlet of eighty pages. Those portions of the work which give the teachings of experience and principles in matters of transportation are of particular value to the student. In other places there are expressions of opinion which although it is not possible sometimes to see eye to eye with the writer, definitely stimulate thought and put a different view on matters which have come to be accepted by most soldiers as irrevocable.

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
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
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
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
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CONTENTS.

Secretary's Notes.

Editorial.

1. Essay, by "Manuscript".
2. Britain's Customers, by Major H. G. Tranchell.
3. Remounts, by "Horse Coper."
4. Test Impressions in Australia, by "Charger."
5. Light Infantry Training, by "X" (I. A.)
6. The Industrialisation of the U. S. S. R., by Stephen Barnes.
7. The Co-ordination of the Fighting Services, by Captain J. H. C. Currie.
8. The Relief of Lucknow.
9. The War Game, by Lieut.-Colonel J. McM. Milling, M. C.

Letters to the Editor.

Military Notes.

Reviews.



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
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
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| 16. Brigadier The Viscount Gort, V.C.,
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| | 20. Major A. F. R. Lumby, C.I.E., O.B.E. |

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Editorial	410
1. Essay	422
2. Britain's Customers	446
3. Remounts	452
4. Test Impressions in Australia	464
5. Light Infantry Training	471
6. The Industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.	481
7. The Co-ordination of the Fighting Services	487
8. The Relief of Lucknow	494
9. The War Game	505
Letters to the Editor	514
Military Notes	516

REVIEWS.

1. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914—18, Vol. IV. The A.I.F. in France 1917 ..	531
2. The 4th Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment (D.C.O.) in the Great War	533
3. Grant and Lee—A Study in Personality and Generalship	534

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 21st August 1933 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

W. Christie, Esq., M.C., I.C.S.	Major	A. R. Street.
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„ J. D. Milne.	„ G. S. Dhillon.
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„ R. C. Crowdy.	„ „ H. I. Ahmad.

Gentleman Cadet D. R. Rai.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9. A.M., until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 1-8-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8. A revised up-to-date catalogue is under compilation and will be available for issue toward the end of the current year.

V.—New Books.**BOOKS RECEIVED.**

<i>Title.</i>	<i>Published.</i>	<i>Author.</i>
Grant and Lee—A Study in Personality and Generalship	.. 1933 ..	Maj.-Genl. J. F. C. Fuller.
The Statesman's Year Book	.. 1933
War in the Air, 1936	.. 1933 ..	Major Helder.
The Official History of Australia in the War, 1914—1918, Vol. IV, The A. F. I. in France, 1917.	1933 ..	C. E. W. Bean.
Generalship—Its Diseases and Their Cure.	1933 ..	Maj.-Genl. J. F. C. Fuller.
Thirty-Five Years, 1874—1909	.. 1933 ..	H. Spencer Wilkinson.
Egypt Since Cromer 1904—1919, Vol. I	1933 ..	Lord Lloyd.
Official History of the Great War, Operations in Macedonia to the Spring of 1917, Vol. I.	1933 ..	Capt. Cyril Falls and A. F. Becke.
Storm Over India	.. 1933 ..	Henry J. Greenwall.
Napoleon Passes	.. 1933 ..	Conal O'Riordan.
The Staff College Examination Lecture Series.	1933 ..	Lt.-Col. B. C. Denning.
The Coming Struggle for Power	.. 1932 ..	John Strachey.
The Queen and Mr. Gladstone	.. 1933 ..	P. Guedalla.
The Eclipse of British Sea Power	.. 1933 ..	Sir Archibald Hurd.
The Monetary Problems of India	.. 1933 ..	L. C. Jain.
The Great Illusion	.. 1933 ..	Norman Angell.
The Science of War 1891—1903	.. 1933 ..	Col. G. F. R. Henderson.
Hot Air in Cold Blood	.. 1933 ..	Brig Genl. G. Livingstone.
The Concise Ludendorff Memoirs, 1914—18	.. 1933 ..	Ludendorff.
War Memoirs, Vol. I.	.. 1933 ..	David Lloyd George.
The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 1885—1895, Vol. II.	.. 1933 ..	J. L. Garvin.
Russia and Asia	.. 1933 ..	Lobanov-Rostovsky.
The Tactics and Strategy of the Great Duke of Marlborough	.. 1933 ..	Hilaire Belloc.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

The British Commonwealth of Nations	..	Duncan Hall.
New Imperial Ideals	..	Stokes.
Marlborough, His Life and Times, Vol. I.	..	Winston Churchill.
Storm U. S. A.	..	Claude Cockburn.
Peacemaking 1919	..	Harold Nicolson.
Napoleon III. The Modern Emperor	..	Robert Sencourt.
The Life of Wellington	..	Sir John Fortescue.
Poland	..	Roman Dyboski.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) Campaigns.

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set from October 1933 for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii) and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of the books recommended for the study of each :—

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
October 1933 .. March 1934	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the "History of the Great War—Military Operations,—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I & II.	"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vol. II, Parts I & II" (Cyril Falls). "The Palestine Campaign" (Wavell).
March 1934 .. October 1934 March 1935	France and Belgium, 1914 ; up to and including the Aisne.	"Official History of the Great War—Military Operations—France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. I." "40 days in 1914" (Maurice).
October 1934 .. March 1935 October 1935	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	"Official History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I." "Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign" (Evans). "Tigris Gunboats" (Nunn).

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R. A. I., the following books are recommended :—

"Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation" (Harding-Newman).

"Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).

"A. & Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell).

"Military Law," 1932 (Banning).

"The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).

"Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy).

"Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).

"Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott).

"Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence" (Cole).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) The following books are recommended for the above campaigns :—

(i) *The Strategy of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796.*

Rise of General Buonaparte (Spencer Williamson).

Principles of War (Foch).

Vol. XI of 11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(ii) *The Strategy of the Waterloo Campaign, 1815.*

Six British Battles (Belloc).

Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).

11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(iii) *The Strategy of the Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.*

Short History of the British Army (Sheppard).

Life of Wellington (Fortescue).

(iv) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the American Civil War.*

True History of the Civil War (G. C. Lee).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65
(W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmunds).

Stonewall Jackson (G. F. R. Henderson).

Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (Maurice).

The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

(v) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan-Robinson).

The Japanese in Manchuria (Cordonnier).

Critical Comments only in the "Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military)."

Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Ian Hamilton).

(vi) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of War.*

Official Histories—Military Operations, France and Belgium

Vols. I—V. Egypt and

Palestine Vol. I and

Vol. II, Parts I and II.

Gallipoli, Vols. I and II.

Mesopotamia, Vols. I and

II.

The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign (Evans).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

- {vii} *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the East Prussian Campaign, 1914.*

Tannenburg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Ironside).

The World Crisis, Eastern Front, 1931 (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

- {viii} *The Strategy and Tactics of the Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.*

The Official History, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Vol. II, Parts I and II.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

- {ix} *The Strategy and Tactics of the action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.*

The Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vol. I.

40 Days in 1914 (Maurice).

Liaison, 1914 (E. L. Spears).

- {x} *The Strategy and Tactics of the 3rd Afghan War, 1919.*

The Official Account (General Staff, India, 1926).

- {c} In addition to the above, the following books are recommended for the various subjects :—

- {i} *Strategy and Tactics.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (F. M. Sir W. Robertson).

Governments and War (Maurice).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Lectures on F. S. R. II (Fuller).

Lectures on F. S. R. III (Fuller).

War and Western Civilization, 1832—1932 (Fuller).

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

Military History for the Staff College Entrance Examination (Sheppard).

In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy).

Passing it on (Genl. Sir A. Skeen).

Report of the Dardanelles Commission.

◀(ii) *Organization, Administration and Transportation.*

Military Organization and Administration, 1932 (Lindsell).

A. & Q. or Military Administration in War (Lindsell).

Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation (Harding-Newman).

Administrative Schemes with Solutions (Kirby and Murison).

Outline of the Development of the British Army (Hastings-Anderson).

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. S. O.).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

League of Nations : Armaments Year Book, 1932 (Special Edition).

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

Declaration of British Disarmament Policy, 1932.

Commonsense about Disarmament (Lefebure).

◀(iii) *Military Law.*

Military Law, 1932 (Banning).

◀(iv) *The History and Organization of the Empire.*

Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).

Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

British Empire (Basil Williams).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32.

Problem of the N.-W. F., 1890—1908, with a survey of policy since 1849 (Davies).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt since Cromer, Vol. I. (Lord Lloyd).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakely).

Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott).

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College Examination by introducing as many new schemes as possible. The Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1933 Army Headquarters Staff College Course. These as well as *Precis of Lectures* can be supplied at annas eight per copy plus postage. If maps are required, a charge of Rs. 2 extra is charged.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering, members are requested to give the subject of the schemes, etc., required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1933.

(A)—Tactical Papers.

Continuous Exercise No. 1 "March Orders," with solution.

Continuous Exercise No. 2 "Operation Instructions," with solution.

Continuous Exercise No. 3 "Military Appreciation," with solution.

Continuous Exercise No. 4 "Attack Orders," with solution.

Continuous Exercise No. 5 "Defence Orders," with solution.

Strategy and Tactics—

Withdrawal Scheme.

Counter-Attack Scheme.

Attack Scheme.

Mountain Warfare Scheme.

Cavalry Exercise.

NOTE.—A number of schemes (with solutions) set for the 1932 A. H. Q. Staff College Course (referred to in the July 1933 number of the Journal) can be supplied at the same rate, *i.e.*, annas eight per copy, plus Rs. 2/- per map, if required.

(B)—Precis of Lectures, etc.

Military History.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931).

The History and Organization of the Empire (1932).

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the Influence of Modern Inventions on Warfare (1932).

Tactical Lessons of the Great War (1932).

Cavalry, I (1932).

Cavalry, II (1932).

Artillery, I (1932).

Artillery, II (1932).

Engineers, I & II (1932).

Tactical Employment of Tanks (1932).

Chemical Warfare (1932).

Night Operations (1932).

Frontier Warfare (1932).

Air Co-operation (1932).

Military Law.

Military Law, I (1932).

Military Law, II (1932).

Military Law, III (1932).

Military Law, IV (1932).

Specimen Military Law Paper (1932).

Organization, Administration and Transportation. Mobilization (1932). Reinforcements in War (1932).

Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—Specimen Examination Paper with notes (1932).

Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—Specimen Examination Paper (1932).

"Q" Services in Peace (1932).

Movements (1932).

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper (1932).

Supply of a Division in War (1932).

Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper (1932).

General.

Notes on Military Writing (1932).

Essay—Specimen Paper (1932).

Hints on Working for Examinations (1930).

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the

Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk, will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award).

1889 .. BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

1891 .. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.

RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

* *N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFOLD, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F.F.), (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200).
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C. O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
 KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
 SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K.G.O., Bengal Sappers and Miners.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., v.c., c.b., r.a.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., r.a.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., r.a.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., r.e.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., r.e.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., s.c.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., r.e.
 YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALY, Maj. H., r.e.
 CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., s.c.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., r.e.
 LUBBOCK, Capt. G., r.e. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., d.s.o., Norfolk Regiment.
 BOND, Capt. R. F. G., r.e. (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., d.s.o., r.f.a.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
 1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
 1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
 1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
 EISMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
 1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
 1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
 1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
 1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
 NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides
 (specially awarded a silver medal).
 1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
 1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
 1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
 1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
 1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
 1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
 1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
 1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
 1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
 1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
 1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
 1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
 1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
 1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).

NOTICE.

The Council has decided—

- (i) In order to assist Officers suffering from the cut in pay, payment of the Entrance Fee be suspended during 1933.
- (ii) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of s10/6 per annum.
- (iii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are eligible for membership of the Institution.
- (iv) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.
- (v) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and Indian Air Force, are eligible for the award of the MacGregor Memorial Medal.

The Journal

OF THE

United Service Institution of India.

Vol. LXIII. OCTOBER, 1933. No. 273.

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

EDITORIAL.

The essays submitted for the 1933 Gold Medal were, on the whole, **The Prize Essay, 1933.** disappointing, although the total entries received were larger than for some years past. The Judges have recommended that the Gold Medal should not be awarded—the fifteenth occasion on which it has been withheld since the competition was started in 1872. With this opinion the Council of the Institution have agreed.

The best essay in each of the two subjects has been awarded half the monetary prize, and in this issue we publish the paper submitted by “Manuscript” on subject (ii):—

“Discuss the tactical employment of Light Tanks,

(a) with cavalry,

(b) with infantry,

in both the plains of India and in the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier. Particular reference should be made to the problems of Maintenance and Supply.”

“Manuscript” has written a good paper, full of meat for the cavalryman and, in its main essentials, sound. But, the writer, being a cavalry man, has devoted his attention to the mounted aspect and has chosen to ignore the full terms of the subject set forth. He has made insufficient reference to the Mountain Warfare difficulties, and has fought shy of a thorough examination of the maintenance problem. There is a tendency all through to erect cock-shies for the fun of knocking them down, and the essay is not free from inconsistencies.

For example: "the Light Tank Company may well be sent on ahead of the advanced guard to seize a tactical locality," and later: "there is no question of their being asked to hold on to any specific piece of ground as infantry must do. For this they are entirely unsuitable."

Again, the writer is too ready to ask for more, a tendency noticeable in all our experimenters with mechanised weapons. He recommends the addition of all sorts of vehicles, tracked and otherwise, for purposes of communication, command and extra personnel. All these would only add to the famous "tail" of the modern army and would stultify the very purpose of mechanisation. Finally, the main criticism of the essay must be its disregard for the problem set regarding the tactical employment of Light Tanks with infantry. "Manuscript" devotes twenty-three type-written sheets to the tank-cavalry role and only one and a half to their co-operation with infantry. This omission was pounced upon by all the Judges and is the main reason why the paper was not considered of sufficiently high standard to justify the award of the Gold Medal.

Despite this detailed criticism of the essay, we can cordially recommend it to the attention of those of our readers who are interested in this most important aspect of training, but we must at the same time express our polite disagreement with some of the conclusions reached therein. In the next issue of the Journal we will publish the best essay received on the alternative subject concerning the thorny problem of increased mobility on the North-West Frontier.

* * * * *

It has been unfortunate for the Government of India and Army Headquarters that the recent disturbances on the North-West Frontier have coincided with what might be called the "silly season" of Indian politics. The amount of hot air and ink expended on criticisms of the unavoidable operations against India's enemies would be enough to inaugurate Federation. Because some misguided and completely ignorant politicians in England raised their petulant voices against the use of bombing, the uninstructed press of India swelled the chorus of condemnation, and succeeded in raising a spurious agitation against almost any action to maintain peace on the border. This is a remarkable manifestation of public opinion and augurs no good for the future.

**Frontier
Events.**

To the soldier the problem was comparatively simple. There were two distinct operations which happened to be simultaneous; one against the Bajauris, and the other in defence of the Halimzai tribe against the aggression of the Upper Mohmands. During the summer certain sections of the Bajauris in the Chaharmung Valley gave sanctuary to a mysterious stranger who proclaimed that he was a relative of Amanullah, and that his intentions were to raise the tribes against the Government of Afghanistan. The powers of mischief of an agitator of this description on the Indian side of the Durand Line are well known, and, apart from Government's international obligations in such affairs, it was obviously to our interests to eject the fire-brand. The Bajauris refused to accept any political advice, so towards the end of July an ultimatum was presented to the effect that, if the wanted men were not handed over within a certain specified time, the Government of India would take such action as seemed necessary, either by troops or by air-craft.

This threat was carried into effect during the first week in August when the village of Kotkai was bombed from the air, the principal target being the residence of one Dilawar Khan, the agitator's principal host. Generous warning was given; the village was completely evacuated; material damage to property was effected; no lives were lost; and, finally, with the arrival of troops at Balambat, the mysterious stranger vanished. The total cost to Government for the air expenditure was Rs. 15,000/-. We can find no adequate parallel to this minor operation in recent Frontier history, so remarkable for its rapidity, for its humanity and for its cheapness. Its only disadvantage is in the disappearance of the chief male-factor, who, like the Lewanai Faquir and the Haji of Turangzai, may live to bob up again in some further villainy.

The Mohmand affair was of a different category. The Upper Mohmands have long borne a grudge against the Halimzais, a Lower Mohmand tribe whose integrity has been assured by Government. Rising from the murder of an Upper Mohmand by a Halimzai and the boredom which follows the end of the harvest season, a small *Lashkar* of Upper Mohmands invaded the Halimzai country in the middle of July. They were routed and returned to their country in a dangerous frame of mind. The Government of India, thereupon, in pursuance of the promise made last year to afford protection to the

'assured' tribes, decided to build a road from Shabkadr into Halimzai territory as far as Ghalanai so that assistance would be quickly available from British India for the threatened tribes.

Events then moved swiftly. The enemy collected two formidable *Lashkars*, one near the Khapak Pass and the other near the Nahakki Pass, and were preparing to invade the Halimzai country which was also in a state of mobilisation. In the meantime, however, the Peshawar Brigade had reached Dand Banda, the Nowshera Brigade were at Pir Kala, and the Mohmand Blockade line was held by cavalry, Frontier constabulary and armoured cars.

This prompt action by the military forces, combined with the threat of air action—reconnaissance machines flew daily over the turbulent area as a gentle reminder of the long arm of the law—discouraged the Upper Mohmands. Desultory fighting and sniping occurred, with the tribesmen getting the worst of it. Reconnaissance aeroplanes were being continually fired at and a stern warning was issued that combined operations against the hostile *Lashkars* would be taken in the Kamalai area. These warnings were dropped on the 17th August and had excellent results. Next day a *Jirga* was convened, and as a result, the Upper Mohmand *Lashkars* decided that it would be wiser and safer to disperse. Malcontents continued to shoot up our camps and road protection troops and it was not until the 22nd September that 'peace' was formally declared.

What are the results of these operations? Firstly, a metalled road has been constructed from Shabkadr to Yusuf Khel, a distance of about twenty miles. Secondly, confidence in the strength of the Government of India to afford protection to its friends has been established in this particular area, with a corresponding disclosure of strength to the ever-troublesome Upper Mohmands and their kindred. These results, in themselves excellent, are to our mind inconclusive. There are great tracts of unadministered territory such as Bajaur and the Upper Mohmand countries which will continue to be running sores until some definite progressive policy of peaceful penetration by road-making and continual contact is undertaken by Government. Every year, dismally, we note these eruptions and approve of the palliatives administered, but the physician's day is over; we need a surgeon.

The other important aspect brought to the forefront by this small expedition is the use of aircraft for bombing purposes. Sentimentalists in England and Geneva, visualising the destruction of

Piccadilly Circus and the Place d'Etoile, imagine that the same slaughter of non-combatants occurs whenever a Frontier village is bombed. This view is of course a totally wrong one. We must, however, realise the world unpopularity of air bombing, and that we may be forced, for the sake of the greater cause, to limit its employment against tribal villages. (Incidentally, why an air bomb dropped after 48 hours' notice on an empty hamlet should be more unpopular than a bayonet inserted into the inhabitants is a question to which only the vociferous detractors of air action will be able to reply).

We shall soon be fighting on the frontier with kid gloves, an article of attire to which we, perhaps, could grow accustomed,—if only the armed and savage tribesmen would adopt similar sartorial refinements.

* * * * *

This Mohmand trouble is perennial and it would be foolish to **Lest We Forget.** expect that the termination of present hostilities is anything but a temporary truce. It is an extraordinary fact that educated public opinion in India accepts these frontier disturbances as ordinary, exciting for the moment just as a Test Match is exciting, but liable to be dismissed into limbo with all other newspaper sensations. Let us, therefore, review Frontier eruptions for the last ten years lest we forget that even current history may have its lessons.

1923. *Murders.*—Major Anderson and Major Orr (Khyber).

Mrs. Ellis (Kohat).

Captain and Mrs. Watts (Parachinar).

Major Finnis and Captain Baker-Jones (Zhob).

Operations.—The occupation of Razmak. The handing over of Wana to Khassadars. 37 Bombing flights carried out against the Ahmadzai Wazirs (Tochi).

1924. *Murders.*—Lient. G. H. Tapp (Sarwakai).

The Political Naib Tehsildar (Wana).

Operations.—Extensive air operations against Drap (Waziristan) and minor reconnaissances over Jalal Khel and Spli Toi.

1925. *Operations.*—Air operations lasting for 54 days against the Abdul Rahman Khel, Guri Khel and lesser sections of the Manzai Mahsuds.

Local flights round Razmak.

1926. A most peaceful year for the military forces. Excepting for three Indian soldiers shot on the Bannu perimeter, there was no disturbance.
1927. Trouble in the Upper and Lower Mohmand countries where the *anti-British* Haji of Turangzai and the Faqir of Alingar raised *Lashkars* threatening British territory. Air action taken. Rising from communal disturbances in Lahore, a Hindu boycott forced over 400 trans-Border Hindu families to seek refuge in Peshawar.
1928. *Operations*.—The blockade of the Madda Khel Wazirs. Minor bombing operations against the Giga and Nekzan Khel Mahsuds.
1929. *Murders*.—Lieut. M. Stephen, R. A., and Assistant Surgeon J. R. H. Cabral, I. M. D., near Razmak.
Operations.—Re-occupation of Wana. Minor trouble with the Haji Khel Chamkannis in the Kurram.
1930. Riots in Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Thal. Red Shirt agitation widespread, particularly in Mardan, Shabkadr and Charsadda.
 The Faqir of Alingar and the Haji of Turangzai join forces and create hostile *Lashkars* in Bajaur and Mohmand countries leading to the manning of the old Mohmand Blockade Line
 Air bombing.
 Two Afridi attacks on Peshawar. The occupation of the Khajuri Plain. Trouble in the Kurram.
 In Waziristan attacks on Boya, Datta Khel and Siga Air bombing.
 Razmak Column opposed near Tanda China.
1931. *Murders*.—Lieut. Synge and Private Whawell, R. T. C. (near Sarwakai).
Operations.—Three brigades in Khajuri until a settlement was effected with the Afridis in October.
 A year of air activity when valuable reconnaissances were carried out over Tirah and the Mohmand countries.
1932. More trouble in the Bajaur and Mohmand countries resulting in further air activity.
 The Chitral Relief opposed.
 The North-West Frontier Province raised to the status of a Governor's Province.

In this rough catalogue of events we have omitted all the forgotten internecine disputes and alarums which occurred among the tribes, particularly the Afridis and Orakzais and in the states of Buner, Dir and Swat. These settled themselves by a little blood-letting or by the intervention of the Political Authorities. They should be borne in mind, however, if one visualises tribal territory (as we do) as a boiling cauldron, sometimes simmering gently, but more often boiling over in the direction indicated by the insertion of another faggot in the fire underneath. This diary of frontier unrest speaks for itself and we refrain from comment. But we would like to know the name of the Government of India wit who first dubbed tribal no-man's land as "Unadministered" Territory; if he were alive to-day he would be grieved to see that his appellation is so happy.

* * * * *

The rise of the Nazis to supremacy in Germany was almost inevitable. Since 1919 Germany's greatest danger was **Hitlerism**. Communism, and it has been defeated by Hitler almost exactly as it was stamped out in Italy by Mussolini. Various constitutional parties in Germany rose to transitory power in their attempts to exterminate the poisonous doctrine. The Central Party, Democrats, National Liberals and Social Democrats, all succeeded temporarily in opposing the Russian-Jew gospel according to Marx, but their efforts were as flabby as those of Kerensky. Communism gained steadily, and the following table of representatives in the Reichstag in December 1932 will show its growth from infancy in 1920:—

National Socialist (Nazi) ..	196
Social Democrat (Moderate Labour) ..	121
Communist	100
Centre (Catholic)	70
German National People's (Monarchist)	54
Other parties	43
<hr/>	
Total ..	584

Internal factions among the other parties gave the Communist *bloc* a relative appearance of cohesion, but at the same time isolated it as a definite menace to be fought and conquered. And then Hitler, the dynamic Nazi leader and demagogue, sweeping all the other parties with him in his anti-Communist resistless fury, leapt into the lime-light.

The year 1933 will therefore be historical for the rise of Herr Adolf Hitler to the Dictatorship of the German Republic. Hitler, who is as widely execrated as were Mustapha Kemal and Mussolini in their early years of accession to power, will probably live to assume similar power and grandeur on the European stage. He has all the *flair* for dictatorship ; a passionate patriotism, superb ruthlessness in dealing with those whom, rightly or fanatically he deems to be the enemies of his ideals, a rather engaging contempt for the world's opinion of his methods, courage, conceit, and a dramatic sense for organization and publicity. Like Mr. Gandhi he is prone to indulge in sweeping assertions and generalities and to dislike the chilly reality of international facts ; but, unlike the Mahatma, he has no verbal qualms regarding the benefits of force for the purpose of implementing his policy.

It is idle to decry Hitlerism. Nazi dominance in Germany is now an accomplished fact, and although its flamboyancy, its rude upheaval of European polity and its crude reversion to the Middle Ages, are discordant elements in the harmony of ordered diplomacy, the world has now got to readjust itself to this new and upsetting factor. Since the Treaty of Versailles the resurgence of the broken German Empire into world politics and power has been a gradual, stubborn process from which many nations, in spite of their bitter war memories, have not been able to withhold their sneaking sympathy. As it became more generally realised that her exclusion was impossible, we have witnessed the attempts made during the last eight years to include Germany in all the efforts designed to establish the economical re-organisation of Europe.

We were content to watch the peaceful policies of Von Hindenburg, Stresemann, Dr. Brüning, Von Seeckt, the redoubtable General Von Schleicher and the pathetic Von Papen. We read their utterances at the innumerable European conferences, and were inclined to sympathise with them in their impotence against the inexorable sentence of Versailles in June 1919. Indeed, there were many in England, Italy and America who were irritated and ashamed by the uncompromising attitude which France always adopted towards her hereditary foe. Where are these German post-war leaders now ? Some are dead, some forgotten and some have fled. Only Hindenburg remains. The Nazi dictatorship is supreme, and every day it consolidates its internal lines and presents an unbroken front on all

its borders. The youth of Germany, for whom the Great War is but a humiliating historical fact due to no fault of their own, are on their feet again. They wear the Swastika, symbolical of Victory in Battle; they cheerfully submit to the "voluntary work" military organisations with all their drill and discipline; they are controlled and obedient, while daily they swell their numbers with the excitement inculcated by unscrupulous anti-foreign propaganda.

It is impossible to prophesy where all this patriotic agitation and Prussian *furor* will find an outlet. In their original appeals for power to the masses the Nazi leaders outlined a programme which cannot but help to cause war. These, like British election promises, are liable to be over-estimated in both their scope for mischief and their hope for the electorate. But they deserve notice. The main objects of this programme are, firstly, the revision of the Treaty of Versailles principally in the clauses dealing with War Guilt, rearmament and equality of armaments; secondly, the *Anschluss* with Austria; thirdly, the Nazis want the Corridor and Silesia back from Poland, and Danzig restored from its isolated freedom. There are minor payments to be credited also; such as Northern Schleswig from Denmark, Memel from Lithuania, Eupen and Malmedy from Belgium, and, if possible, the rendition of the former German overseas colonies. Finally, dark threats have been uttered regarding the present constitutions of the Saar and Alsace.

On the face of it this is an ambitious scheme which envisages nothing less than the restoration of pre-war Germany. Obviously it can never reach achievement; but when an overwrought Germany, disappointed of its immediate hopes (as it is certain to be), shows restiveness, it is not unlikely that its ruler may attempt to fulfil at least one of these promises. Then danger will arise. The present situation in Germany contains all the embers of war, and if the Nazis continue to fan them so windily there is every possibility of another European conflagration.

During the year, continuing the progress instituted by our predecessors in office, several innovations and changes have been made by the new Executive Committee. The Library, now outgrown in its original dimensions, is being completely overhauled and re-classified. The new catalogue will be available at the end of the year and will be an up-to-date production containing all military classics issued since the Boer War, as well as a compre-

The U. S. Institution.

hensive list of more general subjects. It would be of great assistance if members requiring the new catalogue would register their names now for their copies.

In order to assist officers working for the Staff College we are now able to issue all tactical schemes and precis of lectures at a flat rate of eight annas per scheme (cost of maps exclusive). We have secured from the General Staff fifty copies of the schemes set for the 1933 Staff College Course. If this supply becomes exhausted, it will be necessary to reprint them and the charges will then, necessarily, be slightly greater.

We would draw attention to the subjects set for the Prize Essay Competition, 1934, by the Council of the Institution. Two alternative subjects have been set, both of which should give scope for both civilian and military members, and we hope for a larger entry than usual. We also hope for Indian participation; up to the present there have been no Indian competitors for these Prize Essays.

Our membership continues to increase at a satisfactory rate principally among army officers. We would like to enrol more members from the Royal Air Force and the other services in India, as we consider that a wider interchange of ideas on all the important subjects which afflict the post-war forces would be to the mutual benefit of all arms. We would again emphasise that for the current year the Entrance Subscription has been waived; it is unlikely that this concession will continue in 1934 when, it is earnestly hoped and expected, the 5 per cent. cut will be restored.

During this year our Historical Research Section has been over-worked. It is surprising and encouraging to see how many of our readers take advantage of this facility, and we endeavour always to provide the information required. Occasionally this willingness recoils on our own heads in the shape of technical questions by members which are outside our province. We regret that we cannot provide the subject matter for essays or lectures set by formations in India; nor is it easy to produce all the names of regimental officers for the last seventy years, giving their dates of promotion and war services! Recently we were asked to give the latest official definition of "Strategy," an interesting line for research but rather vitiated in its seriousness by our correspondent's admission that the information was required to settle a bet. We therefore declined the responsibility.

* * * * *

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1934.

The Council has chosen the following subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1934 :—

- (a) **“It is often said that Indians are by nature divided into what might be called martial and non-martial races. This is a mere myth.....” (p. 65, Indian Military College Committee’s Report).**

Examine this quotation and state your own conclusions,

or

- (b) **The problem of the French in dealing with the tribes on the Southern and Eastern frontiers of Morocco, in the mountainous region of the Atlas, is in many ways similar to ours on the North-West Frontier of India.**

Contrast the two methods of control and administration and state in some detail what is, in your opinion, the best system of defence and control of the North-West Frontier of India (from Chitral to the Persian Frontier inclusive).

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.
- (2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1934.

- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1934.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

ESSAY.

“ Discuss the Tactical Employment of Light Tanks,

(a) with Cavalry,

(b) with Infantry,

in both the plains of INDIA and in the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier. Particular reference should be made to the problems of Maintenance and Supply.”

BY “ MANUSCRIPT.”

(NOTE:—Neither the Council of the U. S. Institution nor the Judges of the Essay Competition, 1933, agree necessarily with the opinions of the author).

Light Tanks with Cavalry.

The object of the first part of this paper is to examine the minor tactics of the employment of Light Tanks in co-operation with Cavalry, not to discuss grand tactics or the principles of employment of mobile forces.

The most satisfactory method, however, of approaching the subject appears to be first of all to review the characteristics of the Cavalry arm, and define its most important and most probable tasks, thus visualizing the circumstances in which the co-operation of Light Tanks is most likely to be required. From these premises it will be easy to deduce clearly what the requirements are, and how they can most satisfactorily be met.

The main characteristic of Cavalry is its MOBILITY, which confers upon it the power to—

- (a) move and fight at a distance from the main armies.
- (b) perform reconnaissance and protective duties without causing delay to slower moving troops ;
- (c) act against an enemy's flanks and rear ;
- (d) carry out a rapid and vigorous pursuit ;
- (e) fight a delaying action and disengage without being seriously committed ;
- (f) move quickly from a position in reserve to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity created by the other arms, exploit success, or restore a dangerous situation.

In addition to the above the mobility of Cavalry confers on it certain other capabilities, which are worthy of mention, *viz.*—

- (a) elasticity, or power to move in extended formations and concentrate rapidly, *i.e.*, controlled dispersion ;
- (b) speed of movement across fire-swept areas, thereby avoiding heavy casualties ;
- (c) power to charge and assault the enemy with the sword ; the “ arm blanche ;”
- (d) ability to co-operate with Armoured Fighting Vehicles ; and, as a corollary, to avoid getting to close grips with hostile Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

An analysis of the above characteristics and capabilities shows that Light Tanks possess them also to a marked degree, subject only to certain limitations as to mobility and maintenance. In addition they have the invaluable assets of immunity from S. A. A. fire and ability to fire their machine guns while moving.

It is advisable at this juncture to compare the relative mobility of Light Tanks and Cavalry, as it is upon this factor that the question of their co-operation mainly depends.

Over favourable ground Light Tanks can move distinctly faster than Cavalry, and this will usually enable them to make good delays caused by obstacles. (It is always preferable for them to go round two sides of a triangle along a known track, than to risk, for example, a difficult unreconnoitred obstacle on a more direct route with the consequent additional mechanical and crew strain).

Apart from maintenance difficulties, which will be referred to later, the main obstacles to Light Tank Movement can be summarized as follows :—

- (a) Any river, canal or stream of more than a certain depth. The stronger the current the less depth can a light tank negotiate owing to water piling up. The conformation of the banks is also all important. (Their fording capacity can doubtless be increased by improved design, and much can be done by Sappers in the way of flying bridges, rafts, etc., such as are at present being experimented with) ;
- (b) rocky or boulder strewn ground ; this may well be impassable to them ;

- (c) heavily inundated or rain sodden ground, which reduces their speed ;
- (d) very precipitous hill and *nala* country, which may either be impassable to them or only passable at a very slow speed.

Cavalry can traverse all these more rapidly than Light Tanks, and even where Light Tanks are definitely obstructed by them can often carry on. On the other hand there will be occasions when Light Tanks will be able to move over bullet-swept zones where Cavalry are either partially or entirely held up.

What is perhaps not fully realized is the extent to which the efficient co-operation and mobility of these arms depends on their close association and understanding of each other. Thus when all ranks of the Cavalry are 'Light Tank minded' they continually study the ground over which they move from the Light Tank aspect, and do not forget to send in information on the subject. At the same time the Light Tank Officers and men are afforded opportunities of seeing how Cavalry move across country. Mutual confidence is thus established. The use of special Cavalry Liaison Sections, to "ground scout" for the Light Tanks, can also be practised. It is obvious that, when the going is good, the Light Tanks will leave a Cavalry Liaison Section far behind, nor can it work in bullet-swept zones. It may also be said that Light Tank personnel should be capable of reconnoitring their own ground, but there is no doubt that, given practice, and used with forethought, such a Liaison Section can be of great assistance in difficult country.

The above leads to the conclusion that in so far as mobility is concerned, Light Tanks are eminently suitable for co-operation with Cavalry over normal ground, though it is essential always to remember the most serious difficulty, which is that as often as not where the Cavalry can go comparatively fast the Light Tanks may have to go slow, and *vice versa*. Just short of an objective in an attack, for example, there may be an unforeseen obstacle which horses can surmount without checking but which will hold up Light Tanks for an appreciable period.

From the above emerges the first and most important basic principle underlying the whole tactical employment of Light

Tanks with Cavalry. It is best described by the following quotations:—

- (a) From Tank Training, Volume II, 1927, 263. “The conception of Armoured Fighting Vehicles operating in close physical contact with Cavalry.....is out of date. They are weapons which make their presence felt at the right time and place by methods best suited to their characteristics” ;
- (b) from Cavalry Training, Volume II, 1929, 85 I. vi. “Cavalry and Tanks should never be ordered to conform rigidly to each others’ movements, as such action will hamper the initiative of both.”

Whenever it is in any way feasible the Cavalry and the Light Tanks should always co-operate, but their co-operation must be *elastic* ; sometimes one will play the more important part in an operation, sometimes the other.

Before proceeding with the actual details of minor tactics in their co-operation it is next necessary to define the basis of discussion more closely by an examination of the following :—

- (a) The most probable and most satisfactory allotment of Light Tanks to Cavalry ;
- (b) the scales of opposition and the types of terrain envisaged in various circumstances ;
- (c) the actual tasks which are most likely to be allotted to the Cavalry when the Light Tanks are co-operating with them.

(a). Our Cavalry is divided into Army Cavalry, the larger bodies acting under the Commander-in-Chief, and Divisional Cavalry, the Regiments which are allotted as an integral part of each Infantry Division. In the Army in India the highest existing Cavalry formation in peace time is the Brigade, though it is possible that in certain war contingencies a Cavalry or “Mobile” Division might be formed. The Cavalry Brigade in India is a self-contained, well-balanced, handy formation, able to use its mobility, and also, with its six gun R. H. A. Battery and its Machine Guns and Vickers Berthiers, possessed of considerable hitting power, which can if necessary be used to give covering fire to Light Tanks.

It is suggested that normally Light Tanks should not be placed under the orders of a smaller Cavalry Force than a Brigade, except when so temporarily sub-allotted by the Brigade Commander for a specific purpose.

The Light Tank Company, at present organized with a Headquarters and three Sections (27 Light Tanks in all), is the smallest self-contained Light Tank unit from an administrative point of view, the Section of seven Light Tanks being the smallest tactical unit for fighting purposes (though a sub-section of three may on occasions be detailed for purely reconnaissance duties). In any case it is a principle of the first importance that they should not be frittered away in "penny packets".

We will assume, therefore, that the normal allotment of Light Tanks to Cavalry in the Army in India will be one Company to a Brigade, and will formulate our tactical handling on this basis.

(b). Next come the scales of opposition and types of terrain, the two being more or less closely inter-related. The opposition can perhaps be suitably divided into three categories—

- (a) Not quite first class; comprising Cavalry, Artillery and Tanks, as well as Infantry, with Machine Guns and some Anti-Tank weapons and Armour piercing ammunition but comparatively poorly disciplined and organized; fairly competent Air Force;
- (b) Second class; some Cavalry of low category, a little Artillery and a few machine guns, but no Anti-Tank weapons, besides Infantry; negligible Air Force;
- (c) Tribesmen; armed with modern rifles, but with no machine guns or Artillery.

As regards the terrain, two types only, the plains and the mountainous North-West Frontier country of India, are postulated. It will be advisable here to mention briefly their peculiarities and probable effect on Light Tanks. The plains are, for the most part, uniformly flat and devoid of tactical features, with the exception of a few rivers and a large number of canals and water channels of varying dimensions.

Apart from these, a great many of which are definite Light Tank obstacles, there is nothing to obstruct movement, except recently irrigated or 'water worn' areas. Owing to the absence of observa-

tion points, and the numerous small woods and villages, however, visibility is surprisingly poor. While rendering control of the Light Tanks and successful co-operation more difficult, this facilitates the attainment of surprise. This terrain is, therefore, not unfavourable to the combined action of Cavalry and Light Tanks.

The North-West Frontier type of country comprises steep rocky ridges and hills, intersected by precipitous boulder strewn *nalas* of varying degrees of difficulty. Except where roads have been constructed only footpaths or mule tracks exist. Light Tanks can work over a proportion of this country, but not by any means all.

In a campaign in the Middle East, however, the most likely terrain is a combination of the two extremes, long stretches of flat plain interrupted occasionally by sharp rocky ridges, such as occur for example in PALESTINE or AFGHANISTAN.

The inference is that in such a Campaign the majority of the Light Tanks available will be used with the Cavalry in the plains sectors in their true mobile rôle, fighting in the mountain areas devolving mainly on the Infantry, occasionally reinforced by some Light Tanks.

Of the opposition envisaged, Class *C* need only be expected in the mountainous tracts, Classes *A* and *B* in either type of terrain.

(c) Now to take the tasks which are mostly likely to fall to the lot of the Cavalry and Light Tanks.

F. S. R., Volume II, 1919, 11.2 states:—

“The main duties of Cavalry may be classified as follows:—

(i) Reconnaissance.

(ii) Protection.

(iii) Participation in battle, including pursuit and withdrawal.

(iv) Raids and other special missions.

(v) Use as a mobile reserve.”

Mobile troops, as opposed to the main armies, have always in the past been sent out well ahead, while the latter were still a long way apart, not only to obtain information, but to seize tactical features such as a river line, and to delay the enemy and harass their concentration in such a way that their main forces will be in a less favourable position when battle is joined. In a Middle Eastern terrain, where the comparative paucity of roads and good tracks militates against the successful employment of Armoured Cars on distant reconnaissance,

situations are certain to arise in which a Commander will wish to utilize Light Tanks backed up by Cavalry to obtain such information, to confirm or supplement air reports, to 'make sure,' even though they cannot be expected to operate at such a distance as Armoured Cars where adequate roads do exist.

During the last hundred years such tasks, though losing none of their importance, gradually became so difficult of achievement owing to the reduced assaulting powers of the mounted man against small arms fire, that Commanders were compelled to forego the advantages hitherto accruing therefrom; it now appears reasonable to suggest that the introduction of efficient Light Tanks has restored the value of the mobile troops.

Work of this nature will, therefore, undoubtedly fall to the lot of the Army Cavalry again in the future, and at the very outset of a Campaign; its success or failure may well be one of the determining factors towards final victory or defeat. Working ahead of the main armies Cavalry and Light Tanks may expect ample opportunities of carrying out all the normal operations of war; it will be sufficient for our purpose therefore if we confine our examination of the minor Tank-cum-Cavalry tactics to this type of work, and do not enter into the major tactics of their subsequent participation in the main battle, and thereafter.

The tactical doctrine thus formulated for Light Tanks working with Army Cavalry will also hold good in principle should they be employed with a Divisional Cavalry Regiment.

We now have our picture complete:—A Company of Light Tanks with a Cavalry Brigade (INDIAN War Establishment) working as Army Cavalry out in front of the main Armies, over a normal Middle Eastern terrain, with the opposition as already depicted.

It is proposed to discuss the use of the Light Tanks in such circumstances under the following headings:—

(a) On the line of march.

(b) Reconnaissance.

(c) With an Advanced Guard.

(d) Attack and pursuit against

	{	Armoured Fighting Vehicles.
		Cavalry with Artillery.
		Infantry with Artillery.
		Artillery.

(e) Defence; Rear and Flank Guards.

- (f) Protection at rest ; Outposts and Perimeter Camps.
- (g) N.-W. F. Warfare ; (Passage of Defile, withdrawal, etc.)
- (h) Inter-communication and Control.

On the line of march.

On the line of march the position of the Light Tanks must depend firstly, on the tactical situation (including the scale of opposition anticipated) and how it is expected to develop, secondly on the ground, and thirdly, on technical limiting factors. In any case they should not be mixed up with the mounted troops, unless this is unavoidable during a night march which should seldom be the case ; they should then be either at the head or the tail of the fighting column. Cavalry Training, Volume II, 1929, Section 86.2 states : " If secrecy is important, the movement of Tanks will *normally* take place at night, and they will have to lie hidden or camouflaged by day." This is perhaps hardly true of Light Tanks working in co-operation with Cavalry, though there will be occasions when night movement is essential. They are inconspicuous and can, it is suggested, if secrecy is all important and at all feasible, move with the Cavalry Brigade's M. T. Column, until the time for their actual participation approaches. Camouflage is not of great value as, unless the ground is very hard or rocky, it is usually their tracks which betray them to the Air, particularly those scrapes on the ground caused by sharp skid turns. After the opening actions of a Campaign, however, it seems unlikely, once the enemy have realized that there are Light Tanks working with our Cavalry, that anything but local surprise on the battlefield, due to rapidity of manoeuvre, will be possible ; they will always be on the look out for them.

Unless the route is good or there is moonlight, or they can use headlights, whether shaded or unshaded, night marching is both exhausting to the crews and uneconomical in petrol and lubricants.

Where rapidity of advance is urgent, the Light Tanks must be right forward, moving by bounds between the Advanced Guard and the Main body so as to be readily available if required. This presents no difficulty if the Cavalry can move off the road, or if the Brigade is moving across country, when it will be in diamond or with two Regiments forward, in either case the Light Tanks being well up behind the centre of the landing regiment or regiments.

If the enemy have very few or no Anti-Tank weapons, the Light Tanks may well even precede the Advanced Guard, moving by bounds. They may thus often brush aside weak resistance before it has time to stiffen. They will only be used in this way with a particular object in view.

If not likely to be required tactically it is best for them either to move at the head of the M. T. Column, behind the Rear Guard, or when feasible independently by a separate route.

For all moves it is essential that the Cavalry Brigade Commander should study the ground before hand with particular reference to the Light Tanks, and, subject to tactical considerations, move them so that they gain the fullest advantage from it ; the ideal being for them to move at their economic speed, by bounds of 4—5 miles at a time, and with sufficient periods for brakebands to cool off after hilly country, so as to obviate avoidable mechanical strain.

Reconnaissance.

When the ground is favourable, and when speed is of paramount importance and the opposition anticipated not too strong (*i.e.*, Class B or C), there will be many occasions when they can with advantage be sent on right ahead of the Cavalry to reconnoitre tactical localities. They can thus at times secure for the Commander very important information, whether negative or positive, much earlier than would otherwise be possible.

As mentioned before, it is important that Light Tank Officers and men should be trained to the same pitch of efficiency as Cavalry men in reconnaissance work. (The provision of horses in peace will greatly assist them in developing an eye for country).

Provided the enemy have no Anti-Tank weapons a Light Tank reconnaissance detachment will often be able to get close up to an occupied locality or move through a bullet-swept zone, where Cavalry could not go, and obtain very valuable information, brushing aside minor opposition.

Consider for example their value for such work through villages, high crops, etc., which are extremely difficult for Cavalry to reconnoitre.

On other occasions, where ground precludes their carrying out the reconnaissance themselves, they may by fire be able to make oppor-

tunities for Cavalry Patrols to obtain information. In this way they act in similar fashion to a reconnoitring Squadron backing up its Patrols.

Another extremely useful reconnaissance role for Light Tanks is an evening sortie to ascertain whether or no there are any formed bodies of enemy within such distance of the Cavalry, but beyond the range of their outposts, that they are likely to be able to molest them during the night or at first light.

Of course, like all other work allotted to the Light Tanks, reconnaissance tasks must only be ordered with due regard to the endurance of the crews, and to maintenance duties which will be discussed later. It is probable that very often the number of Light Tanks available, and the necessity for conserving them for more important tasks, will preclude their use in this way. If they are so used, other essentials are firstly, good orders or instructions to enable them to reconnoitre intelligently and realize the value to the Commander of particular positive or negative information gained, and secondly, adequate facilities for inter-communication.

The Commander can himself utilize a Light Tank in order to traverse bullet-swept areas and carry out personal reconnaissance, but the fighting Light Tank is not really well adapted for this purpose, as it is difficult to observe from when closed down, and the Machine Gunner would have to be dismounted. Normally reliance should be placed on the Light Tank personnel to render adequate reports.

When Light Tanks are on in advance, it may sometimes be advisable to detail a Light Tank escort, with R/T to the Commander moving up in his car ahead of the Cavalry to reconnoitre. An alternative, which will be referred to again later, is for the Commander to be provided with a track or wheel-cum-track reconnaissance vehicle of his own.

To summarize, reconnaissance is in suitable circumstances a very valuable Light Tank role, and a Cavalry Commander who does not on occasions make use of them for this purpose will be failing to obtain full value from them. It must not be supposed from this, however, that they are in any way self-sufficing for reconnaissance; as often as not it will fall to the Cavalry to find and fix the enemy for them. The type of co-operation must vary, according to the circumstances.

Light Tanks should not be used for reconnaissance tasks which can be equally well carried out by the Cavalry.

With an Advanced Guard.

The preceding remarks dealing with 'on the line of march' and 'reconnaissance' apply generally. It should be remembered that the basic role of the Light Tanks is to maintain the mobility of the Cavalry. They must not be frittered away on detachments, nor prematurely or wantonly exhausted, but by using some with the Advanced Guard and so maintaining mobility, and brushing aside enemy forward troops to seize tactical localities and discover the dispositions of the larger bodies before resistance can harden, situations which would ultimately have demanded far more rigorous action can often be avoided.

Nevertheless it should be a principle that detachments should only be made from a Light Tank Company for very cogent reasons. If Light Tanks are required with the Advanced Guard the most satisfactory solution is often to place the whole Company, under its own Commander, forward 'in support of' the Advanced Guard. The Company Commander can then push up a Section, for a limited task, to assist the Advanced Guard, keeping the Brigade Commander who himself will be well forward, informed.

The whole Company thus remains under the control of its Commander, and through him of the Brigade Commander. As has been found with the Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, in an advance this is more satisfactory than placing a Section under the command of the Advanced Guard Commander. Circumstances may, of course, arise in which for special reasons it would be advisable to place a Section of Light Tanks under the command of the Advanced Guard Commander for a specific purpose. If opportunity offers, the Light Tank Company may well, as mentioned before, be sent on ahead of the Advanced Guard to seize a tactical locality. Their use with an Advanced Guard through a North-West Frontier Defile will be dealt with subsequently.

Attack and Pursuit.

Usually the majority of Cavalry work in the opening stages of a campaign or phase of operations will be against the hostile mobile troops, and later when taking part in the main battle Cavalry will

normally be operating on the enemy's flanks or rear to harass them and exploit success. Cavalry will seldom, if ever, be called upon to carry out a mounted attack against undemoralised Infantry in position, except those of low category (Cavalry Training, Volume II, Section 1.6).

Consideration of the co-operation of Light Tanks with Cavalry in the attack will, therefore, be mainly confined to the types of attack which are most likely to fall to their lot.

Before entering into the details of their tactical handling in the attack against particular categories of enemy, what appear to be the most important general principles for all attacks will be enunciated—

- (i) The Light Tanks must not be committed prematurely, or used piecemeal, but must be kept for the decisive encounter.
- (ii) Every effort must be made to obtain surprise when they are finally launched.
- (iii) The greatest care must be taken in selecting their objectives and rallying points so as to minimise the risk of confusion between them and the Cavalry. As previously emphasised, co-operation must be elastic, though fully co-ordinated.
- (iv) The Commander must give the Light Tank Commander very careful orders and instructions, and time for him to pass them on to the occupants of every Tank, as, once loosed, inter-communication may be impracticable for a considerable period. The Light Tank Leader must be thoroughly 'in the mind' of the Cavalry Commander, so that he can instinctively act on his own responsibility in such a way that his Light Tanks will pull their full weight.
- (v) Normally the Light Tanks should be directed against the enemy's flanks and rear, with the object of silencing hostile machine gun fire; they need not concern themselves with riflemen. They should usually be given the best 'going' so that they can exploit to the full their extra speed.
- (vi) Attack does not necessarily imply actual assault or "savage rabbiting;" the best results may often be obtained by machine gun fire at decisive or even effective ranges, particularly if in enfilade.

(vii) Light Tanks, like any other arm of the service, require the maximum possible covering fire when committed to any attack. Supporting Artillery must be ready for counter battery and anti-tank targets.

Now to deal briefly with some of the types of enemy which Light Tanks working with Cavalry may be called upon to attack. It is not proposed to consider hostile tanks, as so much would depend on their comparative performance and armament. As is the case with Armoured Cars, Light Tanks in opposition would tend to stalemate each other, the victory going to the side with the better leadership, training, and morale, and the best handled mobile artillery in support.

Attack on Cavalry with Artillery.

Even with the element of surprise attained Light Tanks will find it difficult to deal Cavalry a vital blow; they can melt away so quickly and, if committed to dismounted action, will naturally make the fullest use of any Tank obstacles.

Whenever possible, opportunities should be made for the Light Tanks to lie up and ambush hostile Cavalry. If surprise is not attainable the correct 'tactique' for the Light Tanks should be to tempt the hostile guns to drop their trails prematurely during a bound, and then to attack the Cavalry from a flank so as to drive them away from the shelter of their Artillery. This may provide an opportunity for the Cavalry with which they are co-operating. As against Infantry, in an attack against dismounted Cavalry, Light Tanks should be directed on their machine guns and light machine guns (and led horses).

Attack on Infantry with Artillery.

The primary object of a Cavalry Commander, even when he has Light Tanks working under his orders, will be—not to attack Infantry in position head on—but to manoeuvre them out of their positions and get them on the move. The normal tendency of the enemy threatened with such an attack will be, on the other hand, to go to ground behind a Tank obstacle if possible. Again for the Light Tanks surprise is all important, and whenever at all feasible, their attacks should be directed from a flank or the rear on the hostile machine guns.

Attack on Artillery.

Except in the case of exploitation tasks, when the situation is somewhat abnormal, attacks on hostile guns should be avoided, or left to the Cavalry, unless the element of surprise is present, or there is a considerable volume of covering fire. When this is not the case Light Tanks may find it possible to use ground to defilade themselves from the hostile Artillery, at least from view.

Should Light Tanks ever surprise hostile guns limbered up within 1,000 yards, and if the ground is not unfavourable, a headlong dash from a flank would present reasonable chances of success. Apart from destroying the crews and teams, the impact of a light tank on a field or horse gun will presumably cause certain deterioration thereto. If, however, Light Tanks are ever committed to attacking guns which are in action, more deliberate and slightly more complicated methods are indicated. For example, one Section of the Company could be used as bait, the second to attack, and the third to provide covering fire.

The bait Section should attempt to get the guns firing at them from comparatively innocuous range, while the remaining two Sections, the Attack Section leading, slip round to the other flank. The Attack Section then endeavour to interpose the Battery teams, etc., between themselves and the guns and shoot them up from behind at short range, while the third Section give covering fire with only turrets exposed. In favourable circumstances smoke might be of great value in assisting Light Tanks to close with such an enemy.

Pursuit.

Cavalry Training, Volume II, Section 7.2 says "The power of Cavalry in pursuit can be greatly increased by the bold employment of Armoured Cars and Machine Guns in carriers, which by making wide detours, etc."

How much truer is this of Light Tanks. The combined action of the two may then well be decisive, provided the Tank crews and the Tanks can stand the strain imposed by exploitation of their powers to the full.

Cavalry Training, Volume II, Section 7.5, says "Fatigue and deterioration of horseflesh will be disregarded—risks, which at other times would not be justifiable, must be freely accepted."

This must be applied to Light Tanks with certain reservations ; as with Cavalrymen, it is obvious that the endurance of all ranks must be taxed to the uttermost if circumstances require it, but if Light Tanks are to continue functioning at all, spare crews, spare parts, and petrol and lubricants must be got up at regular intervals in a way that is not necessary for Cavalry.

Defence, Rear and Flank Guards.

It is unlikely that in mobile warfare Cavalry will have to hold a prepared position for any length of time. For them any form of rigid defence is most undesirable ; their role is to use delaying action as far ahead as possible of the locality to be safeguarded.

The main role of Light Tanks working with Cavalry in the Defence will be the decisive counter-attack, along previously reconnoitred routes, either directly the enemy have penetrated the position, or earlier, if a suitable opportunity occurs (Cavalry Training, Volume II, Section 88'3).

When Light Tanks are launched on a counter-attack it is most important to limit their objectives clearly and fix a suitable Rallying Point or Points. It may not infrequently be advisable to send them ahead of the Cavalry to delay the enemy's advance first at some suitable point beyond the latter's reach. This they are quite capable of doing by adopting an elastic manœuvring role, keeping concealed, and opening fire suddenly with only turrets exposed. There is no question of their being asked to hold on to any specific piece of ground as Infantry must do. For this they are entirely unsuitable.

Light Tanks are also of great value in Defence for checking hostile attempts to outflank.

Rear and Flank Guards.

For Light Tanks working with Cavalry a Rear Guard action is very similar to the Defence. They will normally be used to counter-attack or to check hostile enterprise on the flanks.

Again their counter-attacks may take place either well away should circumstances permit, or not until the Cavalry have become comparatively closely engaged. The counter strokes may be either by fire of stationary machine guns from a suitable position, or by actual assault. If feasible, when the Light Tanks are in ambush, a few

cavalrymen to keep hostile patrols at a distance with rifle fire, and so not disclose their presence prematurely, are advisable. Surprise is all important.

It seems unlikely that within the Cavalry Brigade it will often be necessary to utilize Light Tanks with a flank guard, though such occasions may sometimes occur, for example when the normal rate of advance of the Brigade is for some reason retarded, and there is a definite threat from a flank, possibly from enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicles. Their flank guard work will therefore be mainly confined to occasions when the whole Brigade is doing flank guard to another force.

In either circumstances, unless owing to the lie of the country some locality exists to which they can be sent forward with real advantage, they should usually be kept in the flank guard commander's hand as part of his mobile reserve, and only employed when he has received fairly definite information. If committed prematurely when carrying out lateral protection, it is all the more difficult to extricate them in time to counter what subsequently proves to be a more serious threat.

Protection at Rest. (Outposts and Perimeter Camp).

Light Tanks must have regular opportunities for routine maintenance, but there seems to be no reason why they should not at times be located in an outpost system, so that their searchlights and machine guns can be turned on to one or more localities in which enemy might be expected to mass. And, as mentioned in an earlier paragraph, an evening sortie by Light Tanks just before dark which can satisfy the Commander that there are no formed bodies of the enemy within 9 or 10 miles or more of his force, *i.e.*, considerably further than normal Cavalry night outpost dispositions can ensure, must be most reassuring. A task of this sort will, however, frequently be prohibited by the necessity for rest and time for maintenance.

In a perimeter camp, Light Tanks should not be asked to hold part of the perimeter, but a clear track should be left the whole way round inside the outer defences, so that in emergency they can move unimpeded to any portion to use their searchlights and machine guns.

North-West Frontier Warfare.

In North-West Frontier warfare the scope of Cavalry action in the hills is limited; they cannot be expected to piquet a defile of any

size or length, though they may have to seize the mouth of one in front of the slower moving Infantry or to cover the Infantry withdrawal through the foot-hills once they have emerged from a defile. Cavalry can rarely expect that tribesmen will allow themselves to be caught on ground suitable for mounted action.

In carrying out such operations as the above, however, Light Tanks can be of the greatest assistance, provided that the ground is not so precipitous or boulder strewn as to limit their movement unduly.

When, as will usually be the case in such warfare, the enemy are not equipped with Artillery or Anti-Tank weapons, Light Tanks can with great advantage be sent on ahead of the Advanced Guard and Piquetting troops, either to cover the piquets into position by shooting up the reverse slopes of the features to be piquetted, or occasionally to seize the feature themselves, if the ground is suitable, though this will seldom be the case.

When covering piquets up into position, it is essential that, in order to avoid confusion and casualties to the piquetting troops from Light Tank fire, all the Light Tank crews should know exactly where the piquets are going to and by what route.

Another minor difficulty is the disposal of the led horses of Cavalry piquets; if the gorge is narrow and precipitous, they may have to be sent some distance from the piquet, though a more satisfactory arrangement, if feasible, is for them to proceed with the main body, M. T. vehicles being left to bring in the piquets after withdrawal. If this is not done they may be very late in rejoining, and may also delay the Light Tanks which are covering their withdrawal. For this sort of task Light Tanks have a great advantage over Armoured Cars in that they can turn in their own length in places where the latter could not turn at all.

Light Tanks are of equal value for withdrawing piquets as they can be left to the last with impunity, they are also useful, if they can be spared, for escorting the Cavalry transport column through a defile, during the passage of which they can in addition provide some Anti-Aircraft protection should it be required.

Inter-communication and Control.

The foregoing examination of the tactical handling of Light Tanks with Cavalry has shown that even with the fullest facilities for training

together, and with leadership that is potentially all that can be desired, little can be achieved without adequate machinery for inter-communication and control, both between the Cavalry and the Light Tanks and within the Light Tank Company. More particularly is this so owing to the fact that 'articulated dispersion' is one of the essentials of their co-operation; the distances apart at which they must be considered in touch for purposes of inter-communication being at times considerable.

There can be no doubt that for both purposes R/T provides the most important link. Within the Company Sets should be provided at least down to Section, if not to Sub-Section Commanders.

If it is to be the responsibility of the Light Tank Company to provide the link with the Cavalry Commander then an additional tracked vehicle or vehicles equipped with R/T must be included in their establishment. It is suggested that a more satisfactory alternative would be to provide the Cavalry Brigade Commander with a reconnaissance vehicle of similar capacity on a track, or wheel-cum-track, chassis, equipped with R/T., which could be included in the War establishment of Brigade H. Qrs. or the Brigade Signal Troop and manned by Royal Corps of Signal personnel.

Though a vital necessity, R/T alone will not suffice; at present it is only one-way and somewhat slow, though this should in time be remedied; there are also difficulties with regard to wave-lengths, interference and jamming.

Supposing for instance a Cavalry Brigade Commander is in the fortunate position of having Aircraft working with him as well as Light Tanks, and of having W/T communication with the former as well as R/T with the latter.

It will be necessary to set up the W/T Set approximately a mile from the R/T vehicle or the one will jam the other. The difficulties resulting from the multiplication of W/T and R/T Sets within a formation, apart from deliberate interference by hostile wireless, can be readily imagined.

Auxiliary means must therefore be developed to the full. There must be a galloper party for the Light Tank Company at Brigade Headquarters; this can be provided by one of the Cavalry Regiments, and might consist of a selected N. C. O., with a horseholder, and a Machine Gunner, trained to operate the Light Tank type of Machine

Gun, who when required can hand over his horse to the Tank Commander and take his place in the Tank. There is also the liaison section ground scouting for the tanks which has been mentioned before; this can in emergency be used for inter-communication purposes.

When not in bullet-swept zones and the going is sufficiently good, motor cyclist despatch riders and baby cars (of which the latter are probably the more satisfactory) are economical and rapid, but they are naturally not to be relied upon when the ground is difficult, and of little or no value in bullet-swept areas. Once contact has been gained, if R/T fails, it may be necessary to use a fighting Tank for inter-communication between the Brigade and the Tank Commander. In emergency Aircraft also can and should be utilized to convey important information or orders to the Light Tanks, and to discover their whereabouts for the Commander.

Within the Light Tank Company various codes of flag signals have been tried, and are no doubt of value though only up to a very limited range. It is also possible that at times Cavalry and Light Tanks might make use of the brief Cavalry Battle Code, but with the same limitations.

One of the most important adjuncts towards control within the Company is the development of standard tactics for different circumstances, so as to avoid as far as possible an unco-ordinated *melee*. This will be assisted if all Sections in the Company are homogeneous. It is for consideration whether it would not be advisable to eliminate the sub-section leader link, and reorganize the Company with a larger number of slightly smaller sections, say of 4 tanks each, or the maximum which it is found one man can hope to control during battle. This would greatly simplify questions of inter-communication, command, etc.

Both within the Company, down to individual tank crews, and from the Cavalry Commander to the Light Tank Commander, the vital importance of clear orders and instructions, and the one being in 'the mind' of the other, has already been stressed.

Light Tanks with Infantry.

Not only on account of their scope of action and actual speed in movement, but for almost every reason, there can be no doubt that Light Tanks are more suitable for co-operation with Cavalry than with Infantry: their retention for use with the latter must usually

result in the surrender of much of their mobility, and in the majority of cases be uneconomical.

Infantry have not the mobility either to find and fix suitable targets for Light Tanks in mobile warfare to give them the necessary covering fire when they are operating from a flank or the rear as they normally should be, or to exploit success when they achieve it. It also seems inevitable that Light Tanks working with Infantry will be mainly in demand when the latter are committed to attack a hostile force in position, and will be used for tasks which would be more suitable for Medium Tanks or at least for Light Tanks reinforced by Medium Tanks.

Apart from operations confined to the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier type, it seems probable, therefore, that the majority, if not all, of the Light Tanks available, will be utilized at all events in the initial phases of a campaign to co-operate with the Cavalry in carrying out those vital tasks which then fall to the lot of mobile troops, which have already been discussed. Possibly certain Companies might be retained in G. H. Q. Reserve.

There is no doubt, however, that in mountain warfare, providing they can move over some of the ground, Light Tanks will be of invaluable assistance to Infantry in all the more usual operations, such as piquetting a defile, destruction of a village, withdrawal, etc. In this type of warfare, in fact, they can act as mobile pill-boxes, most demoralising to the tribesmen.

Apart from mountain warfare, should a proportion of the available Light Tanks be allotted from the outset, or later withdrawn from the mobile troops, to work with Infantry, it seems probable that they will definitely be retained in the hands of the higher commander as a mobile reserve, for a decisive stroke should conditions permit, or to restore the situation.

It seems unlikely that a whole Company of Light Tanks will normally be allotted to an Infantry Brigade; a Section would be more appropriate, the Company being retained as Divisional or Army Troops. Possibly at times a Section might be utilized to co-operate with the Divisional Cavalry Regiment with advantage. Another possible role is in co-operation with embussed Infantry, though the tactical limitations of such a force are too well known to require elaboration here.

In any case the principles for their employment should not differ materially from those enunciated for their co-operation with the Army Cavalry.

Maintenance and Supply.

For Light Tanks problems of maintenance and supply are of very great importance, and will more often than not dictate the extent to which they can be employed. It follows that, in the first place, if operations of any length and severity are in view, the reserve supply of Light Tanks for replacement of total losses must be adequate.

Particularly in a Middle Eastern theatre, Light Tanks will seldom if ever be able to "live on the country" in the same way as the horse can. Bhoosa and grain can often be found and collected; Petrol and Oil very rarely.

The results of exhaustion are very different also on a Light Tank Company compared with, say, a Regiment of Cavalry. Generally speaking a Tank is either fit to run or definitely unfit, in which case it must be left behind until the defect can be put right. The horse on the other hand carries on long after he is much below par. He will, and often did in the great war, carry his rider for miles while the latter is fast asleep from exhaustion; even the most ardent advocate of mechanization will hardly claim that the Light Tank will do likewise, though over reasonable ground the two members of the crew might take turns at driving and sleeping. Even then a man driving a Light Tank, even over good going, must keep continually alert.

It appears essential that at least a proportion of the Light Tank spare crews should be carried on track or wheeled-cum-track vehicles which can come up to the fighting tanks during pauses in the operations, so as to relieve them as required. These vehicles might also carry a first refill of ammunition.

With the whole of "A" echelon carried on 30-cwt. six wheelers there is little or no hope of any such reliefs until late in the evening, as unarmoured six wheelers can seldom move across country unprotected when close up to the fighting troops, and may not be able to move across country at all without the assistance of the Field Troop. They must therefore travel with the remainder of the Brigade's "A" echelon M. T. This is not satisfactory, though it may be possible in emergency to transfer a limited amount of ammunition from the less heavily

engaged tanks to others which have run out. As regards crews, the only solution at present is that they must see through a day's operations, the reserves tackling the evening overhaul. While this is the case it seems probable that occasions may arise when full value will not be obtainable from the Light Tanks owing to crew exhaustion. Another course worthy of consideration would be to have all the Light Tanks 'portés' on 'camions' as in the French Army; the Tanks only being released when operations are imminent. This not only saves the crew, but is also much more economical in petrol and in Tank tracks which otherwise deteriorate more rapidly than other components.

Provided that six-wheelers can follow the Cavalry and Light Tanks at all, and with the assistance of the Field Troop it is surprising what difficult country they can now cross, there should be no difficulty in bringing up petrol and spare parts from supply refilling points in the evenings, at any rate sufficient for a limited number of days' operations. If no M. T. is expected to reach the Column for a definite period, then the circuit of action of the Light Tanks must be limited to what they can carry with them.

For Light Tanks working with Cavalry it is essential to eliminate the three tonner lorry from their organization entirely: at present the Company "B" echelon is much too unwieldy, and, if the ground is at all difficult, cannot be expected to be 'up' in the evening, during mobile operations, in sufficient time to admit of the necessary overhauls being carried out. The inclusion in the "B" echelon of certain special vehicles for the salvage of derelict light tanks is probably a necessity.

R/T between the Cavalry Commander, the Fighting Company, and its A and B echelons will of course simplify these administrative problems to an appreciable extent.

It follows that the Commander in employing his Tanks, must always think out the administrative problems involved beforehand, and must, in allotting their tasks, consider fully this question of maintenance.

There has as yet been no opportunity of assessing the endurance of the crews if they have to operate under war conditions in hot weather for considerable periods closed down.

Conclusions.

To summarize, it is suggested that the following are the most important conclusions which can be logically derived from an examination of the subject :—

1. The characteristics of Light Tanks make them eminently suitable for co-operation with Cavalry ; with which they form such a formidable combination that they restore the former value of mobile troops.
2. Apart from a limited rôle in North-Western Frontier warfare, or against opposition of definitely low category elsewhere, their employment with Infantry is far less likely to achieve far reaching results, and must mean at least a partial surrender of one of their most important assets—Mobility.
3. Their most valuable and probable rôle will be in co-operation with Cavalry, employed at the very outset of a Campaign or phase of operations on Army Cavalry tasks, thereafter co-operating in the battle and exploiting success. The most suitable allotment as far as the Army in India is concerned is therefore a Company of Light Tanks to a Cavalry Brigade, unless a Mobile Division is created, with possibly a proportion in G. H. Q. Reserve.
4. The salient principles in their tactical handling are as follows: These apply whether they are co-operating with Cavalry or with Infantry, but perhaps require more stressing in the former case owing to the far greater mobility of the operations :—
 - (a) Co-operation, though “intimate,” in that the Light Tank Commander must be really “in the mind” of the superior Commander, and all ranks of both arms imbued with mutual confidence and understanding, must be elastic, though fully co-ordinated.
 - (b) Detachments should only be made from the Light Tank Company temporarily and for very definite reasons; whenever possible the whole Company should work under the control of the Company Commander. Light Tanks must not be frittered away in ‘penny packets’, or on unimportant tasks, or tasks which the other arms can perform satisfactorily without them. They must be

retained for the decisive blow. At the same time their most valuable characteristics of mobility and protected fire power must be exploited to the full.

- (c) "Light Tank Mindedness" must be developed in all ranks of the arms of the service with which they are working. The Commander must continually keep in mind the Light Tank aspect of every situation, and when employing them must make due allowances for their maintenance.
 - (d) In all attacks Light Tank objectives and rallying points must be very carefully selected to obviate risk of collision with their own troops; generally speaking they should be directed on the enemy's flanks or rear, their main task being to neutralize Machine Gun fire likely to hold the other arms up. Fire from stationary Light Tanks may frequently, at decisive or effective ranges, be of greater value than shock tactics.
5. (a) The machinery for inter-communication and control must be developed, the first essential being the provision of R/T.
- (b) First line maintenance echelons must be re-organized on a more mobile basis.

6. If it is accepted that the most important rôle of the Light Tanks will be with the Army Cavalry, commencing from the very outset of a campaign, it is clear that a very high standard of tactical co-operation between the two arms must be reached and maintained in peace.

It seems obvious therefore that the only way in which this can be achieved is by including a Company or Squadron of Light Tanks as an integral part of a Cavalry Brigade in India, as were the Horse Brigade Machine Gun Squadrons in the great war. Whether the Light Tank unit should be Cavalry or Royal Tank Corps hardly comes within the terms of reference of this paper.

BRITAIN'S CUSTOMERS.

BY MAJOR H. G. TRANCHELL.

One of the causes of the Financial Crisis in Great Britain during the Autumn of 1931 was the adverse balance of trade, which meant that Britain was importing much more than she was exporting. The consequence was that Britain was being drained of gold to pay for her imports, because her exports were inadequate for the purpose. It was in order to check this over-development of imports that Britain went off the Gold Standard and a little later abandoned the policy of Free Trade and introduced a system of tariffs. The *Glasgow Sunday Post* has recently published some statistics under the heading "Our Customers Good and Bad", showing the figures for imports and exports for 1931 and 1932 according to countries.

A study of these figures is particularly instructive. They show at a glance the position of British trade with each unit of the Empire and with each foreign country and bring home very forcibly the serious position that was then facing the country. In order to make the position even clearer, the figures as given in the statistics have been rearranged so that the reader may see those countries which buy more from Britain than they sell to her, her "good customers"; the countries which make purchases from Britain reasonably close to their sales to her, "her moderately good customers"; and finally those countries which sell to her far more than they buy, "her bad customers."

Britain trades with fifty-three foreign countries, of which only fourteen in 1932 bought from her more than they sold to her, and of these fourteen, only eight made purchases to the value of over a million pounds, namely :—

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
China	7,773,074	7,858,615	6,202,662	7,778,068
Brazil	5,703,797	4,063,428	4,120,337	4,675,355
Iraq	705,113	1,242,118	423,940	1,975,902
Colombia	764,126	1,352,245	330,360	1,528,713
Yugoslavia	564,020	940,185	455,825	1,219,904
Siam	151,202	1,004,591	48,550	1,140,706

Next comes a group of eight countries whose purchases from Britain are very reasonably close to their sales to her. These countries are:—

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
France	40,921,520	22,551,750	19,022,667	18,460,377
Italy	15,147,876	9,916,611	10,825,110	8,636,710
Japan	6,952,533	6,186,905	6,692,844	5,733,133
Portugal	3,309,273	2,454,939	2,888,622	2,584,150
Greece	2,026,357	3,179,021	2,330,201	2,177,340
Turkey	1,475,144	1,714,922	1,619,676	1,484,010
Mexico	2,397,003	934,004	2,430,510	1,088,643
Austria	2,729,792	1,317,918	1,087,204	944,550

The third group, those countries whose sales to Britain far exceed their purchases from her, are so numerous that it is best to divide them roughly into geographical groups.

Group A.—*Scandinavia and the Baltic Litoral.*

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
Denmark	46,695,568	8,686,592	40,556,327	9,860,499
Sweden	17,342,035	7,743,767	13,424,817	6,887,322
Norway	8,630,233	7,559,388	8,252,767	5,804,003
Finland	11,630,127	1,603,656	11,736,684	2,263,024
Poland and Danzig ..	8,612,175	2,003,774	6,185,145	1,997,281
Latvia	2,927,537	590,712	2,667,430	590,568
Estonia	1,908,066	212,680	1,257,951	348,772

In this group Norway is the only country whose purchases are reasonably close to her sales to Britain, but in all the other Countries purchases lag a long way behind sales, specially so in the case of Denmark and Sweden.

Group B.—European Mainland.

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
Germany	64,162,625	18,411,873	30,410,492	14,580,763
The Netherlands ..	35,198,580	13,701,514	22,000,951	12,107,608
Russia	32,285,563	7,291,319	19,697,013	9,274,534
Belgium	33,189,570	10,025,509	15,989,806	8,744,973
Spain	14,248,575	5,294,001	12,755,235	5,224,827
Switzerland	11,311,750	4,138,024	5,157,692	3,710,379
Roumania	3,412,441	1,333,342	3,464,646	1,757,034
Czecho Slovakia ..	6,619,588	1,337,443	3,036,874	959,847
Lithuania	1,487,692	300,866	1,896,866	392,755
Hungary	1,552,979	513,828	1,112,346	339,970

The figures for Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Belgium and Spain all show a remarkable difference between sales to and purchases from Britain, and this difference is even more striking in the figures for 1931. The figures for 1932 show the effect of the British tariff in checking the immense flood of foreign imports.

Group C.—America, North and South.

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
United States ..	104,009,495	18,245,713	83,671,879	15,098,272
Argentine Republic ..	52,744,214	14,785,467	50,870,371	10,663,101
Uruguay	5,229,628	1,984,604	3,742,330	1,500,669
Peru	3,510,014	664,461	4,388,589	727,747
Cuba	4,292,075	665,821	5,335,764	695,101
Chili	4,482,578	1,932,479	3,859,425	661,889
Bolivia	2,278,771	170,118	1,879,573	194,218
Dutch West Indies ..	3,158,633	200,377	5,326,423	139,874
Cost Rica	2,284,834	135,021	1,343,809	138,778
St. Domingo	1,019,166	103,938	1,717,454	97,516

The figures of this group are the most remarkable of all. We see the United States and the Argentine Republic both with enormous gaps between their sales to Britain and their purchases from her. Healthy trade cannot exist when the United States sell eighty-three million pounds worth of goods and only buy fifteen million pounds worth in exchange. And then at the other end of the scale are countries that sell over a million pounds worth of goods to Britain and do not even buy a quarter of a million worth from her. It is not surprising that Britain could not indefinitely stand the strain of such an inequitable arrangement. Had it not been for Britain's "invisible exports," the crisis would probably have come much earlier.

One small group remains.

Group D.—Near, Middle and Far East.

			1931.		1932.	
			Sold to Britain, £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
Egypt	10,841,942	6,656,427	10,406,455	6,513,002
Java	4,556,001	2,506,721	4,745,375	2,458,361
Persia	5,791,368	727,443	6,979,205	826,067

The figures for Persia show a very glaring difference between sales and purchases.

Though these figures disclose in all its nakedness a very deplorable state of affairs, good has come out of the evil. The crisis drew public attention to the lopsidedness of British trade, and as a result, a National Government was formed, which has adopted a system of tariffs, a change of policy which party rivalry would never have permitted in more normal times. It will be remembered that Joseph Chamberlain's championship of a policy of Tariff Reform was one of the main causes of the Unionist party being swept from power in 1906.

Now that tariffs have been instituted in Britain and the Government has the power to protect itself from its bad customers, it is interesting to note that already six trade agreements have already been signed within the last few weeks :—those with Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Argentine Republic and Iceland. The figures for Iceland have not been included in these tables because her trade

with Britain is very small, not amounting to quite half a million pounds per annum.

When we turn to the British Empire we find that of fifty countries twenty-nine bought in 1932 more from Britain than they sold to her, but of these only eight bought goods of over one million pounds value.

These are :—

Group A.—

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
India ..	36,711,288	32,288,759	32,314,548	34,091,397
Union of South Africa ..	13,120,251	21,856,810	15,529,679	18,109,396
Hong Kong ..	406,335	4,435,340	245,510	4,818,366
Straits Settlements ..	5,391,218	4,810,946	3,870,840	4,725,602
Nigeria ..	3,364,847	3,731,842	3,767,165	4,381,864
Channel Islands ..	3,486,712	3,510,024	3,876,794	4,034,731
Gold Coast ..	1,290,992	1,952,687	1,485,647	2,661,739
Malta and Gozo ..	43,199	974,292	37,617	1,004,677

After this comes a group of eight countries whose purchases from Britain are reasonably close to their sales to her.

Group B.—

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
Irish Free State ..	36,546,967	30,511,122	26,530,856	25,774,025
Jamaica ..	2,414,542	1,505,265	2,961,135	1,871,113
Trinidad and Tobago ..	1,450,453	1,266,800	1,608,348	1,401,124
Kenya ..	2,115,734	1,767,878	1,761,395	1,326,981
Palestine ..	1,413,843	793,783	1,558,660	1,304,263
Southern Rhodesia ..	996,165	1,476,884	1,297,813	1,208,353
Federated Malay States ..	1,061,556	1,470,576	933,942	931,106
British Guiana ..	577,820	814,313	1,093,224	905,310
Tanganyika ..	445,468	665,004	701,365	421,748

The third group consists of those colonies whose sales to Britain far exceed their purchase from her, and it includes some very important units of the Empire.

Group C.—

	1931.		1932.	
	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £	Sold to Britain. £	Bought from Britain. £
Australia ..	46,679,237	14,527,871	47,192,719	20,025,065
Canada ..	32,840,526	20,550,612	43,145,829	16,408,483
New Zealand ..	37,775,155	11,196,327	37,484,785	10,360,214
Ceylon ..	11,996,189	2,707,752	10,352,564	2,486,251
Newfoundland and Labrador	2,029,326	542,834	2,606,542	648,967
Sudan ..	997,201	736,779	2,835,036	584,759
Mauritius ..	1,683,921	442,201	2,166,626	414,707

The figures for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ceylon are decidedly impressive, and show how great an effort is needed on both sides if British trade with them is to become healthy once more. The figures for the Empire are for the calendar year 1932, and so do not show the results of the Ottawa Conference upon British trade.

Naturally there are any causes for these large gaps between the sales and purchases of certain countries to and from Britain; in some cases it is due to an exchange very unfavourable to Britain, and in others it is due to a failure to hold the markets, but primarily it is due to that curious modern spirit of nationalism which animates so many countries and under the influence of which they wish to be self-supporting, so that while willing and wishing to sell their own goods abroad they are loth to buy goods from foreign countries. This spirit of nationalism if allowed to develop will be productive of very serious rivalry some day between the various nations, more especially between those who have gone in extensively for industrialisation. The alternative is to reorganise the trade of the nations and arrange a partitioning of markets. But that is a subject outside the scope of this article, though actually such discussion leading to the establishment of economic spheres of influence has already been mooted as between Japan and Britain.

The outstanding lesson of these figures is the magnitude of the effort needed to bring Britain's exports into a nearer and more reasonable relation to her imports.

' REMOUNTS.

BY "HORSE COPER."

The object of this article is to give a brief account of the operations of the Army Remount Department in India in peace time, and to explain how animals required for army purposes are procured and supplied.

General.

The Remount Department is responsible for the supply of all army animals, with the exception of carrier pigeons. With the progress of mechanisation, bullocks and camels, which figured to some extent in our transport until a few years ago, have now almost disappeared as regards peace requirements, though both would be required again in a war of magnitude. Elephants formerly used for hauling heavy guns and for work such as bridge building, now appear no longer on army returns, the last elephant on the strength having been disposed of by sale in 1932. The main requirements in animals at the present time are, therefore, horses and mules.

Horses.

The number of horses of various types on the peace establishments of the army, excluding officers' chargers, amounts to over 23,000. They are issued to the service at about five-six years of age and their service life normally comes to a close at about fifteen years of age, although in exceptional cases some horses are fit for retention until they are twenty years old.

Casualties amongst horses at younger ages naturally also occur, and reduce the average service life of a horse to rather less than nine years. Based on this average, it is found necessary to calculate on 12 per cent. per annum as the percentage of annual replacements of horses required to maintain efficiency, giving an approximate number of 2,750 remounts required for issue to the service each year. The various categories of horses are given below.

(i) Light Draught.

These are employed in both Horse and Field Batteries of the Royal Artillery. In view of the differing nature of the duties required from these two branches of the Artillery, there is a separate classification in Remount Depots for each class.



Horse Artillery, being required to move with Cavalry, require a horse capable of greater speed than Field Artillery. In former days, when carriages and coaches were extensively employed in all countries where roads were available, horses suited to the needs of the Horse Artillery branch were bred in large numbers in Australia, and were easily procured. It is now a matter of considerable difficulty to get the right type of horse for this branch of the service from Australia or any other country, the demand for such horses having disappeared with the increase of mechanical transport. The problem of providing the slightly heavier horse required for Field Artillery is not so acute, as horses are still utilised extensively for farm work in Australia, and the lighter type of farm horse is that which has been found best suited to the requirements of this branch. A number of light draught horses are also employed in Signal and Engineer units. These are of the same type as those supplied to Field Artillery. All Draught horses required for the army are imported from Australia.

(ii) Riding Horses.

These are sub-divided into Rides, Class I, and Rides, Class II. Rides, Class I, are the type formerly known as British Cavalry and Artillery Riders.

The stamp of horse desired is the well bred horse of hunter type, from 15·0 hands to 15·3 in height, with sufficient substance and bone to enable him to carry a man with full equipment for long distances at a reasonably rapid pace.

Rides, Class II, comprise the horses formerly known as Indian Cavalry Rides, and form the greater proportion of the animal requirements of the army in horses. They are smaller and lighter in type than Rides, Class I, averaging slightly over 15·0 hands in height. These rides are supplied to Indian Cavalry regiments, Signal and Engineer units. Ten for each Battery are also authorized for Horse and Field Batteries. Rides, Class II, receive a lower ration and Australian horses of this type cost about £12 a head less than Rides, Class I.

(iii) Riding Ponies.

These are also of two types, divided into classes I and II. Class I, Riding ponies, are issued to Mountain Batteries as riders. Class II, Riding ponies are mainly required by the I.A.S.C., to mount the men who accompany animal transport units.

Mules.

The categories of mules are as follows :—

(a). *Light Draught Mules.*—These are considered as interchangeable with Light Draught horses and are utilised for identical duties.

(b). *Mountain Artillery.*—These are sturdy mules up to great weight for use with Light and Pack Batteries, where the pack loads are necessarily heavy.

(c). *Equipment Mules.*—These are required for Signal and Engineer units and for machine guns and 1st Line Transport of the Infantry.

(d). *Army Transport.*—There are two types under this heading, styled Draught and Pack respectively.

The number of mules on army strength is over 22,000.

Production of horses and mules in India.

The horse and mule supply of India is intimately connected with military requirements. Were it not for the stimulus and support extended to horse and mule breeding operations by the army, the breeding of horses and mules in any appreciable number would speedily languish and dwindle to a very low ebb, except for the production of the small ponies which ordinarily provide the economic requirements of the country.

The object of horse and mule breeding from a military point of view, is to make the country self-supporting as far as practicable, and to ensure that reserves are available in the country in time of emergency.

It is economically unsound to import animals from other countries when they can be produced in the country where they are to be utilised, added to which such importations decrease the wealth and development of home resources. The greater the demand in peace, the greater the supply in war. It should, therefore, be a settled axiom of our policy to increase the numbers purchased in India and correspondingly to reduce the importations from overseas. The Indian bred remount is admittedly more expensive than the Australian, as it is necessary to rear him in a somewhat artificial manner, but the expenditure thus incurred is disbursed in this country, and a further justification for the moderate expenditure on horse and mule breeding is to be found in the large numbers of horses purchased in India during the War of 1914—18.

During the war period over 50,000 horses and ponies were bought and the advantages of being able to procure them in India, as compared with importation of a like number from overseas, proved inestimable. These horses required no acclimatisation, no shipping at a time when shipping space was of vital importance, their purchase money was retained in the country and their price was considerably lower than that of any imported horses.

The system of producing horses and mules for army requirements in India is detailed below.

The Government of India, in certain selected Districts, controls the breeding of horses and mules. Horse and donkey stallions are provided by Government, the mares are owned by horse breeders. There are two systems of breeding known as "bound" and "unbound" respectively. In the "bound" Areas men—selected as likely to prove good horse breeders—receive an allotment of land on condition that they maintain a mare of approved type for breeding purposes.

The "bound" Areas are the Shahpur Area, the Montgomery Area for horse and mule breeding and the Chenab Area for mule breeding with headquarters at Sargodha, Montgomery and Lyallpur respectively. Officers designated District Remount Officers are in charge of each Area. Horse breeders in "bound" Areas receive free services of stallions for their mares, and are required to conform to certain rules designed to ensure production of suitable remounts. They are required to keep their mares and foals in good condition, to produce them for inspection when necessary and to sell the young stock to Government, if suitable for army requirements, up to the age of 18 months. They are permitted to dispose of those which prove unsuitable as they wish.

The "unbound" areas are Rawalpindi, Chenab (horse breeding only) and Meerut. In these areas a branding fee of Rs. 10/- is taken by Government entitling approved mares to the services of Government stallions without further charge. Government has no lien on the young stock produced in these areas, though in practice suitable stock are always purchasable at Government rates, which in all areas is an average maximum of Rs. 230/- for young stock horses and Rs. 120/- for young stock mules.

Young stock, as purchased, are despatched from the horse and mule breeding Areas to the Remount Depôts at Mona and Sargodha,

whence they are issued to the service as they arrive at maturity. The total numbers of horse and mule stock held at these depôts average from 3,500 to 4,500 of various ages at each depôt. The acreage of each depôt is 10,000 acres. The stock produced in each Area are branded in order to facilitate recognition. These brands will be found on the off shoulder of each Indian bred horse or mule and are given below—

Shahpur Area	S
Montgomery Area	M
Chenab Area	C
Rawalpindi Area	P
Meerut Area	U

On the near-shoulder will be found the brand of the depôt at which the horse or mule has been reared.

For Mona this brand is	M
			↑

For Sargodha the brand is	S
			↑

Horses and mules may be reared at either depôt, irrespective of the Area in which they have been bred. They are classified to those branches of the service for which they are considered suitable, on approaching maturity.

Supply of Horses from Australia.

All draught horses and a proportion of Rides, Classes I and II, are imported from Australia. No draught horses are bred in India, as, owing to the fact that they are not employed in agriculture in this country, there is no market other than the army, for horses of this type. A proportion of the annual requirements of rides are also imported from Australia. This proportion is based upon the number of Indian bred horses available for issue to the army each year. The average number varies but works out at approximately 50 per cent. of each breed.

The Australian horse is in general well suited to the needs of the army in India, although a period of acclimatization is essential before he can be considered fit for serious work. There are several reasons which render a period of very light work essential during the early stages of his army career.

(1). The voyage from Australia, which may extend to six weeks of enforced inactivity, and which in many cases adversely affects the feet and condition.

(2). *Change of rations.*—The Australian horse, reared under normal conditions, is unaccustomed to any form of ration other than grazing until placed on board ship for the voyage to India.

(3). *Change of hemisphere.*—This change affects the growing of the winter coat, summer in Australia coinciding with the winter in India. Australian horses have, therefore, to adjust themselves to a complete change of the seasons of the year, before they can be considered fit.

The procedure governing the importation of horses from Australia is indicated below.

After the number of horses required for the ensuing year has been determined and Government sanction has been accorded to their purchase, commissions are issued to certain contractors, styled Government shippers, in the month of May. The number of these shippers is at present nine, of whom seven bring their horses to Calcutta, and two to Bombay. In the commission form issued to each shipper, the number of horses of each class required from him is specified, together with full details as to the type which will be accepted. The numbers allotted to each shipper vary according to the quality of the horses imported by them during the previous season. In order to ensure that they will be in a position to complete their Government order, after elimination of the horses not accepted by the purchasing officer, shippers bring over to India a percentage of additional horses, varying from 20 per cent. to 40 per cent. above their order.

The Government shipper in Australia, on receipt of a cable from the Quartermaster General in India, proceeds to collect horses in compliance with his order, after considering his assets already in hand. No shippers wait until they receive their yearly commission, but, as soon as they return from India they commence to collect their remounts for the following season. The procedure employed entails attendance at the important sales in localities where suitable army horses are produced for sale. At these sales a proportion of their requirements are purchased but his method of purchase requires considerable skill and experience. The horses are railed in trucks from up country stations to the sale centres, practically unhandled by man, turned into sale yard paddocks and thence run into the sale ring, through which they pass very rapidly, being kept well on the move. There is no guarantee except as regards age. Height, action and general suitability must all

be considered by the buyer, during this brief and animated passage through the sale ring.

At the conclusion of the sale the shipper is certain to find, when going through his purchases, that he has collected a percentage of horses unfit for shipment to India, which he then proceeds to eliminate, always to his financial disadvantage. The purchases approved of are then branded, grazing is hired in suitable localities and the horses remain at the shippers risk and expense until the time of shipment to India.

Another method of procuring remounts is to visit a station where horses of the types required for army purposes are bred. This method is subject to previous arrangement with the station owner, as, on the large stations, it may take as much as three weeks to muster from the outlying portions of the run, a draft of horses of suitable age for sale.

On the arrival of the shipper, on purchasing bent, he is shown one or more paddocks of horses of the right age for shipping, *viz.*, four to six years. He is then invited to purchase the whole batch at a fixed price, and the policy of selection of suitable horses only is not viewed with favour by the seller. Where it is agreed to, horses are only sold under such arrangement at a higher price. Facilities for thorough inspection are very scanty and purchase by this method also results in a percentage of unsuitable horses being acquired, which involves loss when they are disposed of.

There are in Australia a few dealers who specialise in the Indian horse trade and collect horses at their yards for sale to Government shippers. These men are, however, in pursuit of their trade, confronted with the difficulties already explained. In order to cover their losses, due to the purchase of a proportion of unsuitable horses, they find it necessary to demand a comparatively high price for the horses selected by shippers from their mobs.

From the foregoing it will be realised that the Government shipper has none too easy a task in procuring horses up to Remount standard, particularly as the percentage of the total number of horses in Australia, up to peace standard of army requirements, is estimated at well below 5 per cent.

Shipments of horses arrive in India, as steamer freight is procurable from Australia, between the end of October and the middle of January. Horses arriving in Calcutta are disembarked at Kidderpore Dock,

which adjoins the Government Remount Dépôt at Alipore. After landing they are given a week's rest in paddocks in the dépôt to give them an opportunity of partial recovery from their enforced inactivity on the voyage. In Bombay they are accommodated in yards belonging to Messrs. Gove, as there is no Government Remount Dépôt. Horses are embarked at various Australian ports, and it frequently happens that a ship designed to carry the normal number of 600—700 horses will pick up some at Adelaide, more at Melbourne, and a further consignment at Gladstone or Townsville before the voyage to India is actually commenced. The horses shipped at Adelaide will have been on board for five-six weeks before the arrival of the steamer in Bombay or Calcutta.

Voyage casualties vary considerably being dependent on weather conditions. The average losses last season amounted to about 0·86 per cent. of deaths on the voyage. Shipping is normally arranged by the British India Steam Navigation Company, and is a matter for private arrangement between the shipping company and the shippers of horses, with which Government has no concern in peace time.

Apart from other considerations affecting the horse trade to India, the financing of these operations demands heavy capital outlay. The shipper has to provide, without receiving any advance from Government towards meeting this liability, the purchase price and all incidental expenses such as feed and keep and rail movements of horses until the time of shipment from Australia.

His disbursements are not recouped until he sells his horses to Government after arrival in India. The only concession given to shippers is that the freight due by them to the shipping company concerned is advanced as soon as the horses have been landed in India.

Shortly after landing in Calcutta or Bombay the shipper selects his best conditioned horses and shows them to the Remount purchasing officer. Horses accepted are taken over by Government and despatched to Remount Dépôts for acclimatisation. This procedure is varied in the case of Indian Cavalry regiments, which receive a proportion of their remounts annually from the port of purchase by direct transfer.

Importations from other Countries.

Apart from Australian horses the only army animals normally imported from overseas are topload mules for Mountain Artillery and Light Draught mules. It has been found impossible to produce

these types of mules in sufficient numbers in India, as there are very few draught mares in this country from which this powerful type of mule can be bred. The exceptions are the imported draught mares at six studs in the Punjab, from which a proportion of our requirements are now being procured. The balance of Light Draught and Mountain Artillery mules to meet our requirements are imported from North America annually.

Equipment mules are bred in India and are all found from the Remount Depôts at Mona and Sargodha, where they are reared. Transport mules are supplied, to the extent available, from the same sources as equipment mules. The greater portion are, however, purchased from dealers in the Punjab by an officer detailed for mule purchasing duty during the cold weather each year.

Chargers.

Regulations in India do not provide for the supply of free chargers to officers as in the United Kingdom. This has been the policy of the Government of India from the early days of its armed forces. Many schemes have been under consideration during the past few years with the object of providing chargers at less cost to the officer, approximating to the Home system. Financial considerations have hitherto rendered this measure impossible.

An officer holding an appointment for which a charger is laid down as necessary, is, therefore, required to provide himself at his own expense with the charger or chargers considered essential for the performance of his duties. He receives from Government an allowance styled syce and forage allowance which is estimated as providing the pay of a syce and grain and fodder for the charger. No allowance is admissible for shoeing, clipping and other incidental expenses.

Chargers may be purchased privately in the open market or by purchase from Government. In the latter case they can be selected either from a Remount Depôt or from the ranks of a unit. Payment for horses purchased from Government is recovered by monthly instalments deducted from the officer's pay. The price paid is fixed according to the rank of the purchasing officer, and is a concessional rate fixed at less than the issue cost of the charger. It is necessary for officers either to select their chargers themselves or to depute some person to do so on their behalf.

Officers commanding Remount Depôts are prohibited from accepting the responsibility of selecting chargers. The reason for this rule

is that, before it was operative, complaints were received as to the unsuitability of chargers selected by dépôt commanders, coupled with a demand that the rail freight expended on the removal of the charger from dépôt to home station should be refunded either by Government or by the officer responsible for the alleged faulty selection.

The officer who wishes to select a charger, having submitted his indent, arrives to make his choice at the nearest Remount Dépôt. The methods adopted by officers are necessarily somewhat varied. Generally speaking these methods fall into one of three categories:—

(a). That adopted by the officer who knows what kind of a horse he requires, and sets about the business of selecting a horse suited to his requirements.

(b). That of the officer with little or no experience, who states his requirements to the Dépôt Commander, asks for advice to help him to a suitable choice and accepts the advice tendered.

(c). That adopted by the officer with or without experience, who entertains deep suspicion of the Dépôt officers, and who, if he asks for advice, normally rejects it and selects another horse. Selectors of this category occasionally accuse the Remount Department of having “struck them with a dud.”

It will be understood that the Officer Commanding a Remount Dépôt, who has nothing to gain from providing officers with unsuitable chargers, welcomes the arrival of officers in the first two categories described above, and that he derives but little pleasure from his duties in connection with those in category (c), who comprise fortunately a very small minority.

Selection being completed by one or other of the methods set forth above, the Veterinary officer then examines the charger for soundness, and the purchasing officer is informed of any unsoundness which may be detected at that examination, before the charger can be removed.

Some amusing cases have occurred which illustrate the proverbial suspicion harboured by those who deal in horse flesh.

In one case an officer, ten weeks after removing a charger selected by him from a Remount Dépôt, submitted an official complaint to the effect that, whereas he had selected a mare, the charger sent to him proved to be a gelding. This discrepancy of sex, which had apparently escaped his notice for some time, proved on enquiry, to be an unfounded accusation.

In another case, an officer brought his syce with him, pointed out the charger which he had selected and told him that he was to remain with the charger until the time of despatch, and that he was to permit no substitution! These directions were given in the presence of the Officer Commanding the dépôt.

Another officer brought with him a decrepit old gentleman, believed to have been his syce. After the Veterinary Officer had completed his examination of the selected charger, the purchaser instructed the syce to examine the horse in order to confirm the accuracy of the veterinary examination. This was carried out with due solemnity, and doubtless with much resulting benefit.

The price paid by the Government of India for chargers is identical with that of troop horses. Chargers are, therefore, a selection of the best remounts. In the United Kingdom considerably higher prices are sanctioned for officers' chargers.

It is, nevertheless, a fact that many prizes at Horse Shows in India are won every year by chargers purchased from Government and many of these are playing high class polo in this country, and providing excellent hunters and pigstickers. The number of chargers purchased yearly by officers varies from two to three hundred.

Some hard cases necessarily occur when such numbers are dealt with. A small percentage, sound at the time of purchase by an officer, do not long remain serviceable. Such misfortunes are not confined to purchases from Government, but occur also in the case of horses procured from other sources. This must be regarded as one of the chances incidental to transport of all descriptions, not excluding second hand motor cars. In other cases horses fail to train on and to become suitable for the work required of a charger. This may be due to the horse or again to the methods of training, which are liable to prove unsuccessful when both the rider and the horse require simultaneous instruction.

Purchase of Horses and Mules.

This is the most difficult operation included in the varied duties of officers of the Remount Department. Anyone who has ever purchased animals in large numbers, knows well that there is no difficulty whatever in buying a good horse or mule which has no faults of conformation or action. Such equine paragons are, however, rarely met with, and, if purchasing operations for the army were restricted solely

to this desirable type, the duties of purchasing officers would be simple, interesting and pleasant.

A well wisher of the Remount Department, who desired to preserve his anonymity, wrote to the press not long ago, and described Remount officers as those who were able to estimate how bad a horse could be issued to the service. This somewhat harsh dictum contains a considerable element of truth. If purchasing officers rejected every horse which was not of the highest type, the Australian shippers would not survive one season without bankruptcy, and horse breeding in India would suffer a set-back from which it would not recover.

The sole criterion of fitness for purchase of horses and mules must be, not a pleasing outline and absence of any faults of conformation or action, but a deliberate decision as to whether such faults as may exist, constitute a bar against efficient military service. The Remount Department have a large number of customers with varying tastes in their clientele. Complaints are frequently registered; satisfaction not so often voiced. Some of their customers have sufficient expert knowledge to realise the difficulty of providing animals which will meet with approval, others have none. These latter are often loudest in their condemnation of animals issued to their unit.

Constant endeavours are made to improve the quality of army animals but one thing is certain, and that is that in India, as in all other armies, there will always be a percentage of horses and mules which units do not like, or in alternative, if these are eliminated, there will be deficiencies in animal establishments. Remounts which will receive universal approval will never be procurable in sufficient numbers to meet the large requirements of an army of appreciable strength.

TEST IMPRESSIONS IN AUSTRALIA.

By "CHARGER."

It has been said, both in England and Australia, that too much has already been written about the Tests and some of it has caused a certain amount of dissatisfaction in both countries. Judging by extracts from the English papers which have been reproduced in Australia it would appear that English people have not been given a true picture of the Australian attitude towards sport, or that Australians are being purposely misinformed of English opinion by incomplete and often highly derogatory quotations from the English press. The purpose of this article is not to discuss the question of "leg theory," but to endeavour to show that the Australian is as equally appreciative of talent, although somewhat more demonstrative, as the rest of the sport-loving British public.

Cricket is intensely popular in Australia, much more so than at home, where a great proportion of the population never get a chance to play at all and are consequently disinterested in the game. Barracking plays a great part in all Australian sport, as it does in professional football in England, and there will always be a section of the crowd which will carry it to unpleasant extremes. This is not peculiar to Australia, but is seldom extended to cricket at home on account of the lack of interest in the game shown by the more violent section. Extremists are equally unpopular on both sides of the world.

Having been in Sydney for six months and read their papers, seen most of the two Test matches played there and discussed with numerous Australians the question of leg theory, I have come to the conclusion that the greatest harm was caused by sensational journalism. "Body line bowling" was a phrase coined by the Australian press, the result of which was to misrepresent leg-theory tactics to a certain section of the public. Photographs were reproduced of popular Australian cricketers showing where balls had struck them during an innings and pointing out that this was normal in "Body line bowling." What they failed to state was whether these blows were all landed during the leg theory field or whether it is unusual to be struck when the bowling is confined to conventional attacks. Oldfield being struck in the third Test was regarded as a natural result of leg theory.

Hammond was also struck in the face in the following innings, but this incident was not mentioned by the papers giving prominence to "Body line bowling."

Again, small incidents during games were enlarged to alarming proportions and reported at great length. Such was the "Resin Sensation" which gained the main headline and an exclusive half-column on the front page of a daily paper. "Not Cricket-Woodfull's Accusation"; another headline right across the page in the next publication, followed the next day by the Board of Control's cable of protest to the M. C. C. It was reported in one paper that Woodfull expressed regret to Warner for his outburst, but this was emphatically denied in another under headlines recorded as an official statement. Such startling headlines, whilst being amusing to certain people, cause a lot of sensation which finds its outlet in extreme barracking.

Such reports fade into insignificance when compared to the publications following "Larwood's unjustified attack" printed in a Sunday paper in England. One Australian paper devoted a half-page headline to "Dissension in Jardine's team," under which it was maintained that during the team's travels in Australia this dissension developed into cleavage of friendships and disunion. In the two and a half columns it was claimed that Mitchell wanted to return home, Tate did not throw a glass of beer at Jardine but did throw many words, Larwood obliterated his name from the list of players at Bendigo, expressing anger at being shown as twelfth man and was finally "able to call the tune and Jardine and the Managers deferred to him," Pataudi was annoyed at not being given the Royal room which was claimed by the Manager, Palaret: Brown was unhappy, Larwood was jealous of Allen, Pataudi was hurt because he was omitted from three Tests and let fall "sarcastic remarks in all manner of places and before mixed audiences" and, finally, that Sutcliffe passed sarcastic remarks to the umpire on the size of ball in the first Test. Perhaps the most astonishing passage of the whole report is that Jardine went up to Larwood after Woodfull had been hit over the heart in the third Test and said "Well bowled, Harold." This is almost equalled by the report of an English player going up to Larwood when Bradman came in to bat saying "Don't waste time! Let him have it straight at him." Such statements reported in a widely circulated paper show a definite abuse of the privileges conferred on the press and must do a lot.

towards increased animation on the part of extremists. It is obvious to all who followed the way the team faught together through every Test that such statements can have no foundation whatever in fact.

I suppose that Larwood's untimely outburst was deplored much more in England than in Australia. It is a pity that, having returned to England, Larwood could not have preserved that silence which was so much to be admired in every other member of the team. Larwood was not universally regarded as an unpleasant cricket character. Here is a quotation from one Australian paper:—

“ If I were choosing a world team to play Mars I would invite Jardine to be Captain. And I have an idea that Jardine would accept the invitation provided Larwood too were asked to make the trip. I shudder to think what would have happened to England yesterday had Larwood gone fishing or golfing or something. To me he appeared the only bowler on the side.” Later on it gives “ a word of appreciation to the world's greatest bowler.”

So much for Australian journalism. It is a comforting sign that these sensational outbursts did not find an echo amongst the majority of the public. Leg theory was freely discussed and feeling is as mixed as in England. It is not a new method of attack, but must be far more difficult to play as bowled by “ The Larwood Express ” than by previous exponents. It led to what appeared from a spectator's point of view to be anticipation on the part of certain Australian batsmen before the ball left Larwood's hand, and nearly resulted on several occasions in them ducking their heads into the ball. Players frequently stepped right across the wicket to play a perfectly straight ball and were bowled. The Oldfield incident has been shown in slow motion at many theatres and the film was taken in a direct line with the two wickets. This ball was pitched outside the off stump and Oldfield stepped across, saw the ball coming straight for him and ducked, showing what appeared to be double anticipation. An Adelaide taxi driver said to me “ They can put what they like in the papers, but I could see in a direct line with both wickets and it wasn't Larwood's fault.” He then proceeded to describe the incident much as I have explained it above.

Before the first Test match the Sydney public had not seen leg theory in practice as bowled by the English team and the term “ Body line bowling ” had not come into universal use. I don't remember

hearing it until after the second Test when it was used by certain papers to the practical exclusion of "leg theory." The crowd therefore, or the barracking section, had nothing particular on which it could focus its attention and energies. Barracking was common, but kept within reasonable limits. One or two remarks called for deprecatory murmurs from the more tolerant section of the public, but generally speaking it was an extremely well behaved crowd. I heard much more tense barracking in Melbourne when the M. C. C. was playing Victoria before they came to Sydney. The slow batting of the Englishmen during their first innings in the first Test at times deserved a more often received a little "gingering up," especially Pataudi's last forty runs for his century.

There is a small portion of the spectators which will never be satisfied. If the scoring is fast they advise the Captain to give the ball to someone else. There is always some unfortunate who must form a butt to receive their remarks, so very seldom approaching politeness. They don't come along to watch cricket, they want to see their side win and to do their best to put their opponents off their game. In spite of this section being small in comparison to the rest of the crowd it is a loud-voiced collection of enthusiasts who have no trouble in making themselves heard. Amongst them are a number of spectators who have no ideas of their own, but spend their time in echoing the expressed sentiments of others just to be able to hear their own voices. In this way it much resembles a football crowd at home which groans at the mistakes of their own team and laughs at those of others.

The fifth Test gave them great scope for their energies and they made the most of it. With the Ashes won and lost it was surprising to see so much enthusiasm in the game, but the reason must have been that it either made England and Australia all square in Test wins or Australia would come out two to the good. The ground was crowded each day and it was difficult to get a patch of grass to sit on, even on the famous "Hill," which is the home of barrackers. Once secured it meant staying there for the day or you ran the risk of losing it when you went away for lunch. Hope for a sandwich man to come round and an occasional visit from an ice cream vendor was the only certain way of comparative comfort. People walk over your legs, tread on your fingers and park their overripe grapes in the hole you have dug for your elbow. Your hand, seeking an alternative resting place, finds a smouldering cigarette-end, and it is a case of

keeping your eyes moving between the game and your immediate surroundings.

The Test was a tale of dropped catches. With Australia batting four batsmen were given two innings and two of these had even three lives before they were finally dismissed. These were not possible "lives," but would have been certain catches with normal Test fielding. The first dropped catch was bad luck, the second a coincidence, the third a joke, the fourth a scream, the fifth, sixth and seventh were greeted with roars of delight and called for many caustic remarks from the crowd. After that it became boring and not even the most hardened barracker could think of anything new. Larwood was the greatest sufferer, six catches being dropped off his bowling, whilst Allen saw three of his catches carefully placed on the ground and Hammond, one.

It was, however, much the same during the Englishmen's innings. Jardine, never comfortable, was twice dropped and so was Hammond. Stan McCabe, the local hero, was an offender in both cases. In spite of his universal popularity he could not escape the barrackers and a loud voice carried above all the noise requesting Woodfull to "Put him on the boundary," immediately followed by a counter-suggestion to "Put him on the dole."

It was in this Test that Larwood made his great and sparkling knock of 98 which was thoroughly appreciated by everyone. It was a good, hard-hitting innings such as is seldom seen in modern Test cricket and an innings with few technical faults. In the last over bowled to him Larwood hit a six, a four and two twos. This brought him to 98 and he had decided to drive the next ball through the covers, but changed his mind at the last minute and pulled it round to long-on; Ironmonger, the veteran player who can't run and stops a ball with his foot rather than stoop to it. Whilst the ball was travelling through the air everyone leant forward and shouted "Drop it; drop it, you blighter." But Ironmonger was one of the few Australians who held an offered catch in that innings. The ovation given Larwood as he walked to the pavilion could not have been excelled had it been Bradman completing a double century. Larwood was the hero of the day and the write-up he received in the papers should have gone a long way to make him forget the unpleasant treatment previously accorded him. Hammond's century was a matter of secondary importance.

The one really unpleasant incident during the final Test was when Jardine was jeered and "counted out" for complaining about

Alexander digging up the wicket when bowling. When Jardine was hit by a fast ball a little while later and was obviously in pain the incident was greeted with cheers. No sane community could ever be induced to believe that this was an echo of the feelings of any but a very small minority of the spectators ; and statements, therefore, to the effect that this attitude is universal cannot be expected to mend an unfortunate breach which had occurred in cricket relations, but should be condemned as extreme and highly exaggerated.

The " Hill " is blamed for every unpleasant remark and it is to the Hill that one must go to learn the true feelings of the crowd. The Hill extends round one complete half of the Oval from directly behind one wicket to behind the other. Scattered right round this large semi-circle are cricket fans whose one desire is to make a noise. But for every one of these there are hundreds who wish to see the game played and, when barracking goes beyond the limits of decency, will request the perpetrators to " cheese it " or " chuck it " or " dry up." Now these have no desire to make a noise greater than will carry across the distance separating them from the object of their remarks. So it is easily understood that spectators in other areas and players on the field gain the impression that the Hill is one hundred *per cent.* hostile. There were spectators seated near me, and I'm sure on other slopes of the Hill, who were so disgusted with the continual barracking that they made a point of applauding every run-scoring stroke made by the Englishmen, and in general showed their sympathies to be with the visiting team—as a mark of protest.

The Tests finished and the M. C. C. team departed, the greater majority of people in Australia were content to forget all about " Body line bowling," and would have given a lot for the question never to have been referred to the M. C. C. but to be allowed to work out its own solution. Why was it necessary to write articles in Sunday papers, why write books on the question, why write this article ? Everyone is trying so give their own impression and they must all be restricted in their scope. Isolated cases are always misleading so, let us generalise by taking the good into account with the bad and by maintaining that, although there may have been faults on both sides, the game is the only thing that matters to sportsmen.

Jardine did not enjoy the popularity enjoyed by previous English Captains, but this was due, I think, to his naturally retiring disposition. He was recognised as one of the finest Captains ever sent with a team.

Larwood was a hero and his talent recognised by all. Every time he appeared on the screen in Test match scenes he was applauded and cheered. Shown in slow motion after the departure of the team, in order to give the public an idea of leg theory, he was cheered and clapped although shown in the scene where Oldfield was injured, whilst the producer, Arthur Mailey, in introducing the film was greeted with silence.

Herein lies the fault—an improper impression created by certain newspapers, perhaps in both countries. Sometimes incomplete and often highly exaggerated accounts of incidents just for so much “copy” and an additional write-up. What must be remembered is that, although Colonies are widely separated, they and the Mother Country are still British in outlook and at heart. The feelings of one part of the Empire are bound to find an echo in other parts, being derived as we all are from the same stock. Britishers have a reputation with the rest of the world for being sportsmen. There is no reason why we should refute this reputation by being divided amongst ourselves over a few unpleasant incidents.

LIGHT INFANTRY TRAINING.

By "X". (I.A.).

I wonder how many there are to-day who, like me, are puzzling their heads over the term "Light Infantry Tactics." They no doubt have read Chapter XII of Henderson's "Science of War", particularly pages 344 and 349 to 352, and perhaps have hoped to find inspiration by reading :—

British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century, by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.

The Diary of Sir John Moore, edited by Major-General Sir J. F. Maurice.

The Future of Infantry, by Liddle Hart.

Sir John Moore's System of Training, by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller.

I admit I have found little inspiration in these books, but I have gone so far as to put down on paper some random jottings, which I have now arranged in some sort of order and give for what they are worth.

1. *Some points of principle.*

(a) We are endeavouring to break up a stereotyped habit, but while doing this we must remember that principles are immutable.

(b) The skilful co-operation of all arms in battle is still of paramount importance; fire which makes movement possible is just as essential as ever it was.

The term "Light Infantry Tactics" may lead some to become obsessed with a desire for speed: but speed, without co-operation of other arms is useless, and if we sacrifice the principles of protection to speed we will deserve what we will surely get—a raspberry in peace, regrettable incidents in war. It is the duty of any commander to bring his men into action at the top of their form so far as circumstances permit. To cover 30 miles, using a "run and walk step", and arrive in an exhausted condition is worse than useless. Light infantry tactics require alertness and quick thinking, but the brain is dulled by physical fatigue.

On the other hand, to be able to bring a battalion into battle after a 30 mile march, in record time, with sufficient energy remaining for the task in hand, would be the ideal. We must strive after the ideal, but, in doing so, it is as well to remember that it is the wise man, gifted, as he is, with a sense of proportion, common sense and a practical brain, who exploits the sanguine imagination of the enthusiast.

(c) Static conditions will occur in war, but it must be the fixed aim of all commanders to postpone these conditions by the fullest possible use of manœuvre.

(d) One can only manœuvre round a fixed point; unless the enemy can be pinned down to that point, he will avoid the pretty, well-timed blow we have prepared for him, or will move his troops to parry it.

We find this to be one of our difficulties when fighting on the North-West Frontier. The tribesman will not be pinned. He possesses nothing of sufficient importance to himself to make him stand and fight, and we can rarely conceal our movement from him. In the South African War our turning movements came to naught because the Boer could not be forced to hold on to his positions. He had unlimited space in which to manœuvre and there were other positions he could select. This difficulty may well be present in any war between a first class power and another power of a lower category.

(e) The man with the rifle, whether he attacks the front, rear or flanks of the enemy, will, so far as he is concerned, be attacking to his front. Manœuvre does not mean that he will reach his objective without being fired on.

(f) When static or semi-static conditions are forced on us, the main considerations must be given to the production of a more thorough, detailed and centrally controlled "fire plan" than will be necessary under fluid conditions.

2. In training it must be clear to all ranks what phase is being practised :—

(a) The approach march.

(b) The contact phase.

(c) The attack (the "break in").

(d) Infiltration (maintenance of the momentum of the attack).

(e) Exploitation (the "break through").

Light infantry tactics should be employed in phases (b) and (d) and, whenever the ground permits, in phase (c).

3. Nothing new is implied by the term "Light Infantry Tactics" and, where manœuvre is possible and the ground suitable (for it has little or no meaning without these conditions), the expression, put briefly, means the skilful use of ground and the "shikar habit", combined with tactical unity. It presupposes confidence of the individuals and of the unit in their own weapons. One may say this is all very dry and commonplace—have we not been brought up in these platitudes from the day we joined the army? Are we not making a mountain out of a mole-hill over this business of Light Infantry Tactics? The fundamental fact is that the secret of Light Infantry Tactics lies in attaining a higher standard of leadership, especially amongst the junior leaders, than at present exists.

That our standard of leadership should not be of the highest is not surprising when we realize that in the abnormal conditions of the Great War an infantry attack could only penetrate up to the limit of the range of its supporting artillery or tanks. However successful the attack may have been in its initial stages, the time taken to bring up artillery and the limited radius of action of tanks enabled the enemy to counter any marked success in exploitation. As a result, infantry learned to regard their weapons solely as a means of holding the ground won: they forgot, and perhaps some never realized, the value of their own fire power in the attack under more fluid conditions. The communication trench was the only ground they were accustomed to use. It takes time for those who have fought in the greatest war the world has known, to modify the very deep impressions it made on their minds.

There is another point. The reactions to these impressions and experiences, combined with the general revulsion of feeling against war, have led to the over-elaboration of the "Fire Plan." Essential as the "Fire Plan" undoubtedly is, and always will be, we spend, in training, too much time on its niceties to the exclusion of the practical necessities of the situation.

4. Leadership is defined in the clearest language in *Infantry Training*, Volume I, pages 8 to 10. Here are some extracts from these pages:—

"Increased decentralization of command, necessitated by the power of modern weapons, calls for increased tactical knowledge on the part of all ranks."

"A leader, above all, must have the confidence of his men."

The British officer of the Indian Army starts at a great advantage, for the men trust him from the outset.

We are told that he gains the confidence of his men by :—

“ The clearness and simplicity of his orders and the firm way in which he insists they should be carried out.”

To be able to give simple and clear orders requires much practice, a good deal of study and infinite patience on the part of the instructor.

“ The virtue most to be cultivated in training, as in war, is energy. To do nothing is to do something definitely wrong.”

It is very easy to say “ we can’t get on ; let us send for some more fire support.”

“ A leader must have confidence in himself.”

“ It includes initiative (*i.e.*, the ability to determine when independent action is required) and the necessary self confidence to take such action promptly and to assume responsibility for it, *as well as the power of decentralization*, (*i.e.*, the ability to execute an order through subordinate commanders without interference with their personal responsibility.”

The leader will only have this confidence in war if he has trained his subordinates to act correctly in peace.

5. To acquire Light Infantry Tactics, then, certain attributes are necessary :—

(a) *The Leader.*

- (i) A clear understanding of the object to be attained and a fixed determination, and confidence in his own ability, to attain it.
- (ii) A habit of using his own judgment and initiative.
- (iii) A habit of thinking from the enemy’s point of view.
- (iv) A knowledge of the effect of manœuvres and a clear understanding of its employment. It should be a point of honour with a leader NOT to wait for orders or to ask for fire support, other than that he himself controls, until he is convinced it is necessary to do so.

He must expect the unexpected and devise methods of overcoming difficulties with the means at his disposal.

- (v) Capability in the use of ground and a correct appreciation of its use.

- (vi) A clear understanding of the physical limits to which his men can go, on a minimum amount of food and clothing, and still be fit to fight.
- (vii) An ever present desire to " mystify, mislead, and surprise " the enemy.

Remember that the complements of surprise are rapidity and secrecy. What would have been the result of the battle of Dujaila in the Mesopotamian Campaign had the necessity for rapidity not been over looked ?

(b) *The man with the rifle* must be trained to acquire—

- (i) Physical fitness.
- (ii) Skill in the use of his weapons.
- (iii) The shikar instinct and skill in the use of ground.
- (iv) Ability to grasp quickly both the local picture and the meaning of the shortest orders issued to him.
- (v) Inquisitiveness and the importance of reporting its results.
- (vi) Proficiency in patrolling in all its forms ; for which the habits of preparedness for all eventualities and general alertness are essential.
- (vii) The power and willingness to fight light and lie hard for a limited period.

(c) *The unit and its sub-units* must be able to combine elasticity with tactical unity over any conformation of ground, more especially of the type over which the Army in India may be expected to fight.

6. It is not difficult to jot down these attributes on paper, but the crux comes when we begin to think out how to instil them into the minds of our Indian Officers and N.C.Os.

Firstly, we may accept that the first essential in training is to instil in the minds of all ranks the desire to gain their objectives with the weapons at their disposal. But here, we must remember, it is definitely wrong to attempt to advance over the open, against machine guns in position, without adequate fire support.

Secondly, it is essential to develop, in the junior leaders, a sense of initiative and imagination ; to increase their ability to train their own commands ; to obtain a uniformity of method in the Battalion.

It is considered that this could best be done through the medium of special tactical courses run somewhat on the following lines :—

The instructor must know the language, possess a good knowledge of minor tactics combined with imagination, and a patient temperament.

The course need not last longer than three weeks, for we are not dealing with recruits. Weather counts for much ; the course should not, therefore, be held when it is too hot to think.

Since a clean and simple order will gain the confidence of the men, a set of verbal order headings for attack, defence, outposts and patrols in particular, should be made out in Roman Urdu. Unless one is an expert in the language this is not simple, for it is unfortunately quite easy, by using the wrong word, to give an idea the very opposite of what is meant. Having decided on the headings, their meanings should first be taught. Then follow up by teaching their application by means of a series of tactical exercise on the sand model, the necessary attributes, both in a leader and man, being stressed throughout.

After this, to develop more initiative and imagination, candidates should be made to set their own schemes, first on the sand model and later choosing their own ground.

Lastly there must be some culminating excitement. Who can better provide this than the Commanding Officer by setting and conducting the final schemes ? The results would anyway give him a good idea of the worth of his junior leaders, and it would save him the trouble of holding the tactical examinations for promotion to a Viceroy's Commission as laid down in R. A. I.

7. Would it be unreasonable to suppose that at the end of two individual training periods there would be a good proportion of confident junior leaders well fitted to train their platoons ? Would not the germ of uniformity, initiative and imagination exist in the minds of the junior leaders ? Would we not in fact be getting nearer the spirit of Light Infantry Tactics by means of a higher standard of leadership ?

The growth of this germ will be the very grave responsibility of company commanders, who might bear the following points in mind :—

- (a) When verbal orders have been given by junior leaders, the company commander should make a point of giving the verbal orders himself as an example of how it should be done.

- (b) Whether the exercise is with or without troops, the verbal order headings, in writing, should always be in possession of all taking part in the exercise.
- (c) Platoon commanders should make their own programmes, schemes and solutions, and they must be encouraged to select ground other than that in the immediate vicinity of the lines.
- (d) Programmes and schemes must be prepared well ahead and vetted by the company commander. Time can often be found for this when the company is the duty company.
- (e) During platoon training, a company commander cannot expect to be able to supervise the training of all his platoons in one day. He must visit them in rotation and spend much time with each in turn.
- (f) The greatest patience is required. Results can be obtained in the end ; for the material is excellent and the spirit is there in the shape of a marked desire to learn, combined with great keenness. But initiative and keenness can very easily be blunted by impatience on the part of the British officer due to the relative slow progress made. All criticisms should be constructive, but never destructive.
- (g) Organization must be maintained. Acting platoon commanders, platoon havildars and the sixteen section commanders must be told off if the permanent incumbents are absent.
- (h) Leaders must be made to take notes at the conclusion of the exercise ; this will assist them to carry on, on the right lines, when left to themselves.
- (i) Company commanders must decentralize : this is an essential principle in training if a leader is to have confidence in his subordinates in War.

A simple example :—

The company commander wishes to train his runners.

He must first satisfy himself that the instructor he selects is competent to teach. He then leaves the instructor to carry out the work. At the end of a given period he should arrange a test to

judge results. He will then know whether or not further training is necessary and, incidentally, he will be able to check his own judgment as to the standard of the ability of the instructor.

- (k) Interest can be maintained by demonstration. To sit at a point of vantage and criticize the work of a patrol is a pleasant and profitable way of spending the time. But those criticized should be given an opportunity of becoming critics in their turn. The staging of a demonstration provides a useful opportunity for decentralization.

One of the best methods of developing self-confidence in a junior leader is to place him in command of a fighting patrol. Here he must stand alone. There is no company commander, nor are there other platoon commanders handy, to strengthen his confidence in himself. One could go on in this strain *ad infinitum* and dwell on the details of subjects in which the section commander should be competent to instruct, but there is neither time nor space for it.

8. There are, however, some points in training on which it may be worth while to touch. They are general points, and not connected with Light Infantry Tactics in particular.

Training of runners.

Runners will normally be the only form of communication on which the company commander can depend for keeping in touch with the situation. "If a commander does not know what is happening, he cannot make useful plans."

In teaching runners, a good deal depends upon the form of the message the runner is to memorize.

A verbal message should be short, contain essentials only, and follow a fixed sequence. The sequence of a message for a platoon runner might be —

- (a) The number of his platoon.
- (b) The position of the enemy (if any).
- (c) The position of the platoon and its dispositions.
- (d) The intention of the platoon commander.
- (e) The position of platoon headquarters.

A runner should be trained to grasp the general situation well enough to be able to give intelligent answers if questioned by the company or battalion commander.

A runner should be a picked man, fit, active and physically strong, and possessed of intelligence. He should be able to use ground. A dead runner is of no value.

9. *Night work.*

This is important, but is apt to be overlooked because it is inconvenient.

The following practical training is well worth doing :—

- (a) Moving into bivouac at night.
- (b) Packing up, loading of mules and getting ready to move in the dark as silently as possible.
- (c) Movements at night from column of route to more open formations.
- (d) Moving to forming-up areas and thence into position on the starting line.
- (e) Patrols, fighting and reconnaissance.
- (f) Digging and wiring.
- (g) Compass work for platoon commanders and platoon havildars combined with reconnaissance for a night march.

10. *Battle drill.*

Quickness in deployment is of vital importance, and to secure it it is essential that units should be trained on a definite and uniform system for shaking out into loose formations.

The special points to note here are—

- (a) Quite silent deployment.
- (b) Ground reconnaissance by mounted officers.
- (c) Ground reconnaissance by scouts.
- (d) Local protection.

How often have we been stopped by an obstacle and lost time, energy, and touch with other units, because we have not first found the way across it ?

(See the 1926 edition of *Infantry Training*, Volume I).

11. *Movement to forming-up areas prior to attack.*

The use of ground is of vital importance. If troops are located by the enemy in a forming-up area, the attack may never start.

12. *Collection and transmission of information.*

Whether about the enemy or topographical, the collection and transmission of information is all-important. When troops are held up, they must do everything in their power to locate the areas from which the enemy are firing, and the information gained must reach battalion headquarters. It is difficult to instil this in the minds of the

men, and naturally so, for they are in an unenviable position : but man is a creature of habit.

Machine guns, as enemy, firing blank, provide a useful aid to this form of training.

Since co-ordinates are seldom if ever accurate enough to be used for the building up of a fire plan, it will often be necessary for the commanding officer to visit the company commander and have the enemy's dispositions pointed out to him on the ground. A runner should be able to lead him up by the nearest and safest route.

13. *March discipline.*

Last, but not least, is march discipline (*Infantry Training*, Volume I, Chapter X). The longer and the more trying the march, the stricter must be the discipline. All men who will have to march with the battalion in war, should do so in peace. In peace one can, and one does, hide the useful cripple, but in war this is not possible, nor is he any longer useful. A man who conceals a boot bite, and does not have it treated with iodine, is little better than a malingerer. If the boot bite is caused by an ill-fitting boot, the platoon commander should be called to account. One cannot aspire to light infantry tactics with sore feet. Mounted officers should use their horses, and the men must be taught that there is a good reason for this.

Ed.—Your child's guide to knowledge is all very well, but you seem to have forgotten that there are such things as the training of the higher command. There are also boards, courts of enquiry, etc., and many other obstacles to training. How are you going to get a clear three weeks for your cadre course ?

Author.—I admit your remarks are pertinent. Finding it difficult to reply in my own words, I give some cognate quotations, culled from the writings of great soldiers :—

“ Higher commands should train on a cycle.”

“ Organize, Gentlemen, organize ; for organization is at the root of all success.”

“ Decentralization gives us time in which to think.”

“ Oh ! our Lords and Masters, we pray that some little leisure may be given us in which to think.” (A regimental officer).

“ Think, Gentlemen, think, but let me have a cut and dried plan at the end of it, and give it me in time to arrange for your requirements.” (A Brigade Commander).



THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE U. S. S. R.

BY STEPHEN BARNES.

In estimating the success or otherwise of the much advertised first "Five Year Plan" and its recent successor the second "Five Year Plan", one should first consider what exactly is the ultimate object of their author, Stalin, and what does he, in reality, wish to achieve through the medium of these 'Plans'? It is therefore submitted for the consideration of those interested in this question that this one project (the industrialisation of the U. S. S. R.) has two inter-dependent and yet distinct objects.

- (a) The first is economical; this at first glance would appear to concern the Soviet Union only, and to have as its aim the gradual revolutionization of the industrial system within the U. S. S. R., with the ultimate object of making the country independent of imports from abroad.
- (b) The second object is undoubtedly political; that is to say, there is a deliberate determination to create the maximum surplus of Soviet Goods (confined at present mostly to raw materials) for dumping abroad, and thereby to undermine the capitalistic system of foreign countries where the cost of labour is higher.

This challenge, which it undoubtedly is, must therefore be regarded as another form of Soviet intrigue, sponsored by the leaders of the KOMINTERN AND PROFINTERN. The progress made to date in the realisation of these two objects, diagnosed above, should be examined separately.

In the case of the first object, the Soviet leaders, through the 'GOSPLAN', had set out for the 'mobilised' population of the Soviet Union a definite programme of construction and production, which was to have been completed by the end of 1932. Within this period the ambition of the Stalin faction was to convert the whole of the Soviet State, including the various Autonomous Soviet Republics, into one centrally-controlled and inter-dependent industrial concern, embracing not only the production of factories, mines and forests, but also that of agriculture.

This was to be achieved, as regards agriculture, by the ruthless 'liquidation' of all private farming and the setting up in its place

of 'kolhozy' (Collective Farms) and 'sorhozy' (State Farms), now commonly referred to in the Soviet jargon as Grain and Cotton 'Factories'. Heavy industries were to be modernised by the importation of modern machinery paid for by exporting raw materials to the utmost productive capacity of the Russian masses. It cannot be denied that thanks to the fanatical enthusiasm and relentless driving power displayed by the leaders, and, in a no lesser degree, to the sacrifices imposed on the dumb and now cowed Russian masses, the first "Five Year Plan" has undoubtedly brought into being many so called 'Constructional achievements'.

On the other hand it is apparent even from the Soviet Press that the first "Five Year Plan" did not work quite as smoothly as it was hoped and this would explain the frequent references in the Bolshevik papers to 'breaches' in the Five Year Plan 'front'. We know from many independent sources that new factories recently erected have already revealed serious constructional defects. The same may be said as regards the new railways, notably the TURK-SIB, not to mention the rapid and ever increasing deterioration of all railway transport throughout the country. We have frequently heard that owing to the shortage of fuel, caused by the inability of the Soviet railways to cope with the country's transportation requirements, and to the decline in the coal output in the Donetz Basin, newly erected factories in the Ukraine cannot at present be operated to their full capacity. In spite of this, we know that the Soviet Government in its anxiety to obtain foreign currency, persists in exporting its coal from Black Sea ports—notably to Italy. Mention should also be made of the famous and recently completed hydro-electrical station at DNIEPRPETROVSK, which is reported to be working only at 20 per cent. of its full capacity, because, it is alleged, that the present requirements of the area, earmarked for supply of power from this station, fall far short of its full productive capacity. But the greatest disappointment to the Soviet authorities must surely be on their agricultural 'front'. Here we find that despite the centralised control instituted over production through the medium of 'KOLHOZ' Committees and the introduction of intensified 'tractorization' in these grain 'factories', at the end of the first "Five Year Plan" the inhabitants of the towns, with the possible exception of Moscow, were still compelled to exist on short rations and to stand in bread queues.

These failures which have been exposed at frequent intervals since 1930, would show that there must be serious defects in the central apparatus responsible for the execution, and presumably also in the technical control over the operation of the 'Plan'. To account for these 'breaches' the Communist leaders, in order to cover their own incompetence, are compelled to find scapegoats from among the non-proletariat classes. These unhappy people are arraigned at frequent intervals and with the maximum publicity before Revolutionary Tribunals in Moscow. Only recently the attention of the whole world was centred on the arrest and spectacular trial of the employees of Metropolitan Vickers, among whom were a number of British engineers, who were accused of 'sabotage' and espionage. Thanks to the strong stand taken up by the British Government on behalf of these engineers, their ultimate fate could not have caused undue anxiety to anyone conversant with the mentality and methods of the Bolsheviks. By arraigning these men on what is now generally accepted throughout the civilized world as trumped-up charges and finding them guilty, the Soviet authorities felt that they had cleared themselves in the eyes of their own people. Moreover it was soon realised that, for the sake of keeping Thornton and Macdonald prisoners for two or three years, it would prove inexpedient to have the doors of their best customers closed against them. So Thornton and Macdonald are now back in England and Soviet goods are once again entering British ports unhampered, thus enabling the Soviet Government to resume the collection of English 'valuta' in payment of these goods to finance the 'industrialization' of the Soviet Union. In the meantime negotiations for the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet Trade agreement have been resumed. Thus the Moscow trial which has served its purpose to the Stalin faction is forgotten and we are back where we were. Litvinoff must be smiling.

It is here suggested that these theatrical displays, to which Moscow is becoming more and more attracted, only go to emphasise the belief among thinking people, both in and outside the U. S. S. R., that neither the first 'Five Year Plan' nor the second, (the latter designed by Stalin to develop the light industries), have been working entirely to 'plan.'

This brings us to the second object underlying Soviet industrialisation, namely, the political, or the one which is directed against the

whole existing foreign capitalistic system. I firmly believe that as long as the present Soviet leaders remain supreme in Moscow they will continue to call upon every workman and peasant in the U. S. S. R. to strain every nerve to increase the volume of national production with which to flood the foreign markets. I interpret the true meaning of these 'Five Year Plans' as a means of harnessing one hundred and sixty million people to a chariot driven by a ruthless charioteer who calls on his team for 'Five Year' periods of special spurts. Exactly how far this team will travel during these periods along the road of intensified Soviet production would appear to be of a secondary matter, since, as suggested above I believe that the charioteer will continue to call for further 'Five Year' spurts until he feels that his object has been achieved.

In the meantime the actual producers, whose standard of living is incomparably lower than in any other European country, are compelled by the authorities to 'go without' and to surrender the fruits of their labours for consumption abroad. They are told that these sacrifices are essential and that only by increasing their output is it possible for the Soviet State to acquire the necessary 'exportable surplus' by which alone the financing of the 'Plan' can be secured. To illustrate this I need only take as my examples beet sugar and kerosine oil, both of which are produced in the U. S. S. R. and yet are hardly procurable by its inhabitants, for the simple reason that the authorities require the maximum quantity of these two commodities for dumping abroad and converting them into 'valuta', i.e., negotiable foreign currency.

The present world-wide trade depression appears to be forcing foreigners to play into the hands of the Soviet and indirectly helping the fulfilment of the 'political' object of these 'Plans'. For the past five years, or ever since the U. S. S. R. first embarked upon her programme of intensified industrial reconstruction, she has been the world's largest buyer of heavy machinery. The 'heavy' industries throughout the world have been particularly hard hit by this depression and consequently every country has been anxious to obtain a share in the provision of the technical requirements of the Soviet Government, if only to enable them by this means to reduce the number of their unemployed. This policy, if apparently justifiable, must surely bring retribution in its wake. At the moment foreign

'capitalists', though finding a temporary outlet for their wares in the U. S. S. R., are in actual fact providing that country with plant and machinery which, by Stalin's plans, will make the Soviet State not only independent of foreign imports, but will enable it to increase the volume of exports of her uneconomically priced manufactures, with the ultimate object of killing the competition of highly paid foreign labour. As far back as 1930, Soviet textiles, produced by labour, paid in worthless 'chervonetz' notes, were being dumped in Lodz, the heart of the Polish textile industry, causing a rapid rise in unemployment among the Polish operatives, who, unlike their Soviet confreres, demand a living wage. More recently we have heard that Soviet piece goods are now being dumped in increasing quantities in the Malay States, where they are successfully competing with that class of goods produced by Japanese labour. We thus see that the British piece good manufacturer, who in past years found a profitable market in Malay, is now being elbowed out from that country by the competition of Soviet and Japanese cheap labour. Nearer home, we may quote the instance of Soviet ready-made suits, dumped in Hull during 1930 and 1931 and sold in Yorkshire and elsewhere in the North of England at 15s. 9d. ! How could Bradford compete with such prices ?

In past years we have frequently heard of the Bolsheviki being referred to as a military menace ; we have also been warned of the dangers of Bolshevik propaganda. To-day, Western civilisation is threatened by what strikes me as a far greater menace, namely, Communistic Commercial Enterprise, based on sweated labour production, with which Moscow is now delivering an assault against the whole Capitalistic 'front' or system. Sweden and Finland appears to be among the first casualties, as all their important timber industries are already in a precarious condition caused by the heavy dumping of cheaply produced Soviet timber on the English market. In this connection let us examine for a moment the prices of Soviet timber, *e.g.*, 3×9 Redwood deals, the price of which particular size and quality governs the timber market. These are certainly illuminating. In 1928 the gross f. o. b. price per Standard (One Standard equals 165 cut feet) was £16-10-0 ; by 1932 the price had fallen to £8-16-6, with a stipulation that if the Pound sterling fell below the value of 10/- gold, the Soviet Government would have the option of cancelling the contract. This means that the latter were willing to accept £4-8-0

gold per Standard before they would *consider* cancelling the contract. The price prevailing immediately before the war (1910-14) was £10-0-0 per Standard f. o. b. for 3 × 9 Redwood deals! No 'Capitalistic' country where workmen are paid a living wage can withstand competition of this sort.

In conclusion, I would say that while not believing in the ability of the Soviet leaders to convert their industries into a sufficiently perfect machine to compete successfully with foreign manufacturers on level terms, they may eventually succeed seriously to disorganise, if not actually to destroy the whole of the industrial system of Western civilization. Should this be achieved, the object of the "Five Year Plan" will be deemed a success by its author, regardless of any constructional defects and 'breaches' which may have occurred on the "Five Year Plan front" within Soviet territory. Serious remedies will soon have to be taken by those countries whose industries and very economic existence is now being challenged. While the U. S. S. R., was a large buyer, concerted action against her was naturally impossible. But as already shown above, there are good reasons to suppose that the Soviet Government will shortly cease to be a buyer. All countries desirous of preserving economic stability and maintaining a reasonable standard of living among their working classes and what is still more important, to check the rise of unemployment, must try and realise their danger and be prepared to act in unison against this Communistic Commercial Enterprise. The moment the U. S. S. R., have ceased to buy from abroad the raising of tariffs against Soviet goods will be useless and only by fixing specific quotas on all Soviet raw and manufactured produce, strictly in accordance with the requirements of any particular country, will it be possible for the 'Capitalistic' world to stem and control the tide of cheaply produced Soviet goods now threatening its shores.

THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE FIGHTING SERVICES.

BY CAPTAIN J. H. C. CURRIE.

This is a question of more direct interest perhaps to Officers of the British Service than to those of the Indian Army. The excuse for bringing it before the readers of this Journal is based on two considerations; first, the importance of the role that the Indian forces *may* play should Britain become engaged in another major war; and secondly, the likelihood that India will herself be faced with the problem before long, provided she is able to maintain her present rate of progress towards Self-Government.

It is proposed to examine first the question of the number of the Services, and secondly, if the retention of three Services seems justified, to consider briefly some aspects of their present organisation and the problem of their co-ordination.

The essence of the "Two Services or Three" problem lies in the answer to the question "Is strategy two-dimensional or three-dimensional?" If two-dimensional, the Services that fight in those elements should be given charge of operations; if three-dimensional, then it would clearly be inexpedient to subordinate one of the Services to either or both of the other two. Up to the present time the element of force has been inherent in every weapon, with the exception of Propaganda, which is itself of no avail without the support of force, and in all past wars victory has been won when the enemy nation, through the direct application of force or through the knowledge that it is helplessly exposed to force, becomes unable to carry on the war. The following definition may therefore be accepted "Strategy is the art of applying force decisively to the enemy nation." Can force be applied decisively, therefore, by sea, land and air, or only in two of these elements?

Whatever may have been the case in the past, in modern war every nation will be dependent on outside resources for some essentials. By closing the arteries through which these may reach the enemy—the ultimate task of a belligerent having command of the sea—, Sea Forces exert an indirect, but none the less decisive, pressure. History has produced few clearer examples of this fact than during

the war of 1914—1918. When the Allied Armies at last overcame those of the Central Powers, the German nation was already beaten. It did not need the threat of invasion to make it sue for peace. The blockade had already broken the German *morale*. To-day the trade routes of the world lie across the seas. It will not be till they stretch across the skies, if they ever do, that the sea will become an unimportant medium for strategy. Nor is it possible to envisage a war fought solely in the air and on the sea. Nations live on land, and land is man's natural element. It must be many years before invasion and occupation of enemy territory ceases to be one the most essential methods of depriving the enemy of the will and power to fight.

Sea and land warfare, therefore, are means by which the decisive application of force to the enemy may be exercised, and strategy is at least two-dimensional. Owing to the speed and range of modern aircraft and the damage that they are capable of inflicting, the air offers the most direct medium for waging war on a nation as a whole, and there can be no question that force can be readily applied in this manner. The air's claim to be considered a separate medium for strategy, however, must depend on the degree of decisiveness of such aerial attack.

No nation can afford to maintain in peace sufficient aeroplanes to carry out a series of large scale aerial attacks on the outbreak of war, and, at the same time to preserve a margin for defence against enemy reprisals and for co-operation with the other services. Nor will the employment of such civil aircraft as are at their disposal give them the great increase of strength that at first sight might appear possible. Large passenger-carriers, for instance, because of their "un-mancœuvrability" and their greater utility as troop-carriers, and small private aeroplanes, because of their comparatively slow speed and their value as training machines, would probably not be used for aerial attacks at all. Other types in varying degree would be of greater utility, but against an enemy, who had an organised air defence system, heavy losses in them would probably be incurred. If belligerents are not unequal at the beginning of a war, many months must elapse before aeroplane construction would increase sufficiently to enable one of them to achieve predominance in the air. Until that time a nation would have to rely on those aerial forces, with which it had provided itself in peace with the addition of suitable civil machines and the gradually expanding output of its factories. Experience in the last war and the

lessons of peace time exercises show that heavy losses are to be expected if repeated attacks are made on the civilian centres of a prepared nation. It is unlikely, therefore, that a nation would risk embarking on a series of attacks against civilian centres of population until it was assured of replacements adequate for maintaining its own aerial defence, for co-operation duties with the other Services and for other duties independent of them.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of aerial attack is its inherent possibility of effecting surprise, and an attack on the outbreak of war, or even before war is declared, would combine with this advantage the attractive possibility of shattering the enemy's *morale* at one blow and thus avoiding the exhausting effects of a prolonged war under modern conditions. The dangers, however, will normally be too great to justify the adoption of such a course, and no nation is likely to give up the substance for the shadow by prejudicing his present and future aerial strength in relation to the enemy in thus embarking on an immediate attack on the civilian centres of an enemy nation—a policy hitherto untried, of doubtful result, and accompanied by the certainty of heavy losses. It may be expected that the theory of seeking a quick decision by indiscriminate air bombardment will give place to one of husbanding air resources and confining air bombardment to objects of more direct military importance.

With the small and highly efficient armies of to-day and to-morrow early decision will probably be sought on land. The necessity for retaining the maximum air support for this purpose is an additional reason for confining the air rôle initially to offensive operations against targets of military importance. Should no decision on land at first be obtained, the next attempt to force one may be expected when the nation's second line troops are ready to take the field. This will be before more than a fraction of its ultimate potential air resources can be developed. This second attempt will also require the maximum of air support, and these requirements will also have to be met by economy of air resources to that end.

So far, therefore, it does not appear that the air offers the means of applying force decisively to the enemy nation. This, however, is based on the assumption that the necessary margin of superiority will be lacking, and will probably be true for the reasons shown above. The opposing nations, however, may not be evenly matched and, if one belligerent has the necessary superiority *ab initio*, it is difficult to

see what considerations, other than those of humanity or foreign policy, would prevent him endeavouring to strike the enemy directly from the air.

If, moreover, no early decision is reached and the war is prolonged, there is no reason that the belligerents will remain equally matched in the air indefinitely. In the war of 1914-1918 first one side, then the other, obtained the ascendancy temporarily before it finally passed into the hands of the Allies. Similarly in a future war the superiority in resources of men or material will eventually give one side a definite supremacy, and, if this supremacy is used for action against the civil population, the effect is likely to be enhanced by the fact that the people will now be shaken by the losses and privations of modern war. It is possible, therefore, to take direct and decisive action against an enemy nation through the medium of the air, the necessary condition being an adequate margin of superiority. Strategy thus logically becomes three-dimensional, and it would seem that the present policy of maintaining a separate air force is logically justified.

Some other aspects of the present organisation of the Services will now be considered, and the problem of their co-ordination. The alternatives to the present organisation are either to have naval and military air wings, abolishing the R. A. F. entirely, or else to retain a proportion of the R. A. F. for independent air action and fuse the remaining portions of it with the Service with which they would normally act. It is difficult, however, not to regard either of these steps as retrograde when it is remembered that they were stages in the evolution of the R. A. F. in war. Such a reversion to the system of naval and military air forces might be expected to produce better co-operation between the Service concerned and the air, but, in view of the necessity for officers of all Services in the higher ranks being as unparochially minded as possible, it may be worth recalling the advantages of the present organisation in giving air officers experience of other Services; an advantage that would be lost to an officer who had risen through a purely naval or military air force. It is, for instance no uncommon thing to find R. A. F. officers, who, having already initially served in either the Army or Navy, have subsequently on transfer to the R. A. F. had experience with both the Fleet Air Arm and Army Co-operation Squadrons. Nor can we draw inspiration from other nations, none of which are similarly situated to ourselves. Russia's air force for instance, is a military affair, Russia's "defence" problems

being almost entirely military. There is nothing to indicate that any foreign nation's system is superior to our own for our own unique defence problems.

In the event of war questions of policy are decided in the last analysis by the Cabinet—probably in the form of a War Cabinet of not more than six members. The Cabinet acts on the advice of, or chooses between courses presented by, the chief co-ordinating body for Imperial problems, the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which the Prime Minister is the sole permanent member. As regards Service matters the C. I. D. receives advice from the three Chiefs of Staff; and for co-ordinating the views of the three Services there exists the Chiefs' of Staff Sub-Committee of the C. I. D. There is thus a definite organisation for reviewing and settling questions of Imperial Defence, presided over by the Prime Minister, and having at its disposal the considered opinion of the three Services as presented by the Chiefs' of Staff Sub-Committee, which has been aptly called a "super Chief of Staff in Committee."

The weakness lies in the fact that the Chiefs of Staff may find themselves compelled to recommend two or even three different courses to the C. I. D., the latter, or perhaps finally the Cabinet being compelled to give a decision on a problem governed by highly technical considerations, which by virtue of their training the members thereof are unfitted to weigh. The danger of a politician being swayed more by the personality of a Chief of Staff than by the soundness of his views is easily apparent, especially when it is recalled that a Service training emphasises the value of deeds rather than words, and opportunities for intercourse with the politician may arise rarely, if at all.

This danger of divided counsel and the desire to reap the advantages of unity of advice on Service matters before the Cabinet has led to a number of suggestions for an organisation to achieve this. In essence these amount either to a Ministry of Defence, or to a Combined Staff with a Chief of Combined Staff at its head.

The advantages of the former may be summarised as:—

Economy in Staffs and Establishments.

Non duplication of certain work—*e.g.*, Intelligence—common to all Services.

In General, closer co-ordination of, and co-operation between, the three Services, and,

One authority to represent all Services.

The dangers and disadvantages, however, though less apparent are none the less real. Could a man with no technical knowledge of any Service, for instance, ever be found to be an efficient Minister of Defence? Would co-ordination of, and co-operation between the Services, closer than is being developed under the present system be in effect achieved? What would be the power of the Defence Ministry? The pressure exerted on those responsible for national policy by the heads of the Army and Navy in Germany before the War is an illustration of the evils of what may event if fighting Services, filled with a spirit of aggression, are allowed to become too powerful. This is reflected at the present time in Japan, where the Army appears to have forced the hands of politicians in their dealings with China. We may also see a warning in the action of France, who has tried the experiment and abandoned it.

A Combined Staff would appear to hold out a number of advantages. Such a Staff would be formed from graduates of the Imperial Defence College, who, instead of reverting to their own branch of the Service for 15—20 years, as is the case at present, and having had no great scope to exercise that breadth of outlook developed at the College, would fill certain Staff and Command appointments in their own and the other Service as well as on the Combined Staff, and the Secretariat of the C. I. D. From the highest ranks of this *haute école* one officer would finally be chosen as Chief of the Combined Staff. There would thus be created a body of men equipped with great experience of the three Services, who would be at the disposal of their presumably most able member, to give before the C. I. D. the united opinion of the Services on matters affecting any or all of them. These advantages are obviously great but they are dependent on a number of considerations that may well contain the seeds of fatal disadvantages.

The vital point is the choice of the right Chief of the Combined Staff. Who would choose him and how? How often would he have the full confidence and support of all three Services? Would he after all be able to decide between conflicting Service views more effectively than the statesman?

Although after graduating at the Imperial Defence College no arrangement exists whereby officers are given Staff and Command appointments in their sister Services, they are very far from being immersed in matters affecting purely their own Service. There are many appointments involving co-operation with other Services, and

these officers are appointed to them. Nor does an officers' experience of the other Services necessarily commence only after passing through the I. D. C. Many officers hold such appointments at the commencement of their Staff careers. This growing inter-Service co-operation is an accomplished fact, and any officer who reaches the highest ranks in the future will have had experience of the other Services.

Much must of course depend on the character and ability of the Prime Minister, but, in dwelling on the evils of the Chiefs of Staff being unable to present a unanimous recommendation, it is apt to be forgotten that Ministers are used to making decisions between conflicting view points in matters of every degree of importance, and, where other Departments of State and may be the Dominions and Allied nations are involved, it may even assist them in reaching a comprehensive grasp of a problem to hear the views of individual Services, even if they are at variance with one another. The dangers of disagreement in the Chiefs' of Staff Sub-Committee may in fact be exaggerated.

Finally, what is the record of the present system? The C. I. D. since its inception has done an immense and invaluable work. It has had to make decisions soundly and rapidly. As an example the question of the despatch of the Shanghai Force to China came up before it at 11 a.m.; by 4 p.m. the same day the executive orders for its formation and despatch had been sent.

Nor has the work of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee been less noteworthy. In the large number of questions dealt with there has been no case of their failure to agree seriously embarrassing the C. I. D. The present system works and will work as constituted in time of war. Further it will become still more effective when the products of the I. D. C., both civil and military, begin to make their influence felt.

The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister who is directly responsible to the Crown, is the final executive in questions of national policy, and it is the Prime Minister, therefore, who can best say of what value the C. I. D. and its subsidiary organisations have been. Its successful continuance through the office of successive Prime Ministers is sufficient indication of its value. It does not seem difficult, therefore, to justify the continuation of the present system and the expectation of even greater results from it in the future.

THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW.

(The following is an extract from a private letter, written by an officer who took part in it, to his brother).

“ With General Sir Colin Campbell from the 1st to the 22nd November 1857.”

You will be anxious to hear some account of my proceedings for some time back so I will endeavour to give you a sort of summary, commencing at Cawnpore. I arrived there on the 23rd October, 13 days after leaving Calcutta. Colonel Greathead's force came in there on the 26th and I left Cawnpore with it on the 30th, being attached to H. M. 75th Regiment till I could join my own regiment. We crossed the Ganges by the bridge of boats and were in the Oude country. We encamped a few miles from Cawnpore that day. On the 31st we marched to Ingdespur and on the 1st November, Sunday, to Bunnee, 15 miles from Lucknow. On the 2nd we advanced a few miles to Maragunga and were going to pitch our camp when our advanced guard was fired upon from a village a little to the right of the road. Upon this the main body was ordered up and a party was detached to the left flank of the village while the brigade, with which I was, went off to the right. Our Artillery opened and after firing a few rounds the village was taken by assault by a party of the 93rd Highlanders and Sikhs and burnt. The enemy fled and many managed to escape by concealing themselves in the tall grass with which the country is covered at this time of the year (principally, *cholum* if you recollect what this is, like Indian corn—and large crops of sugarcane). We then proceeded on across country to several other villages, driving the rebels out of them, killing a few and burning the houses. We saw a large body of the enemy, horse and foot, in front of us on the plain, but they bolted as we came near them. We got back to camp at 2 o'clock, after rather a pleasant day. It wasn't hot and was tolerably exciting. We killed about 200 of the rebels. I passed several on the plain who had been hit by our round shot. They were horribly torn. One fellow had his leg taken off, at the knee, the bones were exposed. I never saw a more ghastly wound. Another had his head nearly taken off. They were dead enough. We encamped at Maragunga, five miles from Allum Bagh, and there we were halted till

the 12th waiting the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell. He came on the 10th bringing reinforcements which made us up to about 6,000 of all arms. He reviewed on the evening of the 11th and made a short speech to each regiment, which was received with great demonstrations of enthusiasm. He is an old looking tough wiry fellow, rather hot-tempered and as brave as a lion. On the morning of the 12th we marched to the Allum Bagh where we now are and had a skirmish on the way, but nothing to speak of. The Allum Bagh, which means the "Garden of the World," was a summer residence of the Queens of Oude. It is a huge handsome house, square with four towers, and is surrounded by a high brick wall enclosing a space of about 1,000 yards square, round the building. At each angle of the wall is a turret. When Havelock went into Lucknow to relieve the garrison he left all his baggage and carriages with a party of 600 men at the Allum Bagh and it was held by them till our arrival. When they first went there the enclosure was a beautiful orange grove with broad walks and channels of water on each side, but, when we got there, the whole space was completely bare, all the trees had been cut for firewood, the wall loop-holed and guns placed at the angles of the wall. The enemy used to fire round shot into it daily, causing much annoyance and killing some of our people. I found here a detachment of 130 of my own regiment under Captain....., about whom more anon, with a lot of young officers of ours, amongst others, Frank Dobbs, son of Major Dobbs, with whom my mother is staying. I, of course, joined our own fellows and the next day I was sent in command of a picquet to a ruined village about a mile to the right of the Allum Bagh. The Chiefs camp was pitched on the plain to our rear. Franklin of the Sikhs, Parry of my regiment and young Dobbs were on picquet with ours that day and the first and last of these, Franklin and Dobbs, were both killed two days after in Lucknow. In the afternoon the enemy came about our position and began firing at us, but I sent out some of the Sikhs supported by a few Europeans, who drove them back and they left us alone for the night. The next morning, the 14th, our whole army was in motion and, when the sun rose and the mists cleared off, I saw as fine a military spectacle as I ever saw in my life. The whole force was moving up on a road that led close past our picquet—horse, foot and artillery—their arms glancing in the sunbeams, their faces lighted with the expectancy of battle. When part of them had passed we were beginning to wonder

whether we were forgotten in the bustle of the advance, when a staff officer galloped up and told me to bring away my men and he would show me where their breakfast was ready for them. However, no breakfast did we get, nor anything at all but a sup of rum and a bit of hard biscuit on which we subsisted till late that night. Our little detachment, with a detachment of the 90th and one of the 84th have formed into a regiment for the time being, called the "Battalion of detachments" and brigaded with the 93rd Highlanders and a Sikh regiment, under Brigadier the Hon'ble Adrien Hope. We were commanded by Major Barnston of the 90th, as gallant a soldier as ever trod the earth. Well, we marched away, refusing the high road to Lucknow by which route the enemy expected us, we took a country route to the right and passed over open country the greater part of the way. The dust was stupendous and the heat great, but we met with no opposition and advanced steadily till about 12 o'clock when we crossed a huge plain and came to a park wall surrounding a large park in the centre of which, on a small hill, stands a fine country house called the Dil Khusa (Heart's Delight). The Artillery made several breaches in the wall which was of mud and we entered the park in two columns and advanced up the hill. The enemy had abandoned the house and taken up a position at some distance in a magnificent Palace called the Martiniere. It was built by a French General who lived formerly in Lucknow and, at his death, he left it as a charitable institution—a sort of orphanage. Going up the hill we put up lots of deer and hares, some of which were caught by the soldiers and proved capital grub the next day. When we got to the top of the hill the enemy's artillery opened on us. We were drawn up behind the house and were ordered to lie down while our guns went to the front and began pounding away at the enemy's. A round shot came over the house and pitched right among the Highlanders near where we were lying, carrying off one poor fellow's head and another's leg. Our guns shut up the enemy's fire and we got the order to advance again. We moved down the other side of the hill, out of the park, across a broad road and made a rush at the Martiniere, but it was empty, the rebels had bolted and we found ourselves in possession. We got a gun there that they could not carry off. I never saw anywhere a more splendid building. I shan't attempt a description. The style is Italian and the rooms are all painted and ornamented with frescoes in excellent taste. The pavement is tessellated blocks and white

marble. There is a fine stone tank in front from the centre of which rises a tall fluted pillar, very high and beautifully proportioned with a statue on the top—round the roof outside are immense statues and above the centre of the building is a sort of dome, with a staircase leading up the outside. From the top the view of the city and the country is magnificent. Well, we made ourselves at home in the place, the battalion of detachments was ordered to occupy it for the night—it was now about three in the afternoon. A wing of the building was assigned to my detachments to guard. Captain..... was on the rear guard, so I was in command of our fellows and I had just posted my sentries and found a very comfortable upstairs room for the officers to live in, when the call came to “fall in,” and away we went at a tearing pace out of the Martiniere, down the broad road that leads from it towards Lucknow about half a mile, till we came to a large grove of trees through which the road passed. There we were halted and were told we were to bivouac for the night. We felt very jolly, arms were piled and the men broken off. The camels came up with the beds and our servants and were speedily unloaded. My boy got out my things and I was just going to enjoy the unspeakable luxury of plunging my head into a basin of cold water after all the heat and fatigue of the day, when “fall in” came down the ranks again, the men stood to their arms and we were formed up in line under the trees across the road. Then little firing began on our front and the bullets began to whistle over our heads, pattering like falling rain through the trees, one or two were hit but nothing very serious. Soon after we moved off to the left out of the grove, through a breach in a wall, ascended a slope where a lot of our guns were firing tremendous salvoes, passed the guns, saw a battered building in our front some hundred yards distant, advanced a little further and then broke into a rush with a cheer and away we went at the house, when our ardour was suddenly checked by coming on the brink of a canal full of water and too deep to be crossed, on the further edge of which the house was situated. There was nothing for it but to pull up, which we did and lay down in the grass near the bank of the canal. It was now dark, and the enemy, terrified by the tremendous fire from our guns, had bolted, so we left picquets along the canal and returned to our grove of trees. Our fires were soon lighted and our servants came up with dinner and if ever I enjoyed a glass of beer and a cheeroot afterwards you may be sure, old fellow, it was that night.

The next day was Sunday and we remained all day in the tope, exposed to a straggling fire of round shot and musketry, but, as we were well covered by a bank that ran round our position, we didn't suffer much. On Monday, the 16th November, we were under arms at daylight and at about 8, after the men had their breakfast, we started off for Lucknow. Our Brigade, led the advance. We didn't take the high road, but changed to the right and crossed the canal at a place where it was dry, crossed some fields and then entered a long narrow winding lane through a large village of mud huts, which was deserted, as we came up, by the inhabitants. I must, before going on, explain that the way by which we proposed to reach the Residency where Outram and Havelock were shut in, does not lead through the city but is through a suburb where the ground is open and intersected by regular metalled roads and here and there a palace, or country residence of some native swell, or large mosque. The Residency is on the bank of the river Goomtee, which was on our right and nearly a mile off. I will try and send you a rough sketch with this which will enable you to understand our movements better. We went on through the village, nearly smothered with dust, in single file in some places and—tolerable confusion; suddenly there was a check in front, then a tremendous fire of musketry began; we moved on again and, all at once, emerged from the lane, in front of an immense building in the open on our right about 100 yards from us. It was a large square enclosure, with very high walls and turrets, a gateway in front strongly fortified and the walls loop-holed. It is called the Secunder Bagh. It was full of the enemy who saluted us with a storm of bullets. The road on which we were was rather sunk and the men were thus somewhat shattered from the fire. A big gun was ordered up from the rear of our brigade and I was told to make my men to drag it up the bank and get it into position opposite the building. The excitement was tremendous. I remember having my sword in one hand and pulling like a maniac at the drag rope of the gun with the other, the men worked willingly, the gun was out in position, and with a few rounds drove a hole through the wall, where there was a window and then, without any word of Command but with a British Cheer, we went off in a mob, Highlanders, Fusiliers and 90th mixed up anyhow, right at the place, the first up went in through the hole. As I was running up I saw the gate to our left was open and, calling to my men to follow, I made for that. Most of the fellows I

had with me were recruits—it was the first time they had been under fire and they were rather backward—so we were just too late. When I reached the gate the beggars inside were shutting it in our faces. The few men who had come up put their bayonets to it and tried to force it back and one gallant fellow put his arm in and got a slice across the fingers for his pains. They shut the gate and bolted it, but we fired at the bolt till it gave way and then threw back the gates. Inside, on each side of the entrance was a sort of open verandah, or serai as we called it, crammed with natives. The men wouldn't go in with the bayonet which would have been far the better plan, but crowded the entrance and fired into these masses of human beings, till there was on each side a loathsome seething mass of bodies, dead and dying heaped upon one another, you never saw such a sight. Inside the enclosure were several buildings and in them the carnage was awful. In one room the next morning 62 sepoys, alive and unhurt, were found concealed under the dead. They were taken out and shot. Altogether in the Secunder Bagh we killed about 2,000. They counted 1,740 bodies the next day when dragging them out and stopped counting. They had provided no way of escape for themselves and all who tried to get over the wall or through the windows were shot down by parties outside. Our own loss was considerable, several officers were killed, amongst others, poor Franklin of the Sikhs and Captain Dalzell of the 93rd Highlanders from Dumfries, and a number were wounded. Two of my men were killed and several wounded. After this we advanced on the main road that leads to the Residency, leaving a force to occupy the Secunder Bagh. The next *piece de resistance* was the Kudum Russool, a mosque on a hillock to the right of the road. The artillery nearly knocked it to pieces and then it was taken and occupied by the Sikhs, who are as fine brave soldiers as ever lived. We advanced again, all the time under a heavy fire of round shot shell, occasionally grape and always musketry, from the trees and huts in the vicinity, till we came near the Shah Nujeeb, a very strong mosque surrounded by a loop-holed wall. It lies low to the right of the main road and was hid from one's view by a small mud village and some low jungle. From this post and from a building called the "32nd Mess House," (because it was used as such by the officers of H. M. 32nd before the rebellion) some distances to our left front, the enemy kept up a tremendous fire; they also had a cross fire on us from a battery on the other

side of the river which makes a bend from the Secunder Bagh and flows nearly under the walls of the Shah Nujeef. We were ordered to get under cover and the big guns of the Naval Brigade, under Captain Peel of the Shannon, came up and for several hours the fight was kept up by the Artillery. We were a great deal exposed all the time however and lost many men. Major Branston was struck on the hip by a piece of a shell and fell off his horse into my arms and, giving me an order, he was taken to the rear and I hope he will recover, though his wound is a very bad one.

The command of the battalion now devolved upon Captain..... of my regiment, but I am sorry to say he wouldn't take it and allowed a junior, unfortunately for me three months my senior, to assume it. Captain..... is a regular hen and behaved so badly that an enquiry is now going on about his conduct and I hope he will be obliged to leave. He regularly funked and showed it too, most unmistakably. About two in the afternoon the Chief and his staff came up and I was ordered out to the right front with some of our men to skirmish and try to keep down the enemy's fire from the mud village. We got under a low bank, not a foot high, lying close to the grass and the men began firing, but we could produce little impression. We were exposed to a tremendous fire and many were hit. One poor fellow next to me was shot through the lungs and rolled in the sand at my feet groaning and gasping and declaring he was quite dead. I took off his belts and gave him some rum and water, which revived him so much that I thought he might live and with some difficulty got him sent to the rear, but he died soon after. After a while the 93rd Highlanders led by Brigadier Hope, came up on our right and went on through the village, which the enemy had now abandoned as we had set fire to the thatch roof of the houses. They got under cover of the mud walls and fired at the Shah Nujeef. I then took on my men a little to the left, crossed a road leading up the Shah Nujeef and got among some grass huts and a few trees. On crossing the road, which we did by a regular bolt, the fire was something indescribable. The bullets were falling like hail and it seemed wonderful that any of us escaped. It was now getting dusk when the Chief, seeing he couldn't get his men into the place, ordered up one of the big guns of the Naval Brigade to breach the wall; accordingly a huge 24 pounder was dragged up by the blue jackets and a party of the Fusiliers and opened about 30 yards from the walls. You can imagine the crash

each shot made at that distance. The uproar now was at its height—the shouts of the enemy and assailants—the rattle of the musketry and roar of the big guns—the groans and cries too of the wounded and dying as the shades of evening were deepening rapidly into night, the whole scene I shall not readily forget. I was standing with a knot of our men and Parry and Dobbs, beside a tree trying, all of us, to get a little cover from it from the enemy's fire, when I heard a bullet strike close beside me and poor Dobbs called out "Oh..... my leg is broken." He fell and I turned and lifted him up, tied up his wounds with my handkerchief, and assisted by a sergeant, carried him out of the fire behind a mud wall. Poor boy, the ball had entered his right thigh, passed quite through shattering the bone and lodged in the left. I was, of course, obliged to leave him and return to the men and I never saw him again alive. He was taken in a dooly to the Field Hospital and died that night. He was a fine high spirited boy and behaved most gallantly all the day. After the big gun had fired some rounds a breach was made in the wall, but it was then found there was an inner wall and no way in after passing the first, for the second was not breached. It was dark, many men had fallen and the order was given to limber up and take away the gun, preparatory to our retiring. The dead and the wounded were hastily collected and taken to the rear and we were going to retreat when some of the Highlanders, who had got close up to the wall, found they could scramble up the breach on to the top of the building. Up they went, the enemy bolted and at last the Shah Nujeef was ours. I can't tell you the feeling of satisfaction after expecting to retreat, to find we had succeeded. The Highlanders occupied the place and I gathered up my few scattered sheep amounting to about 40 and took them back to the place we started from. You may be sure we slept sound that night after the hardest day's work we had. Next day we were lying down near the Secunder Bagh all the evening, the round shots flying about in all directions, while the Artillery in front were pounding away at the 32nd Mess House. It is a very strong position—an old palace square with a deep dry ditch of masonry round it and a door in each side with a drawbridge. About one o'clock the Officer Commanding the detachment came to me and told me to take 50 men for a fatigue party to the Chief who would give me orders. Away I went and when I got up to Sir Colin he ordered me to form up my men and then, to my surprise, made us a little speech. He said

he wanted us for a service of difficulty, but it must be done quickly and *nicely* and if well done, he said he would recommend the Officer Commanding (that was me) for the Victoria Cross. Here was a chance. The service was to carry planks and materials for a bridge across the ditch at the 32nd Mess House. To make a long story short, we were all ready, planks on our shoulders and all expectancy. The covering party advanced in front of us, got into the garden, surrounding the building, saw no one, advanced and found the place empty! the enemy had bolted according to custom and my chance for the Cross was gone. From there the advanced party made a dash across the road at a large place called the Mooti Mahal and took it, killing some of the enemy. This building was next to the Residency, the way was now open and in another house Sir James Outram and old Havelock with some of their staff, came out and met the Chief in the garden of the 32nd Mess House.

Next day the 2nd Brigade had some hard fighting and took what had been the Hospital and Barracks, but I know nothing about their proceedings. We went into the Mooti Mahal and were quartered there from Wednesday till Sunday night. I went into the Residency several times and was overjoyed to meet our fellows again and find so many of them well and jolly. The Mooti Mahal is a fine place, especially the zenana, the walls of which were adorned with magnificent mirrors, all the furniture was English mostly and in the garden were roses and jessamine in full bloom. The river flows under its walls and the view from the zenana up the river towards the Residency is extremely beautiful. The Residency buildings comprise the Residency proper, a large square house where Sir H. Lawrence lived, a Palace called the Ferad Bux, a little lower down the river, and a number of small houses all of which were occupied and enclosed in a circle of rough fortifications by our people. We remained in the Mooti Mahal (*i.e.*, our Brigade did) till Sunday, the 22nd. During those days the sick and the wounded, the women and children, were passed out of the Residency and sent under escort to the Dil Khusha where the Field Hospital was established. All the ammunition too and stores that could be carried away were loaded on camels and carts and despatched, and every preparation made for abandoning the place. All this was done under a heavy fire from the enemy and our casualties were numerous. To decline them they established two heavy batteries outside of the Mooti Mahal and commenced breaching the King's palace walls. On Sunday

morning the rebels who occupied the Observatory, a bungalow outside the compound of the 32nd Mess House, gave considerable annoyance to our people serving a mortar Battery in the compound, and I was ordered up with a party of 20 of our men to see what was going on and give assistance, if necessary. On getting into the Battery I found preparations being made for storming the Observatory, and soon after I got there a party of 20 men from the 84th and 40th Sikhs got over the compound wall and made a dash at the bungalow, which was only about 60 yards distant. The Europeans attacked on one side and the Sikhs from the other. The enemy kept up a heavy fire as they crossed the open and the officer leading the 84th was shot through the heart and his men got into confusion, but the Sikhs got in by the rear and the rebels then bolted into one of the rooms and fastened the door, and tried to escape through the window. This they were prevented from doing by some of the Sikhs who shot several as they came out. The Sikh bugler began sounding the advance and making signals to us for assistance, so I bolted over with my men and got into the house. I found it full of smoke, several dead natives lying about, the Sikhs in tremendous excitement firing wildly in all directions and at the door into the room where the fellows were barricaded inside. I got our men together and Parlett, the Sikh Officer, and I made a rush at the door and kicked it open, but our men didn't follow and the door was brought to again. Our men then began firing like maniacs at the door and as the English bullets went through the planks like paste board, they hit a lot of the natives inside and at last we forced the door and got in, and slew about 40 sepoys who were inside. The Sikhs then, according to custom robbed them of anything worth taking and set fire to their clothes. In a short time the house was full of smoke and smell of sepoy and as the fire reached their pouches they blew up one after another and you may fancy under what peaceful circumstances I passed that Sunday. I had the dead bodies thrown out of the window, indeed I had to take a hand at it myself to get the men to work at it. It was ghastly work and some of the young recruits turned quite sick over it. We barricaded the windows and put the place into as decent a state of defence as possible. About three in the afternoon the vagabonds had the cheek to come up and attack us, with an idea that they could retake the house. As they came close under the windows we had very good shooting at them and I had the satisfaction of knocking over a couple of them with one of our rifles. We held the post all that

day and at 12 o'clock at night the whole force retired from Lucknow. The retreat was uncommonly well conducted and the enemy were so completely deceived that they didn't know till the forenoon of next day that we had gone. Long before this we bivouacked at the Martiniere and Dil Khusha and from there on the 26th we returned to the Allum Bagh. They did not attempt to follow us. Sir Colin had accomplished what he proposed, had relieved the garrison in Lucknow and was impatient to return to Cawnpore where he arrived, as you will have heard long ago, just in time to save that place and defeat the Gwalior rebels.

CAMP ALLUM BAGH.

9th December 1857.

THE WAR GAME

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. McM. MILLING, M.C., *p.s.c.*

In Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923, it is laid down that War Games should not be used for minor tactics; that such instruction can only be adequately given on the ground or on a Sand Model. It is proposed to offer herein a method of using the War Game for the teaching of minor tactics, should any hardworked Commanding Officer be interested and able in these busy days to find time and inclination for such method of tactical study or instruction.

For the further benefit of those inexperienced in the running of a War Game and its many complications, and to whom a few additional guides to those already given in Training and Manœuvre Regulations may be of use, it is proposed to outline to a certain extent the organization and conduct of a War Game where the study of a situation embodies minor tactics only.

II.

Whilst referring always to Training and Manœuvre Regulations, it is suggested that the War Game should be clearly divided into four distinct periods:—

- (a) The opening Narratives—that is, the General Narrative for each side.
- (b) The Appreciations, preliminary Orders, and Instructions (or plans only) of both Commanders.
- (c) The period of gaining contact, requiring the normal scale (1"=1 Mile) map, and
- (d) The period of contact, requiring a map of considerably larger scale.

As regards (a) and (b), Training and Manœuvre Regulations are abundantly explanatory and nothing further need be said on the subject.

As regards (c), one would remark that problems of Time and Space, Administrative details, minor tactical situations affecting the Commanders and Leaders only, and such like, may here be usefully considered. This period may, however, be jumped, and that right up to the point where the forward troops begin to leave the smaller scale map in (c) and to come on to the larger scale map as in (d). This, it is hoped, will make itself clear as one proceeds.

As regards (d), this is the battle zone and one has to be very careful that the area of this map shall cover the course of events which are to comprise the coming battle. Here there is little difficulty, for the selection of the scene of action, and its extent, on the small scale map varies in no way from the procedure which must be followed in producing a fight on the ground itself. For, whereas in the latter one is given, or selects, the battle area *on the ground* and then fits the Exercise to it, so in the former one merely selects the battle area *on the map* and fits the Exercise in like manner.

III.

Having then fixed the battle area on the small scale map, about a square inch or so, the next thing is to produce it in the larger scale. This is easy if the 6" to 1 Mile Map is available. If it is not, and it is desired to practice commanders under local conditions, then an enlargement is definitely necessary. But for the evolutions of scouts or the smaller units, even the scale of 6" to 1 Mile is somewhat small and may usefully be increased. It follows, therefore, that an enlargement must practically always be made, and it is recommended that this be not less than twelve inches to the mile.

It should be noted that, in making the enlargement the main point is that all such features, contours, and details as appear in the small scale map must be similarly reproduced in the enlargement. These in themselves will not be sufficient. Should the enlargement be made from a 6"—1 Mile Map much extra detail will thus already be there, but, even so, still more will probably be required. The point, however, is that this extra detail need in no way represent the true nature of the countryside as it exists, and can, therefore, be purely imaginative. For, in actual Exercises on the ground the small scale Map in use can only be indicative, and nothing else, save what is obtained from æroplane photos, previous personal knowledge, etc., will be known till the ground itself is actually reached. So, in like manner, in War Game Exercises nothing else will be known till the larger scale map is reached; so that, whether these extra details be fact or *fiction*, they can have no bearing on the Game before this period is reached. All such extra detail must, however, appear with the greatest accuracy on all maps—a highly important point.

It must be realized too, that the putting in of this imaginary extra detail needs no great labour, nor tax on either the ingenuity or imagination, whilst it is further suggested from a comfort and convenient

point of view that the map should be enlarged in breadth to that of about one or a couple of ordinary barrack room tables, in any case, not greater than the area of the tables to be used in the War Game.

IV.

It is recommended that the War Game shall be run under one of the following three conditions ;

- (a) where the commander of either side fights his own battle entirely, and knows nothing of his opponent's dispositions or plans, other than he is able to deduce from the General Narrative issued to him, and the subsequent course of events and information received during the Game, or,
- (b) where the action of one of the Commanders, though normally carrying out his moves in accordance with the situation given him, is mainly regulated by the Directing Staff, or,
- (c) where one side is in the nature of a Skeleton force ; and its action is indicated to the other side purely by narrative and fire indication.

V.

The guiding principle of the layout of the room in which the War Game is to be played is that as the situation begins to cause deployment, so each Unit or Sub-Unit Commander (Section commander in the case of a Platoon Exercise ; Platoon Commanders in the case of a Company Exercise) must have his own or part of his own enlarged map and compartment, and thus become isolated from his Commander and the other Sub-Unit Commanders, in much the same way that he would in an exercise on the ground.

To accomplish this there should be, for a Company, five separate rooms or compartments, with an enlarged map in each. But in actual fact three are found to suffice—one for the Company Commander, and two for the four Platoon Commanders as their various Platoons become deployed.


One would like to explain here that in the case of (a) and (b) Para. VI, the control of both sides, working on the isolation principle, is found to be very complicated, and it is recommended that one Commander be allowed to run his battle entirely himself (his Sub-Unit Commanders merely being present with him) on one single enlarged map. Thus only one room or compartment is required for him, and another for the Directing Staff, making a total of five in all.

From a point of control, too, compartments as against rooms are recommended, so that they can be closer together. The chances of connected information being overheard are very small, and should in any case be eliminated quite easily by a call on the sense of fair play. A large sized room, gymnasium, or drill hall is therefore required, the compartments being formed by means of screens, or blankets slung on ropes, etc.

In laying out the compartments it is recommended that the one for the Directing Staff be in the centre, the three for the one force and the one for the other force being situated on either side. From the point of view of spectators, there is no need for more screening than is absolutely necessary to produce the desired isolation. In each compartment there will be a table, with a copy of the enlarged map pinned to it, form and chairs. A clock (designed on a blackboard with moveable hands) must be displayed where all can see it, in order to denote times of moves.

This latter is simpler than the written up details of timing, dates, etc., for the larger War Games, *vide* Training and Manœuvre Regulations.

As regards the moves and representation of the situations of Units, coloured pins can be utilized. It is recommended in the action of a Company, say, that though sections should be represented, only Platoon Commanders should move them—this again from point of control and complication. A more realistic method of depicting the units is as follows. The pieces can be cut out of thin sheet brass or tin, and coloured with enamel in any pioneers' shop. A small metal stump should be welded to each to facilitate movement. The following diagrams of pieces are drawn to suggested dimensions :—



Red (blue) to represent Sections deployed.

Red (blue) to represent Sections in File.

Red (blue) to represent Lewis Guns.

Red (blue) to represent Section M. Gs.

Green to represent hostile Rifle Fire.

Green to represent hostile automatic Fire

Commanders, Company Headquarters and transport can be represented by different coloured flags or pins. Red and blue casualty screens ditto.

This completes the paraphernalia.

VI.

For an Inter-Company Game it is suggested that the Directing Staff consists of :—

- (a) The Director.
- (b) Two Assistant Directors.
- (c) Two Chief Umpires.
- (d) Three or four Umpires.

The duties of the Director are as in any ordinary Exercises. Those of the two Assistant Directors (more or less confined to the Directing Staff Room or Compartment), are to control the moves of the opposing forces, as recorded for them on their enlarged map at the end of each clock hour period by the umpires, in conjunction with the Narrative of events as given to them by the Chief Umpires. They will adjudge whether the moves were possible, setting back the situation of the pieces where necessary and indicating to the Chief Umpires the new situation and details of fire effect. They will decide the various clock movements.

The duties of the Chief Umpires are (a) to keep the various Unit Commanders aware of the situation, assisted if need be by their Umpires, and (b) to keep the Assistant Directors aware of the situation.

The duties of the Umpires are to record on the Directing Staff Map the completed moves at the end of each clock hour period; to regulate on Commanders Maps such alteration of situation as decided by Directing Staff, and to assist the Chief Umpires wherever so required by them.

VII.

To explain more easily the suggested sequence of events in the action of the War Game itself, the outline of an actual Game as carried out last Training Season is taken. The Commander of either side was issued with a General Narrative, and asked to produce his Appreciation and plan.

One side represented a party of raiders about 100 strong led by a modern Outlaw, the force adequately impeded by the booty problem,

and ignorant of the immediate presence of the other side, which was an Infantry Company with a platoon of Machine Guns in the process of carrying out a "flag march."

As a result of the plans adopted by the two Commanders certain adjustments to the situation became (as will practically always be the case) necessary to get the fight staged. The raider was therefore given some indirect information about the Company of Infantry, and asked to give his complete dispositions as he considered they would be when the intended raid was completed and his convoy of booty was just clearing a given map reference, and to state the hour. These dispositions being considered practicable were agreed to.

The purpose of the Exercise being that the Company should be the attackers, the conditions (in view of the Company Commanders' Plan, not given here) as they now stood reversed matters. It became necessary, therefore, still further to adjust the situation, and a second Narrative had in consequence to be prepared for the Company Commander whereby he was suitably, and without digressing from tactical possibility, delayed and so prevented from getting, as he had very correctly planned, right astride the obvious alley way of withdrawal for the raiders, and the only one which could be got on to the enlarged map.

VIII.

The War Game opened with the two Commanders and their respective sub-unit commanders and leaders in the compartment allotted to each Commander. The Commander of the raiders was asked to set his pieces as previously decided by him, as at 06-30 hours. The Company Commander was given the second Narrative and asked to give his orders and dispositions resulting from it, and place his pieces also as at 06-30 hours. Seeing too, that, had he been on the ground itself, he would have been able to view the scene of action and actually been able to carry out a reconnaissance of the ground, he was permitted to use the enlarged map.

As a result of these two dispositions, both sides claimed possession of a certain highly important Hill. But as the raider Commander claimed to have been in possession by 05-45 hours, whereas, owing to his unforeseen delays, the Company Commander felt that he could not have got his two forward Platoons moving beyond the edge of some maize fields half a mile short of it before 06-15 hours, it was ruled that possession of the hill was to the raiders.

It will be seen that here the Game opened at the point of contact, and the Directing Staff were forced, even at the opening situation, to order a re-disposition of pieces. This may or may not occur as the case may be. It just depends on the setting of the exercise. But exactly where the point of contact occurs, so long as it occurs on the enlarged map, is in itself quite immaterial. The 06-30 hours situation as adjudicated by the Directing Staff was, therefore, transferred to the two Commanders' Maps, their pieces being readjusted where necessary, such enemy visibility or fire effect indicated on both maps by means of the opposite coloured, or green fire indication pieces, and the latest situation report given to them.

IX.

Nos. 9 and 10 Platoons of the Infantry Company being, in accordance with the 06-30 hours situation, now deployed, their respective Commanders were transferred to the two other compartments, where their pieces were set for them by the Umpires in accordance with the 06-30 hours situation. The clock was put on by a quarter of an hour, and they were instructed to place their sections as they considered they would be at that hour. These moves were then translated on to the Directing Staff Map, as were also any variations in the dispositions made by the two main Commanders, such explanation of moves being explained by the Chief Umpires, and the Assistant Directors then made their decision as in the previous situation.

It should be noted here that the Commander of the Raiders was allowed one compartment and one enlarged map, and, though he had all his platoon Commanders with him, actually carried out all moves of his pieces himself. In this case, too, it was found possible to give him a free hand. This, for lack of space, is as far, it is thought, as it should be necessary to go. The succeeding procedure is on exactly similar lines, the same, in fact, as in any normal War Game. Actually here the fight was carried up to point where the raiders, after a severe engagement, just got back across the frontier after considerable casualties with a loss of half their mules and booty.

The following further points, however, are suggested for guidance :—

1. No Commander or Leader must be allowed to speak to the other, or another, once they have become, and so long as they remain, isolated—that is out of speaking or shouting distance in the Field.

2. All communication must be as in the Field, and all messages must pass through a Chief Umpire or Umpire delegated for that duty. Nor should the messages be delivered to the addressee until such time as it is adjudged they could have been delivered—signal, runner, etc.—and considering, too, the fire situation.

3. Everything that a Commander or Leader could see of the battle must be depicted on his map by the Umpires, *i.e.*, where, say, advancing on a broad front two platoons are deployed, then each Platoon Commander's Map will have placed on it, in addition to his own pieces, those of the other Platoon (if he should be able to see them) of rear Platoons if needs be, the location of Company Headquarters, and enemy fire indications.

4. The Company Commander should be permitted to visit his Platoon Commanders' tables and watch from the rear any of their movements, but must not be allowed to converse unless claiming to be with that Platoon Commander and so permitted by an Umpire.

5. Red and blue casualty screens may be employed and regulated in the same manner as on the ground if so desired.

6. It often saves time and facilitates matters generally if the Directing Staff can indicate to Chief Umpires the general regulation of the next clock hour situation. It means that these latter can control much of the moves of pieces at the time, rather than waiting for only such readjustments as the Directing Staff may order later. In so doing umpiring can be usefully practiced and taught, being carried out in exactly the same manner as it is in the Field.

X.

As one has already tried to make it clear, there is nothing new in the so-called Junior War Game itself, only, in the disposition given here, a rather different manner of using it. Its purpose is merely a further move in the direction of elevating the military mentality of the junior commanders. Minor tactics are dependent entirely on the understanding of major tactics. The Commander or Leader, to be able to apply his minor tactics in the field, must have a working knowledge of major tactics. His instruction is normally confined to lectures, T. E. W. T.'s and demonstrations on models. The former usually wraps his brain more closely than ever in padded felt, the latter demands a gift of imagination which as often as not is entirely

lacking. The map, however, is a hard and fast fact, and generally fairly well understood by even the most junior leaders ; the advantage of its use in the War Game over a T. E. W. T. is that it pins the individual to a definite decision which he cannot talk round, moreover, it is an excellent lead to expertness in map reading.

The days of brute courage are gone. Under circumstances of modern war brute force must give way to science. Drill, the stand by of the Napoleonic era, is no longer an element of the battlefield. Modern weapons, and the manner of fighting they demand, call for deployment—the isolation of the individual, where brute courage alone must fail. This view point has already been considerably thrashed out. To-day it is initiative combined with courage that one must have, the individual who can think for himself, the commander who can command with knowledge.

To this end the manner of using the War Game demonstrated here is, in the writer's opinion, of considerable value. Its potentialities are enormous.

It was first used to test out the fighting and administrative organization of a Local Mobile Column which had been in existence for some years. The result was that the Scheme had to be completely scrapped and a new and purposeful one evolved. It can be used equally well for all the fighting branches of the service, including the mechanised arms, and particularly in the Drill Hall of the Territorial Units.

It provides a valuable means of studying ground tactics under cover, where inclement weather so prevalent in England, or the excessive heat of the tropics, precludes work out of doors ; of teaching the purposeful study of the map ; and of map reading in general. It is one of the best methods the writer knows of for teaching the art of umpiring. It is further, in his humble opinion, a far more exacting and reliable method of testing tactical and administrative knowledge and ability in the individual than any T. E. W. T., and can be most usefully so applied.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

A MATRIMONIAL TANGLE.

SIR,

Reference the case of P. B. Rifleman vs. Queen of the Battlefields and R. Arty Llery.

The account given by Auspex * of this case was not quite complete, as further evidence was adduced. I give here a summary of the judgment in that case. Most of the salient facts are touched on, and it may interest your readers.

“ The plaintiff’s case rested partly on the plea of incompatibility of temperament ; the plaintiff however also alleged undue intimacy, amounting to misconduct, between the respondent and R. Arty Llery, the co-respondent. He further pleaded that the co-respondent had exerted undue influence over the respondent to such an extent that his domestic life had been ruined. His particular grievance was the respondent’s craze for a fire plan which, he alleged, she had acquired from Mr. A. Llery when he had accompanied the plaintiff and his wife on a business tour to France some 19 years ago. He stated that he had to have a fire in summer when he did not want one, and that in winter the foundations of this fire were so carefully laid—and discussed at such length—that he derived no benefit from it until too late ; that, where a small fire quickly lit would have warmed him in the first place, he frequently found that even a furnace was insufficient to warm his frozen body when at long last it started to function. He had frequently begged her to be content with less preparation and to reserve her efforts for suitable occasions. The evidence supports the plaintiff’s plea.

The respondent brought a counter charge of misconduct with Miss Louisa Gun (a cousin of the respondent). This counter claim is not upheld by the evidence and it is quite clearly proved that though Miss L. Gun did undoubtedly frequent the house, it was only for the purpose of lighting small fires quickly while the respondent and Mr. Arty Llery were discussing the question of a bonfire in the Drawing Room. So far from the plaintiff falling in love with Miss L. Gun it

* A Matrimonial Tangle, published in the U. S. I. Journal for July 1933.

was proved that he had frequently stated that she was not as good as she ought to be, that she was troublesome and heavy and that she should be improved.

The respondent further pleaded that, during the visit to France mentioned above, she and Mr. Arty Llery were entirely responsible for the support of the plaintiff who was himself entirely without visible means of support. The plaintiff in the main acknowledges this, but pleads that it was due to his bad education, and maintains that now he is in a much better position. He also states that nowadays his business frequently takes him into mountainous country where the respondent's extravagance in the use of powder demand a scale of paraphernalia and transport which it is unreasonable to expect him to supply.

On all the above points judgment goes to the plaintiff. His temporary inability to support himself is now a thing of the past, while the respondent appears bent on continuing her liaison with the co-respondent.

The respondent however produces a further charge of undue familiarity between the plaintiff and a younger sister of Miss L. Gun. She cannot however give her name or produce her in Court. The plaintiff denies this. I know that he has stated that, if this person is in any way as attractive as has been stated, he would elope with her to-morrow. But this cannot be held to prove a past or present intimacy, and again on this point judgment goes to the plaintiff."

A decree nisi was pronounced.

I have, etc.,

"LEX."

MILITARY NOTES.

FRANCE.

Direction des Fabrications d'Armement.

By a decree dated 29th April, 1933, a new directorate has been created which will be responsible for the manufacture of all armaments, munitions and war material both in peace and war, and for the preparation and speeding up of industrial mobilization.

It revives in peace an organization which will fulfil, on a small scale, the rôle of the Ministry of Armament in the Great War.

It will include various technical organizations formerly under the artillery and other directorates.

According to reports General H. A. M. Saltet de Sablet d'Estières, *Inspecteur Permanent des Fabrications de l'Artillerie*, has been appointed *Directeur des Fabrications d'Armement*.

The services allotted to the new directorate will provisionally continue to be operated either by personnel belonging to, but seconded from, the artillery, or by officers of other arms having the necessary qualifications and similarly seconded.

No increase in expenditure will be involved.

Appointments.

General J. C. Duchéne, member of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*, has been appointed *Inspecteur Général Adjoint* of National Air Defence.

Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.

The following two representatives of the army of the air have now been introduced into the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* as advisory members on the same footing as the representatives of the navy :—

The Inspector-General for the Army of the Air.

The Chief of the Staff of the Army of the Air.

When the council is called upon to give an opinion on questions affecting the army of the air, the above mentioned officers will be allowed a vote.

Conseil Supérieur de l'Air.

The following new members are introduced into the *Conseil Supérieur de l'Air* in an advisory capacity :—

- (a) The Inspector-General of National Air Defence.
- (b) Two representatives of the army :
 - (i) The Inspector-General of the Army.
 - (ii) The Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
- (c) Two representatives of the Navy :
 - (i) The Chief of the Navy Staff.
 - (ii) A member of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Marine* (appointed by the Minister of Marine).
- (d) A representative of the Colonial Ministry :
The General Officer Director of Military Services.

When the council is called upon to give opinions on questions affecting the national air defence, the army, the navy or the colonies, the representative members will be allowed a vote in the council.

As a result of the above two measures, the liaison between the army and the army of the air will be considerably strengthened.

Re-organization of the Air Arm.

A decree dated 1st April completely reorganized the French Air Force and laid down new general principles for its employment and organization. It is now to be known as the Army of the Air (*L'armée de l'air*), and is brought much more into line with the army as regards command, training and territorial organization.

In place of Air Forces strictly specialized for particular duties, the Army of the Air is to be organized, trained and inspected with the object of rendering it capable of taking part in air operations, in combined operations with the Army and Navy, and in territorial air defence.

Note.—The units of the Fleet Air Arm and shore based Naval co-operation units are definitely exempted from this decree, only the fighters and torpedo bomber squadrons of the hitherto autonomous Naval Air Force are included.

Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.

Général de Division J. C. Duchéne, Member of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*, will be retained on the active list for one year till 17th March 1934, and is placed *hors cadre*.

Appointments to commands.

(a) *French West Africa.*

Général de Division A. T. Thiry has been appointed G. O. C. Troops, French West Africa, *vice* General Freydenberg, tour expired.

(b) *19th Army Corps, Algeria.*

Général de Division A. P. C. A. Nogués, has been appointed G. O. C. 19th Army Corps, Algeria, *vice* General Georges, recently appointed to be a member of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*.

Appointment of military attachés.

Colonel Mendras, Professor in Artillery at the *Ecole Supérieur de Guerre*, has been appointed Military Attaché, Moscow, and Major Simon, formerly Head of the Russian Section of *Deuxième Bureau*, has been appointed Assistant Military Attaché, Moscow.

Bounties, Foreign Legion.

By a Decree, dated 7th April, the bounties awarded to soldiers of the Foreign Legion have been amended—considerably to the detriment of the soldier.

Whereas previously a man serving on a normal 5-year engagement received a sum of 1,000 francs on enlistment plus an additional 400 francs, he now only receives 600 and 400 francs, respectively.

For non-commissioned officers and men re-engaging up to 10 years, a sum of 300 francs is now payable for each year's service, instead of sums of 800 francs for senior non-commissioned officers and 600 francs for corporals and private soldiers.

Fusion of Civil Air Lines.

A Decree, dated 1st June, provides for the formation of a new company from 1st September 1933, to operate French Air Lines under semi-State control.

The main result of this re-organization will be a great saving to the Government in subsidies, which in 1932 reached a total of 204 million francs. The subsidy to the new company is to be 150 million francs in 1934, and will be progressively reduced, until in 1937 and subsequent years it will stand at 135 millions.

The company is under contract to the Government to maintain a fixed number of services on twenty-one given lines, any long and

unnecessary stoppage entailing cancellation of the agreement. There will be services of varying frequency to the great majority of European capitals and important towns, as well as to those of North Africa. In addition, two long-distance weekly services are worthy of note :—

- (a) Marseilles—Beirut—Baghdad—Saigon.
- (b) Casablanca—Dakar—Natal (Brazil)—Rio de Janeiro—Montevideo—Buenos Aires—Santiago.

The Atlantic crossing from Dakar to Natal is at present carried out by boat, but it is hoped to institute a trans-Atlantic air service in the future.

Rhone Development Scheme.

A general constituent meeting of the *Compagnie Internationale du Rhône* was held at Lyons on 27th May in the presence of M. Herriot. About a quarter of the total authorized capital of 240 million francs has now been paid up and work is to begin shortly on the scheme, which will be carried out by stages as follows :—

- (i) The construction of a hydro-electric power station capable of developing 350,000 kilowatts and supplying Paris and Marseilles as well as the surrounding country and the P. L. M. railway.
- (ii) The irrigation of a large area in Provence and Languedoc.
- (iii) The development of the Rhône with Swiss assistance, in order to enable ocean-going steamers to reach the Lake of Geneva.
- (iv) The development of Lyons as a first class industrial port.

Paris—Marseilles—Algiers Service.

The new marine railway station at Marseilles was opened on 15th June. This enables a saving of five hours to be effected on the journey from Paris to Algiers. The *Compagnie Transatlantique* are constructing three new ships for this route, and improvements are to be carried out in the port of Algiers which will include three new moles and the extension of the outer breakwater.

ALGERIA.

Oujda Nemours Railway.

The first section of this railway from Zoudjel Beghal to Sidi-bou-Djenane, will, it is hoped, be completed and opened to traffic towards

the end of 1933. Depots are being built at the latter place for the ore from the Moroccan mines, and transport from there to Nemours will be effected by motor lorries until the whole line is completed.

Telephone service between Algiers and Paris.

On 11th March the first direct telephone call was put through between Algiers and Paris on the new service which is to be open to the public shortly.

Coast defence.

During the discussion in the Chamber on the marine budget for 1933, attention was drawn to the fact that the guns removed from the Algerian coast defences during the Great War and transported to France, had never been replaced. In consequence these defences were totally inadequate.

BELGIUM.

Modification of the uniform of the Chasseurs Ardennais.

In future the collar patch of this regiment will be dark green instead of red as in the remainder of the infantry, and will carry a boar's head. The non-commissioned officers and men will wear a beret (*bonnet Basque*) instead of the ordinary infantry head-dress.

Re-organization of Army Committees.

A Royal Decree has just been published re-organizing the Higher Committee and the committee of the various arms, and constituting in addition similar committees for the Air Force, for the *Corps des Transports* and for the various services of the army (intendance, medical, veterinary). The composition of the committees will be decided by the Minister of National Defence, and they will meet whenever he considers it advisable. The primary duty of the committees of the various arms and services is to pronounce on the general fitness of officers for promotion to major, lieutenant-colonel and colonel. The Higher Committee has the same duty up to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in respect of appointment to the command of divisions and corps. At the same time, any other question may be submitted to the opinion of these committees at the discretion of the Minister of National Defence.

New Territorial command.

By a decree dated 7th April, 1933, a fourth territorial command has been created. It will comprise the provinces of Luxembourg and Namur—hitherto part of the third territorial command. Its commander will be directly under the Minister of National Defence and his functions will include the special study of the defence of his provinces and of the fortified position of Namur.

The troops for the new command will include only the Fortress Regiment of Namur and the 10th Regiment of the Line (*Chasseurs Ardennais*). No field artillery will be allotted to it.

Lieutenant-General Verhavert, commanding 2nd Cavalry Division at Namur, has been selected for the new command. He was originally in the artillery.

GERMANY.

Scheme for national physical training.

At a Federal Cabinet Meeting on 3rd April, it was decided to transfer the control of the scheme for national physical training (*Jugendertüchtigung*) to the Federal Ministry of Labour, which already controls the Voluntary Labour Camps, with which the youth movement is closely connected. Since its inception last year, the movement has been under a National Board of Control, which has proved in practice too unwieldy for its task, and the real organizing work has been done by a small energetic executive committee. This committee has some 12 branch headquarters distributed throughout Germany and East Prussia, through which it controls the 16 to 18 training camps which already exist.

There is already a tendency to devote some of the camps to some special form of Wehrsport (Defence Sport). A camp near the Kiel Canal is devoted to nautical training, another near Berlin is to follow suit, while a third is apparently to specialise in mounted Wehrsport for the benefit of the various Reit und Fahr Vereine (riding and driving clubs).

By the end of March four complete courses of three weeks' duration had been held and during April a course was specially held for university students.

Having carefully studied the experience at their disposal, the new chairman and committee do not propose to make any major alteration to their programme. Their object is to provide assistant instructors in Wehrsport for the associations and clubs, and they are satisfied that a period of three weeks is just long enough to demonstrate how instruction in Wehrsport should be given, provided the candidates are sufficiently adept themselves. There have been very few failures at the passing-out examination at the conclusion of courses to obtain certificates qualifying the holders to act as assistant instructors.

The scope of the examination, which is divided into three parts is as follows :—

1. Physical exercises.

- (a) 100 metres (time limit 15 seconds).
- (b) Long jump (distance 4 metres).
- (c) Club throwing (distance 30 metres).
- (d) Putting the shot weighing 16 lb. (distance 9 metres).
- (e) 3,000 metres (time limit 14 minutes).
- (f) Swimming 300 metres (no time limit).

2. Small calibre rifle shooting.

Firing 3 practices at 50 metres range over open sights without any aids.

3. Field sport.

- (a) Marching 15 miles carrying a pack weighing $27\frac{1}{2}$ lb. in $5\frac{1}{2}$ hours.
- (b) Tests of eyesight.
- (c) Map reading and compass tests.
- (d) Transmitting verbal messages.
- (e) Making a written report on a site for a post.
- (f) Judging distance.
- (g) Describing and appreciating a piece of ground for an advance or withdrawal.
- (h) Camouflage.
- (i) Use of ground.

The candidate is also judged on his bearing and conduct during the test.

The activities at the camps include "Wehrsport" (defence sport) and Geländeübungen (field exercises).

Under the term "defence sport" are included—

- (a) Drill and physical training.
- (b) Field exercises and pack marches. (Standard pack march of 16 miles carrying over 50 lb. equipment).
- (c) Judging distance.
- (d) Miniature rifle shooting.
- (e) Map reading and compass marches.
- (f) Tactical appreciation of ground and the use of glasses.
- (g) Sand table instruction in tactics.
- (h) Messages and reports.

Under the term "Field Exercises" are included—

- (a) Scouting.
- (b) Attack.
- (c) Defence.
- (d) Withdrawal.
- (e) Pursuit.
- (f) Surprise and ambushes.

New German field uniform.

The *Reichswehrministerium* have announced the introduction of a new German field service uniform. (A photograph of the new German uniform appeared in the "Daily Mail" of 22nd June). It is announced that the new type of jacket will be introduced as soon as the stocks of the old uniform have been exhausted.

Experiments have been carried out for some time and commanders of all units concerned have been unanimous in preferring the British type of jacket to any other. The new tunic, which is made of a material similar to gabardine, is much looser in cut than the one at present in use and is designed to give as much freedom as possible. The collar of the jacket will normally be turned up and will be worn with a kind of stock which buttons on at the back. It can also be worn open. The tunic has a slit at the back and is provided with breast and side patch pockets. The latter have been introduced in order to permit of the men carrying extra ammunition, message pads, &c. For walking out and on

ceremonial occasions, the present walking-out tunic and cloth trousers will be retained without any alterations. The present type of marching boot will be improved by introducing lacing at the instep and by providing adjustable straps. In this way it is hoped to eliminate the friction on the heels. A ribbed stockinette shirt will be issued for wear with the new type uniform, which will be worn on manœuvres this autumn.

TURKEY.

National Defence Budget, 1933-34.

The National Defence Budget for 1933-34 is made up as follows :—

			£T.
Army	32,373,640
Aviation	943,000
Navy	3,775,560
Military factories	2,955,800
Cartographical section		..	603,505
			<hr/>
Total	..		40,651,505
			<hr/>

To this total should be added a sum of £T. 9,835,242 included in the Public Debt Vote for the redemption of bonds in respect of military supplies.

The total expenditure allowed for in the National Defence Budget shows an increase of £T. 427,240 over that of the previous year.

ROUMANIA.

Civil Mobilization.

A law has recently been passed in Roumania dealing with civil mobilization in time of war which, according to the public decree, " has as its object the making use of the whole of the forces and resources of

the country to ensure national defence.” The following is a summary of its more important provisions :—

- (a) All inhabitants of the country liable to military service become part of the armed forces. Inhabitants who are not liable to military service and who have reached the age of 18 years are liable in time of war to be called up for employment on some service connected with national defence.
- (b) Any property belonging to the inhabitants of the country may be requisitioned, and industrial establishments may be obliged to carry out any work required in connection with national defence.
- (c) Public services, establishments, concessions, &c., belonging to the State or to private persons which are required to work in the interests of national defence, shall be organized in accordance with appropriate mobilization regulations, and the provision of cadres of personnel necessary for working in time of war shall be carried out in peace time.
- (d) Each Ministry shall prepare a mobilization plan and an officer of the General Staff shall be attached to each Ministry to ensure the co-ordination of its work with the requirements of the Ministry of War.
- (e) Every year each Minister shall draw up a report dealing with the preparation for war of his Department and shall forward it to the Superior Council of National Defence. The latter will then draw up a general report regarding the national preparations for war, for submission by the Prime Minister to the King.
- (f) The administrative and economic organization of the country for war shall be carried out within each Army Corps District by Army Corps Headquarters, assisted by the local prefects and mayors, special offices being established in peace time in each district and municipality to carry out all preparatory work in connection with civil mobilization.
- (g) The passing of the nation from a state of peace to a state of war shall be ordered by Royal Decree.

Proposed Danube Bridge.

For some time past intermittent discussions have taken place between the Governments of Roumania and Yugoslavia regarding the proposal to build a bridge across the River Danube, linking the railway systems of the two countries. From a statement recently made by the Yugoslav Ministry of Communications it would appear that this project has now been definitely approved. It is proposed to build the new bridge at a spot about 30 miles below Turnu Severin, and a new railway line will be constructed to connect it with the existing Roumanian railway system. The cost of construction is estimated at about 500 million lei, which is to be shared between the two countries concerned.

SPAIN.

Co-ordination of air services.

By a decree issued on 6th April, 1933, the Spanish Government authorized the formation of a Directorate-General of Aviation.

Hitherto, the air services of Spain have been branches of the navy and army, respectively, each having its own air arm purely for co-operational purposes, there being no apparent intention of employing aircraft in an independent rôle. The present decree legislates for—

- (i) An independent air force (for bombardment purposes).
- (ii) A defence aviation branch.
- (iii) An army co-operation branch.
- (iv) A naval co-operation branch.

The decree not only authorizes the formation of a Directorate-General of Aviation which is to be responsible for civil as well as military aviation, but also sanctions the creation of a "Higher Air Council" whose functions, however, are not defined. This body is apparently quite distinct from the Directorate-General of Aviation, and although the Director-General of Aviation is to be one of the members, the chiefs of staff of both the army and the navy, as well as three political officials, are also members of this air council.

In the matter of command it is of interest to note that the air forces are to be under a military or naval officer to be known as the "Chief of Air Forces". This officer is to have direct and full command of all branches of the air forces except that, for purposes of operations

and discipline, the army and navy branches are to come under the military or naval command to which they are affiliated.

Formation of Train Corps.

A Decree of 25th March provides for the gradual organization of a Train Corps in the army. It will be responsible for the road transport of troops, animals and material, also for supply and evacuation and all other transport requirements which the different units and services cannot carry out with the means at their disposal. Transport duties will, therefore, in future be carried out by oneservice, instead of being divided as hitherto among the intendance, medical and other services; all purely transport units and elements now with the latter will be withdrawn, and they will be confined to their technical functions.

A Directorate of the Train Corps will be formed at the War Ministry under a lieutenant-colonel of the artillery or engineers, to study and develop principles governing the technical preparation of officers, the upkeep, repair and types of material, and management of schools and parks. There will also be an Inspectorate attached to the Under-Secretariat, responsible for regulating the duties, training and recruiting of the corps.

The smallest unit of the Train Corps will be the section—two, three or more of which will form a company. Sections will be entirely mechanized, horse drawn or pack, while companies may be homogeneous or mixed.

Each division and each island command will have a mixed company of the Train Corps; the cavalry division will have a M.T. Company and the two Circumscriptions of Morocco a Mixed Train Group each.

In peace, train units will in principle come under the orders of the G.O.C. the formation to which they are attached, but the companies in Spain itself will be formed for command and administration into three groups with headquarters at Madrid, Saragossa and Valladolid, respectively. Peace establishments will be limited to those necessary for training and garrison duties, since in war the material will be almost entirely requisitioned.

Then necessary officers will be got from volunteers and supernumeraries from other corps.

MOROCCO.

SPANISH ZONE.

Autumn Manœuvres.

Manœuvres will be carried out in Morocco during September, in which it is estimated that some 23,000 men will take part.

High Commissioner's visit to Madrid.

Senor Moles, High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco, has arrived in Madrid in order to lay certain schemes before the Government dealing with road construction, irrigation works, and grants to Spanish farmers in the zone.

ITALY.

The Military Budget, 1933-34.

The estimates for expenditure on the armed forces in 1933-34, as compared with those of the preceding year, are as follows :—

..				1932-33.	1933-34.
				million lire.	million lire.
Army	2,961	2,621
Navy	1,539	1,359
Air Force		754	696
Total				5,254	4,676

It will be seen that the reductions made are relatively greatest in the army and smallest in the air force. The total of 4,676 million lire represents approximately 22 per cent. of the whole national budget.

Progress in mechanization.

The Minister of War stated recently that all heavy and medium artillery batteries in the Army have now been mechanized, and that mechanization had also been applied to certain regiments of field artillery. A cavalry regiment has, as an experimental measure, been equipped with the new "Carri Armati Veloci," which are light two-man armoured machine-gun carriers.

Commemoration of Italy's entry into the war.

In connection with this year's celebration of the anniversary of Italy's entry into the Great War, Signor Mussolini has himself written an article for publication in the Press, dealing with Italy's contribution to the victory of the Allies. The article is largely composed of extracts from a book by General Alberti, in which the author has collected a vast number of quotations from foreign sources, testifying to the valour of the Italian troops and to the importance of the operations on the Italian front. The evidence cited is taken for the most part from despatches, books and other writings by prominent German, Austrian and French military leaders.

YUGOSLAVIA.

Compulsory Physical Training.

A new law compelling all young people in Yugoslavia up to the age of 20 to take part in compulsory courses of physical training has been passed by both Houses of Parliament and has been signed by the King. Unless specially exempted, every boy and girl in the country must belong to a gymnastic association and attend the courses in physical instruction in the State schools or attend special courses arranged by the municipalities. Anyone who refuses to obey the instructions and to practise regularly the exercises prescribed, will be liable to fine or imprisonment. Parents who dissuade or prevent their children from practising physical culture are also liable to severe punishment.

The Army Budget.

The total Army Budget for 1933-34 amounts to 1,715 million dinars as compared with the previous year's total of 1,828 million dinars. Nearly half the apparent decrease of 113 million dinars is accounted for by a reduction in supply items which has been made possible by the fall in the prices of rations and forage.

The strength of the army for 1933-34, excluding the Frontier Guard, is shown in the budget as:—

Officers	8,150
Permanent Non-commissioned Officers	9,501
Corporals	} Conscripts	..	{ 7,000
Privates			
Students at Military Schools	3,783
Grand total	111,434

U.S.A.

The Civilian Conservation Corps.

One of the items in President Roosevelt's plan for dealing with the unemployed is the enrolment of 275,000 men between the ages of 18 and 25 in a special corps called the "Civilian Conservation Corps" for work in the national parks and forests. Orders for the formation of this corps were issued on 5th April when the President directed that 275,000 men were to be at work in 1,300 forest camps by 1st July.

The actual selection of the men for enrolment is carried out by the Labour Department, but all other work connected with the scheme has been handed over to the War Department. The newly enrolled men are taken over by the Army, medically examined and placed in army camps or barracks where they undergo physical training to make them fit for work, and are subjected to discipline under the charge of army officers. The Department of Agriculture decides where the men are to work, but the forest camp sites are elected by the Army, and the camps established by advance parties under army officers. After the camps have been established, parties of men are sent from the conditioning camps to start work.

As the centre of unemployment is in Ohio and most of the forestry work is in the Western States, a transport problem of considerable magnitude is involved.

It is estimated that 5,000 officers will be required for work in the various camps, and others will be required for supply work and hospitals. As many regular officers as possible are being employed on the scheme, and in order to make a large number available, all army courses are being concluded a month earlier and large numbers of instructors on duty with the National Guard and Organized Reserves are being recalled. In addition 320 Naval and Marine Corps officers and 169 naval surgeons have been allotted for duty under the War Department, and 1,200 Reserve Corps officers are being called to active duty. The latter are expected to derive special benefit from this opportunity to command men, an opportunity which the reserve corps officer does not usually get owing to the lack of enlisted reserves.

As the President has ordered the men to be at work by 1st July, enrolment and preliminary training has had to be carried out at high speed. Up to 5th June 217,000 men had been enrolled in the corps and men were coming in at an average daily rate of 9,000.

Facilities for recreation are being provided for the men. Applications for enrolment have far exceeded the numbers that can be taken.

REVIEWS.

Official History of Australia in the War of 1914—18.

Volume IV. The A. I. F. in France 1917. By C. E. W. BEAN.
(Angus & Robertson, Ltd., Sydney, 1933), 21s.

This volume deals with the part, an important part too, taken by the A. I. F. in the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line, the British efforts to carry it in 1917, and the battles of MESSINES and THIRD YPRES.

How the I and II Anzac Corps had emerged from the chrysalis stage and became highly efficient and trained instruments of war is amply shown in this volume, and proved by German records, with which the book is amply provided in appropriate places.

The account of the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line is of particular interest in showing how difficult it is, even with the most vigilant reconnaissance, to prevent the orderly withdrawal of a well-organised modern army. It is interesting to speculate what effect a modern armoured force would have on such a withdrawal, especially in view of the almost complete failure of the first "massed" attack with tanks which took place after touch with the Hindenburg line had been gained. The tactics used and initiative shown by all ranks of the A. F. I. in following up the withdrawal might well be studied by those who are striving to train their men to become efficient "light" infantry. The great value of initiative amongst junior officers, non-commissioned officers and men is specially noticeable, but this quality appears to be more an instinct of our dominion soldiers, than due to the effect of training. The bold spirit, so often decried as lack of discipline, which made so many Australian soldiers push on in search of adventure beyond their objectives, is the same which made them hang on with such remarkable tenacity to positions they had won. It is amply borne out by the vivid account of the costly attacks on the Hindenburg line at BULLECOURT.

The lesson to be learnt is that, far from such spirit being decried, it should be encouraged, but should be tempered with understanding discipline. The ideal soldier will emerge.

The well-earned rest after the BULLECOURT operations was amply justified by the amazing increase in efficiency, discipline and

morale of the men. The friendly rivalry between units and formations in the A. I. F. engendered by this rest, and the belated recognition by higher authorities that their fighting efficiency would be greatly enhanced if the two Anzac Corps were to enter battle side by side, were largely responsible for the tremendous enthusiasm with which they fought in the battles of MESSINES and THIRD YPRES.

The tactics of these two battles are well brought out. The value of the limited objective in this type of warfare, coupled with the necessity for effective support by artillery at every stage, stands out. The over-optimism of the higher command after the initial successes is held to be responsible for the comparative failure and costliness of the final attacks of each battle, which were undertaken with more hurried and less complete preparations. In spite of enormous casualties, the Anzac Corps felt that they were given a chance, and came out of each action in great spirits and with unimpaired morale. After the 1st PASSCHENDAELE battle, they were moved to a quiet front, and except for the normal trench warfare, were not employed again in 1917.

A very able summary of allied action in 1917 closes the volume. The author's comments on the strategy and tactics of the Flanders battles should do much to allow those, who remember only the casualty lists, to view them in their proper perspective.

The difficulties of the higher command and the policy and strategy of the Allies in 1917 are well set out at appropriate places in the book; the methods employed to achieve tactical success are well explained. In addition, the author deals in great detail with the actions of units and individuals in each battle. For these reasons, the book should be of interest to every student of war, but will be of particular interest to individual officers and men who fought with or near the A. I. F. in France. Prospective readers should not be daunted by the length of the book,—967 pages!

It would have been of advantage if one general map had been inserted at the end of the book, in order to allow the reader to fit the numerous small sketch-maps, which illustrate the descriptions of the various actions, into the general picture.

NOTE.—Vol. III was reviewed in the October 1929 number of the Journal.

D. D. G.

**"The 4th Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment (D. C. O.)
in the Great War." BY W. S. THATCHER,**

(University Press, Cambridge, 1932.)

Regimental histories can be divided roughly into two classes; those read by the regiments concerned as a duty and those read by the Service as a pleasure. The former are too common, the latter too rare. Belonging to this latter category are, among a few others, the histories of the Guards battalions and, recently, an excellent record of the now disbanded Madras Pioneers.

The 129th Baluchis are therefore to be congratulated on their historian, Mr. Thatcher (Lieut. W. S. Thatcher, M.C., 129th Baluchis) who joined the battalion as a 2nd Lieutenant, A. I. R. O., at the beginning of the war and served with it to the end. He is now, we believe, a Don at Cambridge and looks back upon his war service as "the great adventure of his life." Consequently he brings to his task of historian all the enthusiasm for the battalion and men whom he fought with and loved, and all the understanding, personal touch and experience to clothe the dry bones of official records. All through this record of winter fighting in Flanders and bush warfare in East Africa there is a silver thread running of the affection that existed between officers and men, which is both an inspiration and example.

The work done by the Indian Divisions in Flanders in 1914-15 is apt to be decried by historians and others who have not the imagination to realise how magnificent were their achievements, in appalling conditions, against the flower of the German Army. From October 1914 until September 1915, the 129th Baluchis were in and out of the trenches in the Ypres sector, suffering casualties for which there were no replacements, being shelled and gassed without being able to reply in kind, and in an environment for which they were not clothed, equipped or trained. It is an honourable story which almost hurts to read. At Hollebeke, Sepoy Khudadad Khan won the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Indian soldier. In the muddle of the 2nd Battle of Ypres the regiment gave an excellent account of itself despite the German gas and confusion of orders so lightly glossed over in the *Official History*.

After refitting in Egypt the regiment reached East Africa in March 1916 and remained there fighting Von Lettow-Vorbeck's elusive columns until January 1918. The author served with the 129th during most of this period and gives an account of the work, fighting and general operations as interesting as it is instructive. For any student of this campaign or type of warfare the book is invaluable. Disease, hardship and poor rations exacted a greater toll than enemy bullets but the actions at Kibata, Mbindia Nameki and Mwiti Water serve to show the continuance of the fighting spirit. A sad ceremony occurred on 3rd December 1917 when the 129th were inspected at Namakongwa by General Hannington who had gone with them as 2nd in Command to France. Only 250 men were on parade, of which a mere 11 were Flanders veterans.

It is an inspiring record of which any regiment should be proud and the 129th Baluchis will be the first to admit the help and strength they received in the form of drafts and reinforcements from its sister battalions, all of whom now form the 10th Baluch Regiment.

The volume is replete with admirable maps and appendices, not the least deserving of notice being a note on the "Composition of the Regiment" by Lieut.-Colonel H. V. Lewis, D.S.O., M.C. Those interested in the problem of martial and non-martial classes of trans-border soldiers and such like controversial subjects will herein find something to their taste. Finally the following extract of a report by the German Commander, Von Lettow-Vorbeck deserves notice: ".....the 129th Baluchis.....were without a doubt very good." We congratulate Mr. Thatcher on one of the most readable and documented regimental histories published since the war.—ED.

GRANT AND LEE. A Study in Personality and Generalship.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER.

(*Fyre und Spottiswoode*, 10s. 6d. net.)

General Fuller tells us in his preface that his book "is not primarily a history of the American Civil War." "In place," he says, "it is an analysis of two personalities, in which the outline of the war as set forth is no more than the background" This background,

however, stands out in some relief, so much so in fact that the book was originally recommended in Army Orders to those preparing to study the American Civil War, when that Campaign was still in the promotion examination syllabus.

After an introductory chapter in which a comparison is made between the Federals and Confederates, their Presidents, their Problems, their Armies, etc. ; General Fuller proceeds to examine the personalities of Grant and Lee. This he does mainly by means of quoting what has been written about the two Generals in various books. It is a thorough analysis and full references are given, though it must be said that this mass of quotations becomes a trifle wearisome. Then an outline of the War comprising three chapters brings us to the final chapter, in which the qualities of Grant and Lee are compared. Those who have read General Fuller's book "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" will not be surprised to learn that Grant comes well out of the comparison. Possibly the author treats Lee somewhat harshly though we know what to expect when we are told in the early pages of the book that, as a result of studying the American Civil War, General Fuller has discovered that Lee, whom he previously regarded as "one of the greatest Generals this world has ever seen," was "in several respects one of the most incapable Generals-in-Chief in history." But those who disagree either wholly or in part with the author's conclusions must admit that amongst Lee's characteristics were those, such as his weakness with his subordinates and his subservience towards the President, which one would hardly look for in a great general.

This "Study in Personality and Generalship" is a well arranged book with plenty of sketch-maps. It cannot fail to interest the student of military history, but the book will not be confined by any means, one believes, to that class of reader alone.

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
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
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
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
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
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